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The quest for sustainable growth has been the most intriguing topic in the 
world for economists and policy makers since Adam Smith’s An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations was published in 
1776. Measured by today’s living standards, all countries in the world 
were poor at the beginning of the 18th century. Their economies were pre-
dominately based on agriculture. Growth of gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita had lingered at around 0.05 percent a year for millennia. Only 
after the onset of the Industrial Revolution did per capita income growth 
in the now advanced countries accelerate, jumping to around 1 percent a 
year in the 19th century and doubling to about 2 percent in the 20th cen-
tury. This was an unimaginable change. While it took about 1,400 years 
for world income to double before the 18th century, the same process took 
only about 70 years in the 19th century and only 35 years in the 20th cen-
tury for the now advanced countries (Maddison 1995). Nevertheless, the 
acceleration of growth was largely limited to the United Kingdom, where 
the Industrial Revolution began, a few western European economies, and 
Britain’s “offshoots”: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
States (Maddison 1982). The result was a great divergence in income 
 levels as the ratio of the top few to the majority bottom-income countries 
increased from 8.7 in 1870 to 38 by 1960 (Pritchett 1997). 
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After World War II, most countries in the developing world gained 
economic and political independence and started their postwar or post-
independence reconstruction. By the end of the 20th century, a small set of 
developing countries was able to achieve prolonged high growth, catching 
up with or signifi cantly narrowing their gap with the advanced indus-
trial economies. Japan, in 1950 a developing country with a per capita 
income one-fi fth of the United States, reached 63 percent of U.S. income 
by 1970 and became the world’s second-largest economy. Japan’s rise was 
the result of an impressive annual growth performance of 9.6 percent dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s, driven by the transformation from an agrarian 
to an industrial economy and continuous upgrading in key manufacturing 
sectors. Using an outward-oriented, market-friendly development strat-
egy, the Asian Tigers—Hong Kong SAR, China; the Republic of Korea; 
 Singapore; and Taiwan, China—grew in excess of 7 percent annually 
between the early 1960s and the early 1990s, demonstrating that it is 
possible to maintain impressive growth rates and to close the gap with 
advanced economies. More recently, growth in several large economies, 
such as China,  Brazil, and India, has taken off, turning them into new 
global growth poles (World Bank 2011). These high growth rates have 
led to a signifi cant reduction in poverty. Between 1981 and 2005, the 
percentage of people living below US$1.25 a day was halved, falling from 
52 percent to 26 percent. This drop in poverty was nowhere as apparent 
as in my home country, China. In 1981 a staggering 84 percent of Chinese 
lived in poverty. By 2005 this proportion had fallen to 16 percent—well 
below the average for the developing world.
Although the occurrence of high, sustained growth further diversifi ed 
in the 21th century to some Sub-Saharan African and Latin American 
countries, such growth still remains the exception rather than the rule. 
Most developing countries suffered from prolonged uninterrupted spells of 
anemic growth (Reddy and Minoui 2009). Between 1960 and 2009, only 
about one third of low-income countries reached at least middle-income 
status. Despite the rising weight of middle-income countries in supporting 
global growth, many of them have been stuck in the “middle-income trap.” 
Of the countries that were independent and had middle-income status in 
1960, almost three-fourths remained middle-income or had regressed to 
low-income by 2009. The ones that made it to high-income status are 
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countries in Western Europe, Japan, the Asian Tigers, and two island econ-
omies in Latin America (Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago). If we can 
learn from the failed development attempts by most developing countries 
and especially the few successes, explore the nature and determinants of 
economic growth, and provide policy makers with the tools to unleash 
their country’s growth potential, poverty could become within a generation 
or two a memory of the past. 
Sustained economic growth cannot happen without structural changes 
(Kuznets 1966). All countries that remain poor have failed to achieve 
structural transformation, that is, they have been unable to diversify away 
from agriculture and the production of traditional goods into manufactur-
ing and other modern activities. In Sub-Saharan Africa, which constitutes 
the core of the development challenge today, agriculture continues to play 
a dominant role, accounting for 63 percent of the labor force. Its share of 
manufacturing in 2005 was lower than in 1965 (Lin 2011). Recent empiri-
cal work confi rms that the bulk of the difference in growth between Asia 
and developing countries in Latin America and Africa can be explained 
by the contribution of structural change to overall labor productivity 
(McMillan and Rodrik 2011).
Development economics fi rst became an independent subdiscipline of 
modern economics after World War II. Various schools of fi rst-generation 
development economists in fact emphasized the importance of structural 
change and saw structural differences as a result of market failures. Not 
surprisingly, they proposed to use government interventions to facilitate 
structural change through import substitution and gave priority to mod-
ern advanced industries. It was a period when new protective devices such 
as quantitative restrictions on imports and exchange controls to manage 
the balance of payments were fi rst used on a large scale by most coun-
tries. Using Keynesianism as the main intellectual foundation for their 
analyses, early development economists advocated a “dirigiste dogma” 
(Lal 1983), positing as the central tenant of their theories that develop-
ing countries were irremediably different from industrial countries. Most 
developing countries and multilateral development institutions followed 
these policy recommendations. From Latin America to Europe, Asia, and 
Africa, results were disappointing, and the gap with the industrialized 
countries widened.
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The failure of the government interventions inspired by the fi rst-wave 
development thinking generated a new wave, which highlighted govern-
ment failures and adopted an astructural approach toward economic 
development that emphasized the essential function of markets in allocat-
ing resources and providing incentives for economic development, ignored 
the structural differences among countries at different levels of develop-
ment in their policy recommendations, and expected the structural change 
to happen spontaneously in a country’s development process.
Keynesian macroeconomics was also challenged by the emergence of 
stagfl ation in the 1970s, the Latin American debt crisis, and the collapse 
of the socialist planning system in the 1980s. The rational expectations 
theory became the dominant intellectual framework for development and 
helped refute the structuralist theoretical foundation for the state’s role in 
using fi scal, monetary, and trade policy for economic  development. The 
new development thinking emphasized getting the price right,  creating a 
stable market environment, strengthening the institutions necessary for 
markets to function well (property rights, good governance, business 
environment, and the like), and building human capital (education and 
health) to supply the increasingly skilled labor required by advances in 
technology. 
Multilateral institutions and development agencies were the main advo-
cates for this wave of thinking and infl uenced economic policies in devel-
oping countries through their programs. They based much of their policy 
advice and conditionality on stabilization and structural adjustment pro-
grams that refl ected the new dominant paradigm and promoted economic 
liberalization, privatization, and the implementation of rigorous stabiliza-
tion programs. The results of these policies for growth and employment 
generation were at best controversial. 
Something strange and unexpected happened in the recent history of 
economic development: it was observed that developing countries that 
succeeded during the second half of the 20th century did not follow the 
dominant development thinking or the policy prescriptions of the fi rst and 
second wave. That puzzling fact convinced researchers to revisit some of 
the big assumptions underlying theories of economic development.
As pointed out, countries that have led the world growth since the Indus-
trial Revolution and developing countries that have successfully converged 
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with developed countries all experienced profound structural changes in the 
composition of employment and the relative contribution of primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary sectors to aggregate growth. Drawing lessons from the 
intellectual advances, controversies, and disappointments of development 
economics, a third wave of development thinking, advanced by a small 
group of economists such as Dani Rodrik, Ricardo Hausmann, Andres 
Velasco, Philippe Aghion, Michael Spence, Ann Harrison, Célestin Monga, 
myself, and a few others is well under way. It aims at bringing structural 
change back to the core of development studies, and it emphasizes the 
important roles for the market and the state in the process of promoting 
economic development. These economists all agree that the market should 
be the basic mechanism for resource allocation, but that government must 
play an active role in coordinating investments for industrial upgrading 
and diversifi cation and in compensating for externalities generated by fi rst 
movers in the dynamic growth process. 
The “New Structural Economics” presented in this book is an attempt 
to set out this third wave of development thinking. Taking into account the 
lessons learned from the growth successes and failures of the last decades, 
it advances a neoclassical approach to study the determinants and dynam-
ics of economic structure. It postulates that the economic structure of an 
economy is endogenous to its factor endowment structure and that sus-
tained economic development is driven by changes in factor endowments 
and continuous technological innovation. 
The factor endowments in a country are given at any specifi c time and 
changeable over time. A country’s comparative advantages and thus its 
optimal industrial structure are determined by its factor endowments. 
Upgrading the industrial structure in a given country requires the upgrad-
ing of the factor endowment structure from one that is relatively abundant 
in labor and natural resources to one that is relatively abundant in capital, 
the introduction of new technologies, and the corresponding improvement 
in infrastructure to facilitate economic operations. The new structural 
 economics argues that the best way to upgrade a country’s endowment 
structure is to develop its industries at any specifi c time according to the 
comparative advantages determined by its given endowment structure 
at that time. The economy will be most competitive, the economic sur-
plus will be the largest, and the capital accumulation and the upgrading 
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of factor endowment structure will be the fastest possible. For the pri-
vate enterprises in a country to enter industries according to the country’s 
comparative advantages, relative factor prices must fully refl ect the rela-
tive abundance of those factors, and those prices can be determined only 
through competition in a well-functioning market. Therefore, the market 
should be the basic institution of the economy. 
For the introduction of new technologies, developing countries can turn 
their backwardness into an advantage by borrowing or adapting technolo-
gies that have already matured in richer economies. In contrast, advanced 
economies must produce at the global technology frontier and have to 
invest continuously in new R&D to achieve technological innovation. 
Hence developing countries have the potential to achieve a rate of techno-
logical innovation several times higher than that of advanced countries. 
Upgrading the industrial structure as well as the corresponding improve-
ment in infrastructure, however, entails coordination of investments and 
compensation for externalities generated by fi rst movers that cannot be 
internalized by private enterprises. Without this coordination and com-
pensation, the process of economic development will slow. The govern-
ment should therefore play an active role in facilitating structural change 
through mitigating the coordination and externality problem. 
Chapter I reviews the evolution of development thinking and presents 
the main arguments and extensions of New Structural Economics. This 
chapter also includes insightful comments on the framework from my col-
leagues Anne Krueger, Dani Rodrik, and Joseph Stiglitz and my rejoinder 
to their comments. 
Chapter II shows how the New Structural Economics complements pre-
vious thinking on development and growth. It compares the predictions 
derived from the New Structural Economics with the stylized facts of suc-
cessful countries identifi ed by the Growth Report issued in 2008 by the 
Commission on Growth and Development and discusses the policy lessons 
that can be drawn from the New Structural Economics. The principle of 
comparative advantage and the role of the state in facilitating structural 
transformation, which are key aspects of the framework, are further dis-
cussed in a subsequent debate between Ha-Joon Chang and myself.
The Growth Identifi cation and Facilitation Framework (GIFF), which 
lays out a step-by-step approach for policy makers to facilitate structural 
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change based on the framework of the New Structural Economics, is 
 presented in chapter III. It guides policy makers on how to identify new 
industries consistent with a country’s latent comparative advantage. It 
also presents information, coordination, and externality issues intrinsic 
to industrial upgrading and discusses government policies that can help 
overcome these constraints. Explaining why industrial policy has often 
failed in the past, the chapter also warns against government policies that 
are aimed at protecting selected fi rms and industries that defy a coun-
try’s  comparative  advantage. Dirk Willem te Velde, Suresh Tendulkar, 
Alice Amsen, K. Y. Amoako, Howard Pack, and Wonhyuk Lim provide 
thought-provoking comments on the approach. The chapter concludes 
with a rejoinder. 
Chapter IV illustrates how to apply the GIFF in developing countries. 
Using the example of Nigeria, the chapter identifi es appropriate compara-
tor countries and selects a wide range of industries in which Nigeria may 
have latent comparative advantage as the comparator countries may be 
losing theirs. The chapter argues that these industries, which include food 
processing, light manufacturing, suitcases, shoes, car parts, and petro-
chemicals, may lend themselves to targeted interventions of the govern-
ment. The paper also discusses binding constraints to growth in each of 
these industries’ value chains as well as mechanisms through which gov-
ernance-related issues in the implementation of industrial policy could be 
addressed. 
Chapter V focuses on the question of fi nancial structure and devel-
opment. Financial structure varies signifi cantly across countries and, 
within a country, at different levels of development. The chapter argues 
that the optimal fi nancial structure in an economy is endogenous to 
real demand for fi nancial services based on industrial structure, which 
in turn hinges on a country’s comparative advantages. Historically, the 
fi nancial literature has argued that fi nancial depth rather than fi nan-
cial structure matters for economic development. This chapter pro-
vides an overview of theoretical and empirical advances that support 
the notion that fi nancial structure is important for economic develop-
ment and endogenous to its industrial structure. It also discusses the 
circumstances under which the actual fi nancial structure deviates from 
its optimal structure.
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The New Structural Economics argues that countries that pursue a 
 comparative-advantage-following development strategy perform better 
than other countries. In chapter VI, the book presents empirical evidence to 
support this notion. It shows that countries that follow their comparative 
advantage have higher growth, lower economic volatility, and less inequal-
ity. It argues that the failure of most developing countries to converge with 
advanced economies can be explained largely by their governments’ inap-
propriate development strategies. In the past, governments placed prior-
ity on the development of certain capital-intensive industries rather than 
focusing their efforts on upgrading a country’s endowment structure and 
creating an enabling environment for the development of sectors aligned 
with a country’s comparative advantage.
Chapter VII points out that as wages rise rapidly in dynamically grow-
ing emerging market economies, such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia 
and others, in the multipolar growth world of the 21st century, the labor-
intensive industries in those emerging market economies will be losing 
comparative advantages and provide golden opportunities for other low-
income countries to enter. China alone currently has 85 million manufac-
turing jobs in labor-intensive industries. If low-income countries in Africa 
and other parts of the world are able to seize these jobs, they will be able 
to grow dynamically, reduce poverty, and improve living standards quickly. 
Lower-income countries should therefore turn their late-comer status to 
their advantage by identifying mature industries in carefully selected lead 
countries and facilitating the entry of their own private enterprises or for-
eign direct investments from the comparator countries into those indus-
tries. This chapter also summarizes key policy messages and provides con-
cluding thoughts. 
As stated in the annual UNU-WIDER Lecture that I delivered in Maputo 
on May 4, 2011, I believe that every developing country, including those in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, can grow at 8 percent or more continuously for several 
decades, signifi cantly reducing poverty and becoming middle- or even high-
income countries in the span of one or two generations, if its government 
has the right policy framework to facilitate the private sector’s development 
along the line of its comparative advantages and tap into the late-comer 
advantages (Lin 2011). I hope that the publication of this book will make a 
contribution toward the realization of that goal in the developing world.
Introduction | 9
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I
New Structural 
Economics: 
A Framework for 
Rethinking 
Development*†
Several decades from now, when economic historians look back on the 
story of the past hundred years, it is very likely that they will be intrigued 
by the mystery of diverging performances by various countries, especially 
during the second half of the twentieth century. On the one hand, they 
will be amazed by the rapid growth path followed by a small number of 
countries such as Brazil, Chile, China, Indonesia, India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, where the industrializa-
tion process quickly transformed their subsistence, agrarian economies 
* Adapted from “New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development,” by 
 Justin Yifu Lin, originally published in The World Bank Research Observer (2011) 26 (2): 193–221, 
published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
 Development / The World Bank. © 2011 The International Bank for Reconstruction and  Development/
The World Bank.
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and lifted  several hundred million people out of poverty in the space of 
one  generation. On the other hand, they will be puzzled by the apparent 
inability of many other countries, where more than one-sixth of humanity 
remained trapped in poverty, to generate sustainable growth. They will 
also notice that with the exception of a few successful economies, there 
was little economic convergence between rich and poor countries in spite 
of the many efforts made by developing countries and despite the assis-
tance of many multilateral development agencies. 
Long-term sustainable and inclusive growth is the driving force for 
poverty reduction in developing countries, and for convergence with 
developed economies. The current global crisis, the most serious one since 
the Great Depression, calls for a rethinking of economic theories. It is 
therefore a good time for economists to reexamine development theories 
as well. This paper discusses the evolution of development thinking since 
the end of World War II and suggests a framework to enable developing 
countries to achieve sustainable growth, eliminate poverty, and narrow 
the income gap with the developed countries. The proposed framework, 
called a neoclassical approach to structure and change in the process of 
economic development, or new structural economics, is based on the fol-
lowing ideas: 
First, an economy’s structure of factor endowments evolves from one 
level of development to another. Therefore, the industrial structure of a 
given economy will be different at different levels of development. Each 
industrial structure requires corresponding infrastructure (both tangible 
and intangible) to facilitate its operations and transactions. 
Second, each level of economic development is a point along the con-
tinuum from a low-income agrarian economy to a high-income post-
 industrialized economy, not a dichotomy of two economic development 
levels (“poor” versus “rich” or “developing” versus “industrialized”). 
Industrial upgrading and infrastructure improvement targets in  developing 
countries should not necessarily draw from those that exist in high-income 
countries. 
Third, at each given level of development, the market is the basic 
mechanism for effective resource allocation. However, economic devel-
opment as a dynamic process entails structural changes, involving indus-
trial  upgrading and corresponding improvements in “hard” (tangible) 
and “soft” (intangible) infrastructure at each level. Such upgrading and 
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improvements require an inherent coordination, with large externalities to 
fi rms’ transaction costs and returns to capital investment. Thus, in addi-
tion to an effective market mechanism, the government should play an 
active role in facilitating structural changes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section 
examines the evolution of development thinking and offers a critical review 
of some of its main schools of thought. I then outline the basic principles 
and conceptual framework of the new structural economics, the function 
of the market, and the roles of a facilitating state. In the next section I 
highlight similarities and differences between old and new structural eco-
nomics, and discuss some preliminary insights on major policy issues based 
on this new approach. 
A Short Review of Development Thinking and Experiences
The process of sustainable per capita income increase and economic 
growth, characterized by continuous technological innovation and indus-
trial upgrading, is a modern phenomenon. From Adam Smith to the early 
twentieth century, most economists believed that laissez-faire was the best 
vehicle for achieving sustainable growth in an economy. It was assumed 
that in thriving economies all decisions about resource allocation are made 
by economic agents interacting in markets free of government interven-
tion. The price system determines not only what is produced and how but 
also for whom. Households and fi rms pursuing their own interests would 
be led, “as if by an invisible hand,” to do things that are in the interests 
of others and of society as a whole. Although the laissez-faire approach 
was challenged by Marxist economists and others, it became the domi-
nant intellectual framework for the study of growth in all countries and 
remained so for a long time. It certainly provided many good insights on 
the process of economic development but it missed the importance of the 
process of continuous, fundamental technological changes and industrial 
upgrading, which distinguishes modern economic growth from premodern 
economic growth (Kuznets 1966). 
The study of economic development proceeds in two related but sep-
arate tracks: growth theories and development theories. While some of 
the key ingredients of modern growth theory such as competitive behav-
ior, equilibrium dynamics, the importance of physical capital and human 
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 capital, the possibility of diminishing returns, and the impact of techno-
logical progress can be found in the work of classical economists (Ramsey 
1928; Schumpeter 1934), systematic modeling only started in the 1940s 
when some pioneers used primary factors to build generic models based on 
aggregate production functions. Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) trig-
gered extensive research along these lines. Following their initial work, 
the Solow-Swan model sparked the fi rst major wave of systematic growth 
analysis. The objective was to understand the mechanics of growth, iden-
tify its determinants, and develop techniques of growth accounting, which 
would help explain changes in the momentum and role of economic policy. 
That fi rst generation of growth researchers highlighted the centrality of 
capital. One important prediction from these models was the idea of con-
ditional convergence, derived from the assumption of diminishing returns 
to capital—poor economies with lower capital per worker (relative to their 
long-run or steady-state capital per worker) will grow faster. While that 
assumption allowed the model to maintain its key prediction of conditional 
convergence, it also seemed odd: technology, the main determinant of long-
run growth, was kept outside of the model (Lin and Monga 2010). 
A new wave of growth modeling had to come up with a convincing 
theory of technological change. Endogenous growth theory, as it came to 
be known, maintained the assumption of nonrivalry because technology is 
indeed a very different type of factor from capital and labor—it can be used 
indefi nitely by others, at zero marginal cost (Romer 1987, 1990; Aghion 
and Howitt 1992). But it was important to take the next logical step and 
to understand better the public good characterization of technology and 
think of it as a partially excludable nonrival good. The new wave there-
fore reclassifi ed technology not just as a public good but as a good that is 
subject to a certain level of private control. However, making it a partially 
excludable nonrival good and therefore giving it some degree of exclud-
ability or appropriability was not suffi cient to ensure that incentives for 
its production and use were socially optimal. The move away from perfect 
competition was therefore necessary. It has yielded high methodological 
payoffs. While neoclassical models of growth took technology and factor 
accumulation as exogenous, endogenous growth models explain why tech-
nology grows over time through new ideas and provide the microeconomic 
underpinnings for models of the technological frontier. 
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Another important question has been to understand how technological 
diffusion takes place across countries and generates or sustains growth—
and why it does not take root in others. Various interesting possibilities 
have recently been explored in an attempt to answer that critical ques-
tion (Jones 1998; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Glaeser and 
 Shleifer 2002). Both on the theoretical and empirical fronts, progress has 
been made in our understanding of growth in recent decades. However, 
growth research still faces signifi cant methodological diffi culties and chal-
lenges in identifying actionable policy levers to sustain and accelerate 
growth in specifi c countries. Intellectual progress has been even slower 
in the particular domain of development theories. It took a paper by 
 Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) to bring development issues to the forefront of 
the discipline. The paper suggested that the virtuous circle of development 
depended essentially on the interaction between economies of scale at the 
level of individual fi rms and the size of the market. Specifi cally, it assumed 
that modern methods of production can be made more productive than 
traditional ones only if the market is large enough for their productivity 
edge to compensate for the necessity of paying higher wages. But the size of 
the market itself depends on the extent to which these modern techniques 
are adopted. Therefore, if the modernization process can be started on a 
very large scale, then the process of economic development will be self-
reinforcing and  self-sustaining. If not, countries will be indefi nitely trapped 
in poverty. 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s framework sparked a wave of similar ideas (Chang 
1949; Lewis 1954; Myrdal 1957; Hirschman 1958) which came to be 
known as the structuralist approach to economic development. These early 
development theories held that the market encompassed insurmountable 
defects and that the state was a powerful supplementary means to accelerate 
the pace of economic development (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Nurkse 1953; 
Hirschman 1958). The slump of international trade in the Great Depres-
sion led to export pessimism in the post-War period. In Latin  America, for 
instance, political leaders and social elites were infl uenced strongly by the 
deterioration in the terms of trade, the economic diffi culty encountered 
during the Great Depression in the 1930s, and the thesis developed by 
Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950). They believed that the decline in the 
terms of trade against the export of primary commodities was secular and 
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led to the transfer of income from resource-intensive developing countries 
to capital-intensive developed countries. They argued that the way for a 
developing country to avoid being exploited by developed countries was 
to develop domestic manufacturing industries through a process known as 
import substitution. Moreover, the emergence of previous colonies or semi-
colonies as newly independent states in Asia and the Middle East, and later 
in Africa, was accompanied by strong nationalist sentiments. 
The results were disappointing in many cases. In many developing coun-
tries, well-intended government interventions failed. This was the case 
across Latin American, African, and South Asian countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s when import substitution and protection were essential features 
of the development strategy. One of the main reasons for the failure of 
many former socialist and developing countries to achieve dynamic growth 
in their transitional processes was the fact that they attempted to defy the 
comparative advantage determined by their endowment structures and 
gave priority to development of capital-intensive heavy industries when 
capital in their economies was scarce. In order to implement such strate-
gies, developing-country governments had to protect numerous nonviable 
enterprises in their priority sectors (Lin 2009a; Lin and Li 2009). 
By shielding unsustainable industries from import competition, devel-
oping countries also imposed various types of other costs on their econo-
mies. Protection typically led to: (i) an increase in the price of imports and 
import-substituting goods relative to the world price and distortions in 
incentives, pushing the economy to consume the wrong mix of goods from 
the point of view of economic effi ciency; (ii) the fragmentation of mar-
kets, as the economy produced too many small-scale goods, which resulted 
again in loss of effi ciency; (iii) decreased competition from foreign fi rms 
and support for the monopoly power of domestic fi rms whose owners were 
politically well connected; and (iv) opportunities for rents and corruption, 
which raised input and transaction costs (Krueger 1974; Krugman 1993). 
As government-led economic development strategies based on the 
structuralist teachings failed in many countries, the free market approach 
appeared to triumph and infl uence development thinking. This trend 
was reinforced by a new revolution in macroeconomics. The prevailing 
 Keynesian macroeconomics was challenged by the stagfl ation in the 1970s, 
the Latin American debt crisis, and the collapse of the socialist planning 
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 system in the 1980s. The so-called rational expectations revolution emerged 
and refuted the structuralist theoretical foundation for the state’s role in 
using fi scal and monetary policy for economic development. 
The Latin American debt crisis began in 1982 when international fi nan-
cial markets realized that the collapse of the Bretton Woods system had put 
some countries with unlimited access to foreign capital in a situation where 
they could not pay back their loans. The crisis was precipitated by a num-
ber of interrelated exogenous shocks that toppled the Mexican and several 
other Latin American economies, which were already overburdened with 
a substantial percentage of the world’s outstanding debt (Cardoso and 
Helwege 1995). It prompted multilateral lending institutions and bilateral 
lenders—especially the United States—to call for a comprehensive set of 
reforms of Latin American economies and to advocate a set of free-market 
policies that followed the canons of the neoclassical paradigm, later known 
as the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990). 
The Washington Consensus quickly came to be perceived as “a set of 
neoliberal policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by the 
Washington-based international fi nancial institutions and have led them 
to crisis and misery” (Williamson 2002). It promoted economic liberal-
ization, privatization, and the implementation of rigorous stabilization 
programs. The results of these policies in terms of growth and employ-
ment generation were at best controversial (Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel 
1997; Easterly 2001). By the end of the 1990s and parallel to the dis-
missal of structuralism and the prevalence of the free market approach, the 
development economics research community was witnessing the end of an 
era dominated by cross-country regressions, which attempted to identify 
growth determinants. That approach had been to focus on the independent 
and marginal effects of a multitude of growth determinants. This led to the 
linearization of complex theoretical models. Yet, the general view was that 
growth determinants interact with each other. To be successful, some pol-
icy reforms must be implemented with other reforms. There was a general 
perception that the policy prescriptions stemming from such regressions 
did not produce tangible results. 
An alternative perspective on non-linearities was the Growth Diag-
nostics or Decision Tree approach suggested by Hausmann, Rodrik, and 
Velasco (2005). They recognized the central role of structural change in 
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economic development and argued that there are “binding constraints” on 
growth in each country. These authors suggested that binding constraints 
can vary over time and across countries. They concluded that identifi ca-
tion of the binding constraint was therefore key in practice. This frame-
work highlighted pragmatically the inability of governments to reform 
everything and stressed the need to prioritize reforms, which should be 
done through the information revealed by shadow prices. It should be 
noted that the Growth Diagnostics approach is not operational unless 
one assumes away reform complementarities, which is the feature of 
linear growth regressions. 
The divergence in growth performance between developed and devel-
oping countries, despite predictions of convergence from mainstream 
 economic theory, has led to controversy. Some have concluded that the pol-
icy prescriptions, or expectations about their effectiveness, or both, were 
wrong. Others have observed that growth researchers had paid  limited 
attention to heterogeneity (the specifi c characteristics of each country). The 
suggestion that cross-country distribution may be multimodal (with the 
existence of “convergence clubs”) did not settle the debate about which 
new directions were needed for growth research. Instead, many basic ques-
tions have come back on the agenda: Are development economists looking 
in the wrong place in their quest for the determinants of growth? Should 
the focus be on institutions (institutional outcomes), instead of or in addi-
tion to policies? And, assuming that they are not refl ecting other factors, 
how can good institutional outcomes be generated? 
These unanswered questions were on the agenda for a long time. Start-
ing in the 1980s, many development economists tried to understand 
better the causality of relationships and the various transmission chan-
nels through which policies, institutional changes, or foreign aid affect 
growth. They were also the rationale for an increased focus of growth 
research on microbehavior issues at the household and fi rm levels, with 
two goals: (i) allowing for heterogeneity in the economy (across and 
within countries); and (ii) investigating how constraints to growth oper-
ate at the microlevel. 
The growing disappointment and disillusionment with aid effectiveness 
also led to the quest for rigorous impact evaluation of development proj-
ects and programs. This has generated a new approach to development 
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led by economists at the MIT Poverty Lab, whose goal is “to reduce pov-
erty by ensuring that policy is based on scientifi c evidence” through the 
use of randomized control trials (RCT) or social experiments. Although 
RCT are good tools for understanding the effectiveness of some specifi c 
microprojects, they often do not start from a clear strategic assessment of 
how a  particular method would fi t the knowledge gaps of highest priority 
(Ravallion 2009). All too often, research looks for topics “under the light.” 
The positive outcomes for policymaking are more often the occasional 
by-products of research than its objective from the outset. 
Recent microempirical studies may have indeed shed light on some 
important problems, such as the impact of the investment climate 
on fi rm performance or the impact of household behavior on produc-
tivity ( Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985). But “there is a risk the bulk of 
 present-day research in development economics appears to be too nar-
rowly focused and/or of too little generalizability to help much in the fi ght 
against poverty and to facilitate structural change and sustained growth” 
(World Bank 2010). 
The time has come to reexamine the state of development economics, 
to learn from past experiences and previous knowledge, and to offer new 
thinking and a new framework. Drawing lessons from past experience and 
from economic theories, the next section presents the key principles of a 
new structural economics, which is a neoclassical approach to economic 
structure and dynamic change in the process of economic development.1 
A Neoclassical Approach to Structure and Change
The starting point for the analysis of economic development is an econ-
omy’s endowments. Endowments are a given in an economy at any spe-
cifi c time and are changeable over time. Following the tradition of classical 
economics, economists tend to think of a given country’s endowments as 
consisting only of its land (or natural resources), labor, and capital (both 
physical and human).2 These are in fact factor endowments, which fi rms 
in an economy can use in production. It should be noted that the  analysis 
of new  structural economics focuses on the dynamics of the capital/labor 
ratio. This is because land is exogenously given in any realistic discussion of 
a country’s development and natural resources, such as  mining resources, 
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exist underground in fi xed quantity and their discovery is often random. 
Conceptually, it is useful to add infrastructure as one more component 
in an economy’s endowments. Infrastructure includes hard (or tangible) 
infrastructure and soft (or intangible) infrastructure. Examples of hard 
infrastructure are highways, port facilities, airports, telecommunication 
systems, electricity grids, and other public utilities. Soft infrastructure con-
sists of institutions, regulations, social capital, value systems, and other 
social, economic arrangements. Infrastructure affects the individual fi rm’s 
transaction costs and the marginal rate of return on investment. 
Countries at different levels of development tend to have  different 
 economic structures due to differences in their endowments. Factor 
endowments for countries at the early levels of development are typically 
characterized by a relative scarcity of capital and relative abundance of 
labor or resources. Their production activities tend to be labor intensive 
or resource intensive (mostly in subsistence agriculture, animal husbandry, 
fi shery, and the mining sector) and usually rely on conventional, mature 
technologies and produce “mature,” well-established products. Except for 
mining and plantations, their production has limited economies of scale. 
Their fi rm sizes are usually relatively small, with market transactions often 
informal, limited to local markets with familiar people. The hard and soft 
infrastructure required for facilitating that type of production and market 
transactions is limited and relatively simple and rudimentary. 
At the other extreme of the development spectrum, high-income coun-
tries display a completely different endowment structure. The relatively 
abundant factor in their endowments is typically capital, not natural 
resources or labor. They tend to have comparative advantage in capital 
intensive industries with economies of scale in production. The various 
types of hard infrastructure (power, telecommunication, roads, port facili-
ties, etc.) and soft infrastructure (regulatory and legal frameworks, cultural 
value systems, etc.) that are needed must comply with the necessities of 
national and global markets where business transactions are long distance 
and large in quantity and value. 
Economic development requires continuous introduction of new and 
better technology to an existing industry. Most people in low-income 
countries depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Improvements 
in agricultural technology are key to increasing farmers’ income and 
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 reducing poverty. However, economic development also requires contin-
uous diversifying and upgrading from existing industries to new, more 
capital-intensive ones. Without such a structural change, the scope for 
sustained increase in per capita income will be limited. Therefore, the 
discussion in this paper will focus mostly on issues related to industrial 
upgrading and diversifi cation. 
Developing countries have the advantage of backwardness in the 
upgrading process and a whole spectrum of industries with different levels 
of capital intensity available for them to choose. However, they must fi rst 
upgrade their factor endowment structure, which requires their stock of 
capital to grow more rapidly than the labor force (see Ju, Lin, and Wang 
2009). When they move up the industrial ladder in the process of economic 
development, they also increase their scale of production—because of the 
indivisibility of capital equipment. Their fi rms become larger and need a 
bigger market, which in turn necessitates correspondent changes in power, 
transportation, fi nancial arrangements, and other soft infrastructure. 
The process of industrial upgrading and diversifi cation also increases 
the level of risk faced by fi rms. As fi rms move closer to the global technol-
ogy frontier, it becomes increasingly diffi cult for them to borrow mature 
technology from advanced countries. They increasingly need to invent new 
technologies and products and thus face more risk. The idiosyncratic risk 
of a fi rm has three components based on risk sources: technological inno-
vation, product innovation, and managerial capacity. At the early level of 
development, fi rms tend to use mature technologies to produce mature 
products for mature markets. At that level, the main source of risk is the 
managerial ability of fi rms’ owner-operators. At a higher level of develop-
ment, fi rms often invent new technologies to produce new products for 
new markets. In addition to managerial capacity, such fi rms face risks 
arising from the maturity of technology and markets. Therefore, while 
technological innovation, product innovation, and managerial capacity all 
contribute to the overall level of risk associated with fi rms, their relative 
importance varies greatly from one industry to another and from one level 
of economic development to another. 
With changes in the size of fi rms, scope of the market, and nature of 
risk, along with the upgrading of the industrial structure, the require-
ments for infrastructure services, both hard and soft, also change. If the 
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infrastructure is not improved simultaneously, the upgrading process in 
various industries may face the problem of x-ineffi ciency, a phenomenon 
discussed by Leibenstein (1957). Because the industrial structure in an 
economy at a specifi c time is endogenous to its given relative abundance 
of labor, capital, and natural resources at that time, the economy’s factor 
endowment will change with capital accumulation or population growth, 
pushing its industrial structure to deviate from the optimal determined by 
its previous level.3 
When fi rms choose to enter industries and adopt technologies that are 
consistent with the comparative advantage determined by changes in the 
country’s factor endowments,4 the economy is most competitive.5 As com-
petitive industries and fi rms grow, they claim larger domestic as well as 
international market shares and create the greatest possible economic sur-
plus in the form of profi ts and salaries. Reinvested surpluses earn the high-
est return possible as well, because the industrial structure is optimal for 
that endowment structure. Over time, this approach allows the economy to 
accumulate physical and human capital, upgrading the factor endowment 
structure as well as the industrial structure and making domestic fi rms 
more competitive over time in more capital- and skill-intensive products. 
Firms care about profi ts. For them spontaneously to enter industries and 
choose technologies consistent with the economy’s comparative advantage, 
the price system must refl ect the relative scarcity of factors in the country’s 
endowment. This only happens in an economy with competitive markets 
(Lin 2009a; Lin and Chang 2009). Therefore, a competitive market should 
be the economy’s fundamental mechanism for resource allocation at each 
level of its development. That kind of comparative-advantage-following 
approach in economic development may appear to be slow and frustrating 
in countries with major poverty challenges. In reality, it is the fastest way to 
accumulate capital and upgrade the endowment structure, and the upgrad-
ing of industrial structure can be accelerated by better access to technol-
ogy and industries already developed by and existing in more advanced 
countries. At each level in their development, fi rms in developing countries 
can acquire the technologies (and enter the industries) that are appropriate 
for their endowment structure, rather than having to reinvent the wheel 
(Gerschenkron 1962; Krugman 1979). This possibility to use off-the-shelf 
technology and to enter into existing industries is what has allowed some 
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of the East Asian newly industrialized economies to sustain annual GDP 
growth rates of 8 and even 10 percent. 
As a country climbs up the industrial and technological ladder, many 
other changes take place: the technology used by its fi rms becomes more 
sophisticated, and capital requirements increase, as well as the scale of 
production and the size of markets. Market transactions increasingly take 
place at arm’s length. A fl exible and smooth industrial and technologi-
cal upgrading process therefore requires simultaneous improvements in 
educational, fi nancial, and legal institutions, and in hard infrastructure so 
that fi rms in the newly upgraded industries can reduce transaction costs 
and reach the production possibility frontier (Harrison and Rodríguez-
Clare 2010). Clearly, individual fi rms cannot internalize all these changes 
cost effectively, and spontaneous coordination among many fi rms to meet 
these new challenges is often impossible. Change in infrastructure requires 
 collective action or at least coordination between the provider of infrastruc-
ture services and industrial fi rms. For this reason, it falls to the government 
either to introduce such changes or to coordinate them proactively. 
Successful industrial upgrading in responding to change in an econo-
my’s endowment structure requires that the pioneer fi rms overcome issues 
of limited information regarding which new industries are the economy’s 
latent comparative advantages determined by the changing endowment 
structure. Valuable information externalities arise from the knowledge 
gained by pioneer fi rms in both success and failure. Therefore, in addition 
to playing a proactive role in the improvements of soft and hard infrastruc-
tures, the government in a developing country, like that in a developed 
country, needs to compensate for the information externalities generated 
by pioneer fi rms (Rodrik 2004; Lin 2009a; Lin and Monga 2011; Harrison 
and Rodríguez-Clare 2010).6
What Is “New” About the New Structural Economics?
Like all learning ventures, economic development thinking is bound to 
be a continuous process of amalgamation and discovery, continuity, and 
reinvention. The existing stock of knowledge has been the result of many 
decades of work by thinkers from various backgrounds and disciplines 
and has come to light through several waves of theoretical and  empirical 
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research. It is therefore only natural that the proposed new structural eco-
nomics has some similarities to and differences from previous strands in 
the development economics literature. Its main value-added should be 
assessed on the new policy insights it provides and the pertinence of the 
research agenda ahead. 
Difference with Earlier Literature on Structural Change
Earlier thinking on structural change in the context of economic develop-
ment is mostly associated with Rostow (1990 [1960]) and Gerschenkron 
(1962). In trying to understand how economic development occurs and 
what strategies can be adopted to foster that process, the former suggested 
that countries can be placed in one of fi ve categories in terms of their level 
of growth: (i) traditional societies, characterized by subsistence economy, 
with output not traded or even recorded, the existence of barter, high levels 
of agriculture, and labor-intensive agriculture; (ii) societies with precondi-
tions to growth, where there is an increase in capital use in agriculture, the 
development of mining industries, and some growth in savings and invest-
ment; (iii) societies in take-off mode, with higher levels of investment and 
industrialization, accumulation of savings, and a decline in the share of 
the agricultural labor force; (iv) societies that drive to maturity and where 
wealth generation enables further investment in value adding industry and 
development—growth becomes self-sustaining, industry is diversifi ed, and 
more sophisticated technology is used; and (v) mass-consumption societies 
that achieve high output levels and where the services industry dominates 
the economy. 
Gerschenkron questioned Rostow’s proposition that all developing 
countries pass through a similar series of levels and its implication that it 
is possible to generalize the growth trajectory of different countries. For 
the new structural economics, economic development from a low level to 
a high level is a continuous spectrum, not a mechanical series of fi ve dis-
tinguished levels. Although the change in an economy’s industrial structure 
refl ects the changes in that economy’s endowment structure, the develop-
ment of industries in different countries with a similar endowment struc-
ture can be achieved in different and nonlinear ways. This is especially 
true with the increased globalization of markets, the rapid development of 
new products, and constant technological change, as countries can exploit 
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opportunities that were not available in the past and specialize in industries 
that are likely to vary from one economy to another. 
The new structural economics also provides a framework for under-
standing the endogeneity and exogeneity issues surrounding the key styl-
ized facts of modern growth analysis that have been outlined by the Growth 
Commission (2008) and Jones and Romer (2009): an economy that fol-
lows its comparative advantage in the development of its industries will be 
most competitive in domestic and world markets. As a result, the economy 
will generate potentially the largest income and surplus for savings. Capital 
investment will also have the largest possible return. Consequently, house-
holds will have the highest savings propensity, resulting in an even faster 
upgrade of the country’s endowment structure (Lin and Monga 2010). 
Similarities to and Differences from Old Structural Economics
In terms of similarities, the “new” and the “old” structural economics are 
both founded on structural differences between developed and develop-
ing countries and acknowledge the active role of the state in facilitating 
the movement of the economy from a lower level of development to a 
higher one. However, there are profound differences between these two 
approaches regarding their targets and the modalities of state interven-
tion. The old structural economics advocates development policies that 
go against an economy’s comparative advantage and advise governments 
in developing countries to develop advanced capital-intensive industries 
through direct administrative measures and price distortions. By contrast, 
the new structural economics stresses the central role of the market in 
resource allocation and advises the state to play a facilitating role to assist 
fi rms in the process of industrial upgrading by addressing externality and 
coordination issues. 
The differences between the two frameworks derive from their dissimi-
lar views on the sources of structural rigidities: old structural economics 
assumes that the market failures that make the development of advanced 
capital-intensive industries diffi cult in developing countries are exoge-
nously determined by structural rigidities due to the existence of monopo-
lies, labor’s perverse response to price signals, and/or the immobility of 
factors. By contrast, the new structural economics posits that the failure 
to develop advanced capital-intensive industries in developing countries 
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is endogenously determined by their endowments. The relative scarcity 
in their capital endowment and/or the low level of soft and hard infra-
structure in developing countries make the reallocations from the existing 
industries to the advanced capital-intensive industries unprofi table for the 
fi rms in a competitive market. 
Old structural economics assumes a dual and restrictive view of the 
world, with a binary classifi cation of only two possible categories of 
countries: “low-income, periphery countries” versus “high-income, core 
countries.” As a result, it views the differences in the industrial structure 
between developed and developing countries as expressing a dichotomy. 
Contrary to that vision, the new structural economics considers these 
 differences as the refl ection of a whole spectrum that includes many dif-
ferent levels of development. The new structural economics also rejects 
dependency theories. In an increasingly globalized world, it sees oppor-
tunities for developing countries to counter negative historical trends by 
diversifying their economy and building industries that are consistent 
with their comparative advantage so as to accelerate growth and achieve 
convergence by exploiting the advantage of backwardness in an open, 
globalized world. 
Another major difference between the new and the old structural eco-
nomics is the rationale for using key instruments of economic manage-
ment. Old structural economics sees systematic government intervention 
in economic activities as the essential ingredient in the modernization 
objective. Among the key instruments used to move from “developing” 
countries to “industrialized” countries are generalized protectionism (such 
as government-imposed tariffs on imports to protect infant industries), 
rigid exchange-rate policies, fi nancial repression, and the creation of state-
owned enterprises in most sectors. 
By contrast, the new structural economics recognizes that import sub-
stitution is a natural phenomenon for a developing country climbing the 
industrial ladder in its development process, provided that it is consis-
tent with the shift in comparative advantage that results from changes in 
its endowment structure. But it rejects conventional import- substitution 
strategies that rely on the use of fi scal policy or other distortions in 
low-income, labor- or resource-abundant economies to develop high 
cost, advanced capital-intensive industries that are not consistent with the 
country’s  comparative advantage. It also stresses the idea that the industrial 
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upgrading process in a developing country should be consistent with the 
change in the country’s comparative advantage that refl ects the accumula-
tion of human and physical capital and the change in its factor endow-
ment structure—this ensures the viability of fi rms in new industries. The 
new structural  economics concludes that the role of the state in industrial 
diversifi cation and upgrading should be limited to the provision of infor-
mation about the new industries, the coordination of related investments 
across different fi rms in the same industries, the compensation of informa-
tion externalities for pioneer fi rms, and the nurturing of new industries 
through incubation and encouragement of foreign direct investment (Lin 
2009a; Lin and Chang 2009; Lin and Monga 2011). The state also needs 
to assume effectively its leadership role in the improvement of hard and 
soft infrastructure in order to reduce transaction costs on individual fi rms 
and so facilitate the economy’s industrial development process. 
New Structural Economics: Some Policy Insights
The ultimate goal of development thinking is to provide policy advice 
that facilitates the quest for sustainable and inclusive economic and social 
progress in poor countries. Although specifi c policy measures to be derived 
from the new structural economics approach will require further research 
and depend very much on country context and circumstances, in this sec-
tion I will make some conjectures about a few preliminary insights on 
various topics. 
Fiscal Policy. Until Britain’s very high unemployment of the 1920s and the 
Great Depression, economists generally held that the appropriate stance 
for fi scal policy was for governments to maintain balanced budgets. The 
severity of the early twentieth-century crises gave rise to the Keynesian 
idea of counter-cyclicality, which suggested that governments should use 
tax and expenditure policies to offset business cycles in the economy. By 
contrast, neoclassical economics offers doubts about the implicit assump-
tion behind the Keynesian model of a multiplier greater than one7 and 
its implication that governments are able to do something that the pri-
vate sector has been unable to do: mobilize idle resources in the economy 
(unemployed labor and capital) at almost zero social cost, that is, with no 
corresponding decline in other parts of GDP (consumption, investment, 
and net exports). Instead, they warn against the possibility of the so-called 
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Ricardian equivalence trap and point to the fact that households tend to 
adjust their behavior for consumption or saving on the basis of expecta-
tions about the future. They suggest that expansionary fi scal policy (stimu-
lus packages) is perceived as immediate spending or tax cuts that will need 
to be repaid in the future. They conclude that the multiplier could be less 
than one in situations where the GDP is given and an increase in govern-
ment spending does not lead to an equal rise in other parts of GDP. The 
neoclassical paradigm even suggests the possibility of some rare instances 
where multipliers are negative, pointing to situations where fi scal contrac-
tions become expansionary (Francesco and Pagano 1991). 
From the viewpoint of new structural economics, the effects of fi scal 
policy may be different in developed and developing countries due to the 
differences in opportunities of using counter-cyclical expenditure for mak-
ing productivity-enhanced investments. Physical infrastructure in general 
is a binding constraint for growth in developing countries, and govern-
ments need to play a critical role in providing essential infrastructure to 
facilitate economic development. In such contexts, recessions are typically 
good times for making infrastructure investments, for three main reasons. 
First, such investments boost short-term demand and promote long-term 
growth.8 Second, their investment cost is lower than in normal times. And 
third, the Ricardian equivalence trap can be avoided because the increase 
in future growth rates and fi scal revenues can compensate for the cost of 
these investments (Lin 2009b). 
If a developing country government follows the new structural econom-
ics approach of facilitating the development of industries according to the 
country’s comparative advantage, its economy will be competitive and the 
fi scal position and the external account are likely to be sound, thanks to 
the likelihood of strong growth, good trade performance, and the lack of 
nonviable fi rms that the government has to subsidize. Under this scenario, 
the country will face fewer homegrown economic crises. If the economy 
is hit by external shocks such as the recent global crisis, the government 
will be in a good position to implement a counter-cyclical fi scal stimulus 
and invest in infrastructure and social projects. Such public investments 
can enhance the economy’s growth potential, reduce transaction costs on 
the private sector, increase the rate of return on private investment, and 
generate enough tax revenues in the future to liquidate the initial costs. 
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In addition to its different stance on fi scal stimulus, the new structural 
economics approach also offers a different strategy for managing natural 
resource wealth. In resource-abundant countries, it would recommend that 
an appropriate share of revenues from commodities be used to invest in 
human capital, infrastructure, social capital, and compensation for fi rst 
movers in new nonresource sectors so as to facilitate the structural trans-
formation. To accomplish this with the greatest effect, these resources 
should fi nance investment opportunities that remove binding constraints 
on industrial diversifi cation and upgrading, especially in the infrastructure 
and education sectors. Microeconomic analyses show that even when fac-
tory fl oor costs are comparable, ineffi ciencies in infrastructure can make it 
impossible for poor countries to compete on international markets. Freight 
and insurance costs in African countries are 250 percent of the global aver-
age,9 with road freight delays two to three times as long as in Asia. Lacking 
fi nancial resources and the appropriate policy frameworks, many of these 
countries are often unable to sustain much needed investment and main-
tenance expenditures. In such contexts, the effective fi scal strategy would 
not be to keep natural resource revenues in sovereign funds and invest in 
foreign equity markets or projects but, rather, to use a substantial portion 
of the revenues for fi nancing domestic or regional projects that facilitate 
economic development and structural change—i.e., projects that stimulate 
the development of new manufacturing industries, diversify the economy, 
provide jobs, and offer the potential of continuous upgrading.10 
Monetary Policy. Old structural economics suggested that monetary policy 
should be under government control (not independent central banks) and 
directed at infl uencing interest rates and even sector credit allocation. But 
it also acknowledged that many other factors that infl uence the investment 
demand-schedule in developing countries are too powerful for monetary 
policy alone to achieve suffi cient levels of investment, channel resources in 
strategic sectors, and combat unemployment. 
Building on lessons from the rational expectations revolution, neoclas-
sical economists doubted the idea that monetary policy could be used to 
support industrial development. They recommended that its main goal be 
price stability, and advocated the use of short-term interest rates by inde-
pendent central banks to maintain the general level of prices (or to control 
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money supply growth), and not to stimulate economic activity and trigger 
infl ation. 
The new structural economics envisions the possibility of using inter-
est rate policy in developing countries as a counter-cyclical tool and as an 
instrument to encourage infrastructure and industrial upgrading investments 
during recessions—measures that may contribute to productivity growth in 
the future. Monetary policy is often ineffective for stimulating investment 
and consumption in recessions and excess capacity situations in developed 
countries, especially when nominal interest rates hit the zero bound in a 
context of limited profi table investment opportunities,  pessimistic expecta-
tions, high unemployment rates, low confi dence about the future, and the 
likelihood of liquidity traps. It should be noted, however, that developing 
countries are less likely to encounter such liquidity traps. Even when faced 
with excess capacity in existing domestic industries, their scope for indus-
trial upgrading and diversifi cation is large. Their fi rms have incentives to 
undertake productivity-enhancing, industrial- upgrading investments dur-
ing recessions if interest rates are suffi ciently low. Furthermore, they tend 
to have many infrastructure bottlenecks. Lowering interest rates in such 
contexts would also encourage investments in infrastructure. 
The objective of monetary policy should be much broader than tradi-
tionally conceived under neoclassical economics—in economic slumps, it 
should aim at encouraging investment that removes bottlenecks on growth. 
In practical terms, this implies not just that interest rates should be lowered 
in the slump, as would be the case in most circumstances under a stan-
dard Taylor rule. It also implies that monetary authorities should resort to 
temporary interest rate subsidies, fl exible credit allocation rules, or similar 
time-bound devices, targeting infrastructure projects identifi ed by devel-
opment banks as binding constraints, preferably in specifi c geographic 
 locations where the payoff is the largest and where political economy con-
straints can be more easily managed. 
Financial Development. There is ample consensus that fi nancial develop-
ment is essential to sustaining economic growth. There is, however, much 
less agreement on the specifi c role it plays in that process. Starting with the 
observation that one of the major constraints facing developing countries 
was limited capital accumulation, old structural economics regarded the 
problems of the fi nancial sector in underdeveloped economies as resulting 
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from widespread market failures that could not be overcome by market 
forces alone.11 They recommended that governments adopt a hands-on 
approach in that process, mobilize savings, and allocate credit to support 
the development of advanced capital-intensive industries. This very often 
led to fi nancial repression (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973). In some coun-
tries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, the belief in soft-budget constraints 
led governments to accumulate defi cits in state-owned fi nancial institu-
tions and created a pervasive business culture of self-repression not only 
for banks, but also for private enterprises (Monga 1997). Drawing conse-
quences from such analyses, neoclassical economists advocated fi nancial 
liberalization. They contended that bureaucrats generally do not have the 
incentives or expertise to intervene effectively in credit allocation and pric-
ing, and that a well-defi ned system of property rights, good contractual 
institutions, and competition would create the conditions for the emer-
gence of a sound fi nancial system. They recommended that government 
exit from bank ownership and lift restrictions on the allocation of credit 
and the determination of interest rates (Caprio and Honohan 2001). 
While agreeing with the need to address the deleterious effects of fi nan-
cial repression, the new structural economics would emphasize the fact that 
those distortions are often designed to protect nonviable fi rms in priority 
sectors in developing countries. It would then stress the importance of an 
appropriate sequencing of liberalization policies in domestic fi nance and 
foreign trade so as to achieve stability and dynamic growth simultaneously 
during transition. The new structural economics also posits that the optimal 
fi nancial structure at a given level of development may be determined by 
the prevailing industrial structure, the average size of fi rms, and the usual 
type of risk they face, all factors that are in turn endogenous to the econo-
my’s factor endowments at that level. Observing that national policies fre-
quently favor large banks and the equity market regardless of the structure 
of the economy, it would suggest that low-income countries choose small, 
local banks as the backbone of their fi nancial systems, instead of trying to 
replicate the fi nancial structure of advanced industrialized  countries. This 
would allow small-scale fi rms in agriculture, industry, and the service  sector 
to gain adequate fi nancial services. As industrial upgrading takes place and 
the economy relies increasingly on more capital-intensive industries, the 
fi nancial structure will change to give greater weight to large banks and 
sophisticated equity markets (Lin, Sun, and Jiang 2009). 
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Foreign Capital. In a world that they thought was characterized by the 
core-periphery relationship, old structural economists tended to view for-
eign capital mainly as a tool in the hands of industrialized countries and 
their multinational fi rms to maintain harmful control over developing 
countries. They rejected the idea that free capital movements among coun-
tries could deliver an effi cient allocation of resources and considered for-
eign direct investment fl ows to poor countries as an instrument for foreign 
ownership and domination. They advocated tight restrictions on virtually 
all forms of international fi nancial fl ows. 
Neoclassical economic theory argues that international capital mobility 
serves several purposes: it allows countries with limited savings to attract 
fi nancing for productive domestic investment projects; it enables investors 
to diversify their portfolios; it spreads investment risk more broadly; and 
it promotes intertemporal trade—the trading of goods today for goods in 
the future (Eichengreen and others 1999). Therefore, the theory generally 
favors open or liberalized capital markets, with the expectation of more 
effi cient allocation of savings, increased possibilities for diversifi cation of 
investment risk, faster growth, and the dampening of business cycles. It 
should be noted, however, that some neoclassical economists also argue 
that liberalized fi nancial markets in developing countries can be distorted 
by incomplete information, large and volatile movements in and out of the 
system, and many other problems leading to suboptimal consequences that 
are damaging for general welfare. 
The new structural economics approach considers foreign direct 
investment to be a more favorable source of foreign capital for devel-
oping countries than other capital fl ows because it is usually targeted 
toward industries consistent with a country’s comparative advantage. It 
is less prone to sudden reversals during panics than bank loans, debt 
fi nancing, and portfolio investment, and does not generate the same acute 
problems of fi nancial crises as do sharp reversals of debt and portfolio 
fl ows. In  addition, direct investment generally brings technology, man-
agement, access to markets, and social networking, which are often lack-
ing in developing countries and are yet crucial for industrial upgrading. 
Thus, liberalizing inward direct investment should generally be an attrac-
tive component of a broader development strategy. By contrast, portfolio 
investment that may move in and out quickly, in a large quantity, tends to 
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target speculative activities (mostly in equity markets or the housing sec-
tor) and create bubbles and fl uctuations. It should not be favored.12 The 
new structural economics approach may also shed new light on the puz-
zle raised by Lucas (1990) about the fl ow of capital from capital scarce 
developing countries to capital abundant developed countries. With-
out improvement of infrastructure and upgrading to new comparative 
 advantage industries, the accumulation of capital in a developing country 
may encounter diminishing returns, causing lower returns to capital in 
developing countries, and justifying the subsequent outfl ow of capital to 
developed countries. 
Trade Policy. There have been various old structural economics approaches 
to external trade. But one constant feature is the belief that integration into 
the global economy is bound to maintain the existing world power struc-
ture, with Western countries and their multinational corporations domi-
nating poorer countries and exploiting their economies. In order to break 
the dependency trap, old structural economics thinkers have suggested that 
priority be given to import-substitution strategies, with developing econo-
mies closed and protected until their modern industries can compete with 
advanced industrialized countries in world markets. 
A radically different view was adopted by economists in the 1980s. 
Observing that macroeconomic crises in developing countries almost always 
have an external dimension, they considered that their immediate cause 
was the lack of foreign exchange to service debts and purchase imports. 
They recommended trade liberalization and export promotion as a solu-
tion to generate foreign exchange through export earnings. This was also 
consistent with the view that, in the long term, outward oriented develop-
ment strategies are more effective than inward looking policies. This view 
was bolstered further by the argument that such a strategy would increase 
demand for unskilled labor and hence unskilled wages, as had happened in 
successful East Asian countries (Kanbur 2009). 
The analysis from the new structural economics would be consistent 
with the view from neoclassical economics that exports and imports are 
endogenous to the comparative advantage determined by a  country’s 
endowment structure (they are essential features of the industrial upgrad-
ing process and refl ect changes in comparative advantage).  Globalization 
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offers a way for developing countries to exploit the advantages of 
 backwardness and achieve a faster rate of innovation and structural 
transformation than is possible for countries already on the global tech-
nology frontier. Openness is an essential channel for convergence. The new 
structural economics approach recognizes, however, that many developing 
countries start climbing the industrial ladder with the legacy of distortions 
from old structural economics strategies of import-substitution. It would 
therefore suggest a gradualist approach to trade liberalization. During 
transition, the state may consider providing some temporary protection to 
industries that are not consistent with a country’s comparative advantage, 
while liberalizing at the same time entry to other more competitive sectors 
that were controlled and repressed in the past. The dynamic growth in 
the newly liberalized sectors creates the conditions for reforming the old 
priority sectors. This pragmatic, dual-track approach may achieve the goal 
of growth without losers in the transition process (Naughton 1995; Lau, 
Qian, and Roland 2000; Subramanian and Roy 2003; Lin 2009a). 
Human Development. Old structural economics generally said little 
about the role of human development in economic growth. By contrast, 
neoclassical economics has shown that the continuing growth in per 
capita incomes of many countries during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries was mainly due to the expansion of scientifi c and technical 
knowledge that raised the productivity of labor and other inputs in pro-
duction. Economic theory has demonstrated that growth is the result of 
synergies between new knowledge and human capital, which is why large 
increases in education and training have accompanied major advances 
in technological knowledge in all countries that have achieved signifi -
cant economic growth. Education, training, and health, which are the 
most important investments in human capital, are considered to be the 
most important driving force for economic development (Becker 1975; 
Jones and Romer 2009). 
The new structural economics considers human capital to be one com-
ponent of a country’s endowment. For economic agents, risks and uncer-
tainty arise during the process of industrial upgrading and technological 
innovation that accompanies economic development. As various fi rms 
move up the industrial ladder to new, higher capital-intensity industries and 
get closer to the global industrial frontier, they face higher levels of risks. 
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Human capital increases workers’ ability to cope with risk and uncertainty 
(Schultz 1961) but its formation requires a long time. A person who loses 
the opportunity to receive education at a young age may not be able to 
compensate for that loss at a later age. In a dynamic growing economy, 
it is important to plan ahead and make human capital investments before 
the economy requires the set of skills associated with new industries and 
technologies. However, improvements in human capital should be com-
mensurable with the accumulation of physical capital and the upgrading 
of industry in the economy. Otherwise, human capital will either become a 
binding constraint for economic development if it is under-supplied because 
of insuffi cient investment, or the country will have many frustrated highly 
educated youths if the industrial upgrading of the economy is not progress-
ing fast enough to provide skilled jobs. 
A well-designed policy on human capital development should be an 
integral part of any country’s overall development strategy. The new struc-
tural economics goes beyond the neoclassical generic prescription for edu-
cation and suggests that development strategies include measures to invest 
in human capital that facilitates the upgrading of industries and prepares 
the economy to make full use of its resources. The key components of such 
strategies should follow Lucas’s (2002) suggestion to allow human capital 
to have both a quality and a quantity dimension. It should also include 
alternative policies for promoting skill formation that are targeted to dif-
ferent levels of the life cycle,13 with the government and the private sector 
working closely together to anticipate or respond to the skills needs in the 
labor market. Singapore, one of the 13 high-growth economies14 that have 
been able to grow at more than 7 percent for periods of more than 25 years 
since World War II, provides a successful example of human capital devel-
opment as a national strategy (Osman-Gani 2004), which goes beyond the 
schooling decision and recognizes that on-the-job training is an important 
component of aggregate human capital. Its human resource strategies have 
been continuously revised and adjusted in conjunction with other national 
strategic economic policies. 
Concluding Thoughts
The new structural economics approach highlights the importance of 
endowments and differences in industrial structures at various levels of 
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development and the implications of distortions stemming from past, 
misguided, interventions by policymakers whose belief in old structural 
economics led them to over-estimate governments’ ability to correct 
market failures. It also points out the fact that policies advocated under 
the Washington Consensus often failed to take into consideration the 
structural differences between developed and developing countries and 
ignored the second-best nature of reforming various types of distortions 
in developing countries. 
The proposed new structural economics attempts to develop a general 
framework for understanding the causality behind the observed stylized 
facts of sustained growth. Specifi cally, the new structural economics pro-
poses to: (i) develop an analytical framework that takes into account 
factor and infrastructure endowments, the levels of development, and 
the corresponding industrial, social, and economic structures of devel-
oping countries; (ii) analyze the roles of the state and the market at 
each development level and the mechanics of the transition from one 
level to another; and (iii) focus on the causes of economic distortions 
and the government’s strategies for exit from the distortions. It is not 
an attempt to substitute another ideologically based policy framework 
for those that have dominated development thinking in past decades, yet 
showing little connection to the empirical realities of individual coun-
tries. Rather, it is an approach that brings attention to the endowment 
structure and level of development of each country and suggests a path 
toward  country-based research that is rigorous, innovative, and relevant 
to development policy. This framework stresses the need to understand 
better the implications of structural differences at various levels of a coun-
try’s  development—especially in terms of the appropriate institutions and 
policies, and the constraints and incentives for the private sector in the 
process of structural change. 
The current state of development economics and the severe impact of 
the global crisis on the economies of developing countries have gener-
ated strong demand for a new framework for development thinking. The 
research agenda of the new structural economics should enrich research and 
enhance the understanding of the nature of economic development. This 
would help assist low- and middle-income countries in achieving dynamic, 
sustainable, and inclusive growth, and in eliminating poverty. 
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1.  I will refer to the early contributions by structuralist economists such as 
 Prebisch (1950) and Furtado (1964, 1970) and recent contributions by struc-
turalist economists such as Taylor (1983, 1991, 2004) and Justman and Gurion 
(1991) as old structural economics. 
2.  The total endowments at a specifi c time—the economy’s total budgets at that 
time and the endowment structure, together with the households’ preferences 
and fi rms’ available production technologies—determine the relative factor 
and product prices in the economy. Total budgets and relative prices are two 
of the most fundamental parameters in economic analysis. Moreover, the 
endowments are given at any specifi c time and are changeable over time. 
These properties make endowments and the endowment structure the best 
starting point for analysis of economic development. Except in Heckscher-
Ohlin trade theory, the economic profession has not given suffi cient attention 
to the implications of factor endowments and endowment structure.
3.   The proposition that the industrial structure is endogenous to an economy’s 
endowment structure at each level of its development has been the subject 
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of extensive theoretical studies. For instance, Lin and Zhang (2009) develop 
an endogenous growth model that combines structural change with repeated 
product improvements to discuss the endogeneity of industrial structure, the 
appropriate technology, and economic growth in a less developed country 
(LDC) in a dynamic general-equilibrium framework. They use a two-sector 
model in which technological change in the traditional sector takes the form 
of horizontal innovation based on expanding variety as suggested in Romer 
(1990) while technological progress in the modern sector is accompanied by 
incessantly creating advanced capital-intensive industry to replace backward 
labor-intensive industry. This requires an intentional investment of resources 
by profi t-seeking fi rms or entrepreneurs (Grossman and Helpman 1994). 
The model shows that: (i) the optimal industrial structure in LDCs should not 
be the same as that in developed countries (DCs); (ii) the appropriate technol-
ogy adopted in the modern sector in LDCs ought to be inside the technology 
frontier of the DCs; and (iii) a fi rm in an LDC that enters a capital-intensive, 
advanced industry (by DC standards) would be nonviable owing to the relative 
scarcity of capital in the LDC’s factor endowment. Ju, Lin, and Wang (2009) 
develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to show that industries will 
endogenously upgrade toward the more capital-intensive ones as the capital 
endowment becomes more abundant. The model features a continuous inverse-
V-shaped pattern of industrial evolution driven by capital accumulation: As 
the capital endowment reaches a certain threshold, a new industry appears, 
prospers, then declines, and fi nally, disappears. While the industry is declining, 
a more capital-intensive industry appears and booms. Capital is mobile in an 
open economy. It is unlikely that the mobility of capital will equalize the cap-
ital–labor ratio in high-income, capital-abundant countries and low-income, 
labor-abundant countries. This is because there are two main purposes for 
the capital to fl ow from a higher-income country to a lower-income country. 
The fi rst one is to exploit the lower-income country’s comparative advantage 
of abundant labor (or natural resources) so as to use the lower-income coun-
try as its export base. For this purpose, the industry must be consistent with 
the recipient, lower-income country’s comparative advantage determined by 
its factor endowment, although the technology used by the foreign-invested 
fi rms may be somewhat more capital intensive than the indigenous fi rms. The 
second purpose of capital fl ow from a higher-income country is to get access to 
a lower-income country’s domestic markets. For this type of capital fl ow, the 
foreign-invested industries will be more capital intensive than the indigenous 
fi rms but only the types of production activities that are consistent with the 
host country’s comparative advantage, for example assembly of parts into fi nal 
products, will be located in the lower-income country. Therefore, the theoreti-
cal insights derived from the assumption that the relative abundance of capital 
in a country is given at any specifi c time will hold even with capital mobility. 
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4.   For nontradable goods and services, the nature of least-cost production tech-
nology will also be endogenously determined by the endowment structure. 
That is, as capital becomes relatively abundant, the technology used to pro-
duce nontradable goods and services will also become relatively capital inten-
sive, just as happens in the tradable goods sector. For simplicity, the discussion 
in the paper will focus on the tradable sector. 
5.  Porter (1990) made the term “competitive advantage” popular. According to 
him, a nation will have competitive advantage in the global economy if the 
industries in the nation fulfi ll the following four conditions: (1) their indus-
tries intensively use the nation’s abundant and relatively inexpensive factors of 
production; (2) their products have large domestic markets; (3) each industry 
forms a cluster; and (4) the domestic market for each industry is competitive. 
The fi rst condition in effect means that the industries should be the economy’s 
comparative advantage determined by the nation’s endowments. The third and 
the fourth conditions will hold only if the industries are consistent with the 
nation’s competitive advantage. Therefore, the four conditions can be reduced 
to two independent conditions: comparative advantage and domestic market 
size. Of these two independent conditions, comparative advantage is the most 
important because if an industry corresponds to the country’s comparative 
advantage, the industry’s product will have a global market. That is why many 
of the richest countries of the world are very small (Lin and Ren 2007). 
6.  Industries in advanced developed countries today are typically located on the 
global frontier and face uncertainty as to what the next frontier industries 
will be. This explains why government policy measures to support pioneer 
fi rms in such countries are usually in the form of general support to research 
in universities (which has externalities to private fi rms’ R&D), patents, 
preferential taxes for capital investments, mandates, defense contracts, and 
government procurement. Support in the form of preferential taxes, defense 
contracts, and government procurement are industry or product-specifi c. 
Government support to basic research also needs to be prioritized for certain 
types of potential industries or products because of budget constraints. How-
ever, government support to pioneer fi rms in developing countries, especially 
low-income countries, often fails. One of the most important reasons is the 
attempt by low-income countries governments to support fi rms in industries 
that are inconsistent with the economy’s comparative advantages (Lin 2009a; 
Lin and Chang 2009). 
7.  Barro (2009) calls active fi scal policy of the Keynesian type “the extreme 
demand-side view” or the “new voodoo economics.” 
8.  Recent research suggests that economic returns on investment projects in devel-
oping countries average 30–40 percent for telecommunications, more than 40 
percent for electricity generation, and more than 200 percent for roads. In 
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Thailand, production loss due to power outages represented more than 50 
percent of the total indirect costs of doing business in 2006. Firms often rely 
on their own generators to supplement the unreliable public electricity supply. 
In Pakistan, more than 60 percent of homes destroyed by fi re surveyed in 2002 
owned a generator. The cost of maintaining a power generator is often high 
and burdensome, especially for small and medium-size fi rms, which are impor-
tant sources of employment. Yet, while these costs must be privately borne, 
their benefi ts are felt across the economy. 
9. This is percentage of cost (UNCTAD Statistical Database). 
10.  The exploitation of natural resources can generate a large amount of revenues 
but it is generally very capital intensive and provides limited job opportuni-
ties. In a recent visit to Papua New Guinea, I observed that the Ok Tedi cop-
per and gold mine in Tabubil generates almost 80 percent of the country’s 
export revenues and 40 percent of government revenues but provides only 
2,000 jobs. A proposed liquefi ed natural gas project will double Papua New 
Guinea’s national income after its completion in 2012, but the project will 
only provide 8,000 jobs. The majority of Papua New Guinea’s 6.5 million 
population still live on subsistence agriculture. The contrast between the stan-
dard of living of a few elite workers in modern mining and that of subsistence 
farmers is becoming a source of social tensions. A similar observation can be 
made about Botswana: the failure to diversify the economy from diamond 
mining and to generate employment opportunities may explain the widening 
disparity and deterioration of various human and social indicators, despite the 
diamond industry’s great success in sustaining Botswana’s growth miracle over 
the past 40 years. 
11.  Gerschenkron (1962) made a similar point, arguing that the private sector 
alone cannot effectively address the problems of access to fi nance in weak 
institutional environments. 
12.  A sudden large infl ow of portfolio capital is most likely to be invested in specu-
lative sectors rather than in productive sectors. The reason is twofold: a large 
increase in investment in existing industries may encounter diminishing returns 
to capital, and the potential for quick and large industrial upgrading is limited 
by human capital, as well as soft and hard infrastructure constraints. 
13.  Carneiro and Heckman (2003) have demonstrated the importance of both 
cognitive and noncognitive skills that are formed early in life in accounting 
for gaps in schooling among social groups and other dimensions of socio-
economic success. They have provided empirical evidence of a high return to 
early interventions and a low return to remedial or compensatory interven-
tions later in life. 
14.  The list includes: Botswana; Brazil; China; Hong Kong SAR, China; Indone-
sia; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; Malta; Oman; Singapore; Taiwan, China; and 
 Thailand. 
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Anne Krueger*†
Ever since development economics became a fi eld, there has been a search 
for “the” key to development. Physical capital accumulation, human 
capital, industrial development, institutional quality, social capital, and 
a variety of other factors have been the focus at one time or another. As 
each became the focal point, there was a parallel explicit or implied role 
of government. 
If I understand Justin Lin correctly, he is saying that the “new struc-
tural economics” (NSE) accepts that earlier thought ignored comparative 
advantage, which should be market determined, but that growth requires 
improvements in ‘hard’ (tangible) and ‘soft’ (intangible) infrastructure 
at each stage. Such upgrading and improvements require coordination 
and inhere with large externalities to fi rms’ transaction costs and returns 
to capital investment. Thus, in addition to an effective market mecha-
nism, the government should play an active role in facilitating structural 
change (p. 28). 
He seems also to believe that growth depends almost entirely on 
industry growth and believes that constant “upgrading” or moving up 
the value added chain is the central challenge. He says that “the laissez-
faire approach . . . missed the importance of the process of continuous, 
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fundamental technological changes and industrial upgrading, which 
 distinguishes modern economic growth from premodern economic 
growth” (p. 15). 
It is questionable whether such changes and upgrading must take place 
early in the development process. In many countries, unskilled labor has 
moved to unskilled-labor-intensive industries, with expansion of those 
industries’ outputs for a period during which more and more workers 
acquired acquaintance with modern factory techniques, and exports of the 
unskilled-labor-intensive goods increased. Only later in the development 
process did upgrading become a major part of industrial growth once there 
had been signifi cant absorption of rural labor, and much of it happened 
in existing fi rms in response to rising real wages, lower capital costs, and 
learning through exposure to the international market. 
However, in most countries rural labor could be absorbed only as agri-
cultural productivity increased; Lin’s NSE seems to equate growth with 
industrial expansion, ignoring the importance of increased productivity 
of the large fraction of the labor force (and of land) in rural areas. Fail-
ure to invest in agricultural research and development and in rural health 
and education has been a major weakness of many countries’ develop-
ment strategies. While strides have been made in reducing discrimination 
against agriculture, the NSE as exposited by Lin would appear to support 
the industrial and urban bias that has itself constituted a very large distor-
tion in some countries. 
It will come as no surprise that I agree that the market should be used 
to determine comparative advantage, and that governments have respon-
sibilities for insuring an appropriate incentive framework and provision of 
infrastructure (both hard and, as he terms it, “soft”). 
But there is nothing new in that. What purports to be the “new” part 
is the assertion that coordination and upgrading of infrastructure should 
in some way be related to particular industries. It is at this point where a 
question arises: most economists would accept the view that cost–benefi t 
analysis should be used in the choice of infrastructure projects. If “exter-
nalities” and “coordination” are important, are they important for specifi c 
industries or for the entire industrial economy? If the former, how are those 
industries to be identifi ed, and how would the externalities be  estimated 
in cost–benefi t analysis? Or would they? If infrastructure is seen to be 
 industry-specifi c, it is not clear what it is. As with the possible existence 
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of infant industries, it is one thing to believe that there are such industries 
(perhaps) and quite another to identify ahead of time which they are. And 
even if such industries exist and are identifi ed, questions arise as to the 
incentives that would be appropriate for the government to foster these 
industries. (Would they be fi rm-specifi c treatment? Tariffs? Subsidies to 
fi rms or industries? Each has huge problems.) And if it is more “conven-
tional,” what is new? If infrastructure is specifi c to industry (or a group of 
industries), the same questions must be addressed. 
Some hints are given as to what Lin has in mind: “successful industrial 
upgrading in responding to change in an economy’s endowment structure 
requires that the pioneer fi rms overcome issues of limited information 
regarding which new industries are the economy’s latent comparative 
advantages determined by the changing endowment structure. Valuable 
information externalities arise from the knowledge gained by pioneer 
fi rms in both success and failure. Therefore, in addition to playing a 
proactive role in the improvements of soft and hard infrastructures, the 
government in a developing county, like that in a developed country, 
needs to compensate for the information externalities generated by pio-
neer fi rms” (p. 25). 
Here, the infant industry concerns arise again. How can these externali-
ties be forecast? As Baldwin (1969) pointed out, there are major diffi culties 
with this argument, quite aside from the identifi cation of such externalities. 
And fi rms producing unskilled-labor-intensive goods and exporting them 
have usually learned of the opportunities provided by the international 
market and chosen to upgrade as their experience has increased. Learning 
does not seem to have been a major issue for fi rms in South Korea, Taiwan, 
and elsewhere. 
Another hint as to what Lin has in mind comes from his advocacy of 
coordination of infrastructure investments. According to him, “Change in 
infrastructure requires collective action or at least coordination between 
the provider of infrastructure services and industrial fi rms. For this reason, 
it falls to the government either to introduce such changes or to  coordinate 
them proactively.”(p. 25) How this would be carried out is unclear; Lin 
insists that infrastructure must be upgraded with growth as long as it is 
consistent with the evolving future direction of comparative advantage, 
but does not elaborate on how that future direction should be identifi ed. 
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Involving individual fi rms and industries in decisions as to infrastructure 
investments would appear to offer far too much scope for individual fi rms’ 
and industries’ infl uence over these investments. 
Although it is certainly true that not everything can be done at once, 
focus on selected areas for large investments at the neglect of the rest of 
the economy is a highly questionable strategy. Why it would be preferable 
to allocate scarce capital so that some activities have excellent infrastruc-
ture while others must manage with seriously defi cient infrastructure is not 
clear: without further evidence, it would appear to be a distortion. Further, 
questions can also be raised as to why “soft infrastructure,” such as the 
“business environment” (which consists of such things as the commercial 
code, the structure of taxes and subsidies, regulations, and so on), cannot 
be economy wide. And the criteria by which there would be designation of 
a given area, or the types of industries that would be eligible, as the recipi-
ent of special treatment are not discussed. What the hard infrastructure 
is that does not consist of items such as roads and ports, and is industry 
specifi c, is not discussed. 
But all of this hinges on the proposition that decisionmakers in the pub-
lic sector can ascertain the appropriate rate of “upgrading” and the extent 
of the supposed externalities. This raises a host of issues. There is, fi rst, 
the consideration that even if one could know which activities would have 
comparative advantage, that advantage often develops as small fi rms enter, 
some of which are successful and grow larger. Any strategy of “upgrad-
ing” would inevitably favor larger, established fi rms, and hence encounter 
the same sorts of problems as did the older import-substitution strategy 
which, as Lin recognizes, failed. “Picking winners” as industries is diffi cult; 
it  cannot be fi rm specifi c or the usual problems of corruption and cronyism 
arise. And yet supporting an industry or industries as an undifferentiated 
entity is diffi cult: are textiles an industry? Or is synthetic fi ber an industry? 
Or is nylon an industry? And, of course, the breakdown could go further. 
And as capital and skills per person accumulate, how is it to be decided 
where the industrial park or export processing zone should be? And which 
fi rms should be eligible to enter it? 
Another strand of Lin’s argument pertains to the role of distortions. He 
appears to be saying that countries that earlier adopted import-substitu-
tion strategies have distorted industrial structures that should affect policy. 
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In particular, he says: “many developing countries start climbing the indus-
trial ladder with the legacy of distortions from old structural strategies of 
import-substitution. [The new structural economics] would therefore sug-
gest a gradualist approach to trade liberalization. During transition, the 
state may consider some temporary protection to industries that are not 
consistent with a country’s comparative advantage, while liberalizing at the 
same time entry to other more competitive sectors that were controlled and 
repressed in the past” (p. 36). 
Here, as elsewhere, little guidance is given as to how much protection 
industries would be provided with; how long that protection would last; 
how industries to be protected would be chosen; and so on. But even more 
important, one can imagine the political pressures for greater protection 
for longer periods. Protection of some industries is disprotection of oth-
ers, as is well known, so reform efforts would clearly be dampened. Even 
worse, a major challenge for liberalizing reform is for it to be credible 
that the altered policies are not reversible. Lin’s prescription would greatly 
increase the challenge of creating credibility, and a slower transition would 
be a longer period during which growth was slow and political pressures 
opposing liberalization at all were mounting. 
In all, there is much in Lin’s analysis with which most would agree, but 
focus on governmentally led identifi cation of industries with “latent com-
parative advantage” and industry-specifi c provision of infrastructure is not 
convincing. Lin calls for much research. A fi rst task should be to show that 
there are industry (or industry-cluster) externalities, how they could be iden-
tifi ed and measured ex ante, and what sorts of government support would 
improve potential welfare and growth prospects without generating the 
same sorts of rent-seeking opportunities as import substitution policies did. 
Until that research is undertaken, the NSE will, it is to be feared, be 
taken as a license for governments to support specifi c industries (and worse 
yet, perhaps even fi rms), in ways that may be no more conducive to growth 
than were the old, failed, import-substitution policies. 
Note
†  Anne Krueger is Professor of International Economics in the School of 
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University and a 
Senior Fellow at the Stanford Center for International Development.
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Dani Rodrik*†
Justin Lin wants to make structuralist economics respectable again, and I 
applaud him for that. He wants to marry structuralism with neoclassical 
economic reasoning, and I applaud this idea too. So he has two cheers 
from me. I withhold my third cheer so I can quibble with some of what he 
writes. 
 The central insight of structuralism is that developing countries are 
qualitatively different from developed ones. They are not just radially 
shrunk versions of rich countries. In order to understand the challenges of 
under-development,  you have to understand how the structure of employ-
ment and production—in particular the large gaps between the social 
 marginal products of labor in traditional versus modern activities—is 
determined and how the obstacles that block structural transformation 
can be overcome. 
The central insight of neoclassical economics is that people respond to 
incentives. We need to understand the incentives of, say, teachers to show 
up for work and impart valuable skills to their students or of entrepreneurs 
to invest in new economic activities if we are going to have useful things to 
say to governments about what they ought to do. (And of course, let’s not 
forget that government offi cials must have the incentive to do the economi-
cally “correct” things, too.) 
If we put these two sets of ideas together, we can have a useful devel-
opment economics, one that does not dismiss the tools of contemporary 
economic analysis and yet is sensitive to the specifi c circumstances of devel-
oping economies. This is the kind of development economics that is appro-
priately nuanced in its take on government intervention. It doesn’t  presume 
* Adapted from “Comments on “New Structural Economics’ by Justin Lin,”  by Dani Rodrik, 
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omniscience or altruism on the part of governments. It has a healthy respect 
for the power and effectiveness of markets. But it does not blithely assume 
that development is an automatic process that takes care of itself as long as 
government stays out of the picture. 
So as Lin rightly emphasizes, the state has a useful role to play in pro-
moting industrial diversifi cation and upgrading. He lists among desirable 
functions the provision of information about new industries, the coordina-
tion of investments across fi rms and industries, the internalization of infor-
mational externalities, and the incubation of new industries through the 
encouragement of foreign direct investment. Policies of this kind may be 
unnecessary or superfl uous in advanced economies, but they are essential 
if poor countries are to progress. 
To distinguish his brand of structuralist development economics from 
old-style structuralism, Lin writes that a key difference is that the old school 
advocated policies that go against an economy’s comparative advantage. 
The new approach, by contrast, “stresses the central role of the market . . . 
and advises the state to play a facilitating role to assist fi rms in the process 
of industrial upgrading by addressing externality and coordination issues.” 
Lin argues that government policies should “follow” comparative advan-
tage, rather than “defy” it. 
Here is where I quibble with Lin’s argument. It seems to me that Lin 
wants to argue both for and against comparative advantage at the same 
time, and I cannot quite see how this can be done. If one believes that 
externality and coordination problems need to be addressed, as Lin appar-
ently does, one must believe that such problems are preventing fi rms from 
investing appropriately. One must believe that markets are sending entre-
preneurs the wrong signals—invest here, not there—and that allocating 
resources according to comparative advantage, as revealed by market 
prices, would be socially suboptimal. Comparative advantage has practical 
meaning for fi rms only insofar as it gets refl ected in prices. 
So when Lin asks governments to step in to address market failures and 
recommends the type of policies I have listed above—the coordination of 
investments, the incubation of new industries, etc.—he too is asking them 
to defy comparative advantage as revealed in market prices. In this respect, 
there is less difference between what the old school said and what the new 
school is saying. 
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Lin doesn’t want governments to employ “conventional” import sub-
stitution strategies to build capital-intensive industries which “are not 
consistent with the country’s comparative advantage.” But isn’t building 
industries that defy comparative advantage what Japan and South Korea 
did, in their time? Isn’t it what China has been doing, and quite success-
fully, for some time now? According to my calculations, the export bundle 
of China is that of a country between three and six times richer. If China, 
with its huge surplus of agricultural labor, were to specialize in the type of 
products that its factor endowments recommend, would it now be export-
ing the advanced products that it is? 
Some people draw a distinction between static and dynamic compara-
tive advantage in this context, but I don’t think that is the relevant dis-
tinction. Market failures drive a wedge between market prices and social 
marginal valuations, and distort the relative costs that signal comparative 
advantage. Whether these distortions are introduced into intertemporal 
relative prices or today’s relative prices is largely secondary. The policies 
that Lin recommends are meant to offset such market distortions, and their 
intended effect is to induce fi rms to make choices that defy comparative 
advantage. 
I suspect that my difference with Lin is mainly methodological—and 
perhaps even just terminological—and may have little practical import. 
What Lin probably has in mind is that today’s industrial policies need to 
have a softer touch than that which structuralists of old tended to recom-
mend. They must be more respectful of markets and incentives; they must 
show greater awareness of the potential of government failures; and they 
must focus specifi cally on market failures rather than vague shortcomings 
of the private sector. I would agree with all this. 
But a deeper question relates to the policy implications one draws from 
all this. In principle, market failures need to be addressed with appropri-
ately targeted policies. So if the problem is one of information spillovers, 
the fi rst-best is to subsidize the information generating process. If the 
 problem is lack of coordination, the fi rst-best is for the government to 
bring the parties together and coordinate their investments. In practice, 
though, the relevant market failures cannot be always closely identifi ed 
and the directly targeted remedies may not be available. The practical 
 reality is that the type of policies structuralism calls for—whether of the 
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traditional or the contemporary type—have to be applied in a second-
best setting. And in such a setting, nothing is all that straightforward 
anymore. 
Presumably this is the reason why Lin recommends, for example, a 
gradual approach to trade liberalization. Such an approach is, at best, a 
second-best remedy to some loosely specifi ed market failures that either 
cannot be precisely identifi ed ex ante or cannot be fully treated with fi rst-
best Pigovian interventions. But how different is this from the old struc-
turalist approach? Didn’t most structuralists also view protection as a 
temporary expedient, to be done away with once the requisite industrial 
capabilities were built? 
To repeat, my differences with Justin Lin are second order, and they are 
swamped by our areas of agreement. My quibbles are a bit like the internal 
doctrinal debates waged among communists—does the revolution require 
the intensifi cation of the class struggle, or can that stage be skipped?—when 
much of the rest of the world is on a different wavelength altogether. 
As a fellow traveler, I am greatly encouraged by what Justin Lin is try-
ing to do. It is high time that the common sense exhibited in his approach 
reclaimed its mantle in development economics. 
Note
†  Dani Rodrik is professor of international political economy at Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.
Joseph E. Stiglitz*†
Twelve years ago, when I was chief economist of the World Bank, I sug-
gested that the major challenge to development economics was learning 
the lessons of the previous several decades: a small group of countries, 
mostly in Asia, but a few in other regions, had had phenomenal success, 
beyond anything that had been anticipated by economists; while many 
other countries had experienced slow growth, or even worse, stagnation 
* Adapted from “Rethinking Development Economics,” by Joseph Stiglitz, originally published in 
The World Bank Research Observer (2011) 26 (2): 230–36, published by Oxford University Press 
on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. © 2011 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.  
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and decline—inconsistent with the standard models in economics which 
predicted convergence. The successful countries had followed policies that 
were markedly different from those of the Washington Consensus, though 
they shared some elements in common; those policies had not brought high 
growth, stability, or poverty reduction. Shortly after I left the World Bank, 
the crisis in Argentina—which had been held up as the poster child of the 
country that had followed Washington Consensus policies—reinforced the 
doubts about that strategy. 
The global fi nancial crisis, too, has cast doubt over the neoclassical 
paradigm in advanced industrial countries, and rightly so. Much of devel-
opment economics had been viewed as asking how developing countries 
could successfully transition toward the kinds of market-oriented policy 
frameworks that came to be called “American style capitalism.” The debate 
was not about the goal, but the path to that goal, with some advocating 
“shock therapy,” while others focused on pacing and sequencing—a more 
gradualist tack. The global fi nancial crisis has now raised questions about 
that model even for developed countries. 
In this short essay, I want to argue that the long-term experiences in 
growth and stability of both developed and less developed countries, as 
well as the deeper theoretical understanding of the strengths and limitations 
of market economies, provide support for a “new structural” approach 
to development—an approach similar in some ways to that advocated by 
 Justin Lin in his paper, but markedly different in others. This approach sees 
the limitations of markets as being greater than he suggests—even well func-
tioning market economies are, on their own, neither effi cient nor stable. The 
only period in the history of modern capitalism when there has not been 
repeated fi nancial crises was the short period after the Great Depression 
when the major countries around the world adopted, and enforced, strong 
fi nancial regulations. Interestingly this was also a period of rapid growth 
and a period in which the fruits of that growth were widely shared. 
But government not only has a restraining role; it has a constructive 
and catalytic role—in promoting entrepreneurship, providing the social 
and physical infrastructure, ensuring access to education and fi nance, and 
supporting technology and innovation. 
The perspective that I am putting forward differs not only in its view 
of the effi ciency and stability of unfettered markets, but also in what it 
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sees as the primary driver of economic growth. Since Solow’s pioneering 
work more than a half-century ago (Solow 1957), it has been recognized 
that the major source of increases in per capita income are advances in 
technology.1
The argument that improvements in knowledge are a primary source 
of growth is even more compelling for developing countries. As the World 
Development Report for 1998–99 emphasized, what separates developing 
and developed countries is not just a gap in resources, but a disparity in 
knowledge. There are well understood limits to the pace with which coun-
tries can accumulate capital, but the limitations on the speed with which 
the gap in knowledge can be closed are less clear. 
But the view that creating a learning society, focusing on absorbing and 
adapting, and eventually producing knowledge, provides markedly differ-
ent perspectives on development strategies than those provided by the neo-
classical model. That model centered attention on increasing capital and 
the effi cient allocation of resources. Since the appropriate sectoral structure 
of the economy naturally depends on the resource endowment, there will 
be a natural evolution of the economy’s structure over time. Markets allo-
cate resources effi ciently, enabling the structure to change as the (endog-
enous) endowments change. A government’s main role, in this view, is not 
to put impediments in the market. 
The standard market failures approach criticized these conclusions by 
focusing on a variety of market imperfections: For instance, imperfections 
in capital markets meant that fi nance was often not available for new 
enterprises that were required as part of this sectoral adjustment. Indi-
viduals on their own couldn’t fi nance their education. There are pervasive 
externalities—not only environmental externalities but also those associ-
ated with systemic risk, so evidenced in the current crisis. Research over 
the past 20 years has explored the consequences of market failures like 
imperfect capital markets, traced these imperfections back to problems of 
imperfect and asymmetric information, and proposed a set of remedies, 
which in some countries, in some periods, have worked remarkably well. 
Good fi nancial regulations in countries like India protected them against 
the ravages of the global fi nancial crisis. 
But the perspective of the “learning society”—or, as Greenwald and 
I call it, the “infant economy”—adds a new dimension to the analysis 
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(Greenwald and Stiglitz 2006). Knowledge is different from an ordinary 
commodity. The accumulation of knowledge is inherently associated with 
externalities—knowledge spillovers. Knowledge itself is a public good. 
If the accumulation, absorption, adaptation, production, and transfer of 
knowledge are at the center of successful development, then there is no 
presumption that markets, on their own, will lead to successful outcomes. 
Indeed there is a presumption that they will not. 
The “new structuralist approach” advocated by Justin Lin is perfectly 
aligned with this perspective. Lin provides guidance as to how governments 
should direct the economy; he emphasizes that they should strive to shape 
the economy in a way that is consistent with its comparative advantage. 
The problem is that some of the most important elements of comparative 
advantage are endogenous. Switzerland’s comparative advantage in watch-
making has little to do with its geography. 
Standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory (emphasizing that trade in goods was 
a substitute for movement in factors) was formulated in a period before 
globalization allowed the kinds of fl ows of capital that occur today. With 
fully mobile capital, outside of agriculture, natural resource endowments 
need not provide the basis for explaining patterns of production and 
specialization.2 In short, there is no reason for countries to need to limit 
themselves to patterns dictated by endowments, as conventionally defi ned. 
More important is the “endowment” of knowledge and entrepreneurship. 
A major focus of policy should be on how to enhance and shape those 
endowments. 
Even if a government would like to avoid addressing these issues, it 
cannot; for what the government does (or does not do) has consequences, 
positive and negative, for the development of the “learning society.” This is 
obviously so for investments in infrastructure, technology, and education; 
but also for fi nancial, trade, intellectual property rights and competition 
policies. 
At the center of creating a learning society is the identifying of sectors 
that are more amenable to learning, with benefi ts not captured by fi rms 
themselves, so that there will be underinvestment in learning. Elsewhere 
Greenwald and I have argued that an implication of this is the encour-
agement of the industrial sector, which typically has large spillovers. This 
approach provides an interpretation of the success of Asia’s export-led 
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growth. Had Korea allowed market forces on their own to prevail, it would 
not have embarked on its amazing development successes. Static effi ciency 
entailed that Korea produced rice; indeed the country might today have 
been among the most effi cient rice farmers—but it would still be a poor 
country. As Arrow pointed out (1962), one learns by doing (and one learns 
how to learn by learning [Stiglitz 1987]). 
This discussion highlights the fundamental difference with neoclassical 
approaches emphasizing short-run effi ciency. The fundamental trade-offs 
between static and dynamic effi ciency should be familiar from the debate 
over patent laws. 
A major concern with these industrial policies3 concerns implementa-
tion—do developing countries have the requisite capacities? We need to 
put this question in context. There is probably no country that has grown 
successfully without an important role, not just in restraining and creating 
markets, but also in promoting such industrial policies, from the countries 
of East Asia today to the advanced industrial countries, not just during 
their developmental stages, but even today. The task is to adopt policies 
and practices—to create institutions like an effective civil service—that 
enhance the quality of the public sector. The successful countries did so. 
Policies that either intentionally or unintentionally weaken the state are 
not likely to do so. 
Economic policies have to refl ect the capacity of the state to implement 
them. One of the arguments in favor of exchange rate policies that encour-
age export industries is that they are broad based: the government does 
not have to pick particular “strategic” sectors to support. As always, there 
are trade-offs: effi ciency might be enhanced if the sectors with the largest 
externalities could be targeted. 
There are other broad-based policies, such as a development-oriented 
intellectual-property regime, and investment and fi nancial policies that 
encourage transfer of technology and the promotion of local entrepreneur-
ship, that can help promote a learning and innovation society (Hausmann 
and Rodrik 2003; Stiglitz 2004; Emran and Stiglitz 2009; Hoff 2010). 
Some forms of fi nancial and capital market liberalization may be counter-
productive. 
Interventions will never be perfect, nor need they be to effect an improve-
ment in economic performance.4 The choice is not between an imperfect 
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government and a perfect market. It is between imperfect governments and 
imperfect markets, each of which has to serve as a check on the other; they 
need to be seen as complementary, and we need to seek a balance between 
the two—a balance which is not just a matter of assigning certain tasks 
to one, and others to the other, but rather designing systems where they 
interact effectively. 
While I have been discussing the economics of development, that sub-
ject cannot be separated from broader aspects of societal transformation 
(Stiglitz 1998), as Hirschman emphasized in his writings (1958, 1982). 
Race and caste are social constructs that effectively inhibit the human 
development of large parts of the population in many parts of the world. 
The study of how these constructs get formed, and how they change, is 
thus a central part of developmental studies (Hoff and Stiglitz 2010). In 
this article, I have emphasized the creation of a learning society. The eco-
nomics of doing so entails policies that change sectoral composition. But at 
the root of success is the education system and how it inculcates attitudes 
toward change and skills of learning. Other policies (for example legal sys-
tems, gender-based microcredit schemes, affi rmative action programs) can 
also play an important role. Before concluding, I want to make two further 
remarks. The fi rst concerns the relationship between growth and poverty 
reduction. While growth may be necessary for sustained poverty reduction, 
it is not suffi cient. Not all development policies are pro-poor; some are anti-
poor. Policies like fi nancial and capital market liberalization have, at least 
in some countries, contributed to greater instability, and a consequence of 
that instability is more poverty.5 Contractionary monetary and fi scal poli-
cies in response to crises exacerbate the downturns, leading to higher unem-
ployment and a higher incidence of poverty. Policies to promote a learning 
economy too can either be pro- or anti-poor, but the most successful poli-
cies will necessarily be broad-based, engendering a transformation of the 
learning capacities of all citizens, and will therefore be pro-poor. 
The second comment relates to the broader objectives of development, 
which should be sustainable improvements in the well-being of the citizens 
of the country, and the metrics we use to assess success.6 Our metrics don’t 
typically capture the increase in the wealth of a country that is a result of 
the learning strategies advocated here. It is only gradually, over time, that 
the benefi ts are realized and recognized. 
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The aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis should be an exciting time 
for economists, including development economists, since it dramatically 
revealed fl aws in the reigning paradigm. This paradigm has had enormous 
infl uence in development economics, though that infl uence was already 
waning, because its prescriptions had failed. Fortunately there are alter-
native frameworks already available—a plethora of ideas that should 
provide the basis for new understandings of why a few countries have 
succeeded so well and some have failed so miserably. Out of this under-
standing, perhaps we will be able to mold new policy frameworks that 
will provide the basis of a new era of growth—growth that will both be 
sustainable and enhance the well-being of most citizens in the poorest 
countries of the world. 
Notes
†  Joseph Stiglitz is a professor of fi nance and business at Columbia University 
and chair of the university’s Committee on Global Thought. This article was 
originally a paper prepared for a World Bank symposium, based on Justin Yifu 
Lin’s paper, “New Structural Economics” (chapter I in this book). The perspec-
tive taken here is based on joint work with Bruce Greenwald (2006; forthcom-
ing). Stiglitz is indebted to Eamon Kirchen-Allen for research assistance.
1.  Even before Solow, Schumpeter had argued that the strength of a market 
economy resided in its ability to promote innovation and invention; and, 
shortly after Solow’s work, there developed a large literature on endogenous 
growth, associated with names like Arrow, Shell, Nordhaus, Atkinson, Das-
gupta, Uzawa, Kennedy, Fellner, and Stiglitz, followed on in the 1980s and 
1990s by the work of Romer. (See for example Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969; 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980a and 1980b; Fellner, 1961; Kennedy, 1964; Nor-
dhaus, 1969a and 1969b, Romer, 1994; Shell, 1966 and 1967; Uzawa, 1965.) 
The earlier work on endogenous (sometimes referred to as induced) innovation 
addressed not only the rate of innovation but its direction. For a discussion of 
more recent contributions in this line of research, see Stiglitz (2006). 
2.  Indeed, the work of Krugman has emphasized that today most trade is not 
related in fact to differences in factor endowments. 
3.  I use the term broadly to embrace any policy attempting to affect the direction 
of the economy. 
4.  Indeed, if all projects were successful, it suggests that the government is under-
taking too little risk. 
5.  As I have also noted, such policies may have an adverse effect in enhancing 
domestic learning capacities. 
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6.  The International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress emphasized the failures of GDP to refl ect either sustain-
ability or well-being (Fitoussi, Sen, and Stiglitz 2010). GDP per capita does 
not say anything about how well most citizens are doing; it can be going up 
even though most citizens’ incomes are declining (as has been happening in 
the United States). GDP focuses on production in the country, not on incomes 
earned by those in the country, and takes no account of environmental degrada-
tion or resource depletion, or, more broadly, of sustainability. The United States 
and Argentina both provide examples of countries whose growth appeared to 
be good—but both were based on unsustainable debts, used to fi nance con-
sumption booms, not investment. 
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Rejoinder
Development Thinking 3.0: 
The Road Ahead
Development economics appeared after World War II with the intention 
of helping developing countries industrialize their economies, reduce pov-
erty, and narrow their income gaps with advanced countries. However, the 
developing countries that followed its recommendations to formulate their 
development policies failed to achieve the intended goals. In a paper on 
New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development 
published in the most recent issue of the World Bank Research Observer 
[and reprinted as chapter I in this book], I took up the challenge of syn-
thesizing half a century of various approaches proposed by development 
economics, and suggested a way forward. I am very fortunate and honored 
that my paper was critically discussed in the same issue of the journal by 
Anne Krueger, Dani Rodrik, and Joseph Stiglitz, who are among the best 
minds and most respected experts in the profession—two of them happen 
to be my predecessors as Chief Economist at the World Bank.
I basically argue that early researchers who launched development eco-
nomics as a sub-discipline of modern economics focused on market fail-
ures and advocated old structuralist, state-led development policies. These 
policies did not properly account for comparative advantage and failed 
to create competitive industries. In reaction, a second wave of develop-
ment thinking inspired by neo-liberalism focused on government failures 
and recommended Washington Consensus–type policies that also failed to 
deliver sustainable, inclusive growth and poverty reduction in developing 
countries. 
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Looking at the economic history of all successful economies since the 
Industrial Revolution, I have suggested a general framework for engag-
ing in a third phase of development thinking that focuses on structural 
change, driven by changes in endowment structure and comparative 
advantages. That framework, encapsulated in the idea of New Structural 
Economics (NSE), would help the state play a proactive facilitating role in 
structural transformation. It would also require policy makers to be more 
disciplined in designing and implementing strategies around the function 
of the market. 
As could be expected, Anne Krueger, Joseph Stiglitz, Dani Rodrik, and I 
all agree on the importance and need to reignite the debate on development 
recipes—especially in light of the current global fi nancial and economic 
crisis. But we also have subtle and important differences of ideas on the 
true lessons from economic history and economic theory. 
My biggest divergence of views is with Anne Krueger, who questions 
whether the fundamental technological changes and industrial upgrading—
which I consider to be at the heart of, and crucial to, the mechanics of 
growth—must take place early in the economic development. She contends 
that “only later in the development process did upgrading become a major 
part of industrial growth once there had been signifi cant absorption of 
rural labor, and much of it happened in existing fi rms in response to rising 
real wages, lower capital costs, and learning through exposure to the inter-
national market” (p. 49). My view of economic development is slightly dif-
ferent: The migration of unskilled rural labor to unskilled labor-intensive 
industries is a form of structural change that may not occur spontaneously. 
I believe that proactive action must be taken by policy makers to manage the 
demand for labor: Indeed it is necessary for the government to facilitate the 
growth of existing and emerging unskilled labor-intensive industries along 
the line argued in the NSE. Without such action, many rural out-migrants 
will be unemployed as has been the case in Africa, Latin America and many 
other developing countries. On the supply side of the labor market, the 
government also needs to provide basic education and training to enhance 
the rural out-migrants’ ability to adapt to the new working environment 
and requirements in the industrial sector. Moreover, successful catching-up 
countries may start their upgrading process long before their rural surplus 
labor is exhausted. One example is China. With 39.1 percent of China’s 
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labor force still working in the primary sector in 2009, that issue is hotly 
debated in academic circles: some economists wonder whether China has 
reached the so-called Lewis turning point and depleted its labor surplus. 
However, the quick and continuous upgrading of China’s industries is still 
going on, exemplifi ed by the quality and varieties of China’s exports to the 
U.S. market. A similar situation was observed in 1980 when 34 percent of 
Korea’s labor force was still in agriculture. However, Korea had already 
entered not only industries such as consumer electronics, but also ship-
building, automaking, and memory chips by that time. 
I fully agree with Anne that agricultural productivity needs to be 
improved in parallel with industrialization (p. 48). But again, in order to 
improve agricultural productivity and increase farm income, the govern-
ment must play a proactive role in making new agricultural technology 
available, providing extension services, improving irrigation, and expand-
ing market channels. The government also needs to create conditions to 
facilitate the diversifi cation of agriculture into new, higher-value-added 
cash crops. 
While Anne agrees that “the market should be used to determine com-
parative advantage, and that governments have responsibilities for  insuring 
an appropriate incentive framework and provision of infrastructure, both 
hard and soft,” she objects, most notably, to government intervention aim-
ing at fostering the development of specifi c industries and doubts “why it 
would be preferable to allocate scarce capital so that some activities have 
excellent infrastructure while others must manage with seriously defi cient 
infrastructure” (p. 51).
In fact, identifi cation of new industries and prioritization of govern-
ment’s limited resources to facilitate the development of those industries 
are both essential for successful growth strategies in developing countries. 
Why? Because the infrastructure improvements required are often indus-
try specifi c. One simply has to look at the list of recent success stories 
in African countries to understand the necessity for identifi cation: tex-
tiles in Mauritius, apparel in Lesotho, cotton in Burkina Faso, cut fl owers 
in Ethiopia, mango in Mali and gorilla tourism in Rwanda all required 
that governments provide different types of infrastructure. The refrigera-
tion facilities needed at the airport and regular fl ights to ship  Ethiopia’s 
cut fl owers to the auctions in Europe are obviously quite different from 
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the improvements required at the port facilities for textile exports in 
 Mauritius. Similarly, the type of infrastructure needed for the garment 
industry in Lesotho is distinct from the one needed for mango production 
and export in Mali or for attracting gorilla tourism in Rwanda. Because 
fi scal resources and implementation capacity are limited, the government 
in each of those countries had to prioritize and decide which particular 
infrastructure they should improve or where to optimally locate the public 
services to make those success stories happen. Deng Xiaoping explained 
that pragmatic wisdom at the beginning of China’s transition to a market 
economy when he advocated allowing a few regions and people to get rich 
fi rst so as to achieve common prosperity for all people in the nation. The 
dynamic growth in those regions and industries would increase fi scal rev-
enues, giving the government more resources to improve infrastructure for 
other regions in the nation later.
Identifi cation of new sectors or lines of business and prioritization of 
infrastructure investment are also necessary because to be competitive in 
the globalized world, a new industry not only must align with the coun-
try’s comparative advantage so that its factor costs of production can 
be at the lowest possible level but it also must have the lowest possible 
 transaction-related costs. Why? Suppose a country’s infrastructure and 
business environment are good and industrial upgrading and diversifi cation 
happen spontaneously. Without government coordination, fi rms may enter 
into too many different industries that are all consistent with the country’s 
comparative advantage. As a result, most industries may not form clusters 
that are suffi ciently large and will not be competitive in the domestic and 
international markets. A few clusters may emerge eventually after many 
failures. Such a “trial and error” process is likely to be long and costly, 
reducing the individual fi rms’ expected returns and incentives to upgrade 
or diversify to new industries, and slowing down the country’s economic 
development. It is therefore imperative for a facilitating state in a developing 
country to identify and select new industries that are consistent with com-
parative advantage, use its limited resources to improve infrastructure for a 
limited number of carefully selected industries, provide adequate incentives 
for fi rst movers, and coordinate private fi rms’ related investments in those 
industries so that clusters can be formed successfully and quickly. Whether 
the government plays the identifi cation and facilitation role may explain 
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why some developing countries can grow at 8 percent or more for several 
decades while most others fail to have a similar performance.
I agree with Anne that cost-benefi t analysis is indeed an excellent tool 
that should be used for evaluating the potential merits of every single 
infrastructure project (p. 49). Such an analysis sheds light on the valid-
ity of competing alternatives and can help make better public investment 
decisions. It forces policy makers to provide quantitative data to back up 
qualitative arguments and is therefore an invaluable technique for increas-
ing social welfare. But it is microeconomic by nature. Without the iden-
tifi cation of potentially successful industries and their likely location and 
needed infrastructure, policy makers are confronted with too many pos-
sible feasible projects that all need careful cost-benefi t analysis. Moreover, 
for every public investment project, there are many benefi ts and costs that 
are intangible and therefore diffi cult to value. It is also well known that the 
results of that analysis can be very sensitive to the choice of the discount 
rate, and that the information used to determine future benefi ts and costs 
is limited by current knowledge.
In her discussion of infant industries, Anne observes that fi rms that pro-
duce and export unskilled-labor-intensive goods have usually learned from 
the opportunities arising from the dynamics of international market. She 
notes that “learning does not seem to have been a major issue for fi rms 
in South Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere” (p. 50). Learning may not be an 
issue if it is a by-product of the fi rms’ business activities, but if it is not such 
a spontaneous element of their activities, fi rms may not have the incentives 
to invest in it. A low-income country should have comparative advantage 
in the production of many unskilled, labor-intensive manufacturing prod-
ucts that it still imports. Such product market information should be avail-
able freely to any entrepreneur in the country. But production information 
about where to buy the equipment and intermediate inputs to manufacture 
these imported products, and knowledge about how to operate a fi rm to 
produce them, are relatively costly to obtain for most entrepreneurs in low-
income countries. Furthermore, the coordination of related investment in 
infrastructure, access to fi nance for investment and operation, or the avail-
ability of foreign exchange for importing equipment for developing the 
new industry may still be serious issues for private fi rms even if learning 
about product market and production information is not a problem. 
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Anne’s skepticism of all industry-specifi c interventions—a skepticism 
widely shared in the mainstream economic profession and Washington-
based development institutions—results from the pervasive failures of 
 government’s attempts to pick winners in the past. Those failures were 
mostly due to the misguided attempts by many governments to develop 
industries that were inconsistent with their countries’ comparative advan-
tages. Firms in those industries were not viable in open, competitive mar-
kets, and their investment and survival depended on heavy government 
protection, large subsidies, and direct resource allocations through mea-
sures such as monopoly rent, high tariffs, quota restrictions, and subsi-
dized credits. The large rents embedded in those measures created many 
distortions and easily became the targets of political capture. All this cre-
ated diffi cult governance problems. The likelihood of these problems aris-
ing is much reduced when the government facilitates the development of 
new industries that are consistent with the country’s changing comparative 
advantage determined by the change in its endowment structure, as sug-
gested in the NSE.
Anne also worries that the identifi cation of any new industry for upgrad-
ing “would inevitably favor larger, established fi rms and hence encounter 
the same sorts of problems as did the older import-substitution strategy” 
(p. 51). Her worry is valid for the old structuralist import-substitution 
strategy because the industries favored went against the comparative 
advantages of the countries that adopted it. Such industries were too capi-
tal intensive and only a few rich and politically well-connected fi rms could 
enter them. However, if the identifi ed new industries are consistent with the 
country’s comparative advantages, capital intensive or not, many fi rms will 
be able to enter and contest the dominance of large fi rms, as exemplifi ed by 
the auto industry in Japan in the 1960s, the textile industry in Mauritius 
and electronics in Taiwan, China, in the 1970s, and the garment industry 
in Bangladesh and salmon-farming in Chile in the 1980s. 
The type of government incentives for the fi rst movers advocated in the 
NSE is limited to compensating for the externalities generated by the fi rst 
movers rather than supporting nonviable fi rms, as in the case of old struc-
turalist import-substitution strategy. Therefore, tax holidays for fi rst mov-
ers for a few years, and preferential access to credit and foreign exchange (in 
countries where lack of access is a binding constraint) would be enough. 
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Finally, Anne questions the uncertainty surrounding the scope, depth, 
and length of government protection and points out the risk of political 
capture and rent-seeking in situations where a government adopts a dual-
track approach during its transition from a heavily distorted economy to 
a well-functioning market economy. She argues that “a major challenge 
for liberalizing reform is for it to be credible that the altered policies are 
not reversible. Lin’s prescription would greatly increase the challenge of 
creating credibility, and a slower transition would be a longer period dur-
ing which growth was slow and political pressures opposing liberalization 
at all were mounting” (p. 52). The credibility argument was used to sup-
port the shock therapy in the transitions of East Europe and the former 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s. However, even though those fi rms were 
privatized, governments in transition economies were very often forced to 
provide other disguised and less effi cient forms of subsidies and protec-
tion to ward off large unemployment and subsequent social and politi-
cal  instability. As a result, most transition economies encountered the 
awkward situation of “shock without therapy.” Instead of a “J-curve” 
recovery as promised by the proponents of shock therapy, those econo-
mies encountered an “L-curve” growth path (a prolonged sluggish growth 
after a sharp decline in the GDP) during their transition. By contrast, good 
performers such as China, Vietnam, Laos, Slovenia, and Uzbekistan have 
reformed their distorted economies by adopting a more pragmatic, dual-
track approach, which consists of progressively phasing out government 
support to “nonviable” fi rms in priority sectors and at the same time lib-
eralizing the entry of formerly repressed private enterprises, joint ventures, 
and foreign direct investment in sectors aligned with their comparative 
advantages. The lesson is clear: for any developing country confronted 
with severe distortions and poor growth performance, the best way to gain 
confi dence and credibility in its liberalization reforms is to achieve stability 
and dynamic growth in the transition process.
The comments by Joe Stiglitz and Dani Rodrik on my paper reveal more 
differences of emphasis and style than divergence on substance. I agree 
with Dani’s assessment that our difference “is mainly methodological—
and perhaps even just terminological—and may have little practical 
import” (p. 55). However, there are a few differences that are worth 
highlighting.
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Beyond the traditional need for regulation, Joe sees a catalytic role for 
governments “in promoting entrepreneurship, providing the social and 
physical infrastructure, ensuring access to education and fi nance, and sup-
porting technology and innovation” (p. 57). He strongly challenges the 
belief in the effi ciency and stability of unfettered markets, and stresses the 
need for advances in technology as a key condition for increases in per 
capita income. Consequently, he favors public action for the creation of a 
“learning society” (p. 58). 
I agree with Joe on the importance of learning. However, the content 
and mechanism of learning may be different for countries at different lev-
els of development. Developing countries that are still at the early phase 
of their development generally do not have the necessary human and 
physical capital to leapfrog into capital-intensive, high-tech industries. The 
more effective route for their learning and development is to exploit the 
advantages of backwardness and upgrade and diversify into new indus-
tries according to the changing comparative advantages determined by 
the changes in their endowment structure. The subsequent dynamics of 
growth,  accumulation of human and physical capital, and industrial and 
technological upgrading eventually open up possibilities to enter and mas-
ter capital- and knowledge-intensive industries at the global frontier. The 
need to generate new knowledge through indigenous innovations in an 
economy increases with its economic development and the narrowing of 
the knowledge gap (the distance to the global technology/industrial fron-
tier). Therefore, the learning and the enhancement of human capital should 
be commensurate with the level of economic development. Otherwise the 
attempt to create a “learning society” by increasing education alone may 
not correspond to the emergence of new, dynamic sectors consistent with 
the comparative advantage refl ected in its endowment structure. Should 
this happen, the educated young people will not fi nd suitable employment 
opportunities, causing a waste of scarce human and educational resources 
and, most likely, social tensions, as has happened in North African and 
many other developing countries.
Joe points out that “some of the most important elements of comparative 
advantage are endogenous” and contends that “Switzerland’s  comparative 
advantage in watch-making has little to do with its geography” (p. 59). 
The fact is that watch-making was a new industry in the 16th century. 
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Switzerland goldsmiths started making watches in 1541 and formed the 
fi rst watch-makers’ guild in 1601.1 According to Maddison’s (2010) esti-
mations, Switzerland’s per capita income in 1600 was 750 measured in 
1990’s  international dollars, which was 77 percent of Britain’s in the same 
year. Therefore, Switzerland was one of the “high-income” countries in the 
world at that time. To continue its income growth, it had to upgrade its 
industries to some new higher-value-added industries. 
While Switzerland’s comparative advantage in watching-making has 
little to do with its geography, as Joe pointed out, geography may be a 
crucial reason for its leadership in this industry since the 16th century. 
Watches are small, light, and high value added, with potential for continu-
ous technology improvements. Such an industry is particularly suitable for 
a landlocked country like Switzerland. This may explain why Switzerland 
has kept its watch-making industry by maintaining technology leadership 
through continuous innovations since the 16th century but gave up other 
industries, such as garments, textiles, and footwear, which fl ourished in 
Switzerland in its early history.
Joe may be a bit too optimistic when he suggests that full capital mobil-
ity in a globalized world allows countries to free themselves from patterns 
dictated by endowments, as conventionally defi ned. He postulates that 
“with fully mobile capital, outside of agriculture, natural resource endow-
ments need not provide the basis for explaining patterns of production and 
specialization” (p. 59). However, short-term capital fl ows are too volatile 
to be a reliable source for long-term productive investments in developing 
countries. We observed that during the East Asian fi nancial crisis of the late 
1990s. By contrast, foreign direct investments are more reliable because 
they are motivated by the search for profi ts. They mostly go to tradable 
sectors or production activities which are consistent with a host country’s 
comparative advantage so as to use that location as an export base, or to 
enter the host country’s domestic market—except when they are driven by 
occasional cases of privatization of large non-tradable sectors such as utili-
ties and telecommunication. Because of his optimism about the mobility of 
capital, Joe highlights the importance of knowledge and entrepreneurship 
endowment. The importance of knowledge and entrepreneurship cannot 
be overemphasized. They are indeed driving forces for industrial upgrad-
ing and diversifi cation in a dynamically growing economy. Nevertheless, 
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as discussed above, the type of new knowledge that is useful for a coun-
try’s development depends on the needs of new industries that align with 
the country’s comparative advantage. An entrepreneur’s investment in an 
open, competitive market is unlikely to be successful if he or she invests in 
industries that do not align with the country’s comparative advantage. 
Joe proposes the undervaluation of the exchange rate as a broad-based 
policy for encouraging the upgrading of tradable industries (p. 60). This is 
a delicate issue: it may help exports but it always makes imports of equip-
ment more expensive, which is an obstacle for industrial upgrading and 
diversifi cation (because fi rms need new capital equipment from abroad to 
upgrade or diversify into new industries). Therefore such a policy may 
help existing industries’ exports but may not be conducive to long-term 
growth. Successful developing countries seem to have adopted a policy of 
undervaluation of real exchange rate if the Balassa-Samuelson theorem is 
used as a reference. However, the explanation may be the following: these 
countries typically converge from a dual economy with large surplus labor 
to a modern economy with a unifi ed national labor market. At some point 
that theorem does not apply: before the depletion of surplus labor, the 
wage rate in the tradable and non-tradable sectors will not increase, which 
is a required mechanism for real appreciation in the theorem. What then 
looks like undervaluation may actually be an equilibrium exchange rate.
Dani’s quibble with my approach seems to be related to his assump-
tion that coordination and externality issues only exist in situations where 
markets send entrepreneurs the wrong signals. He therefore suggests that 
I may be arguing “both for and against comparative advantage” (p. 55). 
This deserves a clarifi cation: Comparative advantage is determined by fac-
tor endowment. If an industry is consistent with a country’s comparative 
advantage, the factor cost of production will be lower than otherwise. But 
for that industry to be competitive in its domestic and international mar-
kets, transaction-related costs should also be reduced to their lowest pos-
sible level. Yet, individual fi rms cannot internalize the reduction of many 
of the transaction-related costs arising from issues such as provision of 
infrastructure, logistics, fi nance, educated labor and so forth. Without gov-
ernment coordination and facilitation to reduce such costs and compensate 
for the externalities generated by the fi rst mover, these industries are likely 
to simply remain as the latent comparative advantage of the economy. An 
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illustration of this problem is the fact that low-income countries typically 
have comparative advantages in most unskilled, labor-intensive industries 
but few of them are able to be competitive in those industries—precisely 
because governments fail to effectively play their facilitating role. There-
fore, the answer to Dani’s objection lies in the distinction between a coun-
try’s latent comparative advantage, which determines the factor costs of 
production, and its actual comparative advantage (or, in Michael Porter’s 
term, competitive advantage), which requires in addition the reduction 
of transaction-related costs. My recommendation that governments step 
into the economic process and address market failures should therefore 
not be misunderstood as an attempt to defy an economy’s “natural” or 
“inexorable” comparative advantage as revealed in market prices but as a 
way of opening the black box of business competitiveness, converting an 
economy’s potential into reality, and igniting the march of domestic fi rms 
toward market success. 
The differences between Dani’s and my understanding of the govern-
ment’s role arise to a large extent from our diverging interpretations of 
experiences in successful countries such as Japan, Korea and China. He 
regards the successful catching up in Japan and South Korea as evidence 
for the need to defy a country’s comparative advantage (p. 55). When Japan 
embarked upon its industrialization path in the early years of the Meiji 
period (1868–1912), it was an agrarian society in which farming, forestry 
and fi shing employed more than 70 percent of the working population 
and represented over 60 percent of national output. Throughout the Meiji, 
Taisho (1912–26) and pre-war Showa (1926–36) periods, the top exports 
were raw silk yarn, tea, and marine products. The main market for these 
commodities was the United States. Historians remind us that along with 
the opening up of Japanese ports, demand for these primary commodities 
quickly ballooned and domestic producers greatly profi ted from it. Silk in 
particular brought wealth to rural areas and generated much coveted for-
eign exchange. Also, mining, which had continued from the previous Edo 
Period, was largely requisitioned by the government and later sold off to 
the private sector to become one of Japan’s principal industries. The suc-
cess of these sectors allowed Japan’s per capita income to increase 40 per-
cent from $737 in 1870 to $1,012 in 1890 and again to $2,026 at the 
onset of Great Depression in 1929 (Maddison 2010).2 From the point of 
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view of NSE, that success contributed to capital accumulation and changed 
Japan’s endowment structure and comparative advantage. In the words of 
Japanese historian Kenichi Ohno, “the industrialization of the Meiji Period 
was a light industrial revolution, which made its way from importing to 
domestic production and then onto exporting. Within this transition, cot-
ton production played a central role. The iron and steel, shipbuilding and 
chemical industries, as well as the manufacture of electrical machinery and 
appliances were in their infancy and the country was still in the process of 
learning by imitating the West… By late Meiji, private-sector production 
in the areas of shipbuilding, railway carriages and machine instruments 
had slowly emerged.”3 Japan’s industrialization proceeded in a fl ying-geese 
pattern, moving step by step from simple, labor-intensive manufacturing 
goods to more capital- and technology-intensive manufacturing goods 
(Akamatsu 1962).
Korea also adopted a realistic approach to industrial upgrading and 
adjusted its strategy to enter industries that were consistent with its latent 
(and evolving) comparative advantage. In the 1960s Korea developed and 
exported labor-intensive products such as garments, plywood, and wigs. 
With capital accumulation and a change in its endowment structure due 
to success, Korea upgraded to more capital-intensive sectors such as the 
automotive sector. But at the initial stage, domestic manufacturers concen-
trated mostly on assembly of imported parts, which was labor-intensive 
and in line with their comparative advantage at the time. Similarly, in 
electronics, the focus was initially on household appliances, such as TVs, 
washing machines and refrigerators before the country moved to the pro-
duction of memory chips, the least technologically complex segment of 
the information industry. Korea’s technological ascent has been rapid, at 
a pace commensurate to changes in underlying comparative advantage. 
Such changes refl ected rapid accumulation of physical and human capi-
tal resulting from the dynamic growth, which could only occur because 
the country’s main industrial sectors remained consistent with its existing 
comparative advantage. 
Similarly, Dani’s observation that China has been defying its comparative 
advantage successfully, with its export bundle resembling that of a country 
between three and six times richer, neglects the fact that these are mostly 
processed products. China only provides value-added in labor-intensive 
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assembly and accessories. Empirical research (Wang and Wei 2010) shows 
that China’s exports are consistent with China’s comparative advantage. 
Dani also questions the differences between my recommendation for 
gradual trade liberalization and the old structuralist policies. The lat-
ter approach advocated protection and subsidies to build new industries 
that were not aligned with comparative advantage, whereas the dual-
track, gradual approach for trade liberalization that I recommend advises 
 governments in transition economies to provide temporary protection 
or subsidies to old industries that were not viable in an open, competi-
tive market but were established under the misguided old structuralist 
strategy. The pragmatic dual-track approach helps a transition economy 
avoid unnecessary and costly economic and social disruption, and eventu-
ally leads to a system of market-based prices and resource allocation as 
explained in my response to Anne’s comments. 
Summing up, it appears that Anne’s questions about the practicality of 
my framework arise mostly from interrogations on how to identify new 
industries that are consistent with a country’s latent comparative advan-
tage, and how to administer the coordination and incentives for the fi rst 
movers. Joe’s and Dani’s advocacy of broad-based interventions such as 
undervalued real exchange rates to support the trade sector but reluctance 
to embrace the idea of sector-specifi c policies are also related to the puzzle 
about how to identify industries aligned with latent comparative advantage. 
Those questions are addressed in a companion paper  entitled “Growth 
Identifi cation and Facilitation,” co-authored with  Célestin Monga and 
published in Development Policy Review (chapter III of this book). Based 
on economic analysis and historical experiences, the growth identifi cation 
and facilitation framework that we propose suggests that policy makers 
identify dynamic tradable industries in fast-growing countries with similar 
endowment structures, and with a per capita income about  double their 
own. If domestic private fi rms in these sectors are already present, pol-
icy makers should identify them and remove constraints on those fi rms’ 
technological upgrading or on entry by other fi rms. In industries where 
no domestic fi rms are present, policy makers could aim to attract foreign 
direct  investment from the countries being emulated or organize programs 
for incubating new fi rms. The government should also pay attention to 
the development by private enterprises of new and  competitive products, 
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and support the scaling up of successful private-sector innovations in new 
industries. In countries with a poor business environment, special economic 
zones or industrial parks can facilitate fi rm entry, foreign direct investment, 
and the formation of industrial clusters. Finally, the government might help 
pioneering fi rms in the new industries by offering tax incentives for a lim-
ited period, co-fi nancing investments, or providing access to land or for-
eign exchange.
I am grateful to Anne, Joe, Dani, and many others who have provided 
comments and constructive criticism of my paper. Despite our differences, 
there seems to be an emerging consensus on the need to reconcile lessons 
from the fi rst two major waves of development thinking (structuralism and 
neo-liberalism) into a new synthesis that recognizes and defi nes the proper 
roles of state and markets. The road ahead towards that third wave (which 
might be termed “Development Thinking 3.0”) will obviously involve 
healthy and useful intellectual disagreements. Because, as Confucius once 
said, “Real knowledge is to know the extent of one’s ignorance.”
Notes
1. http://www.fhs.ch/en/history.php.
2.  Dollars are 1990 dollars adjusted for Geary-Khamis purchasing power parity.
3.  Translated excerpts from the book Tojokoku no Globalization: Jiritsuteki 
Hatten wa Kanoka (Globalization of Developing Countries: Is Autonomous 
Development Possible?) by Toyo Keizai Shimposha (2000), quoted by Japan’s 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS). See http://www.grips
.ac.jp/forum-e/pdf_e01/eastasia/ch5.pdf.
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1. Introduction
Economists have always been confl icted between the need to understand 
the dynamics of business cycles, and the study of long-term growth—both 
of which are important for human welfare. The world economy has just 
experienced a severe fi nancial and economic crisis,1 which has justifi ed the 
intellectual focus on stabilization policies, especially given the role that 
coordinated and decisive monetary and fi scal policies have played in pre-
venting the global recession from becoming a worldwide depression. But 
the persistence of poverty in many parts of the world and the potential 
long-term impact of the crisis on global poverty reduction also highlight 
the importance of policies that are conducive to sustainable and inclusive 
growth.2 Economic growth is indeed the main source of divergences in liv-
ing standards across countries and regions of the world. As Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995) observe, “if we can learn about government policy options 
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that have even small effects on long-term growth rates, we can contribute 
much more to improvements in standards of living than has been provided 
by the entire history of macroeconomic analysis of countercyclical policy 
and fi ne tuning.” 
In fact, economic growth may be the single most important issue con-
fronting economists today. The differences in output per worker and 
national income across countries are still puzzling. According to cal-
culations by Maddison (2001), world population rose 22-fold over the 
past millennium. Per capita income increased 13-fold, world GDP nearly 
300-fold. This contrasts sharply with the preceding millennium, when 
world population grew by only a sixth, and there was no advance in per 
capita income. Measured in today’s living standards, all countries in the 
world were poor in the beginning of the 18th century. Sustained growth 
in income per capita only picked up after 1820: per capita income rose 
more than eightfold. 
A well-known fact confi rmed by the recent crisis is the observation that 
countries that have sustained high rates of growth have also performed 
well despite the global meltdown. Their dynamic performance has made 
them more resilient. With strong external balance sheets and ample room 
for fi scal maneuver before the crisis, they were able to implement coun-
tercyclical policies to combat external shocks. “A crisis is a terrible thing 
to waste,” said Paul Romer, one of the preeminent theorists of growth. 
Despite its heavy human, fi nancial and economic cost, the recent recession 
provides a unique opportunity to refl ect on the knowledge from several 
decades of growth research, draw policy lessons from the experience of 
successful countries, and explore new approaches going forward. 
Looking at the data, one may be surprised to note that the recession has 
obscured the broader economic narrative of our time, which is the remark-
able economic performance of many poor countries, especially in the past 
ten years. Leaving aside the United States, which ranks third, the four most 
populous countries of the world (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia), have 
made great strides, averaging annual growth rates well over 6 percent a 
year. That is a vast improvement in the standards of living for more than 
40 percent of the world’s population. The same trends are in place in many 
other South American countries (Chile, Colombia, Peru) and in some 
 African countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Tunisia, Ghana). 
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To be sure, poverty reduction is still a very challenging development 
issue. In an increasingly globalized world where fi ghting poverty is not 
only a moral responsibility but also a strategy for confronting some of 
the major problems (diseases, malnutrition, insecurity and violence) that 
ignore boundaries and contribute to global insecurity, thinking about new 
ways of generating and sustaining growth is a crucial task for economists. 
It is therefore essential to continue searching for new ideas on the mechan-
ics of wealth creation. Over the last 50 years, much progress has been 
made, most recently with the work of the Growth Commission Report.3 
But beyond a consensus on broad principles and the rejection of one-size-
fi ts-all approaches, economists still face signifi cant challenges in identifying 
actionable policy levers that are directly relevant to specifi c countries. 
This paper reassesses the evolution of knowledge on growth and sug-
gests a new structural approach to the analysis. Section 2 offers a brief, 
critical review of lessons learned from growth research and examines the 
remaining challenges—especially from the policy standpoint. Section 3 
highlights the important recent contribution of the Growth Commission 
Report and the identifi cation of stylized facts associated with sustained and 
inclusive growth. Section 4 provides a consistent framework for under-
standing its key fi ndings through the lenses of new structural economics. 
Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts. 
2. The Quest for Growth: An Unfi nished Journey
Economic historians who have examined the evolution of growth per-
formance throughout history tend to divide it into three distinct periods: 
The fi rst one, which spanned most of human history up to the middle of 
the 18th century, was marked by static living standards, despite popula-
tion growth—the so-called Malthusian conditions. The second one, which 
lasted from about 1750 to the 1820s, was characterized by some improve-
ment in living standards, and changes in demographic trends (higher fertil-
ity rates and lower mortality rates). The third epoch, observed initially in 
England at the end of the fi rst quarter of the 19th century, has been that 
of modern economic growth (Cameron, 1993). Deciphering the mystery 
of modern economic growth and explaining convergence and divergence 
have been major topics of research, especially since the 1950s. While much 
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progress has been achieved on theoretical and empirical grounds, much 
remains to be understood on the policy front. 
Growth Analysis in Historical Perspective
The analysis of growth—and the specifi c factors that have sustained it and 
accompanied the structural changes associated with it—became a major 
topic of interest for thinkers in general and economists in particular in the 
early 18th century. David Hume, whom Rostow claims to be “the fi rst 
modern economist” (1990: 18) placed economic analysis at the center of 
his analysis of the human condition. He also offered economic concepts 
that are considered to “form a reasonably coherent and consistent the-
ory of the dynamics of growth.” Classical economists who followed in 
his footsteps—such as Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall, David Ricardo and 
Allyn Young—were also obsessed with economic growth. Perhaps because 
of their fascination with the idea of human progress celebrated during the 
Enlightenment, they explored the determinants of economic development, 
and the role that policymakers could play in fostering prosperity. Their 
pioneering work highlighted important notions such as factor accumula-
tion, factor substitution, technical change, or specialization, which are at 
the core of modern growth theory. 
But growth analysis slowed down after the Great Depression, as the 
intellectual focus shifted from long-run to short-run issues. In fact, with 
the notable exception of the pioneering work of Robert Solow, for much of 
the 20th century and certainly through the 1960s and 1970s, macroecono-
mists tended to study business cycles issues that characterized the post-War 
period. As they tried to better understand stabilization policies—monetary 
and fi scal measures to avoid disruptive and costly infl ation—few resources 
were devoted to the analysis of the long-run determinants of growth. 
Things changed in the 1980s when many prominent researchers focused 
their attention on differences in economic performance among countries. 
Surveys of economic growth and levels of performance in different parts 
of the world economy show that growth has indeed been uneven across 
countries and regions: between 1900 and 2001, per capita GDP in Western 
Europe increased by a factor of 6.65 (6.7 in Western offshoots), compared 
to 5.2 in Latin America, 4.2 in Eastern Europe, and only 2.5 in Africa.4 The 
number of people living in high-growth environments or in countries with 
The Growth Report and New Structural Economics | 87
OECD per capita income levels has increased in the past 30 years by a fac-
tor of four, from 1 billion to about 4 billion (Growth Commission, 2008).
Following the initial work by Harrod and Domar, the Solow-Swan 
model sparked the fi rst major wave of systematic growth analysis. The 
objective was to understand the mechanics of growth, identify its determi-
nants, and to develop techniques of growth accounting, which would help 
explain changes in the momentum and the role of economic policy. That 
fi rst generation of growth researchers highlighted the centrality of capi-
tal. Their models featured neoclassical forms of production functions with 
specifi cations that relied on constant returns to scale, diminishing returns 
and some elasticity of substitution between inputs. In order to present a 
general equilibrium model of the economy, these researchers adopted a 
constant saving rate rule. This was a crude assumption but a major step 
forward in tool building, as it offered a clear demonstration that general 
equilibrium theory could be applied convincingly to real world issues. One 
important prediction from these models was the idea of conditional con-
vergence, derived from the assumption of diminishing returns to capital—
poor economies with lower capital per worker (relative to their long-run or 
steady state capital per worker) will grow faster.5 
The major strength of that line of growth research was the explicit 
introduction of technology—in addition to capital and labor—in the theo-
retical and empirical analysis. But the limited toolkit available at the time 
created a major shortcoming to that approach: technology was presented 
as an exogenously given public good. The major prediction of the model 
based on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital was the idea that 
per capita growth will cease in the absence of continuous improvements in 
technology. While that assumption allowed the model to maintain its key 
prediction of conditional convergence, it also seemed odd: technology, the 
main determinant of long-run growth, was kept outside of the model.6 
A new wave of growth modeling had to come up with a convincing the-
ory of technological change—one that frees up the neoclassical model from 
the exogeneity of the main determinant of long-term growth. A fi rst step 
was to design a theory of continuous growth fuelled by non-diminishing 
returns to investment on a broad class of physical and human capital. The 
process could go on indefi nitely if returns do not diminish as economies 
grow (Romer 1986). A second, more effective approach was to move away 
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from the straightjacket of perfect competition, and incorporate imperfect 
competition and R&D theories in growth modeling—the rationale here 
being that such bold methodological moves helped explain why the econ-
omy would not run out of new ideas, and growth rates could be kept posi-
tive in the long run (Romer 1987, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). 
Endogenous growth theory, as it came to be known, maintained the 
assumption of nonrivalry because technology is indeed a very different type 
of factor from capital and labor—because it can be used indefi nitely by 
others, at zero marginal cost. But it was important to take the next logical 
step and to better understand the public good characterization of technol-
ogy, and think of it as a partially excludable nonrival good. The new wave 
therefore reclassifi ed technology not just as a public good but as a good 
that is subject to a certain level of private control. By making it a partially 
excludable nonrival good and therefore giving it some degree of exclud-
ability or appropriability, it was possible to ensure that incentives mat-
ter for its production and use. The move away from perfect competition 
was therefore necessary. It has yielded high methodological payoffs. While 
neoclassical models of growth took technology and factor accumulation 
as exogenous, endogenous growth models explain why technology grows 
over time through new ideas, and provide the microeconomic underpin-
nings for models of the technological frontier. 
Another important question has been to understand how technological 
diffusion takes place across countries and generates or sustains growth—
and why it does not take root in others. Various interesting possibilities 
have recently been explored in an attempt to answer that critical question: 
one option has been to add an avenue for technology transfer as a new 
component to the endogenous growth model, that is, “endogenizing” the 
mechanism by which different countries achieve the ability to use various 
intermediate capital goods (Jones, 1998). Another popular route is to 
try to identify the fundamental determinants of growth through political 
economy models. Contrary to previous waves of growth modeling, this 
line of research focuses not on the proximate determinants of growth 
but on the impact on growth of such factors as institutions or the qual-
ity of governance (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer, 
2002). Several other approaches to growth research have yielded various 
insights to the mystery of modern economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 2003; Jones 1998). 
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Challenges of Explaining Convergence—and Divergence
On both the theoretical and empirical fronts, progress has been made in 
our understanding of growth in recent decades. On the theoretical front, 
the analysis of endogenous technical innovation and increasing returns to 
scale has provided economists with a rich general framework for capturing 
 the broad picture and the mechanics of economic growth. From Solow’s 
work, we know the importance of the role of capital accumulation (both 
physical and human) and technical change in the growth process. From con-
tributions by Becker, Heckman, Lucas7 and many others, we also learned 
about the importance of human capital through diffusion of new knowl-
edge or on-the-job learning, often stimulated by trade, and the so-called 
college wage premium. From work by North (1981), with supporting the-
oretical and empirical analyses exemplifi ed by the works of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001), Greif (1993), and Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), we have 
learned that growth is in large part driven by innovation and institutions 
that have evolved in countries where innovative activity is promoted and 
conditions are in place for change to take place. From Romer and the endog-
enous growth theorists, we have understood the need to change the focus of 
growth theory from accumulation to knowledge creation and innovation. 
In sum, we know quite a lot about some of the basic ingredients of growth. 
On the empirical side, the availability of standardized data sets—
especially the Penn World tables—has stimulated interest in cross-
country work that highlights systematic differences between high-growth 
and low-growth countries with regard to: (i) Initial conditions such as 
productivity, human capital, demographic structure, infrastructure, 
fi nancial development, or inequality; (ii) Policy variables of various sorts 
such as trade openness, macroeconomic stability, levels and composi-
tion of public spending, taxation, or regulation; and (iii) Institutional 
variables such as general governance indicators, administrative capacity, 
rule of law, protection of property rights, or corruption. 
However, growth research still faces signifi cant methodological diffi cul-
ties, and challenges in identifying actionable policy levers to sustain and 
accelerate growth in specifi c countries.8 
Deaton (2009) expresses the general sentiment of despair among econo-
mists when he notes that “empiricists and theorists seem further apart now 
than at any period in the last quarter century. Yet reintegration is hardly an 
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option because without it there is no chance of long-term scientifi c prog-
ress.” Despite many decades of theoretical advances and the development 
of new techniques to help policymakers in developing countries identify 
systematically constraints to growth, the intellectual and policy agenda 
ahead is indeed still daunting. 
Contrary to the prediction of most neoclassical models, convergence 
among world economies has been a limited phenomenon (Pritchett 1997). 
In 2008, GDP per capita in the United States (the world’s richest coun-
try) was three times higher than per capita income in neighboring Mexico, 
16 times higher than the per capita income in India, and 145 times the per 
capita income of the Democratic Republic of Congo. That gap is still wid-
ening. In most of the past century, incomes in developing countries have 
fallen far behind those in developed countries, both proportionately and 
absolutely.9 
Yet, empirical observation reveals that divergence between industrial-
ized and developing countries is not inexorable: in the past two centu-
ries, some countries have been able to catch up with the most advanced 
economies (most notably Germany, France, and the USA in the late 
19th century, and the Nordic countries, Japan, and the 13 economies 
analyzed in the Growth Commission Report in the 20th century). After 
the Industrial Revolution began in England in the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, experiments conducted in laboratories became the major source 
of technological invention and innovation (Lin, 1995). This was espe-
cially true for those macro-inventions that consisted of radical new ideas 
and involved large, discrete, novel changes, as defi ned by Mokyr (1990). 
For developed countries, such inventions were essential to technologi-
cal advances. With investment in research and development, innovation 
became endogenous (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). Industrial structures 
were upgraded continuously and productivity increased. As a result, 
developed countries began to take off and the divergence between the 
North and the South appeared (Baumol, 1994). 
Historical evidence suggests that the growth process followed a simi-
lar pattern in developing economies such as the four East Asian dragons 
(Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong), which converged to the income 
levels of advanced western countries in the second half of the 20th cen-
tury. The same process subsequently allowed countries as diverse as China, 
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Vietnam, Botswana, or Mauritius to achieve rapid and sustained growth 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Lin, 2003, 2009; Rodrik, 2005). Except for that 
select group, most developing countries have failed to achieve their eco-
nomic growth ambitions since World War II. In fact, many have encoun-
tered frequent crises despite efforts from their governments and assistance 
from international development agencies. Yet, their experiences highlight 
the need to understand how developing countries can create the conditions 
for facilitating the fl ow of technologies and unleash growth, even in the 
context of sub-optimal microeconomic policies, weak institutions, and the 
absence of full-fl edged private property rights. 
The failures of growth research to predict divergence on a large scale indi-
cates that the proposed theories did not capture the fundamental factor(s) 
that determines whether or not a developing country will converge. Some 
researchers have recently argued that the evolution of economic perfor-
mance of nations is determined by conditional convergence—the idea that 
countries converge when all other macroeconomic variables that proxy 
for differences in steady-state characteristics are held constant—or to 
put it differently, the distribution of world income reveals the existence 
of convergence clubs among countries.10 But the puzzle of diverging per-
formances may be more easily sorted out through comparative analysis 
based on in-depth country studies and historical experience: the key ingre-
dients for convergence of successful economies seem to lie in their abil-
ity to change their endowment structure, increase the pace of adoption 
of new ideas, speed up the process of industrial upgrading, and improve 
institutions simultaneously. Understanding and replicating the economic 
strategies and policies that allowed latecomers to catch up with the most 
advanced economies is still a major challenge for economists and policy-
makers around the world. 
New Directions in Applied Growth Research
The disappointments of growth research—most notably from the perspective 
of policymakers seeking specifi c action plans to generate prosperity—have 
led to a reassessment of the validity and usefulness of existing knowledge, 
and to the development of radically new approaches. An important study 
by the World Bank (2005) that focused on lessons of the 1990s highlighted 
the complexity of economic growth and recognized that it is not amenable 
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to simple formulas. The report also noted that the reforms carried out in 
many developing countries in the 1990s focused too narrowly on the effi -
cient use of resources, not on the expansion of capacity and growth. While 
they enabled better use of existing capacity, thereby establishing the basis 
for sustained long-run growth, they did not provide suffi cient incentives for 
expanding that capacity.11 The report concluded that there is no unique, 
universal set of rules to guide policymakers. It recommended less reliance 
on simple formulas and the elusive search for “best practices,” and greater 
reliance on deeper economic analysis to identify each country’s one or two 
most binding constraints on growth. 
That line of research is exemplifi ed by the Growth Diagnostics frame-
work, which aims at identifying the one or two most binding constraints 
on any developing economy, and then focusing on lifting those. The main 
rationale is to ensure that economic reforms are contingent on the eco-
nomic environment. “Presented with a laundry list of needed reforms, poli-
cymakers have either tried to fi x all of the problems at once or started with 
reforms that were not crucial to their country’s growth potential. And, 
more often than not, reforms have gotten in each other’s way, with reform 
in one area creating unanticipated distortions in another area. By focusing 
on the one area that represents the biggest hurdle to growth, countries will 
be more likely to achieve success from their reform efforts” (Hausmann, 
Rodrik and Velasco, 2008). The proposed approach offers a decision tree 
methodology to help identify the relevant binding constraints for each 
country. While it does not specifi cally identify the political costs and ben-
efi ts of various reform strategies, its focus on alternative hypotheses can 
help clarify the options available to policymakers for responding to politi-
cal constraints. “We are concerned mainly with short-run constraints. In 
this sense, our focus is on igniting growth and identifying constraints that 
inevitably emerge as an economy expands, not on anticipating tomorrow’s 
constraints on growth” (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2008).
A key lesson from that approach is the notion that different countries 
(or even the same country at different points in time) require different pol-
icy choices to facilitate growth, and that the ‘big principles’ that growth 
requires—sound money, property rights, openness, free markets—can take 
many forms and that achieving them requires country-specifi c context and 
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information. In particular, these principles need not take any one precise 
institutional or policy form. Each country is assumed to have some bind-
ing constraints to its growth potential, and failure to identify and remove 
them would impede economic performance, even if every other produc-
tion factor is satisfactory. The Growth Diagnostics approach is certainly an 
important advance in growth analysis. However, its model does not fully 
fl esh out the notion of “binding constraint.”12 The variable defi nitions are 
deliberately left quite imprecise, which makes it challenging to operational-
ize them. 
Another infl uential new approach is the one adopted by researchers at the 
MIT Poverty Lab, who suggest that the quest for growth be re-centered on 
assessing the impact of a development project or program (against explicit 
counterfactual outcomes). Starting with the idea that credible impact evalu-
ations are needed to ensure that the most effective programs are scaled 
up at the national or international levels, they design randomized control 
trials (RCTs) or social experiments that can be used to leverage the benefi ts 
of knowing which programs work and which do not (Dufl o and Kremer, 
2003). Their approach is based on the notion that the standard aggregate 
growth paradigm relies, to a large extent and mistakenly, on the assump-
tion of a rational representative agent. Stressing heterogeneity in country 
circumstances and among micro agents, this new wave of research attempts 
to explicitly account for the heterogeneity of individual households and 
fi rms in development analysis and policy.13 It has produced some useful 
tools for understanding the effectiveness of some specifi c micro projects. 
But even assuming that they can actually transfer lessons from localized 
development experiences to different geographic or cultural areas,14 RCTs 
still fall short in providing useful overall guidance to policymakers con-
fronted with the design of development strategies.
While these new approaches to growth research have shed light on 
important questions, they have not provided suffi cient guidance on how 
policymakers could foster the process of industrial upgrading and struc-
tural change. It would be desirable to complement them with structural 
analyses of the determinants of growth—specifi cally the identifi cation of 
factors that would allow poor economies to move from one stage of devel-
opment to another. 
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3. The Unique Contribution of the Growth Report
Despite intellectual progress, some of the key questions on the growth 
research agenda today remain the same as those that confronted previ-
ous generations of researchers: If growth is driven in large part by inno-
vation, why are some countries successful at innovating and adapting to 
change, while others are not? What are the forces that drive convergence 
and what are the factors that stifl e material progress? What are the condi-
tions for the kind of structural change that allow low-income countries to 
become middle-income and then high-income economies? What are the 
most important determinants of growth (initial conditions, institutions, 
and policies)? What is the appropriate role for governments and markets 
in the growth dynamics? 
Faced with the diffi culty of providing clear answers to such pressing 
questions and the impossibility of deriving actionable policy recommen-
dations from growth analyses, some growth researchers have found it 
useful to avoid searching for robust determinants of growth, and to look 
instead for the stylized facts that can guide economic policy in develop-
ing countries. This approach goes back several decades, most notably to 
Kaldor’s (1961) six characteristics of 20th century growth, derived from 
United States and United Kingdom macroeconomic data: (i) sustained rate 
of increase in labor productivity; (ii) sustained rate of increase in capital 
per worker; (iii) stable real interest rate or return on capital; (iv) stable 
ratio of capital to output; (v) stable shares of capital and labor as fractions 
of national income; and (vi) a wide variation in the rate of growth of fast 
growing economies, of the order of 2-5 percent. 
More recently, Jones and Romer (2009) have identifi ed a different set 
of stylized facts: (i) increases in the extent of the market—via globalization 
and urbanization; (ii) acceleration of the pace of growth over time, from 
virtually zero to relatively rapid rates; (iii) variation in the rate of growth 
of GDP per capita, which increases with the distance from the technol-
ogy frontier; (iv) large income and total factor productivity differences; 
(v) increases in human capital per worker; and (vi) long-run stability of 
relative wages. 
The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive 
Development, a landmark study issued in 2008 by the Commission on 
The Growth Report and New Structural Economics | 95
Growth and Development, followed a similar approach but took it to a 
new level. It built on the fi ndings of several other empirical studies initi-
ated by the World Bank during the past two decades to reassess the past 
theories of economic growth and poverty reduction, and rethink its policy 
advice to developing countries.15 Launched in April 2006, the Commission 
brought together 22 leading practitioners from government, business and 
policymaking arenas, mostly from the developing world. It was chaired by 
Nobel Laureate Michael Spence and Danny Leipziger, a World Bank Vice-
President. Over a period of two years the Commission sought to “gather 
the best understanding there is about the policies and strategies that under-
lie rapid and sustained economic growth and poverty reduction.” 
The Commission was established to take stock of the state of theoreti-
cal and empirical knowledge on economic growth with a view to drawing 
implications for policy, and avoiding the trap of purely theoretical exer-
cises. It provides the following motivation for its work: (i) the sense that 
poverty cannot be reduced in isolation of economic growth, and that this 
link has been missing in many development strategies; (ii) increasing evi-
dence that the economic and social forces underlying rapid and sustained 
growth are much less well understood than generally thought—economic 
advice to developing countries has been given with more confi dence that 
justifi ed by the state of knowledge; (iii) realization that the accumulation 
of highly relevant (both successful and unsuccessful) growth experiences 
over the past 20 years provides a unique source of learning; and (iv) grow-
ing awareness that, except for China and India, and other rapidly growing 
economies in East Asia, developing countries need to accelerate their rates 
of growth signifi cantly for their incomes to catch up with income levels in 
industrialized countries, and for the world to achieve a better balance in 
the distribution of wealth and opportunity. 
The uniqueness of the Commission lies not only in its very diverse 
composition but also in the way it has reexamined growth analysis. 
Its approach has been to “try to assimilate and digest the cumulative 
experience of growth and development as well as careful and thought-
ful policy analysis in a wide spectrum of fi elds. We then seek to share 
this understanding with political leaders and policymakers in developing 
countries, including the next generation of leaders; with an international 
community of advisors; and with investors, policymakers and leaders in 
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advanced countries and international institutions who share the same 
goals”16 (Growth Commission, 2008, p. x). 
The Report starts with the observation that “fast, sustained growth 
does not happen spontaneously. It requires long-term commitment by a 
country’s political leaders, a commitment pursued with patience, persever-
ance, and pragmatism” (Growth Commission, 2008, p. 2). It then identi-
fi es some of the distinctive characteristics of 13 high-growth economies17 
that have been able to grow at more than 7 percent for periods of more 
than 25 years since World War II. At that pace of expansion, an economy 
almost doubles in size every decade.18 The Report then asks how other 
developing countries can emulate them. Observing that each country has 
specifi c characteristics and historical experiences that must be refl ected in 
its growth strategy, it does not attempt to provide a generic formula for 
policymakers to apply. However, it offers a framework that can help poli-
cymakers design a growth strategy. While it does not lay out a full set of 
answers, it suggests the right questions to be addressed. 
The conclusion is an optimistic one: rapid, sustained growth is not a 
miracle confi ned to certain parts of the world. It can be achieved by all 
developing countries. More important than the list of “growth ingredi-
ents,” which includes a wide range of policy prescriptions whose validity 
depends on specifi c contexts and conditions, the Report lists “fi ve striking 
points of resemblance” among all highly successful countries: 
•  Openness to the global economy. During their periods of fast growth, all 
the successful economies made the most of the global economy. They did 
so in at least two ways: fi rst, they imported ideas, technology and know-
how from the rest of the world—a world that has become more open 
and more tightly integrated since the end of World War II. Second, they 
exploited global demand, which provided an almost infi nite market for 
their goods. In sum, successful economies “all imported what the rest of 
world knew, and exported what it wanted.” The unsuccessful countries 
did the opposite. The lesson here is clear: in order to achieve sustained 
and dynamic growth, a developing country must: (i) rely on its com-
parative advantage (that is, export what the rest of the world needs and 
upgrade its industries step by step at a pace consistent with the change 
in its endowment structure so as to make its economy competitive); and 
(ii) tap the potential of advantage of backwardness (imported ideas, 
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 technology and know-how from the rest of the world in the process of its 
industrial upgrading). 
•  Macroeconomic stability. The second stylized fact of high-growth coun-
tries is their maintenance of stable macroeconomic environments. Dur-
ing their most successful periods, all 13 countries avoided the kind of 
unpredictability in fi scal and monetary policies that damage private sec-
tor investment. While growth was sometimes accompanied by moderate 
infl ation in some of them (Korea in the 1970s, China in the mid-1990s), 
budget defi cits or even high ratios of debt-to-GDP, the situation never 
got out of control. 
•  High saving and investment rates. Another characteristic of high-growth 
countries is their willingness to forgo current consumption in pursuit of 
higher levels of incomes in the future. High saving rates were matched 
by high investment rates. The fact that countries such as Singapore or 
Malaysia adopted mandatory saving schemes have led some research-
ers to stress the importance of deliberate saving policies as the main 
cause for these high saving and investment rates (Montiel and Serven, 
2008). In fact, the main explanation may be the ability of these coun-
tries to produce large economic surplus and to generate rates of return 
on investment that were high enough to provide strong incentives to 
save. In the 1970s, Southeast Asia and Latin America had similar sav-
ings rates. Twenty years later, the Asian rate was about 20 percentage 
points higher. 
•  Market allocation. The Report notes that the 20th century saw many 
experiments with alternatives to a market system. They all failed to help 
developing countries achieve sustained growth. While successful coun-
tries may differ in the intensity and strength of their property rights 
systems, they all adopted a well-functioning market mechanism that 
provided adequate price signals, transparent decision-making and good 
incentives. Their governments also did not resist the market forces in 
the reallocation of capital and labor from sector to sector, industry to 
industry. 
•  Leadership and governance. Sustained growth that can help over-
come poverty is typically a multi-decade process, which only takes 
place in a stable and functional investment environment. It requires 
political leadership and effective, pragmatic and sometimes activist 
governments. 
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The Growth Commission Report also identifi es a series of “bad ideas” 
to be avoided by policymakers in their search for growth. The non-
exhaustive list includes: subsidizing energy; relying on the civil service to 
deal with joblessness; reducing fi scal defi cits by cutting expenditures on 
infrastructure investment; providing open-ended protection to domestic 
fi rms; imposing price controls to stem infl ation; banning exports for long 
periods of time; resisting urbanization and measuring educational prog-
ress through infrastructure; ignoring environmental issues as an “unaf-
fordable luxury”; adopting regulation of the banking system; or allowing 
the exchange rate to appreciate excessively. 
Summing up, it can be said that the Report represents a major step 
forward as it provides a practical approach to help policymakers today 
understand the economic dynamics of catching up, and to identify the pre-
cise (and probably country-specifi c) mechanics of creating the appropriate 
infrastructures, incentive systems, and institutions to facilitate and sus-
tain the evolving growth process. It also offers a new challenge to growth 
researchers, who must come up with a conceptual framework for making 
sense of its main fi ndings. 
4. A New Structural Analysis of the Growth Report
The stylized facts identifi ed by the Growth Commission Report can be 
either endogenous or exogenous variables to the growth process. In order 
to disentangle causes and effects, and prioritize public policies, it is useful 
to go beyond the mere association that these stylized facts suggest, and 
refl ect on the dynamics of possible causal relationships. As Zellner (1979) 
pointed out, this requires some generally acceptable economic theory. The 
new structural economics approach provides such a framework. 
Principles of New Structural Economics
The new structural economics framework (Lin, 2010) is based on the 
analysis of the growth process in modern times and across continents. 
It starts with the observation that the main feature of modern economic 
development is continuous technological innovation and structural 
change. The optimal industrial structure in an economy, that is, the indus-
trial structure that will make the economy most competitive domestically 
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and internationally at any specifi c time, is endogenous to its comparative 
advantage, which in turn is determined by the given endowment struc-
ture of the economy at that time.19 Economies that try to grow simply by 
adding more and more physical capital or labor to the existing industries 
eventually run into diminishing returns; and economies that try to deviate 
from their comparative advantage are likely to perform poorly. 
Because the optimal industrial structure at any given time is endogenous 
to the existing factor endowments, a country trying to move up the ladder 
of technological development must fi rst change its endowment structure. 
With capital accumulation, the economy’s factor endowment structure 
evolves, pushing its industrial structure to deviate from the optimal deter-
mined by its previous level. Firms then need to upgrade their industries and 
technologies accordingly in order to maintain market competitiveness. 
If the economy follows its comparative advantage in the development of 
its industries, its industries will be most competitive in domestic and world 
markets. As a result, they will gain the largest possible market share and 
generate potentially the largest surplus. Capital investment will also have 
the largest possible return. Consequently, households will have the high-
est savings propensity, resulting in an even faster upgrade of the country’s 
endowment structure. 
A developing country that follows its comparative advantage to develop 
its industries can also benefi t from the advantage of backwardness in the 
upgrading process and grow faster than advanced countries. Enterprises in 
developing countries can benefi t from the industrial and technological gap 
with developed countries by acquiring industrial and technological inno-
vations that are consistent with their new comparative advantage through 
learning and borrowing from developed countries. 
The main question then is how to ensure that the economy grows in 
a manner that is consistent with its comparative advantage. The goal 
of most fi rms everywhere is profi t maximization, which is, ceteris pari-
bus, a function of relative prices of factor inputs. The criterion they use 
to select their industries and technology is typically the relative prices 
of capital, labor and natural resources. Therefore, the precondition for 
fi rms to follow the comparative advantage of the economy in their choice 
of technologies and industries is to have a relative price system which can 
refl ect the relative scarcity of these production factors in the endowment 
100 | New Structural Economics
structure. Such a relative price system exists only in a competitive market 
system. In developing countries where this is not usually not the case, it 
is necessary that government action be taken to improve various market 
institutions so as to create and protect effective competition in the prod-
uct and factor markets. 
In the process of industrial upgrading, fi rms need to have information 
about production technologies and product markets. If information is 
not freely available, each fi rm will need to invest resources to search for 
it, collect it, and analyze it. For individual fi rms in developing countries, 
industrial upgrading is therefore a high-reward, high-risk process. First 
movers who attempt to enter new industries can either fail—because they 
target the wrong industries—or succeed—because the industry is consis-
tent with the country’s new comparative advantage. In the case of success, 
their experience offers valuable and free information to other prospective 
entrants. They will not have monopoly rent because of competition from 
new entry. Moreover, these fi rst movers often need to devote resources to 
train workers on the new business processes and techniques, who may be 
then hired by competitors. First movers generate demand for new activities 
and human capital which may not have existed otherwise. Even in situa-
tions where they fail, their bad experience also provides useful knowledge 
to other fi rms. Yet, they must bear the costs of failure. In other words, the 
social value of the fi rst movers’ investments is usually much larger than 
their private value and there is an asymmetry between the fi rst movers’ 
gain from success and the cost of failure. Successful industrial upgrading in 
an economy also requires new types of fi nancial, legal, and other “soft” (or 
intangible) and “hard” (or tangible) infrastructure to facilitate production 
and market transactions and allow the economy to reach its production 
possibility frontier. The improvement of the hard and soft infrastructure 
requires coordination beyond individual fi rms’ decisions. 
Economic development is therefore a dynamic process marked with 
externalities and requiring coordination. While the market is a neces-
sary basic mechanism for effective resource allocation at each given stage 
of development, governments must play a proactive, facilitating role for 
an economy to move from one stage to another. They must intervene 
to allow markets to function properly. They can do so by (i) provid-
ing information about new industries that are consistent with the new 
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comparative advantage determined by change in the economy’s endow-
ment structure; (ii) coordinating investments in related industries and the 
required improvements in infrastructure; (iii) subsidizing activities with 
externalities in the process of industrial upgrading and structural change; 
and (iv) catalyzing the development of new industries by incubation or 
by attracting foreign direct investment to overcome the defi cits in social 
capital and other intangible constraints. 
In sum, the new structural economics framework is three-pronged: it 
includes an understanding of a country’s comparative advantage defi ned as 
the evolving potential of its endowment structure; reliance on the market 
as the optimal resource allocation mechanism at any given stage of devel-
opment; and the recognition of a facilitating role of the state in the process 
of industrial upgrading. It helps explain the economic performance of the 
most successful developing countries. 
Key Findings of the Growth Commission: A New Structural 
Analysis
The new structural economics provides a framework for understanding the 
endogeneity and exogeneity issues surrounding the fi ve stylized facts of the 
Growth Commission Report: (i) exploiting the world economy through 
openness; (ii) maintaining macroeconomic stability; (iii) keeping high rates 
of saving and investment; (v) using markets to allocate resources; and 
(v) having committed, credible, and capable governments. The fi rst three 
stylized facts are logical outcomes of a country following its comparative 
advantage determined by its factor endowments in each stage of develop-
ment. The fourth stylized fact, the market mechanism, is the precondition 
for a country to follow its comparative advantage. The last stylized fact, a 
committed, credible, and capable government, is a prediction as well as a 
consequence of following comparative advantage. 
First, if a country follows its comparative advantage in its develop-
ment strategy, 20 it will have an open economy, and produce whatever is 
consistent with its existing endowment structure and export to the inter-
national market,21 while importing whatever goods and services are not 
in its comparative advantage. Its trade dependency ratio will be endog-
enous to its comparative advantage and will be larger than would be the 
case otherwise. Its economy will become competitive and its endowment 
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structure and industrial structure will be upgraded at the fastest pace 
possible. In the industrial upgrading process, the country will be able to 
tap into the advantage of backwardness by borrowing technologies and 
industries from advanced countries. The country will achieve a much 
faster rate of growth than the advanced countries, as its innovation cost 
will be smaller than that of countries already on the global technology 
frontier. Its economy will therefore achieve convergence with high-income 
countries. From that perspective, exploiting the world economy through 
openness (stylized fact 1) is a result of the growth strategy that facilitates 
industrial upgrading according to the comparative advantage determined 
by the country’s endowment structure. 
Macroeconomic stability (stylized fact 2) is also a consequence of a 
country following comparative advantage in its development strategy. If a 
country does so, its economy will be competitive. Its industries will be via-
ble in an open, competitive market (Lin 2009). The upgrading of industries 
will mainly rely on its own capital accumulation process. The government 
will have a strong fi scal position, for several reasons: fi rst, it will reap the 
benefi ts of dynamic growth; second, there will be no need for subsidizing 
non-viable fi rms; and third, the economy will generate more job opportu-
nities and less unemployment. The country will also be much less exposed 
to homegrown crises due to uncompetitive industries, currency mismatch, 
or fi scal crises. Because of its external competitiveness and limited reliance 
on capital infl ows for growth, the country is also likely to have strong 
external accounts. Therefore, the government will be in a strong position 
to adopt countercyclical measures if there are shocks to the economy from 
global crises. 
Recording high rates of saving and investment (stylized fact 3) is another 
logical result of the new structural economics approach of developing 
industries that are consistent with comparative advantage. Such a strategy 
allows a developing economy to be most competitive and produce the larg-
est possible economic surplus (profi ts). This yields the highest savings for 
the economy. Competitive industries also imply high return on investment, 
which in turn provides additional incentives to save and invest. Moreover, 
good public investments can enhance the economy’s growth potential, 
reduce transaction costs on the private sector, increase the rate of return 
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on private investment, and generate enough tax revenues in the future to 
liquidate the initial costs. 
Adopting a market system to allocate resources (stylized fact 4) is a 
necessary condition for an economy to follow comparative advantage in its 
development. Most fi rms are set up to pursue profi ts. They will follow the 
economy’s comparative advantage in their decisions regarding the adop-
tion of technology and entry into industries if relative prices refl ect the rela-
tive scarcity of each factor in the endowment structure. This only happens 
in an economy with competitive markets (Lin 2009; Lin and Chang 2009). 
Therefore, a competitive market is the economy’s optimal mechanism for 
resource allocation at each stage of its development. 
Building committed, credible, and capable governments (stylized fact 5), 
that is, creating a facilitating state, is also a condition for an economy to 
adopt a comparative-advantage-following strategy in its development pro-
cess. For a developing economy to upgrade from one industrial structure 
to another, the government needs to play a facilitating role in improving 
soft and hard infrastructures and in overcoming the information, coordi-
nation and externality issues. Therefore, a committed, credible and capable 
government is a precondition for sustainable growth. But capable states 
can also be seen as a consequence of that strategy: if the government’s goal 
is to facilitate a development process that is consistent with the country’s 
comparative advantage, its intervention will be implemented more easily 
and more successfully, which will strengthen its credibility. So a committed, 
credible and capable state can also be viewed as the outcome of the coun-
try’s following its comparative advantage in its development. 
Beyond those stylized facts, the Growth Commission Report also iden-
tifi ed “bad ideas” to be avoided by policymakers in developing countries. 
While the Report prudently offers the caveat that there are situations and 
circumstances that may justify limited or temporary resort to some of 
the policies listed under that category, it notes that “the overwhelming 
weight of evidence suggests that such policies involve large costs and their 
stated objectives—which are often admirable—are usually much better 
served through other means” (p. 68). These “bad ideas” include costly or 
unsustainable policy decisions such as subsidizing energy, relying on the 
civil service to deal with joblessness, providing open-ended protection, 
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reducing fi scal defi cits by cutting expenditures on infrastructure invest-
ment, or allowing the exchange rate to appreciate excessively. 
Policy recommendations derived from the new structural economics 
approach would help developing country governments avoid such “bad 
ideas.” Energy subsidies for instance are adopted in most countries to sup-
port nonviable fi rms (political economy rationale), or to help the poor 
(equity rationale). Large, costly and unsustainable government subsidies 
in developing countries arise from the fact that development strategies 
deviate substantially from their optimal industrial structure. If a country 
follows its comparative advantage in its development strategy, few of its 
state-owned or private enterprises will be nonviable, and there will be 
no need to provide subsidies to fi rms. Its economy will achieve dynamic 
growth, which would allow poverty to be reduced rapidly. There will be 
little need to subsidize the poor through price distortions. By growing fast, 
the economy will create many job opportunities. Viable private fi rms offer 
the best insurance against joblessness, so there will be no need to use public 
employment as a tool to deal with joblessness. Moreover, the government 
will not have to use open-ended protection to support or subsidize nonvi-
able fi rms. 
Thanks to the country’s good economic performance, the government’s 
fi scal position is likely to be strong and there will be no justifi cation for the 
kind of erratic budget policies (expenditure cuts, public investment delays, 
payment arrears, salary freezes, etc.) that are often caused by large fi s-
cal defi cits. Likewise, a government that implements a development strat-
egy consistent with the country’s comparative advantage will not have to 
resort to an overvalued exchange rate as a means for subsidizing nonviable 
fi rms that are created in the framework of comparative-advantage-defying, 
import-substitution policies. 
5. Conclusion
The quest for economic growth has preoccupied economists and policy-
makers since at least the 18th century. Much progress has been achieved 
over the past 50 years, most notably on theoretical and empirical grounds. 
On the theoretical front, the analysis of endogenous technical innova-
tion and increasing returns to scale has provided economists with a rich 
The Growth Report and New Structural Economics | 105
general framework for capturing the broad picture and the mechanics of 
economic growth. On the empirical side, the availability of standardized 
data sets such as the Penn World Tables has stimulated interest in cross-
country work that highlights systematic differences between high-growth 
and low-growth countries with regard to initial conditions, and policy and 
institutional variables. 
Yet, despite progress, policymakers around the world—especially in 
developing countries, still face diffi culty in identifying specifi c actionable 
policy levers that can help ignite and sustain the type of dynamic growth 
rates that are necessary to reduce poverty. In recent years, growth research-
ers have responded to their concerns by trying to address various new 
challenges: the lack of convergence among countries; the identifi cation of 
robust determinants of economic performance; the design of the support-
ing institutions for innovation and technological change, which are widely 
acknowledged to be the foundations for structural change and prosperity; 
and the identifi cation of binding constraints to growth, the evaluation of 
successful development programs through randomized control trials, with 
the goal of scaling them up whenever possible. 
By adopting a radically different approach to growth analysis, the 
Growth Report has made an important contribution to knowledge. It 
has identifi ed fi ve stylized facts (openness, macroeconomic stability, high 
rates of saving and investment, market mechanism, committed, credible 
and capable government) that can guide policymaking in developing 
countries. But in doing so, the Report has not disentangled causes and 
consequences. 
The new structural economics framework proposed in Lin (2010) helps 
explain the endogeneity and exogeneity issues surrounding these fi ve styl-
ized facts. A central proposition that runs through this paper is that, devel-
oping countries that implement economic policies in contradiction with 
their comparative advantage tend to perform poorly and suffer macro-
economic instability. They do not exploit the benefi ts of globalization to 
the fullest. Typical features of such strategies are large budget defi cits due 
to government support of nonviable fi rms, infl ationary policies caused by 
excessive consumption, fi nancial repression, and over-valued exchange 
rates in the context of low productivity. By contrast, countries that adopt 
comparative-advantage-following strategies are typically in the position to 
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achieve dynamic growth. They rely on the market as the key mechanism 
for allocating resources at any given stage of development, and they have 
credible and capable governments. As a consequence of following their 
comparative advantage, they have an open economy, achieve macroeco-
nomic stability, and record high rates of saving and investment. 
Notes
†  Célestin Monga, a native of Cameroon, is a Senior Advisor to the World Bank 
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist. In his 13-year career in the World 
Bank, he has held positions in both operations and in the research department. 
He has also served on the Board of Directors of MIT’s Sloan School of Man-
agement (Sloan Fellows) and taught at Boston University and the University of 
Bordeaux (France).
1.  The losses precipitated by the fi nancial crisis have been enormous. Total 
capitalization of world stock markets halved in 2008—about $32 trillion 
of wealth. The losses in household wealth during 2008 were about $11 tril-
lion in the United States ($8.5 trillion in fi nancial assets and $2.5 trillion in 
housing assets) and were estimated at $1.5 trillion in the United Kingdom 
($0.6 trillion in fi nancial assets and $0.9 trillion in housing assets). Losses 
of such magnitude have signifi cant wealth effects on consumption and sav-
ings. Industrial production fell sharply in many developed and emerging 
countries and for the fi rst time since 1929, world trade contracted in 2009. 
Data sources: Global Stability Reports; IMF Survey Magazine, June 24, 
2009. 
2.  There were 1.4 billion people living under the international poverty line of 
$1.25 a day before the global crisis. Applying the country-specifi c growth pro-
jections to survey-based data and aggregating, World Bank experts calculate 
that the crisis will add 50 million people to the 2009 count of the number of 
people living below $1.25 a day and 57 million to the count of the number of 
people living under $2 a day. Given current growth projections for 2010, there 
will be a further impact on poverty in that year, with the cumulative impacts 
rising to an extra 64 million people living under $1.25 a day and 76 million 
more under $2 a day by 2010. 
3.  The report was released in 2008 and titled The Growth Report: Strategies for 
Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development. The Commission was consti-
tuted of 20 experienced policymakers and two Nobel prize-winning econo-
mists, Michael Spence and Robert Solow. Its work has been supported by the 
Governments of Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 
the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the World Bank Group. 
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4.  Maddison (2007). See also The World Economy: Historical Statistics, avail-
able at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. Western offshoots, a term used in 
Maddison (2001), include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
States.
5.  Conditional convergence is a key property in Solow-Swan models. It is con-
ditional because in these models, the steady-state levels of capital and output 
per worker depend on characteristics that vary across economies: saving rate, 
population growth rate, and the position of the production function. Many 
recent empirical studies have suggested that many other sources of cross-
country variations such as government policies or the initial stock of human 
capital should be included in the analysis. 
6.  The Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) versions of the neoclassical model, 
which built on Ramsey’s analysis of consumer optimization, attempted to pro-
vide an endogenous determination of saving rates. While this extension helped 
preserve conditional convergence, it did not solve the problem of long-run 
growth being determined by exogenous technological progress. 
7.  See, in particular, Becker (1992); Heckman (2006); Lucas (2004). 
8.  This is the case not only in development economics but also in various sub-
disciplines of macroeconomics. Following the 2008-09 global crisis, a heated 
debate erupted among economists over the pertinence of the dominant models 
and their policy prescriptions. See for instance Blanchfl ower (2009), Krugman 
(2009), or Stiglitz (2009). For an assessment of controversies in development 
economics over methodological and policy issues, see Deaton (2009) and 
Ravallion (2009). 
9.  From 1870 to 1990, the ratio of per capita incomes between the richest 
and the poorest countries increased by roughly a factor of fi ve. See Pritchett 
(1997). 
10.  That is the view expressed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992); and Baumol 
(1986). Prescott (1999) is even more optimistic and expresses the view that 
continued divergence is not an option, and that the world distribution of 
income will eventually converge. 
11.  As Zagha et al. (2006) note, “whereas reforms can help achieve effi ciency gains, 
they will not put the economy on a sustained growth path unless they also 
strengthen production incentives and address market or government failures 
that undercut efforts to accumulate capital and boost productivity.” Pritchett 
(2006) suggests that economists abandon the quest for a single growth theory, 
and focus instead on developing a collection of growth and transition theories 
tailored to countries’ particular circumstances. 
12.  The methodology proposed for the identifi cation of the binding constraints 
to growth relies on shadow prices. Even in countries where data on shadow 
prices are widely available, it is not clear that this would accurately identify 
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areas in which progress is most needed in each country. For example, one 
could imagine a simple model of growth for a low income country where tech-
nology and human capital are complementary. In such a country, the returns 
to education and technology adoption would both be low due to low levels of 
human capital and technology. An exclusive focus on shadow prices and an 
ignorance of cross-country comparison of levels would then suggest no need to 
improve education levels and encourage technology adoption.
13.  See Banerjee and Dufl o (2005). Bourguignon (2006) offers a compelling theo-
retical framework for making the same case. 
14.  Critics of RCTs point to the fact that they often do not start from a clear stra-
tegic assessment of how a particular method would fi t the knowledge gaps of 
highest priority. See Ravallion (2009).
15.  These previous studies include, among others, the East Asian Miracle (1993), 
the Growth in the 1990’s (2005), and the World Development Report on Agri-
culture for Development (World Bank 2007). 
16.  The way the Commission organized its work was also quite unusual: fi rst, it 
defi ned themes and issues deemed important for growth and development. 
Then, it invited world renowned academics, practitioners and experts to 
author papers exploring the state of knowledge in these themes and issues; 
those were reviewed and discussed at workshops. A working group which 
interacted with academics and commissioners, reviewed and commented on 
papers throughout the process. The working group also supported the Chair-
man in drafting the fi nal report by reviewing interim drafts and providing 
comments. 
17.  The list includes: Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and 
Thailand.
18.  Because growth rates of this magnitude for such long periods were unheard of 
before the latter part of the 20th century, the authors acknowledge that their 
work could have been called a report on “economic miracles,” except that they 
believe the term is a misnomer: unlike miracles, sustained high growth can be 
explained and repeated. 
19.  A country’s competitive advantage refers to a situation where domestic 
industries fulfi ll the following four conditions: (i) They intensively use the 
nation’s abundant and relatively inexpensive factors of production; (ii) Their 
 products have large domestic markets; (iii) Each industry forms a cluster; and 
(iv) domestic market for each industry is competitive (Porter 1990). A coun-
try’s  comparative advantage is the situation in which it produces a good or ser-
vice at a lower opportunity cost than that of its competitors. Such a condition 
is based on the country’s possession of comparative advantage in that product 
or service determined by its endowment structure at any given time (Lin 2010). 
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The fi rst condition for competitive advantage listed by Porter supposes that the 
industries should be the economy’s comparative advantage determined by the 
nations’ endowments. The third and the fourth conditions will hold only if the 
industries are consistent with the nation’s competitive advantage. Therefore, 
the four conditions can be reduced to two independent conditions: the com-
parative advantage and domestic market size. Between these two independent 
conditions, the comparative advantage is the most important because if an 
industry corresponds to the country’s comparative advantage, the industry’s 
product will have a global market. That is why many of the richest countries 
of the world are very small (Lin and Ren 2007).
20.  We defi ne the development strategy here in the same way as Rodrik (2005), 
referring to policies and institutional arrangements adopted by the government 
in a developing country for achieving economic convergence with the living 
standards prevailing in advanced countries. 
21.  Exportable manufacturing goods are of particular importance, as they allow 
late-comers in the industrialization process to position themselves in industries 
where they have lower wages and other competitive advantages than more 
advanced economies.
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Justin Lin
Introduction: Growth and Industrial Upgrading
At a time when cyclical turbulence threatens to distract us from the 
longer-run goal of promoting sustained growth and development, I wel-
come the chance to launch a discussion on this crucial topic with my 
friend Ha-Joon Chang. The Nobel laureate Robert Lucas (1988) has 
commented that ‘Once one starts to think about them [questions of eco-
nomic growth], it is hard to think about anything else’. What he had in 
mind was the remarkable sustained growth in productivity and living 
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standards that has characterised especially the countries of East Asia in 
recent decades, compared with the stagnation that, at least at that time, 
affl icted much of the rest of the developing world. 
To Professor Lucas’ comment, I would add that, once you start thinking 
about growth, it is hard not to focus on the continuous industrial and tech-
nological upgrading that is characteristic of sustained economic growth. In 
theory, as has long been recognised, poor countries should be able to take 
advantage of their backwardness, by importing modern technology and 
institutions developed elsewhere. But while some countries have done this 
well, many others have been far less successful at industrial upgrading and 
therefore at poverty reduction. What is it that makes it possible in one or 
two generations for a country to go from exporting wigs and plywood to 
competing in the most technologically advanced sectors? 
The answer is not simply ‘a dynamic private sector’, though that is the 
ultimate driver. Historical examples make it clear that the answer must 
include effective government policies to catalyse private-sector growth. 
Governments have adopted a variety of measures to promote industrialisa-
tion and technological upgrading, with a wide variety of results. Used well, 
the unique powers available to governments can be wielded to initiate and 
support long-run sustained improvements in factors and productivity. Our 
central task as development economists is to learn from these historical 
examples, as well as from economic theory and empirics, so that we can 
help today’s poorer countries to map out and follow a sustained growth 
path. In this essay, I shall argue that industrial upgrading and technological 
advance are best promoted by what I call a facilitating state—a state that 
facilitates the private sector’s ability to exploit the country’s areas of com-
parative advantage. As I shall explain, the key is to make use of the coun-
try’s current comparative advantage—not in the factors of production that 
it may have someday, but in the factors of production that it has now. 
The Case for a State Role: Market Failures That Block Innovation
First, however, it is necessary to justify why the state needs to take the 
lead in development, because the facilitating-state approach requires 
government to do much more than a pure laissez-faire approach would 
allow. Developing economies are ridden with market failures, which can-
not be ignored simply because we fear government failure. One such 
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 market failure is caused by important information externalities. Economic 
 innovations—whether they succeed or fail—yield information about prof-
itable and unprofi table market opportunities. But because much of this 
information is available not only to the innovators themselves but also to 
competitors and potential imitators, who do not bear any of the costs of 
the innovation, it will tend to be undersupplied by the market. Government 
subsidies are one possible mechanism for encouraging innovation and off-
setting this fi rst-mover disadvantage. 
A second market failure is caused by co-ordination problems. Develop-
ing countries lag behind more developed countries, not only in technol-
ogy and industrial structure, but also in human capital, infrastructure and 
institutions. For a country to climb up the industrial and technological lad-
der, a host of other changes also need to take place: technologies become 
more complicated, capital requirements increase, the scale of production 
increases, the size of markets increases, and market exchanges increasingly 
take place at arm’s length. A fl exible and smooth industrial and technologi-
cal upgrading therefore requires simultaneous improvements in education, 
fi nancial and legal institutions, and infrastructure. Individual fi rms clearly 
cannot internalise all these changes cost-effectively, and co-ordination 
among many fi rms to achieve these changes will often be impossible. For 
this reason, it falls to government either to introduce such changes itself or 
to co-ordinate them.1
In these cases, the positive externalities of fi rm entry and experimenta-
tion and needs for co-ordination can justify government intervention, and 
do so in a way that is perfectly compatible with neoclassical economic 
theory. It is true that the force of this argument is lessened by the high 
risk of government failures, but fear of poor governance does not absolve 
us of responsibility for trying to design effective strategies for facilitating 
development. Another Nobel laureate, W. Arthur Lewis (1955),  correctly 
pointed out that ‘[N]o country has made economic progress without 
positive stimulus from intelligent governments’, even as he warned of the 
‘mischief done to economic life by governments’. A half-century later, it 
remains true that there are few if any examples of governments that have 
succeeded with a purely laissez-faire approach that does not try to come to 
grips with market failures, and far more examples of rapid growth in coun-
tries whose governments have led effectively. Therefore, it is  incumbent 
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upon  policy-makers and researchers to identify the most effective ways 
of promoting the productivity growth and change in industrial structure 
necessary for development. 
The Facilitating State: Helping the Private Sector Exploit 
Comparative Advantage
In summary, these severe market failures can provide a rationale for 
 government intervention to kick-start growth. But what kind of interven-
tion? The key to answering that question is recognising that the optimal 
industrial structure is endogenous to the country’s endowment structure—
 in terms of its relative abundance of labour and skills, capital, and natu-
ral resources. Upgrading the industrial structure requires fi rst upgrading 
the endowment structure, or else the resulting industrial structure will 
become a drag on development. Therefore the government’s role is to 
make sure that the economy is well launched on this endogenous process 
of upgrading. 
Let me explain this. The role of the facilitating state is to encourage the 
emergence of fi rms, industries, and sectors that, once launched, will make 
effective use of the country’s current comparative advantage. In many poor 
countries, that will mean focusing on labour- and/or resource-intensive 
types of production activities and services. Even with the increased inter-
national capital fl ows of recent decades, low-cost capital remains rela-
tively scarce, whereas labour and resources are relatively abundant and 
less costly. Focusing on labour- and resource-intensive production activities 
allows poor countries’ fi rms to be competitive in domestic and interna-
tional markets. The facilitating state provides the necessary co-ordination 
to remove the barriers to the emergence of these fi rms and their related 
industries, and gives them a helping nudge to overcome externalities, but 
then is able to let them grow and advance organically because of their 
comparative advantage. 
As the competitive industries and fi rms grow, they will claim larger mar-
ket share and create the greatest possible economic surplus, in the form 
of profi ts and salaries. When the surplus is reinvested, it earns the highest 
return possible as well, because the industrial structure is optimal for that 
endowment structure. Over time, this strategy allows the economy to accu-
mulate physical and human capital, upgrading the endowment structure as 
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well as the industrial structure and making domestic fi rms more competi-
tive over time in more capital- and skill-intensive products. 
While this comparative-advantage-following approach sounds gradual—
and hence unsatisfying, when we consider the enormity of the poverty 
 challenge—in fact progress is accelerated by the availability of technology 
and industries already developed by and existing in more advanced coun-
tries. Firms in developing countries can at each stage in their development 
acquire the technologies and enter into industries appropriate for their 
endowment structure, rather than having to do frontier innovation them-
selves. This ability to use off-the-shelf technology and to enter into existing 
industries is what has made possible the sustained annual GDP growth rates 
of 8 and even 10% achieved by some of the East Asian NIEs. 
The State as Midwife, not Permanent Nursemaid
Too often, developing-country policy-makers have tried to take a short 
cut in this endogenous process of industrial and technological upgrading. 
They have fi xed their sights and their policies on an ideal industrial struc-
ture that they associate with modernisation, but that structure is of course 
usually capital- and skill-intensive and is characteristic of a higher-income 
country than their own. As I have argued in my Marshall Lectures (Lin, 
2009), industrial strategies of the often newly-independent developing 
countries in the 1950s and 1960s were informed by incorrect perceptions 
of the binding constraints on development. These countries adopted devel-
opment strategies that placed a priority on capital-intensive heavy indus-
tries, that is, industries that made intensive use of a factor that they largely 
lacked, and that neglected to use many of the factors that they had in great 
abundance, such as unskilled labour and natural resources. In effect, these 
policy-makers took the optimal industrial structure as something that they 
could impose exogenously, rather than something that results from the 
characteristics of the economy and changes over time. 
This approach can be thought of as comparative-advantage-defying, 
and it has high costs, both fi nancially and in terms of governance quality. 
To implement this strategy, governments have to provide substantial pro-
tection and subsidisation to fi rms that are not viable without government 
subsidies and protection and cannot quickly become internationally com-
petitive. Such fi rms cannot generate any real surplus for society. Without a 
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continuous fl ow of surplus, it will be far harder to fi nance improvements 
in the factors of production—notably, capital and skilled labour—that are 
in turn necessary to make a more advanced industrial structure viable over 
the medium term. By distorting market signals and shifting resources from 
competitive to noncompetitive sectors, high levels of protection and subsi-
dies slow the country’s accumulation of physical and human capital. They 
also encourage fi rms to divert their energies from productive entrepreneur-
ship into rent-seeking, which corrupts institutions and further slows capi-
tal accumulation. 
Suppose the government tries to protect and subsidise the growth of 
capital-intensive industries, or other industries in which it has no compara-
tive advantage. In that case, the accumulation of capital and the upgrading 
of endowment structure are retarded, slowing the upgrading of its optimal 
technology/industrial structure. Rather than serving as midwife to healthy 
new industries, it is likely to fi nd itself becoming a long-run nursemaid to 
sickly infant industries that never mature. The culture of rent-seeking that 
is likely to emerge will calcify the web of protection even more and make 
later reforms more diffi cult. 
Comparative vs. Competitive Advantage
Putting domestic fi rms in a position to exploit the country’s compara-
tive advantage may sound sensible but old-fashioned. How does exploit-
ing comparative advantage compare with the promotion of ‘competitive 
advantage’, a strategy popularised by Michael Porter (1990) over the past 
two decades? In that literature, the four key sources of competitive advan-
tage are: 
•  sectors/industries that make good use of factors that are abundant 
domestically; 
• large domestic markets, to enable fi rms to achieve scale; 
• industrial clusters; and 
•  vibrant domestic competition, to encourage effi ciency and productivity 
growth. 
But these requirements can be simplifi ed, in my view. First, consider 
domestic competition: if a country’s strategy defi es comparative advantage, 
it will generally be unable to enforce competition, because non-viable fi rms 
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will need to be protected. Industrial clusters will also be hard to build 
and sustain, because, unless the government gives subsidies and protec-
tion, fi rms will not enter into this industry. However, the government will 
not be able to give subsidies and protection to many fi rms in an industry 
at the same time so as to form an industrial cluster. And if the country 
follows its comparative advantage, large domestic markets become unnec-
essary, because the industries and fi rms should be able to compete on glo-
bal  markets. Thus these four requirements boil down largely to a single 
 prescription: exploit your comparative advantage. 
Closing Notes
I am happy to launch this exchange with my friend and colleague Ha-Joon. 
We both care deeply about understanding the roots of rapid  economic 
growth and poverty reduction, and we have both thought carefully about 
the East Asian growth successes of the past two generations. There will 
doubtless be differences in the conclusions we reach on trade and indus-
trial policy, but it is illustrative that neither of us questions the importance 
of a major state role in promoting economic development. Perhaps this 
is because in the countries we know most intimately—China and South 
Korea—a crucial ingredient in growth was a capable and largely devel-
opmentally oriented state. The issue is identifying the key role played by 
the state in those countries and other rapid developers. My reading of 
these cases is that, while they took proactive steps to accelerate industrial 
upgrading, their success was spurred primarily by a state that made pos-
sible the effective exploitation of comparative advantage at each stage of 
development. 
Notes
†   This is the fi rst in an occasional series of DPR Debates, designed to illumi-
nate specifi c issues of international development policy. Each debate will bring 
together two well-known researchers or practitioners, giving them the opportu-
nity, over three rounds, to test and challenge each other’s ideas. The debates are 
intended to be robust but accessible, rooted in rigorous research but useful to 
the wide readership of Development Policy Review.
   Ha-Joon Chang is a reader in the Political Economy of Development, Faculty 
of Economics, University of Cambridge. He is the author, inter alia, of Kick-
ing Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem 
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Press, 2002), and Bad Samaritans: Rich Nations, Poor Policies, and the Threat 
to the Developing World (Random House, 2007).
1.  Note that this is a different argument from the co-ordination role often pro-
posed in the past for developing-country governments. That ‘big push’ line of 
argument stressed that if each potential fi rm’s viability depends on inputs from 
another fi rm that does not yet exist, none of the potential fi rms may emerge. 
In this case, the government can theoretically move the economy to a higher-
welfare equilibrium with a big push that leads to the concurrent emergence of 
upstream and downstream fi rms (see Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; and Murphy et 
al., 1989). But changing global conditions have made the traditional big-push 
argument less compelling. The reduction in transportation and information 
costs in recent decades has led to global production networks in which many 
countries, both developed and developing, produce only certain parts of a fi nal 
product according to each country’s comparative advantage.
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Ha-Joon Chang
It is a pleasure to debate this issue with Justin Lin, whose intellectual inter-
ests are exceptionally wide-ranging and whose theoretical position, while 
fi rmly grounded in neoclassical economics, is never dogmatic. 
In his opening essay, Justin acknowledges the importance of industrial 
upgrading for economic growth and development. This is a point that is 
often missed by today’s development mainstream, which emphasises static 
allocative effi ciency; so Justin’s emphasis on industrial upgrading is really 
welcome. 
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On top of that, Justin also acknowledges the positive role that state 
intervention can play in promoting industrial upgrading, given important 
market failures that exist in the supply of new technological knowledge, 
such as the externalities generated by innovators experimenting with new 
things and the co-ordination failures across different input markets (for 
example, education, fi nance, legal institutions, and infrastructure). Justin 
also rightly warns against the possibility of government failure, but goes 
on to note that ‘there are few if any examples of governments that have 
succeeded with a purely laissez-faire approach that does not try to come 
to grips with market failures, and far more examples of rapid growth in 
countries whose governments have led effectively’. 
Up to this point, we are on the same platform. However, there are some 
important differences in our views. Our main difference is that, whereas 
Justin believes that state intervention, while important, should be basically 
about facilitating the exploitation of a country’s comparative advantage, 
I believe that comparative advantage, while important, is no more than the 
base line, and that a country needs to defy its comparative advantage in 
order to upgrade its industry. 
The concept of comparative advantage, fi rst invented by David Ricardo, 
is one of the few concepts in economics that is more than common sense 
(the others include Keynes’ notion of effective demand and Schumpeter’s 
concept of innovation). The beauty of this concept is that it shows how 
even a country with no absolute international cost advantage in any indus-
try may benefi t from international trade by specialising in industries at 
which it is least bad. Indeed, it was the brilliance of Ricardo’s concept that 
fi rst drew me into economics. And as a guide to fi nding out the best way to 
maximise a country’s current consumption opportunities, given its current 
endowments, we cannot do better than that. 
As is well known, this theory, especially in the Heckscher-Ohlin-
 Samuelson version that Justin uses, is based on some stringent assump-
tions. Of course, all theories have assumptions and therefore the fact that 
there are some stringent assumptions in itself cannot be a point of criti-
cism. However, we still need to ask whether the particular assumptions 
made by a model are appropriate for the particular questions we happen 
to be asking. My contention is that, while the assumptions made by the 
HOS theory may be acceptable when we are interested in short-term 
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allocative effi ciency (i.e., when we want to fi nd out whether a country 
is exploiting its given resources with the maximum effi ciency), they are 
not acceptable if we are interested in medium-term adjustment and long-
term development. 
First, let us look at the issue of medium-term adjustment. One of the 
key assumptions of the HOS theory is the assumption of perfect factor 
mobility (within each country). When this is assumed, no one loses out 
from changes in trade pattern caused by external shocks. So, if a steel 
mill shuts down because, say, the government reduces tariffs on steel, 
the resources employed in the industry (the workers, the buildings, the 
blast furnaces) will be employed (at the same or higher levels of pro-
ductivity and thus higher returns) by another industry that has become 
relatively more profi table, say, the computer industry. No one loses from 
the process. 
However, in reality, factors of production are usually fi xed in their 
physical qualities. Blast furnaces from a bankrupt steel mill cannot be 
 re-moulded into a machine making computers. Steel workers do not have 
the right skills for the computer industry: unless they are retrained, they 
will remain unemployed; at best, they will end up working in low-skill 
jobs, where their existing skills are totally wasted. In other words, even 
if the country as a whole benefi ts from trade liberalisation (which is not 
always the case even in the short run), the owners of factors of production 
that have low or no mobility are going to lose from it, unless there is delib-
erate compensation. This is why trade liberalisation has produced so many 
‘losers’, despite the prediction of HOS theory. 
This is a more serious problem in developing countries, where the com-
pensation mechanism is weak, if not non-existent. In developed countries, 
the welfare state works as a mechanism partially to compensate losers 
from the trade-adjustment process through unemployment benefi t, guar-
antees of health care and education, and even guarantees of a minimum 
income. In some countries, such as Sweden and other Scandinavian coun-
tries, there are also highly effective re-training schemes for unemployed 
workers. In most developing countries, however, such mechanisms are 
very weak and often virtually non-existent. As a result, the victims of 
trade adjustment in these countries are not even partially compensated for 
the sacrifi ce that they have made for the rest of society. 
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If the assumption of perfect factor mobility makes HOS inadequate for 
the analysis of medium-term adjustment, its assumption about technol-
ogy makes it particularly unsuited to the analysis of long-term economic 
development. 
The assumption in the HOS model is that there is only one best tech-
nology for producing a particular product and, more importantly, that all 
countries have the same ability to use that technology. So, in the HOS the-
ory, if Ecuador should not be producing BMWs, it is not because it cannot 
do it, but because doing it has too high an opportunity cost, as producing 
BMWs will use too much of its scarce factor of production—capital. 
However, this is assuming away the very thing that makes some countries 
developed and others not—namely, their differential abilities to develop 
and use technologies, or what is known as ‘technological capabilities’. In 
the end, the rich countries are rich and the poor countries are poor because 
the former can use, and develop, technologies that the latter cannot use, 
let alone develop. 
Moreover, the nature of the process of acquiring higher technological 
capabilities is such that a country trying to catch up with a more techno-
logically advanced country needs to set up and protect industries in which 
it does not have comparative advantage. Why should that be the case? Can 
the country not wait until it accumulates enough physical and human capi-
tal before it enters a more advanced industry that uses physical and human 
capital more intensively? 
Unfortunately, it cannot be done quite like that. Factor accumulation 
does not happen as an abstract process. There is no such thing as general 
‘capital’ or ‘labour’ that a country can accumulate and that it can deploy 
wherever necessary. Capital is accumulated in concrete forms, such as 
machine tools for the car parts industry, blast furnaces, or textile machines. 
This means that, even if a country has the right capital-labour ratio for 
the automobile industry, it cannot enter the industry if its capital has been 
accumulated in the form of, say, textile machines. Likewise, even if a coun-
try accumulates more human capital to justify its entry into the automobile 
industry, it cannot start making cars if all its engineers and workers were 
trained for the textile industry. 
Most (although not all) technological capabilities are accumulated 
through concrete production experiences, and at that in the forms of 
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 ‘collective knowledge’ embodied in organisational routines and institu-
tional memories. Even if a country has all the right machines, engineers, 
and workers (which is not possible anyway, as I have just explained), they 
still cannot be combined into an internationally competitive fi rm overnight 
because they actually need to be put through a (potentially very lengthy) 
learning process before they can acquire all the necessary technological 
capabilities. 
This is why Japan had to protect its car industry with high tariffs for 
nearly four decades, provide a lot of direct and indirect subsidies, and vir-
tually ban foreign direct investment in the industry before it could become 
competitive in the world market. It is for the same reason that the electron-
ics subsidiary of the Nokia group had to be cross-subsidised by its sister 
companies for 17 years before it made any profi t. History is full of exam-
ples of this kind, from eighteenth-century Britain to late twentieth-century 
Korea. 
Of course, Justin is absolutely right in saying that deviating too much 
from one’s comparative advantages is to be avoided. Comparative advan-
tage does offer a useful guideline in telling us how much the country is sac-
rifi cing by protecting its infant industries. The more you deviate from your 
comparative advantage, the more you pay in order to acquire capabilities 
in new industries. 
However, this does not mean that a country should conform to its com-
parative advantage, as Justin puts it. As I have argued, given the nature of 
the process of factor accumulation and technological capability-building, 
it is simply not possible for a backward economy to accumulate capabili-
ties in new industries without defying comparative advantage and actually 
entering the industry before it has the ‘right’ factor endowments. 
Given this, a good neoclassical economist may be tempted to argue 
that a country should do a cost-benefi t analysis before deciding to enter 
a new industry, weighing the costs of technological upgrading against the 
expected future returns, using comparative advantage as the measuring 
rod. However, this is a logical but ultimately misleading way of looking at 
the process. The problem is that it is very diffi cult to predict how long the 
acquisition of the necessary technological capabilities is going to take and 
how much ‘return’ it will bring in the end. So it is not as if Nokia entered 
the electronics industry in 1960 because it could clearly calculate that it 
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would need to invest such and such amount in developing the electron-
ics industry (through cross-subsidies) for exactly 17 years but then would 
reap huge future returns of such and such amount. Nokia probably did not 
think that it would take 17 years to make a profi t in electronics. It prob-
ably did not know how large the eventual return was going to be. That is 
the nature of entrepreneurial decision-making in a world with bounded 
rationality and fundamental uncertainty. In other words, unless you actu-
ally enter the industry and develop it, it is impossible to know how long it 
will take for the country to acquire the necessary technological capabilities 
to become internationally competitive. 
At the most general level, Justin and I share the same policy conclu-
sions. We agree that industrial upgrading is necessary for economic devel-
opment. We agree that it will not happen purely through market forces 
and will need government intervention. We also agree that the govern-
ment should not push the economy too far away from its current structure 
too quickly. 
However, there are some important differences between the two of us. 
In the theory of neoclassical comparative advantage that Justin uses, the 
issue of limited factor mobility is neglected, resulting in the systemic under-
estimation of the costs of trade liberalisation and hence the need for good 
redistribution mechanisms. More importantly, technological capabilities 
are missing from the theory, when they are really what distinguishes devel-
oped countries from developing ones. Once we realise that a lot of tech-
nological capabilities are acquired in an industry-specifi c manner through 
actual production experiences, we begin to see that it is by defi nition nec-
essary to defy comparative advantage if a country is going to enter new 
industries and upgrade its industrial structure. And the length and the 
strength of such protection can be very large, as the examples of Toyota, 
Nokia, and countless other examples of successful infant-industry protec-
tion show, and also inherently diffi cult to predict. 
Justin Lin
Ha-Joon summarises well our key areas of agreement: government has a 
role to play in promoting technological and industrial upgrading, but there 
are risks in deviating too far from a country’s comparative advantage. Our 
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differences lie in how to defi ne ‘too far’—how to interpret trade models 
and historical evidence, and how to promote technological learning cost-
effectively. 
Do Adjustment Costs and Technological Differences Really 
Undermine the Theory of Comparative Advantage?
Ha-Joon argues that, because of imperfect factor mobility (in effect, 
adjustment costs) and simplifi ed assumptions about technology, argu-
ments against infant-industry protection that are based on standard trade 
models (such as Baldwin, 1969) do not provide good guidance for policy. 
Clearly, there are frictions in labour-market adjustment to changes in 
industrial competitiveness, and physical capital is often industry-specifi c. 
Workers cannot move costlessly from one industry to another, or from 
one region to another, and many developing-country governments do 
 little to compensate the losers. But adjustment costs can easily be incor-
porated into standard trade models, without undermining the basic 
theory of comparative advantage (Mussa, 1978). Moreover, when a 
country loses comparative advantage in the existing industry, the indus-
try-specifi c capital can be relocated in the form of foreign direct invest-
ment to other countries, in what has been called a fl ying-geese pattern of 
economic development in East Asia and many other parts of the world 
(Akamatsu, 1962). 
Ha-Joon’s second point is that the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model 
incorrectly assumes that the same technology is available to producers 
in all countries. Yet the theory of comparative advantage does not hinge 
on having identical technology. Ricardo’s original model of comparative 
advantage recognised that England and Portugal had different technologies 
for producing wine and cloth, for example. Moreover, theoretical models 
are intended to be simplifi cations; in empirical trade models, richer and 
poorer countries are routinely recognised to be using different  technologies. 
Thanks to the dramatic reduction in information and transportation costs, 
countries at different stages of development could even concentrate on 
different segments of the same industry, each using different technologies 
and producing different products according to comparative  advantages. 
Take the information industry as an example: high-income countries, like 
the US, specialise in product/technology development; middle-income 
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countries, like Malaysia, concentrate on the fabrication of chips; and 
lower-middle-income countries, like China, focus on the production of 
spare parts and the assembly of fi nal products. 
Ha-Joon correctly observes that in reality trade liberalisation has pro-
duced many losers in the past two decades. But this is because those coun-
tries started with many industries that were inconsistent with their areas 
of comparative advantage, as a result of comparative-advantage-defying 
(CAD) strategies that their governments had adopted in the past. Remov-
ing protection in a shock-therapy manner caused the collapse of nonviable 
fi rms. However, if, in the liberalisation process, the government liberalises 
the entry to sectors in which the country has comparative advantage, and 
phases out protections to the CAD industries gradually, as argued in my 
Marshall Lectures (Lin, 2009), the country can obtain a Pareto improve-
ment by achieving stability and dynamic growth simultaneously in the proc-
ess. Indeed, this is how China has managed its transition from a planned 
to a market economy. 
What Do We Learn about Technological Upgrading 
from the Success Stories?
Underlying Ha-Joon’s line of argument is research that he and others have 
done on some of the most rapid industrialisers. Here, I will comment on 
the case of Korea with a brief note about his Nokia example as well. 
On the one hand, it is hard to argue that an active industrial and trade 
policy substantially hindered growth in the Republic of Korea. The coun-
try did protect certain sectors with high trade barriers, and in some cases 
took an aggressive approach to industrial upgrading into capital-intensive 
industries. And over the past 40 years, Korea has achieved remarkable 
GDP growth rates, and has performed impressively on industrial upgrad-
ing, into such industries as automobiles and semiconductors. 
Yet we should not overstate the extent to which Korea pushed ahead 
of its comparative advantage. In the automotive sector, for example, early 
in its growth period, Korean manufacturers concentrated mostly on the 
assembly of imported parts—which was labour-intensive and in line with 
their comparative advantage at the time. Similarly, in electronics, the focus 
was initially on household appliances, such as TVs, washing machines, and 
refrigerators, and then moved on to memory chips, the least technologically 
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complex segment of the information industry. Korea’s technological ascent 
has been rapid, but then so has its accumulation of physical and human 
capital, due to the conformity of Korea’s main industrial sectors to the exist-
ing comparative advantages, and hence its changes in underlying compara-
tive advantage. 
Equally important, the Korean government had a record of managing 
the protected sectors in ways that kept them subject to market discipline, 
which made large-scale deviation from the economy’s comparative advan-
tage impossible. Industries benefi ting from protection and subsidisation 
were required to prove on export markets that their competitiveness was 
increasing over time. In addition, the government worked hard to make 
sure that Korean manufacturers could access intermediate inputs at world 
prices, for example through duty-drawback and exemption schemes and 
export-processing zones. So the government clearly recognised that com-
parative advantage mattered, and that successful technological upgrading 
depended on fi rms being infl uenced by world prices for both inputs and 
outputs. The evidence indicates that Korea’s government served as a facili-
tating state, as argued in my opening contribution. 
Let me add a footnote on the Nokia example, which I would interpret 
differently from Ha-Joon. Nokia’s technological upgrading—from timber 
company to footwear, to manufacturing for Philips and then manufacturer 
of own-brand household electronics, and fi nally to mobile-phone power-
house—took place roughly in line with the growth of Finland’s stocks of 
physical and human capital. The Finnish government helped in ways that 
were far-sighted, but that I would interpret as consistent with the facili-
tating role in a comparative-advantage-following strategy. It  promoted 
R&D and competition in the mobile-phone industry in the 1970s, creating 
and building on a pan-Nordic mobile network (Ali-Yrkkö and  Hermans, 
2004). The learning-by-doing that Nokia gained was invaluable, but 
the core element of this strategy was not high levels of protection of the 
domestic market. Nokia apparently cross-subsidised the development of its 
mobile-phone division through profi ts in other areas. However, Finland’s 
per capita income in 1970, measured in 1990s’ purchasing power parity, 
had already reached 9,600 international dollars, which was at a level close 
to Germany’s 10,800 dollars in the same year (Maddison, 2006). Nokia’s 
decision is wholly consistent with a model of technological/ industrial 
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upgrading by a profi t-maximising private fi rm in an open, competitive, 
high-income country. 
Are Dynamic Comparative Advantage and Infant-Industry 
Protection Sound Foundations for Industrial Policy?
Finally, we should turn to the question of Ha-Joon’s theoretical founda-
tion for using trade policy as a tool for promoting industrial upgrading. 
His argument is based on the idea of dynamic comparative advantage 
and infant-industry protection. Nevertheless, if industrial upgrading pro-
ceeds step by step in conjunction with changes in comparative advantage, 
 learning costs are lower than if the country attempts a big leap. As an anal-
ogy, think of mathematics learning. Typically, a student starts by study-
ing algebra, then proceeds through calculus to real analysis. If instead he 
started with real analysis, even though he might eventually master it, the 
learning costs would most likely be much higher than otherwise. Similarly, 
if a fi rm begins by manufacturing bicycles, then learns to make motor-
cycles, and eventually moves into making automobiles, the total learning 
costs will probably be much lower than if it starts with the daunting task 
of mastering the effi cient production of automobiles. 
When a government chooses to provide protection or incentives to fi rms 
in sectors that may be viable only in twenty or more years, it will inevitably 
have to draw resources from fi rms in areas of current comparative advan-
tage. This will reduce the surpluses they earn, and will therefore slow capi-
tal accumulation and the upgrading of the country’s endowment structure 
and comparative advantage, making the infant industry stay as an infant 
much longer than otherwise (Baldwin, 1969; Saure, 2007). 
Furthermore, excessive protection risks institutionalising a culture of 
rent-seeking. Given how important the quality of institutions and gover-
nance is to development, the indirect effects of protection through poor 
governance may be even more damaging than the direct effects. 
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Ha-Joon Chang
Even though we come from different theoretical traditions, Justin and I 
agree on the broad framework for the analysis of industrial upgrading. To 
be sure, we have our differences. While we may both be of the view that 
comparative advantage is an important principle, I see it as only a ‘base 
line’, whereas Justin thinks it should be stuck to very closely, if not per-
fectly. We agree on the importance of adjustment costs and technological 
learning, but we differ in how important we think they are and we analyse 
them in different ways. 
However, these are differences whose clarifi cation actually helps us think 
through some of the fi ner points and advances our knowledge, rather than 
those that lead to unproductive bickering. 
First, on adjustment costs. Justin is right in saying that these costs can be 
(and occasionally have been) incorporated into mainstream trade models. 
But my question is: if adjustments costs are important, why have they been 
so much neglected in practice by mainstream economists, who keep rec-
ommending trade liberalisation with only perfunctory, if any, attention to 
adjustment costs? It is not enough to say that adjustment costs can be incor-
porated into mainstream models. Intellectual leaders in the mainstream 
camp, like Justin, should encourage people actually to do it and then fully 
apply the results in designing trade-policy reform. The same applies to the 
assumption of identical technology. If it is better not to assume identical 
technology (as Justin implicitly acknowledges), why do mainstream econo-
mists keep using the HOS version of comparative advantage rather than 
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the Ricardian version, in which differences in technology determine the 
comparative advantages of different nations? 
As for Justin’s point that even activity-specifi c assets do not need to lose 
their value entirely in the adjustment process because they can be shifted 
to another country, I thank him for reminding me of this important point. 
However, this mainly applies to physical assets and then only to a limited 
extent. Not all physical assets can be shipped abroad and many of them 
need complementary assets and skills if they are to realise their full produc-
tive potential. Moreover, workers with specifi c skills (or human capital, 
if you like) cannot move to the ‘next-goose’ country, except for a limited 
number of technicians who may be called upon to advise the factories in 
the new host countries. For the workers, it is cold comfort to learn that the 
physical assets they used to work with may preserve some of their value 
by moving to another country. To make things worse, the workers usually 
have fewer and less diversifi ed assets (even including their own human 
capital) than the owners of physical assets, so they are less capable of cop-
ing with the consequences of the adjustment, even if they are subject to the 
same magnitude of shocks (in proportional terms) as the capitalists. 
Thus seen, Justin’s ‘fl ying geese’ point does not lessen the need to incor-
porate adjustment costs into trade policy design. If anything, it actually 
highlights the need to better design compensation schemes for the workers 
with specifi c skills (for example, subsidised re-training programmes). 
Justin argues that trade liberalisation in the last two decades has pro-
duced many losers ‘because those countries started with many industries 
that were inconsistent with their areas of comparative advantage’ because 
of wrong policies in the past. This may often (although not always) have 
been the case, but it does not justify the way trade liberalisation has been 
conducted in the last two decades. If we know that a country has deviated 
‘too much’ from its comparative advantage, the prudent course of action 
will be not to try to liberalise trade too much too quickly, as otherwise the 
adjustment costs will be very high. 
Two wrongs do not make a right. 
This naturally leads me to Justin’s second point—the challenge of decid-
ing how much to deviate from comparative advantage. Using the Korean 
and Finnish examples, he argues that these countries succeeded because 
they did not deviate from their comparative advantages too much. He is 
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right in saying that Korea’s move along the ‘ladder’ of international divi-
sion of labour has often been carried out in small, if rapid, steps. Although 
I do not fully agree with this characterisation (for example, the moves 
into industries like steel and shipbuilding were big leaps, with virtually no 
‘intermediate’ steps), I also agree that making excessive leaps can result in 
excessive learning costs. 
Thus seen, we could suppose some kind of inverted-U-shaped relation-
ship between an economy’s deviation from comparative advantage and its 
growth rate. If it deviates too little, it may be effi cient in the short run, but 
its long-term growth is slowed down, as it is not upgrading. Up to a point, 
therefore, increasing deviation from comparative advantage will accelerate 
growth. After a point, negative effects of protection (for example, exces-
sive learning costs, rent-seeking) may overwhelm the acceleration in pro-
ductivity growth that the ‘infant’ industries generate, resulting in negative 
growth overall. 
I think Justin would probably agree with the above way of seeing things. 
However, there is one big disagreement between the two of us in applying 
this idea. It is the question of ‘how much (deviation from comparative 
advantage) is too much?’ (or where is the apex in the inverted-U curve?) 
Using the Finnish example, Justin says that Nokia was justifi ed in mov-
ing into the electronics industry, as Finland was already a pretty rich coun-
try, with per capita income (in international dollars) only 13% lower than 
that of Germany in 1970 ($9,577 vs. $10,839). However, the relevant year 
is not 1970 but 1960, which is when the electronics subsidiary of Nokia 
was set up, and in that year the income gap with Germany was much 
greater, at 23% ($7,705 vs. $6,230).1 Anyway, these fi gures are purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) fi gures, which tend to infl ate a poorer country’s 
income. PPP fi gures are preferable if we are interested in measuring com-
parative living standards, but if we are interested in comparative advantage 
in international trade, current dollar fi gures, rather than PPP fi gures, are 
better fi gures to use. 
If we use current dollars, the picture becomes quite different.2 In 1960, 
the per capita income of Finland was only 41% that of the US, the fron-
tier country in electronics and overall ($1,172 vs. $2,881). This does not 
look like the case of a country sticking closely to comparative advantage. 
If  Finland’s decision regarding Nokia does not look ‘wrong’ enough, how 
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about Japan? In 1961, the per capita income of Japan was a mere 19% that 
of the US ($563 vs. $2,934), but Japan was then protecting and promoting 
all sorts of ‘wrong’ industries—automobiles, steel, shipbuilding, and so on. 
For an even more dramatic example, take the case of South Korea. Its 
(then) state-owned steel mill, POSCO, which had been set up in 1968, 
started production in 1972, when its per capita income was a mere 5.5% 
that of the US ($322 vs. $5,838).3 To make it worse, in the same year, South 
Korea decided to deviate even further from its comparative advantage by 
launching its ambitious Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation programme, 
which promoted shipbuilding, (home-designed) automobiles, machinery, 
and many other ‘wrong’ industries. Even as late as 1983, when Samsung 
decided to design its own semiconductors, Korea’s income was only 14% 
that of the US ($2,118 vs. $15,008). Does this sound like a ‘comparative-
advantage-conforming’ strategy, as Justin calls it? 
A further diffi culty with Justin’s argument is that in all these examples 
of defi ance of comparative advantage, the market gave Finland, Japan, and 
Korea unambiguous signals that they should not promote those industries; 
all the companies in those industries ran losses or earned profi ts on paper 
only because they were subsidised by profi table companies in the same 
business group and/or by the government (directly through subsidies and 
indirectly through protection and entry restrictions). But if Justin thinks 
Nokia’s experience is ‘consistent with a model of technological/industrial 
upgrading by a profi t-maximising private fi rm in an open, competitive, 
high-income country’, is he saying that market signals are not to be taken 
seriously? Within the neoclassical framework, how else are we to judge 
whether or not a country is following its comparative advantage, except by 
looking at profi ts and losses made by the relevant companies? 
I think that, deep down, Justin and I actually agree. We agree that coun-
tries should deviate from comparative advantage to upgrade their economy, 
although Justin thinks this deviation should be fairly small and I think it 
can be big. However, because Justin is too faithful to neoclassical econom-
ics, he has to say that a country with an income level that is only 5% of the 
frontier country moving into one of the most capital-intensive industries 
(Korea and steel) is consistent with the theory of comparative advantage. 
Once Justin frees himself from the shackles of neoclassical economics, our 
debate will be more like two carpenters having a friendly disagreement 
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over what kind of hinges and door handles to use for a new cabinet that 
they are building together, on whose basic design they agree. 
Notes
1.  All the PPP income fi gures are from Maddison (2006: Tables 1-c for Europe, 
2-c for the USA, 5-c for South Korea). 
2.  All the current dollar income fi gures are from http://www.nationmaster.com/
red/graph/eco_gdp_percapeconomy-gdp-per-capita, which draws on the World 
Bank and the CIA data. 
3.  Even in PPP terms, its income was only 16% that of the US ($2,561 vs. 
$15,944).
Justin Lin
I’ve enjoyed this extended exchange, which has given us a chance to 
highlight our differences, while recognising our points of agreement. In 
response to Ha-Joon’s latest submission, it is useful to focus on two points: 
the dynamic nature of industrial upgrading, and the role of government in 
promoting it. 
Industrial Upgrading as a Dynamic Process
First, let me reiterate that innovation is necessary for industrial upgrad-
ing and development, and that government has a role in supporting that 
innovation for the positive externalities innovation brings to an economy’s 
development. It is hard work to climb technological ladders, to use a meta-
phor employed by Ha-Joon and others. The developed countries that are 
at the technology frontiers recognise this. They provide considerable public 
support to fi rms in their frontier industries—directly by giving a patent to 
a new invention and sometimes also through defence contracts; and indi-
rectly through supporting basic research at universities, which ultimately 
spills over into product development and benefi ts fi rms and industries at 
the technological frontier. As inside-the-frontier innovations in developing 
countries involve similar risk and externalities, public support can be desir-
able and justifi able in that context too. Well-thought-out subsidisation is 
not only consistent with the role of a facilitating state, but is even implied. 
However, as pointed out in my fi rst essay, the subsidies to compensate for 
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an innovative fi rm’s externality will be small compared with those that 
would be required to protect non-viable fi rms in industries that go against 
an economy’s comparative advantage. 
Second, industrial upgrading in an economy is a continuous process. 
Although government needs to help solve externality and co-ordination 
problems for the pioneer fi rms, their upgrading is based on the fact that 
the economy has successfully exploited its existing comparative advantages 
and its endowment structure, as well as comparative advantage shifting. 
When the Korean government started its world-class state-owned Pohang 
Iron and Steel company in 1968, to use Ha-Joon’s example, that invest-
ment was built upon the success of development in garments, plywood, 
wigs, footwear, and other labour-intensive industries. With the success of 
those labour-intensive industries, Korea accumulated capital and the capi-
tal intensity of its endowment structure increased. From the perspective 
of the comparative-advantage-following strategy, the upgrading of a few 
fi rms into more capital-intensive industries became a necessity. 
The ‘fl ying geese’ metaphor is useful in the domestic context as well as 
the international one: when an economy follows its comparative advan-
tage in economic development, its endowment structure and comparative 
advantage change dynamically. Some fi rms need to play the role of a ‘lead 
goose’ so as to pioneer the upgrading into new industries. This appears to 
be one area of difference between Ha-Joon and me: I see the lead goose as 
a small but important leading wedge in a dynamic process, whereas he sees 
it as a more quantitatively signifi cant part of the economy making larger 
discrete technological leaps. The quantitative difference can cause a quali-
tative difference. When the lead goose is a small wedge in the dynamic pro-
cess, the nature of the economy is consistent with its comparative advan-
tage. Unlike the upgrading in the comparative-advantage-defying strategy 
discussed in my fi rst essay, the subsidies to the lead goose can derive mostly 
from intra-fi rm profi ts obtained in the operations of other products in 
competitive markets, as in the case of Samsung and Nokia. 
Third, the global technological frontier is continually being pushed out-
ward. Industries such as steel production and shipbuilding were among the 
most advanced industries globally in the nineteenth century, but by the mid-
twentieth century they no longer held this leading-edge position.  Compared 
with new industries, such as aviation, information, and heavy chemicals, 
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their technologies had become mature. Investments in these mature indus-
tries required a large amount of capital, compared with traditional labour-
intensive industries, but their capital intensities were much lower than in 
the new emergent industries. It is therefore not surprising that, with some 
government support for overcoming the diffi culty of mobilising a large 
amount of capital in an economy with an underdeveloped fi nancial sector, 
these industries are viable in countries that have achieved or are approach-
ing lower-middle-income status. When Korea established Pohang Iron and 
Steel, its per capita income in dollar terms was just 5.5% that of the US, 
as pointed out by Ha-Joon. I would also like to mention that China had 
become the largest producer of steel in the world by 2000, at a time when 
its per capita income in dollar terms was only about 2.5% of the US level.1 
Korea and China were able to succeed in the steel industry at a relatively 
low income level because steel had become a mature and relatively low 
capital-intensity industry in the global industrial spectrum. 
A related point is that, within industries, some segments are more acces-
sible to developing countries than others. Manufacturing includes various 
stages—product R&D, design, production of complex parts, production 
of simpler parts, and assembly—and they all have different factor require-
ments and are consistent with different patterns of comparative advan-
tage. Countries therefore scale the ladder of technological sophistication 
and capital intensity within industries dynamically in a fl ying-geese pattern 
as well. Samsung’s entry in 1983 into the development of the 64-kilobit 
dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chip, which was relatively low-
tech on the microchip spectrum at that time and was produced with the 
proprietary technology from Micron of the United States and Sharp of 
Japan, was built on some 15 years of successful operations in consumer 
electronics. It is worth noting that, in spite of the success of its entry into 
microchips in 1983, Samsung, on the one hand, has not entered the more 
complicated and advanced CPU chips and, on the other hand, has main-
tained its successful operations in consumer electronics. 
Facilitating Comparative Advantage, with Equal Parts 
Vision and Realism
To sum up my argument in this exchange, I reiterate that the comparative-
advantage-following approach is dynamic in nature and the state should 
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play a facilitating role in that process. This means that economic develop-
ment in a country should exploit pragmatically the existing opportunities 
embedded in the country’s areas of comparative advantage, while recogn-
ising the potential for industrial upgrading when those areas of compara-
tive advantage have been exploited. Industrial upgrading is an innovation 
involving risks and externalities, whether in developed or developing coun-
tries, and thus requires the government to play a facilitating role. Gov-
ernments in developing countries can play that role through the channels 
of information, co-ordination and compensation for externalities, as dis-
cussed in my fi rst essay. 
Ha-Joon’s rhetorical jibe notwithstanding, neoclassical economics is 
simply a useful tool in all this, not a constraint. It is fl exible enough to 
model the externalities, dynamics, and co-ordination failures that give the 
government a role to play, while also providing the metrics to judge whether 
government is supporting industries that take the economy too far from 
its areas of comparative advantage. Without the former, developing coun-
tries may lack the wisdom to seize opportunities to develop competitive 
industries and lay the foundation for sustainable industrial upgrading and 
development. But without the latter, as the historical record emphasises, 
governments can make any number of costly mistakes, most notably by 
funding large-scale, unrealistic and unsustainable comparative-advantage-
defying projects and industries. By facilitating industrial upgrading where 
domestic fi rms will be able to survive and thrive, government can intervene 
in ways that yield the greatest social returns. 
Notes
1.  Here I use Ha-Joon’s method of comparison based on market exchange rates, 
but PPP incomes are the more appropriate basis for comparison, in my view. 
Although market exchange rates govern international trade, PPP fi gures are 
better indicators of the level of development and capacity of an economy, and 
are therefore more relevant for discussions of industrial upgrading. 
Ha-Joon Chang
As the exchange shows, Justin and I agree on many things. Both of us rec-
ognise that ‘climbing up the ladder’ is a hard slog that involves more than 
‘getting the prices right’. It requires, inter alia, intelligent industrial policy, 
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organisation building, and efforts to accumulate technological capabili-
ties through R&D, training and production experiences. We agree that, 
in climbing up the ladder, a country can skip some rungs with the help of 
industrial policy, but that it can slip, fall, and even be destroyed, if it tries 
to jump too many rungs. The principle of comparative advantage, Justin 
says and I agree, can tell us what a country’s ‘natural’ climbing ability is 
and thus help us to see how much risk it is taking in trying to skip a certain 
number of rungs. 
However, we have some important differences. 
Justin emphasises that neoclassical economics is fl exible enough to allow 
us to deal with all the complex issues arising during the development pro-
cess. I think it is not enough. 
I agree that neoclassical economics is a lot more fl exible than is usually 
recognised by many of its critics and that it can justify most types of state 
intervention, even of pretty ‘unorthodox’ kinds. After all, in the 1930s, 
the famous Marxist Oskar Lange tried to justify socialist planning with a 
neoclassical general equilibrium model. 
However, the rational-choice, individualistic foundation of neoclassical 
economics limits its ability to analyse the uncertain and collective nature 
of the technological learning process, which is at the heart of economic 
development. I have emphasised the importance of bounded rational-
ity, fundamental uncertainty (and not just calculable risk), and collective 
knowledge in the development process. This means that the industrial 
upgrading process will be messy. It will not be possible for a country to 
follow market signals closely and enter an industry when its factor endow-
ments are right, as will happen with the smooth comparative-advantage-
conforming strategy that Justin advocates. In the real world, fi rms with 
uncertain prospects need to be created, protected, subsidised, and nur-
tured, possibly for decades, if industrial upgrading is to be achieved. 
In practical terms, my difference with Justin lies primarily in the extent to 
which we think the defi ance of comparative advantage is advisable. While 
Justin believes that the skipping of the rungs in climbing the ladder should 
be very small (‘comparative-advantage-conforming’ in his words), I believe 
that it can be, and sometimes has to be, large (‘comparative-advantage-
defying’ in his words). There is, of course, a chance that such an attempt 
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may not succeed, but that is the nature of any venture into new activities, 
whether purely private or assisted by the state. 
Justin is right in pointing out that Korea’s forays into industries like 
steel, shipbuilding, and microchips were not as dramatic as they may have 
looked at fi rst sight. By the time Korea entered them, steel and shipbuilding 
were technologically mature, although I am not sure whether that neces-
sarily means lower capital intensity, as Justin assumes; technological matu-
rity will increase capital intensity by leading to a greater embodiment of 
technologies in capital goods, while it may reduce capital intensity by low-
ering the relative prices of the relevant capital goods. Even in microchips, 
the segment that Korea entered, namely, the DRAM chip, was (and still is) 
technologically the easiest. 
However, all these still do not mean that Korea’s entry into these indus-
tries was comparative-advantage-conforming. First of all, technologically 
mature or not, the fact remains that industries like steel were still way too 
capital-intensive for Korea at the time (or, for that matter, today’s China). 
More interestingly, Korea’s success in steel was owed especially to the fact 
that it reaped the maximum scale economy by deliberately going for the 
most up-to-date and capital-intensive technology available (bought from 
New Nippon Steel). 
Most importantly, the market clearly signalled that these were ‘wrong’ 
industries to enter, by making the producers run losses or forcing the gov-
ernment or the relevant business groups to manufacture ‘artifi cial’ profi ts 
by protecting and subsidising them. I do not think any version of neoclas-
sical economic theory can justify protecting an industry for four decades 
(for example, Japanese and Korean cars) or cross-subsidising a loss-making 
subsidiary for 17 years (Nokia). 
I have learned a lot from this exchange with Justin. We come from dif-
ferent intellectual traditions, but we have conducted a cordial and very 
productive debate that bears no bitterness or petty point-scoring. I wish 
there could be more exchanges like this in the pages of Development Policy 
Review and elsewhere. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent global crisis, the most serious since the Great Depression, 
has forced economists and policy-makers to rethink their approaches to 
macroeconomic management. For developing countries, in the midst of a 
* Adapted from “DPR Debate: Growth Identifi cation and Facilitation: The Role of the State in the 
Dynamics of Structural Change,” Development Policy Review, 29 (3), May 2011 (DOI: 10.1111/
j.1467-7679.2011.00534.x). © 2011 Lin, J., Monga, C., te Velde, D. W., Tendulkar, S. D., Amsden, 
A., Amoako, K. Y., Pack, H., and Lim, W. © 2011 Overseas Development Institute. Reprinted with 
the permission of John Wiley and Sons / Blackwell Publishing.
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fi nancial and economic turmoil not of their own making, the road ahead 
is likely to be rocky. Because of the sluggish recovery in high-income coun-
tries and the heavy cost of the crisis, they will have to confront a more dif-
fi cult global environment for their exports and fi nancing conditions. Yet, in 
order to continue tackling the enormous challenge of poverty and achieve 
convergence, they must return to the pre-crisis path of dynamic growth. 
How to promote economic growth has been a main topic for economic 
discourse since the publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations 
in 1776. Market mechanisms have proved essential for valuing the basic 
ingredients for production and providing the right price signals and the 
appropriate incentive system for the effi cient allocation of resources. How-
ever, modern economic growth—a fairly recent phenomenon (Maddison, 
2001)—is a process of continuous technological innovation, industrial 
upgrading and diversifi cation, and improvements in the various types of 
infrastructure and institutional arrangements that constitute the context 
for business development and wealth creation (Kuznets, 1966). 
Historical evidence shows that all countries that have successfully 
transformed from agrarian to modern advanced economies—both the old 
industrial powers of Western Europe and North America, and the newly 
industrialised economies of East Asia—have had governments that played 
a pro-active role in assisting individual fi rms in overcoming the inevitable 
co-ordination and externality problems. In fact, the governments in high-
income countries today continue to do so. However, the sad fact is that 
almost every government in the developing world has attempted, at some 
point, to play that facilitating role, but most have failed. In this article, we 
argue that these pervasive failures are mostly due to government inability 
to come up with good criteria for identifying industries appropriate for a 
given country’s endowment structure and level of development. In fact, 
government propensity to target industries that are too ambitious and not 
aligned with a country’s comparative advantage largely explains why their 
attempts to ‘pick winners’ have resulted in ‘picking losers’.1 By contrast, 
spontaneously or intentionally, the governments in successful develop-
ing countries have typically targeted mature industries in countries with 
an endowment structure similar to and a level of development not much 
more advanced than theirs. The main lesson is straightforward: to facili-
tate industrial upgrading and diversifi cation, government policy must be 
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anchored in industries with latent comparative advantage so that, once 
the new industries are established, they can quickly become competitive 
domestically and internationally. 
This article broadens the scope of analysis of industrial policy by 
introducing an important distinction between two types of government 
interventions. First are those that facilitate structural change by aiming 
to provide information, compensate for externalities, and co-ordinate 
improvements in the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure2 that are needed for 
the private sector to grow in a manner consistent with the dynamic change 
in the economy’s comparative advantage. Second are those whose objec-
tive is to protect selected fi rms and industries that are in defi ance of the 
comparative advantage determined by the existing endowment structure—
either in new sectors that are too advanced or in old sectors that have lost 
comparative advantage. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 explains 
the importance of well-functioning markets and the rationale for a facili-
tating state in the process of dynamic economic growth. Section 3 briefl y 
reviews some important lessons from early industrial development strate-
gies around the world and analyses the role of the state in the process of 
structural change in today’s advanced economies. It also examines similar 
attempts by developing-country governments to adopt policy interventions 
to facilitate industrial upgrading and economic diversifi cation, and analy-
ses the reasons for their success or failure. Building on the foundations of 
new structural economics (Lin, 2010), Section 4 provides a framework for 
formulating industrial policy based on a new approach entitled ‘growth 
identifi cation and facilitation’. Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts.
2. Structural Change, Effi cient Markets and a Facilitating State
Economists have long been intrigued by the mystery of modern economic 
growth, typically observed through the seemingly divergent evolution of 
the change in per capita gross domestic product among countries. Since 
taking off sometime around 1820 (Maddison, 2001), the world growth 
rate has risen more or less steadily, peaking during a ‘golden age’ (1950–73) 
when it averaged almost 3% per year. But such progress has been uneven 
across regions, countries, and time. Sustained growth has led to improved 
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living standards, fi rst in Western Europe, North America and Japan, and 
more recently in newly industrialised (NIEs) and other emerging market 
economies. Cross-country income distribution that initially widened (with 
the proportional gap between the richest and poorest countries growing 
more than fi vefold from 1870 to 1990) (Pritchett, 1997) has slowed in 
recent decades among groups of countries. With the narrowing of the top 
end of the distribution, there seem to be ‘convergence clubs’ among nations 
(Evans, 1996). Still, many of the poorest countries, especially in Africa, are 
excluded from the convergence process. 
Modern growth theory has attempted to explain the diverging paths 
followed. Despite differences in approach and methodology, there is wide 
consensus that the variation of living standards across countries and time 
mostly refl ects differences in the rate of capital accumulation and produc-
tivity growth. Empirical studies carried out from the perspective of develop-
ment accounting show that, among these two broad factors, ‘productivity 
differences among countries are the dominant explanation for income dif-
ferences. Similarly, differences in productivity growth are the most impor-
tant explanation for differences in income growth rates among countries’ 
(Howitt and Weill, 2010: 43-4). Over the long term, productivity growth is 
associated with technological3 and structural change, namely, to reduce the 
costs of producing the same outputs with better knowledge and to relocate 
resources from lower value-added to higher value-added industries.4 
It can therefore be said that continuous technological innovation, indus-
trial upgrading, economic diversifi cation and an acceleration of income 
growth are the main features of modern economic growth (Kuznets, 1966; 
Maddison, 2006).5 Each country at any specifi c time possesses given fac-
tor endowments consisting of land (natural resources), labour and capital 
(both physical and human), which are the total budgets that the country 
can allocate to primary, secondary and tertiary industries to produce goods 
and services. These are changeable over time, and conceptually it is useful 
to add both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure to the mix (Lin, 2010).6 Both 
types are essential to the competitiveness of domestic fi rms because they 
affect transaction costs and the marginal rate of return on investment. 
At any given point in time, ceteris paribus, the structure of a country’s 
endowment, that is, the relative abundances of factors that the country pos-
sesses, determines the relative factor prices and thus the optimal industrial 
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structure (Ju et al., 2009). A low-income country with abundant labour 
or natural resources and scarce capital will have comparative advantage 
and be competitive in labour- or resource-intensive industries. Similarly, 
a high-income country with abundant capital and scarce labour will have 
comparative advantage and be competitive in capital-intensive industries. 
The optimal industrial structure in a country, which will make it most com-
petitive, is therefore endogenously determined by its endowment structure. 
For a developing country to reach the advanced countries’ income level, it 
needs to upgrade its industrial structure relative to their capital-intensity. 
However, to achieve that, it must fi rst close its endowment gap with that of 
the advanced countries, and the strategy to get there is to follow its com-
parative advantage at each stage of its development. When fi rms choose 
to enter industries and adopt technologies consistent with that country’s 
comparative advantage, the economy is most competitive. These fi rms will 
claim the largest possible market shares and create the greatest possible 
economic surplus in the form of profi ts and salaries. Because of the com-
petitiveness, re-invested surpluses earn the highest return, which allows the 
economy to accumulate even more physical and human capital over time. 
This dynamic can lead to a virtuous circle: it can upgrade the country’s 
factor-endowment structure as well as the industrial structure, and also 
make domestic fi rms more competitive in more capital- and skill-intensive 
products over time. 
A fi rm’s objective is to maximise profi t, not to exploit the economy’s 
comparative advantage. It will follow the comparative advantage in choos-
ing its industry and technology in the development process only if the rela-
tive factor prices refl ect the relative abundances of factors in the economy 
(Lin, 2009; Lin and Chang, 2009). Relative factor prices of such nature 
will exist only in a competitive market system. An effi cient market mecha-
nism is therefore a required institution for the economy to follow its com-
parative advantage in the process of dynamic development. 
However, in spite of the importance of the market mechanism, for the 
following information, co-ordination, and externality reasons, it is also 
desirable for the government to play a pro-active role in facilitating indus-
trial upgrading and diversifi cation in the development process. 
First, the decision to upgrade or diversify is never an obvious choice. A 
pioneer fi rm may fail due to the lack of complementary inputs or adequate 
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infrastructure for the new industry, or the targeted industry may simply 
not be consistent with the economy’s comparative advantage. Industrial 
upgrading and diversifi cation are therefore likely to be a costly trial-and-
error exercise of discovery, even with the advantage of backwardness 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). In order to be successful in a competi-
tive market, fi rms in a developing country need information about which 
industries within the global industrial frontier align with the country’s 
latent comparative advantage. 
Information has the same properties as public goods. The costs of col-
lecting and processing information are substantial; however, the marginal 
cost of allowing one more fi rm to share the information is almost zero, 
once the information is generated. Therefore, the government can play 
a facilitating role by investing in information collection and processing 
and making information about the relevant new industries freely avail-
able to fi rms. In addition, the choice of a new industry may also shape 
the economy’s future growth potential in a path-dependent way through 
the accumulation of specifi c human and social capital. The government 
is better than individual private fi rms at analysing information about this 
and making that information available to the public. 
Second, technological innovation and industrial diversifi cation and 
upgrading are typically accompanied by changes in capital and skills 
requirements for fi rms, as well as changes in their market scope and infra-
structure needs due to the evolving nature of production embodied in the 
process. In other words, industrial upgrading and diversifi cation are typi-
cally accompanied by changes in hard and soft infrastructure requirements. 
For example, with the change from agrarian production to manufacturing 
and from simple to advanced manufacturing in the development process, 
the scale of production and market scope become increasingly large, and 
with them the demand for transportation and power. Individual fi rms are 
not capable of internalising these provisions or deploying the kind of co-
ordination efforts among fi rms in different sectors needed to meet those 
increasing demands.7 Even if some large single companies were willing to 
fi nance a national road or a power network, co-ordination through the 
public sector would be needed to ensure consistency, effi ciency and preven-
tion of natural monopolies when the national economy grows. In addition 
to the hard infrastructure, in a low-income country fi rms in small-scale, 
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labour-intensive agriculture and manufacturing need only an unskilled 
labour force and an unsophisticated fi nancial and marketing  system. But 
when the economy expands into modern manufacturing,  high-skilled 
labour and large funds for lump-sum investments in equipment, work-
ing capital and/or export fi nancing are needed, as well as new market-
ing arrangements. However, individual fi rms are usually not capable of 
internalising the needed changes in soft infrastructure. Here again, there 
is a need for the state to provide or co-ordinate some of those changes in 
different sectors of the economy so as to facilitate the individual fi rms’ 
upgrading and diversifi cation.8 
Third, innovation, which underlies the industrial upgrading and diver-
sifi cation process, is by nature a very risky endeavour. Even when gov-
ernments are willing and capable of helping by providing fi rms with the 
necessary information and co-ordination, success is not guaranteed. Firms 
can fail because the targeted industry is too ambitious, or the market too 
small, or the co-ordination inadequate. But even such cases of failure offer 
useful information to other fi rms, indicating that the targeted industries are 
inappropriate and should be re-examined. First-mover fi rms therefore pay 
the cost of failure and produce valuable information for other fi rms. And 
when they succeed, their experience also provides information externalities 
to other fi rms: their success proves that the new industry is aligned with the 
economy’s new comparative advantage, thus prompting many new fi rms 
to enter the industry.9 
The subsequent large entry of new fi rms eliminates the possible rents 
that the fi rst mover may enjoy. From the perspective of an individual fi rm, 
the incentive to be a pioneer fi rm is repressed because of the asymmetry 
between the high cost of failure and the limited advantage of success. 
Unless there is compensation for the information externalities that the pio-
neer fi rm creates, few fi rms will have the incentive to be the fi rst movers 
and thus the process of industrial upgrading and diversifi cation as well 
as economic growth will be impeded (Aghion, 2009; Romer, 1990). In a 
developed country with global-frontier industries, a successful fi rst mover 
can in general be rewarded with a patent and enjoys the rent created by a 
period of monopoly for its innovation. For a developing country, its new 
industry is most likely to be a matured industry located within the global 
industrial frontier. So the fi rst mover will not be able to obtain a patent 
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for its entry into a new industry. Some form of direct support from gov-
ernment to pioneer fi rms that are willing to take the risk to move to new 
industries is therefore justifi able.10 
Compared with developed countries whose industries are located on 
the global frontier and their industrial upgrading and diversifi cation rely 
on their own generation of new knowledge through a process of trial and 
error, developing countries in the catching-up process move within the 
global industrial frontier and have the advantage of backwardness. In other 
words, they can rely on borrowing the existing technology and industrial 
ideas from the advanced countries. This method of acquiring innovation 
has a lower cost and is less risky than the one used by fi rms in developed 
countries (Krugman, 1979).11 Therefore, in a developing country commit-
ted to the market system, if fi rms know how to tap into the potential of 
the advantage of backwardness and the government pro-actively provides 
information, co-ordination, and externality compensation in the process of 
industrial upgrading and diversifi cation, the country can grow much faster 
than a developed country and achieve the goal of converging with high-
income countries (Lin, 2009). After all, this was the case for Britain before 
the eighteenth century; for Germany, France and the United States in the 
nineteenth century; and the Nordic countries, Japan, Korea, Taiwan-China, 
Singapore, Malaysia and other East Asian economies in the twentieth cen-
tury (Amsden, 1989; Chang, 2003;  Gerschenkron, 1962; Wade, 1990). 
3. Picking Winners or Losers: Lessons from Experience
There is wide consensus among economic historians on the important role 
played by the state in facilitating structural change and helping sustain it 
across time and across developed countries. However, except for a few 
successful cases post-World War II, the governments in most developing 
countries have failed to play that desirable role. It is therefore essential to 
briefl y review historical and contemporary experiences of state interven-
tion, to draw lessons from the many failures and few successes. 
3.1 The Role of the State in Structural Change in 
Advanced Economies
There is ample historical evidence that today’s most advanced economies 
relied heavily on government intervention to ignite and facilitate their 
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take-off and catch-up processes, which allowed them to build strong 
industrial bases and sustain the momentum of their growth over long 
periods. In his well-known survey of trade and industrial policies lead-
ing to early economic transformations in the Western world, List (1841) 
documented various policy instruments through which governments pro-
tected domestic industries or even intervened to support the development 
of specifi c industries—many of which became successful and provided the 
bedrock for national industrial development.12 
Likewise, Chang (2003) has reviewed economic developments during 
the period when most of the currently advanced economies went through 
their industrial revolutions (between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 
1815 and the beginning of World War I in 1914). He has documented 
various patterns of state intervention that have allowed these countries to 
successfully implement their catch-up strategies. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom that often attributes the Western industrial successes to laissez-
faire and free-market policies, the historical evidence shows that the use 
of industrial, trade, and technology policies was the main ingredient for 
their successful structural transformation. This ranged from the frequent 
use of import duties or even import bans for infant-industry protection to 
industrial promotion through monopoly grants and cheap supplies from 
government factories, various subsidies, public-private partnerships, and 
direct state investment, especially in Britain and the US (Trebilcok, 1981). 
All European countries trying to catch up with Britain devoted efforts to 
technology policy. Up to the middle of the fi rst Industrial Revolution, the 
main channel for technological transfer was the movement of skilled work-
ers who embodied new knowledge. Latecomers to the industrialisation 
process, such as France, attempted to acquire them on a large scale from 
Britain, but the British government banned the emigration of skilled work-
ers for more than a century, starting in 1719.13 When new technologies 
became embodied in machines, they too were put under government con-
trol: various laws were adopted throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries to ban the export of ‘tools and utensils’. 
In all advanced economies, the government supported the acquisi-
tion of foreign technology, ‘sometimes by legal means such as fi nancing 
study tours and apprenticeships, and sometimes through illegal measures, 
which included support for industrial espionage, smuggling of contraband 
machinery, and refusal to acknowledge foreign patents’ (Chang, 2003: 18). 
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In Germany (Prussia), for instance, Frederick the Great annexed the 
industrial province of Silesia and promoted the steel and linen industries. 
Advanced technologies such as iron-puddling, the coke furnace or the 
steam engine were subsequently imported from more successful countries 
(Kindleberger, 1978). 
Government intervention took many forms in the early experiences of 
industrialisation. In Japan, the government created many factories (‘pilot 
plants’) in shipbuilding, mining, textiles, etc., most of which were subse-
quently sold off to the private sector at very low prices and further sub-
sidised. This helped launch the process of industrialisation and diversifi -
cation. Even when government-run enterprises performed poorly,14 there 
were many cases of failures that generated a burgeoning private sector. 
This was most notably the case in Japan during the Meiji Restoration15 
when a vibrant textile industry emerged from the failure of the poorly 
managed state-owned enterprise. Private fi rms were successful because 
they learned the skill and management from the state-owned fi rms, and 
introduced various process innovations to replace expensive equipment 
with inexpensive labour, which was Japan’s comparative advantage at the 
time (Otsuka et al., 1988).16 
Developed-country governments continue to adopt various measures to 
support industrial upgrading and diversifi cation, even though these policies 
may not be announced under the formal label of ‘industrial policy’. Besides 
patent systems, which are industry-neutral, other such measures typically 
include support for basic research, mandates, allocation of defence con-
tracts and large public procurements. Local governments also often pro-
vide all kinds of incentives to private fi rms to attract them to particular 
geographic areas and induce new investments. The application of all these 
measures needs to identify specifi c industries or products and amounts to 
‘picking winners’. 
A prime example is the US, where the government has constantly 
offered strong incentives to private businesses and academic institutions 
for discovering new ideas that are valuable for sustaining growth, as well 
as making such ideas non-rival—besides building infrastructure in key eco-
nomic sectors such as transportation and providing fi nancing to education 
and training in order to build the country’s skills base in various industries. 
This is routinely done through subsidies for research and development, 
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and through the granting of patents and copyrights. The Advanced Tech-
nology Program, for instance, launched in 1990, has been instrumental in 
the research and development of promising high-risk technologies. Gov-
ernment subsidies can also be found in areas such as defence, energy, trans-
portation and home construction. 
The ongoing debate over the need for a US industrial policy17 has not 
changed the hard facts about the important role played by the federal 
and state governments in industrial development in recent decades. Their 
interventions include the allocation of large amounts of public funding to 
defence-related procurements and R&D spending, which have large spill-
over effects throughout the economy (Shapiro and Taylor, 1990). In fact, 
the share of the federal government in total R&D spending, which was only 
16% in 1930, has remained between 50 and 66% during the post-World 
War II years (Owen, 1966; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993). As Chang 
observes, ‘industries such as computers, aerospace and the internet, where 
the U.S.A. still maintains an international edge despite the decline in its 
overall technological leadership, would not have existed without defence-
related R&D funding by the country’s federal government’. Government 
support is also critical in other important segments of the economy such 
as the health industry: public funding to the National Institutes of Health, 
which in turn support a large fraction of R&D by biotechnological fi rms, 
has been essential in helping the US maintain its lead in that industry. 
The same is true in Europe where discussions of active industrial policy 
have been taking place since the end of World War II.18 In fact, many 
of Europe’s most remarkable industrial successes (space programme Ari-
ane, aircraft manufacturer Airbus, etc.) were achieved in the context of 
intergovernmental co-operation, with decisive political support from the 
European Union. Since the early 1990s, the European Commission has 
issued several policy papers on the subject, including the 1994 report 
An Industrial Competitiveness Policy for the European Union, which set 
the stage for more determined government interventions. Other offi cial 
strategy documents have focused on the risk of de-industrialisation, the 
regulatory burden, the impact of enlargement of the EU on the competi-
tiveness of European companies and their location, etc. In the context 
of the review of the Lisbon Strategy in March 2005, EU Member States 
set the objective of ‘creating a solid industrial base’, and reiterated the 
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increasing importance attached to R&D and innovation in all forms, as 
well as information and communication technologies.19 
France has always favoured government-sponsored economic pro-
grammes in which the public and private sectors co-ordinate their efforts 
to develop new technologies and industries. The French government often 
provides fi nancial support and capital to the private sector by direct subsi-
dies, tax credits, or government-run developmental banks.20 In Britain, the 
government, which defi nes itself as ‘a market shaper’, has recently released 
a new industrial policy aimed at: supporting enterprise and entrepreneurial 
activity, including the access to fi nance required for starting and grow-
ing fi rms; fostering knowledge creation and its application; helping people 
develop the skills and capabilities to fi nd work and build the businesses 
and industries of the future; investing in the infrastructure required to sup-
port a modern low-carbon economy; ensuring open and competitive mar-
kets to drive innovation and rising productivity; and building on industrial 
strengths where Britain has particular expertise or might gain a compara-
tive advantage, and where government action can have an impact (British 
Government, 2009). 
Another interesting case is that of Finland, a late but successful state-led 
industrialisation. According to Jäntti and Vartiainen (2009), the economic 
policy that achieved this objective was a mix of heavy government inter-
vention and private incentives. Government intervention aimed at a fast 
build-up of industrial capital in order to ensure a solid manufacturing base. 
The main features of the country’s growth regime were: a high rate of capi-
tal accumulation, which often required the use of administrative rationing 
of credit through interest-rate controls as well as a policy of selective loan 
approvals for capital-equipment investment; and a high rate of investment 
in targeted areas of manufacturing, the paper and pulp and metalworking 
industries in particular. State enterprises were established in the basic metal 
and chemical-fertiliser industries, and in the energy sector. As late as in the 
1980s, state-owned enterprises accounted for 18% of the country’s total 
industry value-added (Kosonen, 1992). 
Almost all developing countries have tried to replicate the earlier mod-
els of state-led structural change, especially after World War II. From the 
planned economies of Eastern Europe and Asia to left-leaning or even 
liberal regimes in Latin America, Asia, Africa and throughout the Arab 
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world, many governments have adopted various policy measures to pro-
mote industrial development and industrial upgrading (Chenery, 1961). 
While there have been a few successes in East Asia, most of these attempts 
have failed to deliver the expected results (Krueger and Tuncer, 1982; Lal, 
1994; Pack and Saggi, 2006). Nevertheless, the governments in developing 
countries will continue to attempt to play the facilitating role. It is there-
fore all the more important to understand better why some countries have 
been able to succeed while most others have failed, so that it is possible 
to advise the governments to do the right things and avoid the mistakes 
(Rodrik, 2009). 
3.2 The Recipe for Success—or Failure
There are two main reasons for the controversies and confusion about 
industrial policy in developing countries. First, economists have tended to 
focus their attention on the failed policies implemented and not on the 
objectives and the broader strategic choices made in the successful cases. 
Second, too often very different types of government interventions are 
lumped together in regression analyses, with little consideration specifi -
cally as to which ones may have attempted to facilitate the emergence of 
industries that are consistent with latent comparative advantage. 
Summing up the research fi ndings on how to achieve sustained growth 
through structural transformation and the diffusion of ideas and accumu-
lation of knowledge, Romer notes that ‘the challenge is to fi nd better forms 
of government intervention, ones that have better economic effects and 
pose fewer political and institutional risks’ (1990: 66). He also points out 
that ‘the temptation for economists, however, has always been to duck 
the complicated political and institutional issues that this kind of analysis 
raises and instead to work backward from a desired policy conclusion to 
a simple economic model that supports it’. In fact, the real challenge for 
economists and policy-makers in any country may be instead to identify 
the new industries that are consistent with the economy’s comparative 
advantage, which evolves as the endowment structure changes. 
A common feature of the industrial upgrading and diversifi cation strate-
gies adopted by successful countries (the most advanced ones and the East 
Asian NIEs in the post-War period) was the fact that they targeted mature 
industries in countries not too far advanced compared with their own 
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 levels of per capita income. This may have been the single most important 
cause for their success. Throughout human history, it appears that pioneer 
countries have always played (and often unwillingly) the role of an ‘eco-
nomic compass’ for latecomers. Going back to the sixteenth century, the 
Netherlands played that role for Britain, which in turn served as a model 
and target for the US, Germany, and France in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and for Japan in the mid-twentieth century. Likewise, 
Japan was imitated by Korea, Taiwan-China, Hong Kong-China, and Sin-
gapore in the 1960s and 1970s. Mauritius picked Hong Kong-China as 
its ‘compass’ in its catch-up strategy in the 1970s. China chose Korea, 
Taiwan-China, and Hong Kong-China in the 1980s. 
Two main lessons can be drawn from these successful cases of state-led 
structural-change strategies. First, it appears that the government imple-
mented policies to facilitate the development of new industries in a way 
that was consistent with the country’s latent comparative advantage as 
determined by its endowment structure. Therefore, fi rms, once established 
with government support in information, co-ordination, and sometimes 
limited subsidies, have turned out to be competitive.21 Second and even 
more important, to ensure that they would tap into their latent and evolv-
ing comparative advantage, the government targeted mature industries in 
countries that were, on average, about 100% higher than their own level 
of per capita income, measured in purchasing power parity.22 When Britain 
applied industrial policies to catch up with the Netherlands in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, its per capita income was about 70% that of the 
Netherlands. When Germany, France, and the US used industrial policy to 
catch up with Britain in the nineteenth century, their per capita incomes 
were about 60 to 75% that of Britain. Similarly, when Japan’s industrial 
policy targeted the US automobile industry in the 1960s, its per capita 
income was about 40% that of the US. When Korea and Taiwan-China 
adopted industrial policies to facilitate their industrial upgrading in the 
1960s and 1970s, they targeted industries in Japan instead of the US, and 
for a good reason: their per capita incomes were about 35% that of Japan 
and only about 10% that of the US at the time.23 
Looking closely at the elements of successful catch-up strategies, it 
appears that the specifi cs of policy interventions depended on the particular 
binding constraints for these new industries and on country circumstances. 
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But while the interventions were often different, the patterns of industrial 
development were similar across countries. They all started from labour-
intensive industries, such as garments, textiles, toys and electronics, in the 
early stage of development and proceeded to move up the industrial ladder 
step by step to more capital-intensive industries.24 The East Asian NIEs, for 
instance, exploited the fact that their endowment structures were similar 
to Japan’s to follow its development in a fl ying-geese pattern (Akamatsu, 
1962; Kim, 1988). This was possible because the per capita income gaps 
with their target-country were not large (Ito, 1980).25 
The story of Korea is a particularly good illustration of this strategy. 
The government took a pro-active approach to industrial upgrading, and 
adjusted its strategy to enter industries that were consistent with the coun-
try’s latent (and evolving) comparative advantage. In the automotive sec-
tor, for example, early in Korea’s growth period, domestic manufacturers 
concentrated mostly on assembly of imported parts, which was labour-
intensive and in line with their comparative advantage at the time. Simi-
larly, in electronics, the focus was initially on household appliances, such 
as TVs, washing machines and refrigerators, and then moved to memory 
chips, the least technologically complex segment of the information indus-
try. Korea’s technological ascent has been rapid, as has its accumulation 
of physical and human capital due to the conformity of its main industrial 
sectors with the existing comparative advantage and, hence, its changes 
in underlying comparative advantage.26As a result, Korea has achieved 
remarkable GDP growth rates in the past forty years and has performed 
impressively in industrial upgrading into such industries as automobiles 
and semiconductors. 
Developing countries in other regions of the world pursued the same 
path with excellent results. Chile, one of the Pacifi c Rim countries, success-
fully targeted industries that were consistent with its comparative advan-
tage determined by its natural endowment, as well as industries that were 
already mature in more advanced countries. While free-market reforms 
introduced in the early 1970s brought many benefi ts to the country, they 
were slowly accompanied by market failures (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985). 
In recognition of these problems, the government has supported private-
sector growth through a number of policy instruments, including the pro-
vision of agricultural public goods by a state institution (Servicio Agricola 
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Granadero); guarantees for loans to small enterprises; a semi-public entre-
preneurial institution (Fundacion Chile) responsible for the development of 
the salmon industry; the ‘simplify drawback’ mechanism, which provided 
subsidies to new exports; the various programmes of the national develop-
ment agency (Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion, CORFO); and 
the National Council on Innovation for Competitiveness. 
In recent years, the country has experienced ‘a burst of export discov-
eries of new comparative advantages’ (Agosin et al., 2008) and dynamic 
growth. Key to this success has been the diversifi cation of Chile’s tradi-
tional resource-based industries of mining, forestry, fi shing and agriculture, 
coupled with a strong drive to increase exports. The initial dependence 
on copper has been gradually reduced in favour of aluminum smelting. 
Forestry products have been expanded into salmon aquaculture and agri-
culture into wine production, as well as freezing and canning fruits and 
vegetables. Manufacturing has been less successful but many foreign fi rms 
have chosen to locate in Chile as it offers a secure platform from which to 
supply other markets across South America. 
Mauritius, one of the most successful African economies, took off in 
the 1970s by targeting labour-intensive industries such as textiles and gar-
ments. These industries were mature in Hong Kong, its ‘compass econ-
omy’. Both economies share the same endowment structure and the per 
capita income in Mauritius was about half that in Hong Kong-China in 
the 1970s.27 The Mauritius Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) and 
Export Processing Zones Development Authority were created by the gov-
ernment to attract Hong Kong-China’s investment in its export processing 
zone. The vision was to position Mauritius as a world-class export hub 
on the Hong Kong-China model. Together, they have contributed to the 
country’s emergence as an economic powerhouse. 
By contrast, many countries designed and implemented catch-up strate-
gies that were too ambitious for establishing the ‘commanding heights’, 
given their level of development. Historical examples of such mistakes 
go back to countries such as Hungary or Russia, which tried to replicate 
industries in place in Britain in the late nineteenth century (Gerschenkron, 
1962). While GDP statistics are scarce for individual countries, purchasing 
power parity estimates by Maddison (2006) indicate that their per capita 
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GDP represented 25% and 30% that of Britain in 1900. Such a large gap 
made any attempt by the former to develop British industries unrealistic.28 
Most developing countries fell into the same trap after World War II. 
They often targeted advanced industries in advanced economies when their 
per capita incomes represented only a very small fraction of that of high-
income countries. After gaining their independence from colonial powers, 
many countries considered the development of advanced heavy industries 
as a key symbol of their freedom, a sign of strength, and a political state-
ment of their reputation on the international scene. Across Latin America, 
Africa and South Asia, some of these newly independent countries were run 
by political leaders with leftist inclinations who chose to follow the prevail-
ing Stalinist model of state-led industrialisation through the development 
of advanced heavy industries, regardless of their political denominations. 
State resources were used in the industrialisation push, with resources 
directly allocated to various investments, and large public enterprises set up 
in almost every sector of the economy—all deemed strategic for the survival 
and modernisation of the nation. Under the ‘macroeconomics of national-
ism’ (Monga, 2006), the criteria for designing industrial policies and select-
ing specifi c sectors for government intervention were mostly political. 
In parallel to political aspirations for heavy-industry development, there 
was an obsession with ‘market failure’ in academic circles—especially 
in Latin America where many infl uential economists and policy-makers 
(Albert Hirschman, Raul Prebisch, Roberto Campos and Celso Furtado, 
among others) argued that industrialisation and growth could not take 
place spontaneously in developing countries because of structural rigidities 
and co-ordination problems.29 They recommended that government sup-
port be provided to the manufacturing industry for these countries to catch 
up with developed countries, regardless of the large income gap between 
the two. 
Too often, such industrial policy defi ed the prevailing comparative 
advantage of many poor countries where factor endowments were charac-
terised by the abundance of labour. By implementing the capital-intensive 
heavy industry-oriented development strategy, they were not able to build 
fi rms capable of surviving in open, competitive markets. Because of their 
high capital needs and their structurally high production costs, these  public 
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enterprises were not viable. Even when they were well managed, they 
could not earn a socially acceptable profi t in an undistorted and competi-
tive market. A good example is Egypt’s industrialisation programme in the 
1950s, which featured heavy industries such as iron, steel and chemicals. 
The country’s per capita income represented about 5% that of the US, the 
world’s most important steel producer at the time. Unless the government 
continuously provided costly subsidies and/or protection, Egyptian fi rms 
could not attract private investment. The limited fi scal resource capaci-
ties of the state made such large-scale protection and subsidies unsustain-
able. In such situations, governments have had to resort to administrative 
measures—granting market monopolies to fi rms in the so-called priority 
sectors, suppressing interest rates, over-valuing domestic currencies, and 
controlling the prices of raw materials—in order to reduce the costs of 
investment and continuous operation of their non-viable public enterprises 
(Lin, 2009). 
These various experiments provide valuable lessons for economic 
policy. They highlight conditions under which industrial policies can suc-
ceed or fail. Failures occur when countries target industries that are too 
advanced, far beyond their latent comparative advantage. In such cir-
cumstances, government-supported fi rms cannot be viable in open, com-
petitive markets. Their survival depends on heavy protection and large 
subsidies through various means such as high tariffs, quota restrictions 
and subsidised credit. The large rents embedded in these measures easily 
become the targets of political capture and create diffi cult governance 
problems (Lin, 2010).30 
4. A Framework for Growth Identifi cation and Facilitation
The historical and contemporary evidence showing that governments 
always play an important role in facilitating industrial upgrading and 
diversifi cation in all successful countries may not be enough to validate 
an idea that has been mired in controversy for so long. Many economists 
who agree with the general notion that government intervention is an 
indispensable ingredient of structural transformation have maintained 
their opposition to industrial policy because of the lack of a general 
framework that can be used to guide policy-making. As Charles Schultze, 
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chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under US President Jimmy 
Carter, once put it: 
The fi rst problem for the government in carrying out an industrial policy is that we 
actually know precious little about identifying, before the fact, a ‘winning’ industrial 
structure. There is not a set of economic criteria that determine what gives different 
countries preeminence in particular lines of business. Nor is it at all clear what the 
substantive criteria would be for deciding which older industries to protect or restruc-
ture. (Schultze, 1983) 
It is therefore useful to draw on the theories of comparative advantage 
and backwardness advantage as well as the successful and failed expe-
riences of industrial policies discussed in Section 3 to codify some basic 
principles that can guide the formation of successful industrial policy. The 
fi rst step is to identify new industries in which a country may have latent 
comparative advantage, and the second is to remove the constraints that 
impede the emergence of industries with such advantage and create the 
conditions to allow them to become the country’s actual comparative 
advantage. Here, we propose a six-step process: 
•  First, the government31 in a developing country can identify the list 
of tradeable goods32 and services that have been produced for about 
20 years in dynamically growing countries with similar endowment 
structures and a per capita income that is about 100% higher than 
their own.33 
•  Second, among the industries in that list, the government may give pri-
ority to those which some domestic private fi rms have already entered 
spontaneously,34 and try to identify: (i) the obstacles that are preventing 
these fi rms from upgrading the quality of their products; or (ii) the bar-
riers that limit entry to those industries by other private fi rms.35 This 
could be done through the combination of various methods such as 
value-chain analysis or the Growth Diagnostic Framework suggested by 
Hausmann et al. (2008). The government can then implement policy to 
remove these binding constraints and use randomised controlled experi-
ments to test the effects of this so as to ensure the effectiveness of scaling 
up these policies at the national level (Dufl o, 2004). 
•  Third, some of those industries in the list may be completely new to 
domestic fi rms. In such cases, the government could adopt specifi c mea-
sures to encourage fi rms in the higher-income countries identifi ed in the 
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fi rst step to invest in these industries, so as to take advantage of the lower 
labour costs. The government may also set up incubation programmes 
to catalyse the entry of private domestic fi rms into these industries.36 
•  Fourth, in addition to the industries identifi ed on the list of potential 
opportunities for tradeable goods and services in step 1, developing-
country governments should pay close attention to successful self-
discoveries by private enterprises and provide support to scale up 
these industries.37 
•  Fifth, in developing countries with poor infrastructure and an unfriendly 
business environment, the government can invest in industrial parks or 
export processing zones and make the necessary improvements to attract 
domestic private fi rms and/or foreign fi rms that may be willing to invest 
in the targeted industries. Improvements in infrastructure and the busi-
ness environment can reduce transaction costs and facilitate industrial 
development. However, because of budget and capacity constraints, most 
governments will not be able to make the desirable improvements for the 
whole economy within a reasonable timeframe. Focusing on improv-
ing the infrastructure and business environment in industrial parks or 
export processing zones is, therefore, a more manageable alternative.38 
Industrial parks and export processing zones also have the benefi ts of 
encouraging industrial clustering. 
•  Sixth, the government may also provide incentives to domestic pioneer 
fi rms or foreign investors working within the list of industries identifi ed 
in step 1 in order to compensate for the non-rival public knowledge 
created by their investments. These incentives should be limited both 
in time and in fi nancial cost. They may take the form of a corporate 
income-tax holiday for a limited number of years,39 direct credits to co-
fi nance investments, or priority access to foreign reserves40 to import key 
equipment. The incentives should not and need not be in the form of 
monopoly rent, high tariffs, or other distortions. The risk of rent-seeking 
and political capture can therefore be avoided.41 For fi rms in step 4 that 
discovered new industries successfully by themselves, the government 
may award them special recognition for their contribution to the coun-
try’s economic development.42 
The industries identifi ed through the above process should be consistent 
with the country’s latent comparative advantage. Once the pioneer fi rms 
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come in successfully, many other fi rms will enter these industries as well. 
The government’s facilitating role is mainly restricted to provision of infor-
mation, co-ordination of hard and soft infrastructure improvement, and 
compensation for externalities. Government facilitation through the above 
approach is likely to help developing countries tap into the potential of the 
advantage of backwardness and realise a dynamic and sustained growth. 
4.1 Possible Ways of Identifying Binding Constraints
The facilitation of industrial growth has been the subject of a rich body of 
research and several approaches have recently been suggested by various 
authors.43 While these are all likely to yield useful results, none of them 
focuses specifi cally on the identifi cation of industries in which a developing 
country may have latent comparative advantage. The intellectual legacy of 
the failure of industrial policies based on development strategies that were 
inconsistent with comparative advantage has certainly led many econo-
mists to conclude that it may be impossible for any government to ‘pick 
winners’ successfully. 
In the absence of a framework for industrial identifi cation, the existing 
literature has been limited to exploring ways of improving the business 
environment and infrastructure, which indeed affect fi rms’ operations and 
transaction costs. There is a robust empirical knowledge based on quanti-
tative data on fi rm performance and perceptions-based data on the severity 
of a number of potential constraints facing fi rms in the developing world. 
It points out that in most of sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, fi rms tend to 
consider many areas of the investment climate major obstacles to business 
development and the adoption of more sophisticated technology. Finance 
and access to land seem to be areas of particular concern to smaller fi rms; 
larger fi rms tend to perceive labour regulations and the availability of 
skilled labour as the main constraints to their activity; fi rms across the 
board are concerned about corruption and infrastructure—especially net-
work utilities such as electricity, telecommunications, transportation and 
water (Gelb et al., 2007). 
Despite their usefulness, investment-climate surveys, which try to cap-
ture the policy and institutional environment within which fi rms oper-
ate, can be misused or misinterpreted. Just as individual perceptions of 
well-being are subjective and do not necessarily correlate with objective 
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measures such as income or consumption, fi rms’ perceptions of binding 
constraints to their development often differ from actual determinants of 
performance. This limitation is due to the very nature of the investment-cli-
mate data and the way they are often used. In a typical survey, the manag-
ers of a sample of fi rms are asked to rate each dimension of the investment 
climate (such as ‘infrastructure’, ‘access to fi nancing’, ‘corruption’, etc.) on 
a scale of 1 to 4, corresponding to the degree to which it is an obstacle to 
fi rm performance.44 High mean reported values for particular dimensions 
of the investment climate are then interpreted as evidence of the severity of 
obstacles to growth. 
However, this may not be the case. Despite their intimate knowledge of 
their business processes and operating environment, fi rms may not fully 
recognise the true origin of their main problems and mistakenly identify as 
a constraint something which is in fact a symptom of another less obvious 
problem. Because of these shortcomings, investment-climate constraints 
are increasingly complemented by the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ indi-
cators, which are based on expert surveys (not just fi rm-level perceptions) 
and provide a more comparable cross-country perspective across a detailed 
range of regulation. 
The problem remains, as survey results often vary depending on whether 
respondents are asked to rate their most important constraints, or to rank 
them. While ranking appears to be favoured by researchers who have 
examined different methodologies, since it forces stronger expression and 
relationships (Alvin and Krosnick, 1985), it may not be entirely reliable: 
fi rms or experts asked to rank constraints may not have a good basis for 
determining whether their top-ranked constraint is serious or not. Ranking 
without a solid and meaningful benchmark against which local fi rms can 
rate the severity of a particular constraint may not provide useful informa-
tion. In addition, there are instances where picking any single quantitative 
criterion could be misleading, as fi rms often face several constraints simul-
taneously. Ranking all of them as important may not be very helpful for 
policy-making. In order to account for the major role of fi rm heterogeneity 
in growth analysis, one must go beyond extracting means of investment-
climate variables from fi rm-level surveys. Careful econometric modelling 
of fi rm performance is therefore needed to identify which particular vari-
able has the biggest effect on growth. In other words, the policy variables 
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with the greatest economic impact can be quite different from those with 
the highest perceived values.45 
Investment-climate surveys have two more limitations. They do not 
provide information about industries that do not yet exist, but in which a 
country has latent comparative advantage. And the existing industries that 
are surveyed may not be consistent with the country’s comparative advan-
tage, either because they are too advanced (as a legacy of a development 
strategy that defi ed comparative advantage), or because they have become 
fundamentally uncompetitive (as a result of a general wage increase that 
accompanied the country’s development). These two additional limitations 
make it highly desirable for investment-climate surveys to cover only a 
sample of fi rms that meet the criteria of viability, and can represent the 
economy’s true potential. 
Another important problem with the recognition of obstacles to growth 
is the fact that many other constraints to business development are endog-
enous to the industries that might be targeted by a developing country. 
Good examples are specifi c types of human capital, fi nancing instruments, 
or infrastructure that may be needed only by fi rms moving to specifi c 
industries. Identifying and removing them may require the use of several 
complementary analytical tools. One useful tool is the Growth Diagnos-
tics Framework suggested by Hausmann et al. (2008). It is based on the 
observation that, when presented with a laundry list of needed reforms, 
policy-makers either struggle to try to solve all of the problems at once 
or start with reforms that are not critical to their country’s growth poten-
tial. Because reforms in one area may create unanticipated distortions in 
another, focusing on the one that represents the biggest hurdle to growth 
is the most promising avenue to success. Countries should therefore fi gure 
out the one or two most binding constraints on their economies and focus 
on lifting those. 
The Growth Diagnostics approach provides a decision-tree methodol-
ogy to help identify the relevant binding constraints for any given country. 
It starts with a taxonomy of possible causes of low growth in developing 
countries, which generally suffer from either a high cost of fi nance (due 
either to low economic and social returns or to a large gap between social 
and private returns), or low private return on investment. The main step 
in the diagnostic analysis is to fi gure out which of these conditions more 
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accurately characterises the economy in question. The use of this frame-
work highlights the fact that, in some countries, the growth strategy should 
identify the reasons for the low returns on investment, while it must explain 
why domestic savings do not rise to exploit large returns on investment 
in other countries. While the Growth Diagnostics Framework attempts to 
take the policy discussion of growth forward, its focus and the specifi cation 
of its model remain quite macroeconomic. This is understandable; after all, 
growth is a macroeconomic concept and taking the analysis to a sector level 
would raise issues of sector interactions and trade-offs. 
Moreover, the Growth Diagnostic Framework is also imprecise in its 
links to the institutions that facilitate the growth process. The methodology 
proposed for the identifi cation of the binding constraints to growth is not 
always straightforward. Even if data on shadow prices were widely avail-
able, it is not obvious that this would accurately identify areas in which 
progress is most needed in each country. For example, one could imagine 
a simple model of growth for a low-income country where technology and 
human capital are complementary. In such a country, the returns to edu-
cation and technology adoption would both be low due to low levels of 
human capital and technology. An exclusive focus on shadow prices and 
an ignorance of cross-country comparison of levels would then suggest no 
need to improve education levels and encourage technology adoption. 
In fact, even in situations where the Growth Diagnostics approach leads 
to relative certainty about the binding constraints to growth in any given 
country, there is still a wide range of policy options available to choose 
from. It is therefore necessary for policy-makers to rely not just on one 
approach but to use several different macro and micro tools to identify 
binding constraints to growth. Microeconomic analyses of growth show 
that differentiated fi rm dynamics drive a good part of aggregate productiv-
ity growth and capital accumulation. Establishing a diagnostic at the aggre-
gate level requires a good knowledge of what happens at the micro level. In 
particular, monitoring the entry and exit of fi rms and the policy variables 
that affect them is essential to understanding overall gains in productivity 
in economies subject to strong structural changes (Bourguignon, 2006). 
One must take account of heterogeneity in country circumstances and 
among micro agents. This can more effectively be done through country-
specifi c analyses. 
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Finally, even if one could identify relevant binding constraints to indus-
trial development in industries with comparative advantage and induce 
improvements in a country’s business environment, the crucial issues of 
externality encountered by fi rst movers and of co-ordination would remain 
unresolved. Despite the removal of the constraints, a country may then fi nd 
its industrial upgrading and diversifi cation process stalled. It is therefore 
necessary that the Growth Diagnostics Framework and other methods of 
targeting obstacles to industrial upgrading be used in conjunction with the 
growth identifi cation and facilitation approach. 
5. Conclusion
The current crisis has infl icted heavy costs on economies around the world. 
Unemployment is at record levels in many countries, fi scal fragility is a leg-
acy of the crisis in many countries, and capacity-utilisation rates in indus-
try remain substantially below pre-crisis levels. Many developing countries 
have the potential to grow faster than developed countries and are now 
confronted with the challenge of fi nding new sources of growth in the con-
text of a world of multi-polar growth (Zoellick, 2010). In this regard, the 
role of developing-country governments in inducing and accompanying 
structural change (industrial upgrading and economic diversifi cation) to 
promote growth, employment and poverty reduction must regain centre 
stage. Indeed, historical evidence and economic theory suggest that while 
markets are indispensable mechanisms for allocating resources to the most 
productive sectors and industries, government intervention—through the 
provision of information, co-ordination of hard and soft infrastructure 
improvement, and compensation for externalities—is equally indispens-
able for helping economies move from one stage of development to another 
(Lin, 2010). 
Because of the many failures observed throughout the world in the post-
World War II period, industrial policy has raised serious doubts among 
economists and policy-makers. Taking into consideration O’Brien and 
Keyder’s recommendation that ‘countries should (if possible) be studied in 
terms of some unique capacity for development at different stages of their 
history’ (1978: 15), this article has examined the mechanics of structural 
change in today’s advanced economies and the reason for success in a few 
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developing countries in East Asia and elsewhere, as well as suggesting a 
framework for government intervention in the economy. 
The article has argued that the failure of industrial policy is most likely 
to arise from mistakes made by policy-makers in the growth-identifi cation 
process. Industrial policies implemented by governments in developed and 
developing countries usually fall into one of two broad categories: (i) they 
attempt to facilitate the development of new industries that are either too 
advanced and thus far from the comparative advantage of the economy, 
or too old and have lost comparative advantage; or (ii) they try to facili-
tate the development of new industries that are consistent with the latent 
comparative advantage of the economy. Only the latter type of policy is 
likely to succeed. High-performing developed and developing countries are 
those where governments were able to play an active role in the indus-
trial upgrading and diversifi cation process by helping fi rms take advantage 
of market opportunities. They have generally done so by overcoming the 
information, co-ordination, and externality issues, and by providing ade-
quate hard and soft infrastructure to private agents. It is expected that the 
growth identifi cation and facilitation approach put forward in the article 
can help governments in developing countries identify the right industries 
in their attempts to facilitate structural transformation in the development 
of their countries.
Notes
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He has also served on the Board of Directors of MIT’s Sloan School of Man-
agement (Sloan Fellows) and taught at Boston University and the University of 
Bordeaux (France).
1.  To protect jobs, governments in both developed and developing countries may 
also support old, declining industries, which have already lost their compara-
tive advantages. Such policies will fail as well. 
2.  Examples of hard infrastructure are highways, port facilities, airports, tele-
communication systems, electricity grids and other public utilities. Soft 
infrastructure consists of institutions, regulations, social capital, value sys-
tems, and other social and economic arrangements. For further discussion 
on their impacts on economic development, see Lin (2010). 
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3.  Technology is defi ned here as knowledge (intangible intellectual capital) of 
how to transform basic inputs into fi nal utility. It differs from human or physi-
cal capital by its non-rival nature. Effi ciency is the way technology is used—
with the goal of optimality, especially in the allocation of resources. 
4.  In the growth literature, structural change has not received as much atten-
tion as technological change because of the use of a one-sector model, which 
is incapable of handling issues related to structural change, in the standard 
growth accounting and regression research. 
5.  Maddison (2006) estimated that, in Western Europe, the annual per capita 
income growth rate before the 18th century was about 0.05%, accelerated to 
about 1% in the 18th and 19th centuries, and reached 2% in the 20th century. 
The required time for doubling per capita income thus reduced from 1400 
years before the 18th century to 70 years in the 18th and 19th centuries, and 
further to 35 years in the 20th century. 
6.  The difference between factors of production and infrastructure is that the 
supply and demand of the former are determined individually by households 
and fi rms, whereas the latter in most cases is supplied by the community or 
governments by collective actions. 
7.  For example, the application of chemical fertilisers in rice and wheat require 
modern semi-dwarf varieties to avoid the lodging problem, and the use of 
modern seeds often requires timely irrigation. Individual farmers will not 
be able to do this by themselves. There is also a need for access to credits 
beyond individual farmers’ capacity. Similarly, the diversifi cation from farm to 
non-farm industries or from small-scale traditional to modern industries also 
requires the provision of many new inputs and improvements in hard and soft 
infrastructure, which cannot be internalised in any individual fi rm’s decision. 
8.  The success of Ecuador’s cut fl owers export in the 1980s is a good example. 
The fact that Ecuador had latent comparative advantages in producing and 
exporting cut fl owers to the US market was known in the 1970s. But the indus-
try did not expand and exports did not take off until the government helped 
arrange regular fl ights and investment in cooling facilities near airports in the 
1980s (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010). A similar story applies to Ethio-
pia’s cut fl owers export to the European market. In issues related to the pro-
vision of skilled labour, Germany’s dual system of vocational education and 
training has been a major factor in the country’s economic success over the 
past six decades. 
9.  In a recent fi eld study in Zambia, we found that a local entrepreneur success-
fully started the production of corrugated roofi ng sheets. Within a year, more 
than 20 fi rms had joined in. 
10.  Precisely because of such positive information externalities, governments in 
developed countries also provide various forms of targeted support to fi rms 
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engaged in innovation, such as funding of basic research, preferential taxes, 
mandates, defence contracts, and procurement policies. 
11.  The possibility of borrowing existing knowledge does not mean that develop-
ing countries need not engage in indigenous innovation. To be successful, they 
need to undertake a process of innovation that makes the borrowed technol-
ogy suitable to local conditions, and also to carry out product innovation in 
sectors where they are already world leaders, or not too far behind the world 
leader. For further discussion, see Lin and Ren (2007). 
12.  List’s book covers the rise of economic powerhouses in a variety of con-
texts, from Italian cities such as Venice to Hanseatic cities such as Hamburg 
or Lübeck, and countries such as the Netherlands, England, Spain, Portugal, 
France, Germany and the United States. 
13. The ban lasted until 1825. See Landes (1969). 
14. For a theoretical exposition, see Jones et al. (1990) and World Bank (1995). 
15.  The Meiji period (1868-1912) marked the beginning of an era of major politi-
cal, economic, and social change which, according to conventional wisdom, 
brought about the modernisation and Westernisation of Japan. See Beasley 
(1972). 
16.  A common reason for the failure of state-owned enterprises is the govern-
ment’s attempt to use them as a vehicle to develop industries or adopt tech-
nologies inconsistent with the country’s comparative advantage (Lin and Tan, 
1999). Such attempts create a policy burden for state-owned fi rms which the 
state is compelled to provide with subsidies and protection. Information asym-
metry prevents governments from knowing exactly what level of subsidies and 
protection would be adequate and state-owned fi rms use the policy burden 
as an excuse to ask for more subsidies and protection, which gives rise to the 
problem of soft-budget constraint (Kornai, 1986). 
17.  During the 1984 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Walter Mondale 
argued that the economic policies of the country were ‘destroying industry—
not building it’, and that federal aid should be directed to ‘those communities 
and regions hit hardest by economic change’ (quoted by McKenzie, 2007). 
Economists Bluestone and Harrison (1982) argued that the ongoing process 
of deindustrialisation amounted to a ‘wide-spread, systematic disinvestment in 
the nation’s productive capacity’. Pointing to the post-War economic success 
of Japan, which he credited to industrial policies orchestrated by its Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Thurow (1980) worried that, if 
left alone, ‘our economy and our institutions will not provide jobs for everyone 
who wants to work’, and that ‘we have a moral responsibility to guarantee 
full employment’. He observed that ‘major investment decisions have become 
too important to be left to the private market alone . . . Japan Inc. needs to be 
met with U.S.A. Inc’. Others recommended various measures such as the cre-
ation of national and regional economic development banks similar to Herbert 
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Hoover’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which would use subsidies and 
federal loan guarantees to slow the contraction of declining industries and 
speed the development of emerging industries; the launch of ‘Tripartite coun-
cils’ at the national, regional, and fi rm levels, which would be composed of 
representatives from management, labour and government and would seek 
consensus on how capital investment should be allocated. While often con-
ceding on protectionist proposals, other economists and political leaders have 
maintained strong opposition to any coherent industrial-policy programmes. 
18.  The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951 and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 1957. 
19.  In October 2005, the European Commission announced seven new horizontal 
initiatives in order to: ‘(1) consolidate the EU’s legal framework in the area 
of intellectual property, (2) take into account the links between the issues of 
competitiveness and environmental protection, (3) adapt the trade policy with 
a view to developing the competitiveness of European industry, (4) simplify 
the law governing certain industrial sectors (i.e. construction, food industry), 
(5) remedy the shortage of skilled labour in certain sectors (i.e. new technolo-
gies, textiles), (6) anticipate and support the structural changes in industry, by 
taking this objective into consideration in other EU policies (structural funds, 
in particular), and (7), adopt an integrated European approach to industrial 
research and innovation.’ 
20.  Several proposals are currently under consideration to stimulate innovation 
and growth. The recently issued Juppé-Roccard report by two former Prime 
Ministers (a socialist and a conservative) recommends that France raises 35 
billion euros (US$52 bn) through public borrowing to be spent on universities 
and research (providing them with endowments and incentives to merge or 
become independent and private), the green economy and high-tech to pro-
pel growth. Among the projects are plans to expand the high-speed Internet, 
develop green cities, and support innovative small businesses and France’s 
cutting-edge aerospace and nuclear industries. Of the 35 bn euros to be raised, 
13 bn will come from the reimbursed bailout packages given to French banks, 
with the remaining 20 bn to be raised on the fi nancial markets. 
21.  The idea of a dynamic comparative advantage is often used to justify 
industrial policy and government support to fi rms (Redding, 1999). In 
our analysis, however, the argument is valid only if the government’s sup-
port is limited to overcoming information and co-ordination costs and 
the externalities associated with the pioneer status of fi rst-movers. The 
targeted industry should be consistent with the comparative advantage of 
the economy and the fi rms in the new industry should be viable, other-
wise they will collapse once the government support is removed. If the tar-
geted industry is outside the country’s comparative advantage, the required 
open-ended support to the subsidised fi rms will crowd out the resources 
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available to other fi rms that operate in industries consistent with the com-
parative advantage. This will obviously slow down economic growth and 
capital accumulation, and it will take more time for the economy to reach 
the stage targeted by the dynamic-advantage policy than an economy that 
follows a comparative-advantage strategy (Lin and Zhang, 2007). 
22.  For the purposes of this article, the use of per capita income measured in pur-
chasing power parity is better than that of the market-exchange rate because, 
in cross-country comparisons, the former refl ects the level of development and 
the cost of production better. 
23.  For a discussion of industrial policies in these countries, see Chang (2003); and 
for the estimations of per capita income for the above countries, see Maddison 
(2006). 
24.  Countries in similar stages of development may specialise in different indus-
tries. However, the level of capital intensity in their industries will be simi-
lar. For example, in recent years, China is achieving dynamic growth by 
specialising in the labour-intensive manufacturing industries, such as elec-
tronics, toys and textiles, whereas India’s growth has relied on specialis-
ing in call centres, programming, and business process services, which are 
labour-intensive activities within the information industry. 
25.  In a similar spirit, Hausmann and Klinger (2006) recently investigated the 
evolution of a country’s level of sophistication in exports and found that this 
process was easier when the move was to ‘nearby’ products in the product 
space. This is because every industry requires highly specifi c inputs such as 
knowledge, physical assets, intermediate inputs, labour skills, infrastructure, 
property rights, regulatory requirements, or other public goods. Established 
industries somehow have sorted out the many potential failures involved in 
assuring the presence of all of these inputs. The barriers preventing the emer-
gence of new industries are less binding for nearby industries, which only 
require slight adaptations of existing inputs. 
26.  For the debate on the conformity of Korea’s industrial upgrading with its evolv-
ing comparative advantage, see the exchange between Lin and Chang (2009). 
27.  According to Maddison (2006), Hong Kong’s per capita income in 1970 mea-
sured in 1990 international dollars was 5,695, whereas that of Mauritius was 
2,945. 
28.  As discussed earlier, a similar policy was pursued successfully in Germany, 
France and the US at the same time. Their per capita incomes ranged from 
60% to 75% that of Britain. 
29.  The new fi eld of development economics was regarded as covering underdevel-
opment because ‘conventional economics’ did not apply (Hirschman, 1982). 
Early trade and development theories and policy prescriptions were based on 
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some widely accepted stylised facts and premises about developing countries 
(Krueger, 1997). These included: (i) developing economies’ production structures 
were oriented heavily towards primary-commodity production; (ii) if develop-
ing countries adopted policies of free trade, their comparative advantage would 
forever lie in primary-commodity production; (iii) the global income elasticity 
and the price elasticity of demand for primary commodities were low; (iv) capi-
tal accumulation was crucial for growth and, in the early stage of development, 
it could occur only with the importation of capital goods. Based on these facts 
and premises, it was a straight step to believing that the process of development 
was industrialisation, which consisted primarily of the substitution of domestic 
production of manufactured goods for imports (Chenery, 1958). 
30.  The other reason for the failure of industrial policy in developing countries is 
that the policy targets industries that have already lost comparative advantage, 
but governments want to protect them for socio political reasons (such as pro-
viding employment, often in urban areas). 
31.  The government refers to both the central and local governments. The process 
discussed here can also be used by multilateral development agencies and non-
governmental organisations to promote industrial upgrading and diversifi ca-
tion in developing countries. 
32.  The tradeable goods refer to manufactured products, agricultural products, 
and fi shery as well other natural-resources products. Because of the ascen-
dance and dominance of international production networks in manufacturing 
industries, the manufactured goods here refer not only to the fi nal products but 
also to intermediate inputs of fi nal products in manufacturing industries. 
33.  As discussed in Section 3, this is the most important principle for a developing 
country to reap the advantage of backwardness in its industrial upgrading and 
diversifi cation. This is because, for a dynamically growing economy, its wage 
rate is increasing rapidly and is likely to start losing comparative advantage in 
the industries that it has produced for many years. Therefore, the industries will 
become the latent comparative advantage of countries with a similar endow-
ment structure but with a lower wage. The principle also means that when a 
country grows beyond the income level of 50% of the most advanced country, 
it will become increasingly diffi cult to identify industries that are likely to be its 
latent comparative advantage. The country’s industries will locate increasingly 
close to the global frontier and its industries’ upgrading and diversifi cation will 
increasingly rely on indigenous innovations. Therefore, the government’s poli-
cies to support industrial upgrading and diversifi cation will increasingly resem-
ble those of the advanced countries. The chance of those policies failing to 
achieve the intended goal will also increase. As for low-income countries with 
per capita income measured at about $1,000 in purchasing power  parity (PPP) 
terms currently, in addition to identifying matured tradeable goods in countries 
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at about $2,000 currently, it may also identify tradeable goods  produced in 
countries that had similar per capita income levels 20 or so years ago and have 
been growing dynamically since then. In particular, China, Vietnam and India 
had a similar or even lower income levels 30 years ago than most of today’s 
poor sub-Saharan countries. Therefore, for today’s poor countries, they may 
identify the list of goods and services produced in China, Vietnam and India 
20 years ago as references. They may also review their imports and identify the 
list of simple manufacturing goods, which are labour-intensive, have limited 
economies of scale, and require only small investments, as the targets of their 
industrial upgrading and diversifi cation. The idea put forward is similar to 
that of monkeys jumping to nearby trees (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006), but 
the step proposed here is much easier to implement than the product-space 
analysis proposed by them. 
34.  This is because every industry requires some highly specifi c inputs such as 
knowledge, physical assets, intermediate inputs, labour skills, and so on. The 
existence of some private fi rms in the industry indicates that the economy at 
least partially possesses these crucial inputs. 
35.  Chile has produced wine for a long time. Its recent success in the wine industry 
is a good example. The change from a negligible wine exporter to the world’s 
fi fth-largest exporter in the 1970s benefi tted greatly from the government’s 
programmes to disseminate foreign technology to local farmers and vineyards 
through Grupos de Transferencia Tecnológica and to promote Chilean wine 
abroad through Export Promotion Offi ce, ProChile (Benavente, 2006). 
36.  Lessons from successful Asian countries can be of relevance here. When local 
Asian fi rms had no historical knowledge in a particular industry, the state often 
attracted foreign direct investment and/or promoted joint ventures. After the 
transition to a market economy in the 1980s, China, for instance, pro-actively 
invited direct investment from Hong Kong-China, Taiwan-China, Korea and 
Japan—a promotion policy which helped the local economy to get started in 
various industries. Bangladesh’s vibrant garment industry also started with 
direct investment from Daewoo, a Korean manufacturer, in the 1970s. After 
a few years, enough knowledge transfer had taken place and the direct invest-
ment became a sort of ‘incubation’, local garment plants mushroomed, and 
most of them could be traced back to that fi rst Korean fi rm (Mottaleb and 
Sonobe, 2009; Rhee, 1990; Rhee and Belot, 1990). The booming cut-fl ower 
export business in Ecuador from the 1980s on also started with three compa-
nies founded by Colombia’s fl ower growers (Sawers, 2005). The government 
can also set up an industrial park to incubate new industries. Taiwan-China’s 
Hsingchu Science-based Industrial Park for the development of electronic and 
IT industries (Mathews, 2006) and the Fundacion Chile’s demonstration of 
commercial salmon farming (Katz, 2006) are two successful examples of the 
government’s incubation of new industries.
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37.  India’s information industry is a good example. Indian professionals in Sili-
con Valley helped Indian companies to take advantage of expanding oppor-
tunities for outsourced IT work in the 1980s. Once the potential of software 
exports was demonstrated, the Indian government helped build a high-speed 
data-communications infrastructure that allowed overseas Indians to return 
home and set up offshore sites for US clients. The Indian software industy 
has grown more than 30% p.a. for 20 years, with 2008 exports close to $60 
billion (Bhatnagar, 2006). Ethiopia’s success in cut fl owers exports is another 
example. Before the government’s identifi cation of cut fl owers export and the 
provision of supports in its industrial policy in the 1990s, a local pirate fi rm 
had exported cut fl owers to the European market for over 10 years. Asparagus 
in Peru is also a good example. The possibility of growing asparagus, a foreign 
crop, was discovered by Peruvian farmers in the 1950s. However, the industry 
and exports did not take off in earnest until 1985 when USAID provided a 
grant for a farmers’ association to obtain advice from a specialist from the 
University of California, Davis, who had recently invented the UC-157 variety 
suitable for the US market, and from another expert who showed members of 
the association’s experimental station how to set up seedbeds for large-scale 
production and package the products for export. The state also supported 
co operative institutions such as the Peruvian Asparagus Institute and Frío 
Aereo Asociación Civil for engaging in research, technology transfer, market 
studies, export drives, and quality promotion, and invested in the freezing and 
packing plants that handled 80% of fresh asparagus exports. With these inter-
ventions, Peru has overtaken China and become the largest asparagus exporter 
in the world (O’Brien and Rodriguez, 2004). 
38.  In addition to infrastructure, many African countries, for instance, also face the 
constraint of rigid labour regulation. To overcome this, Mauritius has allowed 
employment to be fl exible in the export process zone, while maintaining the 
existing regulation for the domestic economy (Mistry and Treebhoohun, 2009).
39.  The measure commonly used in China to attract FDI is to exempt from corpo-
rate income tax for the fi rst two years and reduce the tax by half for a further 
three years. 
40.  Direct credits and access to foreign reserves are desirable measures in countries 
with fi nancial depressions and foreign-exchange control. 
41.  The likelihood of capture is proportional to the magnitude of protection 
and subsidies. If the targeted industries are consistent with the country’s 
inherent comparative advantages, and the protection and subsidies are used 
to compensate the pioneer fi rms for their positive information externalities, 
the magnitude of protection and subsidies should be small, and the elites 
will not have the incentives to use their political capital to capture the small 
rent. In addition, once the pioneering fi rms are successful, many new fi rms 
will enter and the market will become competitive, which will further reduce 
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the danger of capture by elites. Alternatively, if the government’s goal is to 
support the development of industries that go against the country’s com-
parative advantages, the fi rms in the targeted industries will not be viable 
in competitive markets and the required subsidies and protections will be 
large, and are likely to become the target of rent-seeking and political cap-
ture (Lin, 2009). 
42. We owe this ex-post reward idea to Professor Shang-jin Wei. 
43. See, for example, Di Maio (2008) and Agosin et al. (2009).
44.  Ayyagari et al. (2008) present the mean reported values for a number of invest-
ment-climate variables in a sample of over 6,000 fi rms in 80 countries. In the 
overall sample, taxes and regulation, political instability, infl ation and fi nanc-
ing are reported as being the greatest obstacles to fi rm growth. 
45.  Bourguignon (2006) observes: ‘“Extracting means” is the way I would char-
acterize the Investment Climate Assessment exercises that the Bank is now 
carrying out. Like the “Doing Business” indicators, these are undoubtedly 
useful. However, what they give us is essentially new and better right-hand 
side variables in cross-country regressions, not necessarily better data for 
country-specifi c analysis. The goal should be to use investment climate sur-
veys to measure the sensitivity of fi rms of different types to investment 
climate variables, as another way of determining exactly which variable 
corresponds to a major obstacle to growth.’ 
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Comments and Rejoinder*
Introduction, by Dirk Willem te Velde†
Assessing the role of the state in the dynamics of structural change, as Lin 
and Monga do, is not new. However, the novel and noteworthy contribu-
tion of their article is that it provides a practical procedure to identify and 
facilitate growth through a six-step procedure. This approach complements 
existing approaches such as the growth diagnostics approach (Hausmann 
et al., 2005), the competitiveness approach (Porter and Schwab, 2008), the 
investment-climate survey approach (World Bank, 2005), or the capability 
approach (Cantore et al., 2011): 
•  Step 1: Governments should select dynamically growing countries with 
a similar endowment structure and with about 100% higher per capita 
income than their own average. They must then identify tradeable indus-
tries that have grown well in those countries for the previous 20 years. 
•  Step 2: If some private domestic fi rms are already present in those indus-
tries, they should identify constraints to technological upgrading or fur-
ther fi rm entry, and take action to remove such constraints. 
•  Step 3: In industries where no domestic fi rms are present, policy-makers 
may try to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from countries listed 
in step 1, or organize new fi rm-incubation programmes. 
182 | New Structural Economics
•  Step 4: In addition to the industries identifi ed in step 1, the government 
should also pay attention to spontaneous self-discovery by private enter-
prises and support the scaling up of the successful private innovations in 
new industries. 
•  Step 5: In countries with poor infrastructure and a bad business environ-
ment, special economic zones or industrial parks may be used to over-
come barriers to fi rm entry and FDI and encourage the formation of 
industrial clusters. 
•  Step 6: The government should be willing to compensate pioneer fi rms 
in the industries identifi ed above with tax incentives for a limited period, 
cofi nancing for investments, or access to foreign exchange.
Without reviewing the article in detail, one can pose some obvious 
questions regarding the framework. For example, the fi rst step of the new 
framework requires a country to identify sectors in which it has a com-
parative advantage on the basis of goods and services that have been pro-
duced for 20 years in similar countries. But what happens if the current 
circumstances have changed so fundamentally that a comparison with the 
past is less informative (for example, the rise of emerging power, new com-
munications technology including fi ber optic cables, new production pro-
cesses, new global rules and institutions, climate change)? What if demand 
patterns have shifted so fundamentally (for example, the rise of the middle 
classes in China and India, global fi nancial crisis) that different products 
are now more successful compared with those in the past? What if there 
are measurement issues, for example information communication technol-
ogy (ICT) service exports may be quite diffi cult to measure but this might 
be just the export in which small landlocked countries with access to a 
good quality fi ber optic cable have a comparative advantage? What if com-
parator countries are actually very different geographically or institution-
ally? So one could have doubts that step 1 would actually be suffi ciently 
informative under all these circumstances. 
Or with respect to step 2, the argument is made for government support 
(to remove binding constraints to growth), but it is not clear how a country 
knows which policy or instrument works best in which case (a comment 
which can also be made on the growth diagnostics literature, for example). 
So even if the right industry and constraints are identifi ed, the wrong policy 
instrument might still lead to an unintended outcome. This links to a wider 
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point which is underemphasized in the article, namely, that the conditions 
under which policies are implemented (government capacities, political 
incentives, the nature of state-business relations) can also be crucial for the 
success of industrial policies as the need for policies to follow the compara-
tive advantage of a country (which is implicit in steps 1–6). 
However, these issues aside, the growth identifi cation and facilitation 
framework is presented as an alternative to the existing frameworks for 
analysis. We asked fi ve distinguished experts to comment. 
Comments from Experts
Suresh Tendulkar, professor of economics, retired, at the Delhi School 
of Economics, University of Delhi, comments on the distinction between 
the roles of the state in facilitating growth and in identifying sources of 
growth. Tendulkar accepts that there is an important role for growth 
facilitation, but is less certain about the role of the state in growth identi-
fi cation. He asks how the over-enthusiastic government can be restrained 
from taking on much more than it can effectively handle, and refers to 
the South Asian context. He also cautions that time-bound incentives are 
not straightforward. 
Alice Amsden of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology makes three 
points. First, she argues that industrial policies in countries ranging from 
the Middle East’s energy belt to the Asian manufacturing corridor and the 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) economies have been more success-
ful in practice than is portrayed by Lin and Monga. Secondly, she suggests 
that the authors’ two-track approach (identifi cation and facilitation) is bet-
ter than Michael Porter’s value-chain approach and Ricardo Hausmann’s 
‘jumping-monkey’ model, because it involves building up business knowl-
edge which is a more complete approach than is embodied in the other 
concepts. Thirdly, she argues that Lin and Monga’s model can be enhanced 
by using industrial policy to invest overseas and attract skills. 
K. Y. Amoako, founder and president of the African Center for Eco-
nomic Transformation (ACET) in Accra, argues that Lin and Monga’s 
approach is a practical and useful starting guide, suggesting that such a 
pragmatic approach is to be welcomed especially because it comes from 
the World Bank which traditionally has not believed in a proactive indus-
trial policy. However, Amoako also argues that the article pays too much 
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attention to supporting products that follow a comparative advantage and 
too little attention to the acquisition of new technological capabilities and 
learning. Successful industrialisation has not always been based on com-
petitive markets, and African countries have not always succeeded, despite 
following their comparative advantage. 
Howard Pack, Department of Business and Public Policy at the Whar-
ton School, University of Pennsylvania, suggests that the algorithm 
involved in selecting industries on the basis of a selection in richer compa-
rable countries and then following the country’s comparative advantage 
is problematic. This is in part because the economic structure of the richer 
country could be the result of distorting policies, and in part because 
a formidable set of policies is required for successful policies which go 
beyond the mere identifi cation of potential products. Governments should 
address a whole list of issues which are likely to go beyond the capacity 
of any government. 
Wonhyuk Lim, director of policy research at the Center for Interna-
tional Development, Korea Development Institute, agrees that policy 
advice based on the ideas of comparative advantage, self-discovery and 
the facilitating state will help policy-makers in the early stage of develop-
ment, but argues that more needs to be done to move a country beyond 
the middle-income trap. South Korea defi ed its comparative advantage by 
moving into heavy and chemical industries by means of building specifi c 
skills, fi lling specifi c gaps in the value chain, relying on a select set of busi-
ness groups and strategic choice. 
Rejoinder
Lin and Monga close the debate with a rejoinder. They answer many of 
these points directly, for example by arguing that growth identifi cation 
and facilitation go hand in hand implicitly. They also agree with many of 
the constructive comments made, for example those by Professor Amsden 
on the importance of gaining experience in managing business organiza-
tions, or on the way the model can be enhanced by using industrial policy 
to invest overseas. 
But there are also some points where the reader is invited to make up his 
or her own mind. For example, Lin and Monga repeat time and again that 
their model focuses on ‘development of industries consistent with latent 
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comparative advantages’. It is unlikely that many will object to this being 
indeed their intent, but they might object to whether it can be achieved in 
practice. Or, when Lin and Monga say that it ‘simply points to the neces-
sity to set clear, transparent and rigorous criteria that mitigate ... support 
[for] uncompetitive industries’, few would doubt that that is important, 
but many would rather question the ability of governments to implement 
these criteria successfully, as Tendulkar emphasized. 
A further discussion, which has not been completely closed, is to what 
extent countries should follow a path consistent with their static com-
parative advantages or whether they should create dynamic comparative 
advantages (as implied by Amoako). 
Another debate left somewhat open concerns knowledge (as brought 
up by Pack). Government offi cials are unlikely to know enough to be able 
to support industries in the way that is intended and to target the develop-
ment of industries consistent with latent comparative advantages. When 
do they know enough? 
Conclusion
The article by Lin and Monga introduces a useful and practical 6-step 
plan for governments to facilitate growth which seems a credible alter-
native to the existing frameworks (growth diagnostic framework, com-
petiveness analysis, capability analysis, investment-climate analysis). In 
doing so, it reinvigorates the debate on the appropriate role of growth 
policy in development, which has once again become a topical issue in 
development economics. 
Most comments on Lin and Monga’s contribution to the literature agree 
with the importance attached to the role of the state in growth facilitation. 
Many also value the practical policy advice embodied in the approach. 
However, there is some disagreement about the capacity of the state to 
deliver on growth identifi cation. 
Furthermore, the two-track approach in Lin and Monga relies on coun-
tries following their comparative advantage, and several comments suggest 
that countries actually need to defy their comparative advantage involving 
a more complex set of policies than that suggested by the framework. 
In conclusion, most agree that the approach could establish useful ingre-
dients in successful industrial development and comes close to a recipe for 
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growth. But there are doubts about the ability of the cooks to use the recipe 
and turn the ingredients into a fully cooked meal. Nonetheless, it is hoped 
that the application of the six-step procedure will produce relevant infor-
mation that can help countries to grow faster. Indeed, apart from questions 
on what is the binding constraint in a country, developing-country policy-
makers often ask: how did other countries achieve in the past what we 
would like to achieve now? 
Note
†  Dirk Willem te Velde is head of Investment and Growth and Trade Programmes 
at the Overseas Development Institute, London.
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Suresh D. Tendulkar†
Lin and Monga rightly admit that economists have been intrigued by 
the mystery of economic growth. Gone are the days of self-assurance 
and confi dence of Walter Rostow in the 1950s who provided a predict-
able and certain roadmap of growth for every underdeveloped country. A 
large number of economic theoretical analytical models fl ourished shortly 
thereafter. While Rostow did not remain uncontested in his time (Kuznets 
and Gerschenkron readily come to mind), economists have been much 
more circumspect since then, despite or possibly because of the wealth 
of data becoming available. And rightly so. The growth brigade started 
with 1.5 to 2.0% a year in per capita terms in the eighteenth century with 
the Netherlands and Britain. It was joined by the United States, Germany 
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and France in the nineteenth century, and the bar was raised signifi cantly 
by the latecomers: Japan in the 1950s, Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s, China, Thailand, Malaysia and Indo-
nesia in the 1970s, India in the 1980s, and other emerging economies 
since then. With the two most populous countries, China and India, join-
ing the brigade, the population-weighted inter-country inequality in per 
capita GDP has shown a welcome decline. The number of countries in 
the brigade, however, remains countable. While we are reasonably cer-
tain about common ex-post descriptive features associated with rapid 
growth, very few countries have managed to grow rapidly (say, 3% or 
higher in per capita annual terms) in a sustained fashion over more than 
two decades. Nor do we know nor can we predict with certainty what 
triggers spurts of sustained growth in any given country. 
Undeterred, Lin and Monga embark on the ambitious and admirably 
persuasive enterprise of setting a two-fold agenda for government inter-
vention in growth facilitation (provision of hard and soft infrastructure) 
and growth identifi cation (continuing technological upgrading and diver-
sifi cation through anticipatory industrial policy) for developing countries 
striving for rapid economic growth for poverty reduction. The objective 
is indeed laudable beyond doubt. What is also on their side is the lessons 
they seek to draw from well-documented ex-post analyses of the successes 
as well as failures of state interventions during the pre- as well as post-
World War II period. While my heart wants their enterprise to succeed, my 
head remains uncomfortable. Let me therefore express the sources of my 
discomfort with introspective comments which are indeed coloured by my 
South Asian, especially Indian, lenses, while recognizing that the authors 
have an East and South-East Asian, including Chinese, perspective.
Less contentious and more readily acceptable is the important role 
of the government in growth facilitation, that is, the provision of hard 
(adequate networks of road, rail and air transport and communications, 
electricity grids and other public utilities) and soft (basic governance 
including competitive market institutions, fi nancial system and regula-
tion, basic health, and primary and secondary education services includ-
ing vocational training) infrastructure. Because of externalities and their 
public good character, this is indeed the core legitimate domain of the 
government. The adequacy of physical facilities and the cost-effectiveness 
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of operation and delivery of corresponding public services cut down the 
transaction costs of exchange for the private sector and impart competi-
tive edge to the economic structure. 
More diffi cult, uncertain and hence contentious is the role of growth 
identifi cation. Lin and Monga’s excellent historical analysis brings out 
many failures and fewer successes, more over-enthusiastic though often 
well-intended policy excesses, more heavy-handed than ‘right’ mixes of 
non-intrusive interventions, persistence of once successful policies being 
indiscriminately extended beyond their effective time span, indiscriminate 
extension of the public sector well beyond the minimum core and discre-
tionary controls often stifl ing the dynamism of functioning markets and 
leading to rampant rent-seeking activities. While one may readily concede 
that some ex-ante judgments regarding the choice of industries consistent 
with endowment structure and potential comparative advantage may go 
wrong, the discipline of time-bound withdrawal of concessions in the face 
of ineffectiveness and even timely exit from some patently unsuccessful 
policies including subsidies and tariff protection is diffi cult to obtain. The 
question ironically becomes: how do you control the over-enthusiastic 
government from taking on much more than it can effectively handle? In 
my assessment, growth identifi cation and consequent ex-ante nurturing of 
picked winners and keeping them under a tight, time-bound leash are a 
much more diffi cult and risky enterprise based on the South Asian experi-
ence in this context. This does not rule out occasional, lucky successes, but 
this has to be ascertained by the experience of actual experiential judgment 
and confi dence about the existence of warranted discipline. 
Note
†  Suresh Tendulkar is Professor of Economics (Retd.), Delhi School of Econom-
ics, University of Delhi, India.
Alice Amsden†
In their critical essay on the role of the state, Justin Lin and Célestin Monga 
concentrate on the concept of comparative advantage as the clue to slaying 
the dragon of underdevelopment. Are they moving ahead or simply stand-
ing still? 
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Comparative advantage can be construed deductively or inductively, as 
an abstract theory or as something that bubbles up from below. Economists 
mostly conceive of it deductively. Lin and Monga argue that pervasive fail-
ures in developing countries are mostly due to the inability of governments 
to come up with good criteria for identifying industries that are appropri-
ate for their country’s endowment structure and level of development, i.e., 
their ‘latent’ comparative advantage. But the two vast de-colonised regions 
with the most successful industrial policies, fast GDP growth and steeply 
falling poverty, the Far East and Middle East, followed their comparative 
advantage by nosing around their neighbours; if an industry grew next 
door, this was taken as de facto proof of its comparative advantage—what 
more concrete evidence can there be? If an export-processing zone works, 
if a national oil company raises domestic supply and tax revenues more 
than an international oil company, other countries try to follow suit, and 
having a blueprint to follow (imitation has been overwhelmingly South-
South) makes it easier for them to succeed. 
Two great regional role models have evolved, whose meaning of ‘indus-
trial policy’, unlike a theory’s, meanders, depending on who has joined 
and exogenous jolts. (The World Trade Organization’s restrictions on sub-
sidies, I would argue, have driven the industrial policies of ‘emerging’ and 
‘emerged’ economies underground, creating a sort of ‘level playing fi eld’ 
of subterfuges.) The OPEC development role model (as distinct from the 
OPEC price cartel), which started in Iran and Saudi Arabia with Mexico’s 
1938 oil nationalisations as example, employs millions of workers from 
as far away as Bangladesh and approximates the ‘labour-scarce, resource-
rich economy’ described in the 1950s by Hla Myint. The Far East role 
model, running along the lines of the labour-surplus economy analyzed 
by W. Arthur Lewis, formed around post-War Japan, which was neither 
developed nor underdeveloped at the time and which targeted industries 
according to simpler criteria than Lin’s or Monga’s: government support 
went to industries with dense linkages and high productivity growth rates 
internationally, fi rst silk and cotton textiles (see Amsden and Suzumura, 
2001). Large countries like the BRICs have industrial policies that strad-
dle Asia’s manufacturing corridor and the Middle East’s energy belt, so in 
fact industrial policy has probably been more successful than the premise 
of Lin and Monga’s article, that ‘most have failed’. 
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Industrial policy has failed in the peasant export economy, the third pro-
totype of Lewis, Myint and other classical economists, but it is questionable 
if this is a viable economic formation, given hyper-fast population increases 
(the 30 countries in 2005-10 with the highest estimated population growth 
rates include 24 smallholder-type economies, 23 from Africa). Landless-
ness, unemployment and underemployment are high, but labour costs are 
not low enough and manufacturing experience is not deep enough to com-
pete against labour-surplus economies like India. What, besides population 
planning, is the best industrial policy to help peasant economies, many of 
which have newly discovered energy and mineral resources such as Sudan, 
Angola, Cameroon and Ghana: the OPEC development role model, with 
nearby Nigeria teaching what not to do, or Lin and Monga’s ‘important 
distinction’ between two types of government intervention? The latter 
 differentiate policies that facilitate structural change by overcoming infor-
mation, and coordination and externality issues’ from those that aim at 
protecting certain selected fi rms and industries that defy the comparative 
advantage determined by the existing endowment structure (once called 
dynamic comparative advantage). Their distinction seems sensible but 
vague, at least for the vast energy and mining sector, the great hope of the 
defunct peasant economic confi guration. 
Developing countries without unlimited labour supplies, rich natural 
resources or a credible role model close by, such as Colombia, Morocco, 
Nicaragua and Nepal, are in need of advice about how to ‘pick winners’. 
Lin and Monga’s criteria face competition from those of Michael Porter 
(the value chain) and Ricardo Hausmann (the jumping monkey). I think 
Lin and Monga’s two-track approach is better than theirs because, if 
I understand its broad implications, comparative advantage boils down 
to having ‘knowledge of a business’, an empirical construct that rests on 
a roadmap of where an industry is going, production engineering skills, 
and project execution capabilities to get an investment up and running. 
( Taiwan’s electronics fi rms invested in producing CD-ROMs, despite 
 falling world prices, once government R&D had skirted restrictive patents 
and there was a sense that Japan would graduate to producing DVDs.) By 
contrast, where a monkey jumps or where a country situates itself on a 
value chain largely involves decisions determined by the narrow criterion 
of factor proportions. 
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The challenge Lin and Monga face is how to accelerate the growth of 
professionally managed business organizations and their unique skills.
Business knowledge depends on experience, which I would say is the 
critical missing element in economies deprived of East Asia’s pre-War 
manufacturing culture (which was fortuitously strengthened by Japan’s 
regional war preparations). Experience can be understood using a learn-
ing curve, except that learning is not repetitive. Experience depends on 
gaining tacit and undocumented knowledge of multiple activities that 
may change simultaneously—a harder task than gaining ‘information’ (a 
fact). How can an industrial policy hasten the acquisition of experience? 
Two possibilities that I think would move Lin and Monga’s argu-
ment forward would be to follow what the role models of East Asia 
and the Middle East are doing, and use industrial policy to: (i) invest 
overseas (outward foreign direct investment); and (ii) reverse the fl ow 
of talented brain drain (and create a level playing fi eld for local talent), 
which may change a small country’s comparative advantage overnight. 
When Malaysia’s government reformed its industrial policy towards 
its Malay population—instead of subsidising Malay-owned enterprises 
in Malaysia, it began acquiring foreign companies and giving Malays 
equity in them—it developed skills to choose a specifi c overseas asset to 
buy, the same ‘knowledge of a business’ it needs to target a successful 
investment at home. Similarly with SABIC, Saudi Arabia’s state-owned 
petrochemical company, which acquired General Electric’s chemi-
cal business in China, the feedstock costs of both petrochemicals and 
chemicals draw on intelligence of the supply of and demand for oil. 
An outward FDI can thus have positive spillovers on domestic income, 
employment, income distribution (as in Malaysia’s case) and picking 
winners. 
Reversing talented brain drain by creating economic opportunities at 
home is a costly challenge, but one with potentially high returns, because 
embedded in returnees’ experience is an inductive clue as to the specifi c 
industries a government should support. Globalism’s imperfections, 
moreover, have created a willingness on the part of some professionals to 
return home, opportunities permitting. Morris Chang, a top executive in 
Texas Instruments, went back to Taiwan to run its new state-owned semi-
conductor company because he claimed that at TI he had hit a ‘ yellow 
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glass ceiling’. West African executives in Unilever talk about a ‘black 
glass ceiling’. Industrial policy is inherently nationalistic, and the role of 
government is to nurture nationalism of a productive type. 
Note
†  Alice Amsden is Barton L. Weller Professor of Political Economy, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA.
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K. Y. Amoako†
Lin and Monga’s article emphasizes the importance for sustained growth 
of technological innovation, industrial upgrading and diversifi cation, and 
improvements in infrastructure and institutions. It notes that, while the 
market mechanism is essential for effi cient resource allocation, it may not 
be suffi cient to enable fi rms to overcome the problems of information, 
 co-ordination and externality that often stand in the way of achieving the 
above-listed requirements for sustained growth in developing countries. 
It then points out that the historical evidence shows that governments in 
almost all the successful countries (i.e., the industrialized countries and the 
recent East Asian success stories) played and are continuing to play pro-ac-
tive roles in helping fi rms in their economies to overcome these problems. 
It further states that governments in almost all developing countries have 
also tried to intervene in their economies for similar reasons, but most have 
failed. The article’s central thesis is that the failures were due to the fact 
that the governments intervened by trying to defy their economies’ exist-
ing comparative advantage, meaning that they tried to promote products 
that did not refl ect their relative factor endowments, particularly of capital 
and labour. To address this, it proposes a process that policy-makers in 
developing countries may follow to pick industries or products to promote 
or facilitate. 
The authors argue that, for a developing country to diversify its exports, 
the government should ‘… identify the list of tradeable goods and services 
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that have been produced for about 20 years in dynamically growing coun-
tries with similar endowment structures and per capita income that is about 
100% higher than their own’, and then remove the binding constraints or 
take necessary measures to facilitate their export development, including 
attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The government should also 
look for successful discoveries by domestic enterprises and provide appro-
priate support. The article provides examples of the type of facilitation or 
support that may be given. 
Overall, I fi nd this proposal a very practical and useful starting guide 
for a government keen on diversifying and upgrading its country’s exports. 
It is to be welcomed that an article that looks at the role for the state 
in late-industrialisation in such a pragmatic manner emanates from the 
World Bank, which spent a great part of the 1980s and 1990s denying any 
positive or pro-active role for the state in industrialisation and promoting 
liberalization and privatization programmes to support that view. With the 
demonstrably superior economic performance of the East Asian countries 
(for example, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) in recent times, 
in the fi rst three of which the governments pursued active industrial poli-
cies, the Bank has had to revise its position, starting with the East Asian 
Miracle Study (World Bank, 1993). It is to be hoped that this article by Lin 
and Monga will help move the Bank further along on the line of pragma-
tism. As they write, paraphrasing Rodrik (2009), “. . . instead of advising 
the governments in developing countries to give up playing the facilitating 
role, it is ‘more important to understand better why some countries have 
been able to succeed while most others have failed, so that it is possible to 
advise the governments to do the right things and avoid the mistakes’”.
While I fully share the authors’ view that the state has a positive role to 
play in facilitating industrialisation and commend their proposal, I would 
have liked to see a little more fl exibility in the way they use comparative 
advantage (i.e., relative factor proportions) to review the cases of success 
and failure in diversifi cation and industrial upgrading. The apparent use 
of the Hecksher-Olin-Samuelson (HOS) framework to interpret industrial 
policy appears to me to be too confi ning theoretically, and also does not 
seem to adequately explain the country experiences. 
Conceptually, the idea that a country should try to focus on products 
for which it has the required factors in relative abundance makes eminent 
sense. However, this assumes competitive markets, both internationally 
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and domestically, which may not be the case. It is also very static and may 
not take account of the likely demand, price, and prospects of technologi-
cal change and learning of products on the world market. The fact that a 
country’s factor endowments enable it to produce product A more cheaply 
today relative to product B does not necessarily mean that, in the medium 
to long term, it is better off producing A instead of B, if in fact B has bet-
ter demand and technological change and learning prospects. Admittedly, 
producing A today is more likely to raise national income and, presum-
ably, thereby savings, which would enable the country to augment its capi-
tal. However, if the country is aiming to ‘catch up’ in industrialisation, it 
would at some point have to defy its existing comparative advantage and 
take non-marginal steps away from its current productive structure (i.e. try 
to produce B). Certainly, this would be a more risky move, but it would be 
taking high risks for potential high rewards. For me, therefore, the policy 
questions are twofold: (i) what should be the mix of the A and B products 
in industrial policy at any given time, and how should they change over 
time? And (ii) having chosen a particular mix, especially a mix including B 
products, what are the complementary  policies that minimize the risks and 
enhance the chances of success? The latter question brings to the fore the 
issue of the acquisition of technologies and technological capabilities. In 
the HOS framework, which seems to inform Lin and Monga’s article, this 
issue is side-stepped by the assumption that technologies are equally acces-
sible and can be effi ciently operated by all producers. This assumption 
is clearly problematic. In fact, to my mind, the core development prob-
lem that industrial policy should address is precisely the access, effi cient 
deployment, absorption and adaptation of technology (Lall, 2003, 2004). 
To meet this challenge takes more than focusing on existing comparative 
advantage as determined by existing relative capital-labour ratios.
In fact, if each country diversifi ed and upgraded its industries only by try-
ing to break into markets that countries ahead of it on the ‘industrial ladder’ 
were becoming less competitive due to rising labour costs, then one would 
expect the industrial rankings of countries to be rather static over time. 
There would be hardly any instances of ‘catch up’ or overtaking; the US 
and Germany would not have overtaken Britain in industrialisation; Japan 
would not have become dominant in automobile exports; nor would Korea 
have become among the most effi cient steel producers. My reading of the 
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experiences of Japan and the East Asian countries is that the governments 
promoted a mixture of A and B types of industries, with the mix changing 
over time, but supported the industries with a host of fi scal, exchange-rate, 
trade and credit instruments. They also built strong institutions, pursued 
active technology and FDI policies, aggressively developed skills, and pro-
actively engaged in industrial restructuring. One cannot be sure that what 
arose from all these government interventions could always be character-
ized as competitive markets that enabled fi rms to develop according to com-
parative advantage (see Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 
1995; World Bank 1993, and Chang, 2006). It should also be noted that 
in Africa many of the industries established during the import-substitution 
era failed, although a large number of them were engaged in manufactures 
of textiles and other simple consumer goods that refl ected the comparative 
advantage of the countries in terms of relative factor endowments. 
What can be taken from all this is that following comparative advan-
tage is very important, but is only one of a whole host of policies, institu-
tions, capacities and arrangements that have to be deployed together in 
order to increase the chances of success of industrial policy. And for a 
country that wants to accelerate its industrial catching-up, it may be nec-
essary for it to defy its current comparative advantage to some extent and 
promote a carefully selected small sub-set of products that are ‘high-tech’ 
(i.e., from the point of view of the country’s current production structure). 
This would require a government that is capable, organized, disciplined 
and prepared to work closely with the private sector, and yet be able to 
subject it to rigorous performance criteria. 
The above are just questions of nuance. As has already been noted, I 
do think the article makes a valuable contribution by providing a practical 
and sensible way for countries to initiate industrial policy. At the African 
Center for Economic Transformation (ACET), we are engaged precisely in 
exploring ways for African countries to transform their economies through, 
among other things, sensible industrial policy. We therefore welcome this 
contribution from Lin and Monga. 
Note
†  K. Y. Amaoko is Founder and President, African Center for Economic Trans-
formation (ACET), Accra, Ghana.
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Howard Pack†
Lin and Monga have covered an enormous range of issues in this intrigu-
ing article. They correctly argue for a rethinking of whether a more activist 
policy is necessary to stimulate manufacturing development in the least 
industrialised economies, especially in sub-Saharan Africa which has a rel-
atively low level of manufacturing share of GDP and also surprisingly little 
small-scale manufacturing. It is worth noting that the same is true of the 
Arab economies (Noland and Pack, 2007). Given the growth in population 
and labour force and the need to fi nd new sources of employment, the issue 
is of great importance. The main contribution of the article is a reiteration 
of the need to conform with comparative advantage in development, an 
argument made cogently in Lin’s Marshall lectures, while seeking to trans-
form the economy to more advanced activities. The new argument is an 
algorithm for identifying successful sectors; this seems to be deeply infl u-
enced by East Asian experience. Phrased perhaps too baldly, the  algorithm 
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suggests looking at the industries in nations that are more advanced but 
not too much so—for Korea and Taiwan targeting Japan’s structure as 
Japan was ‘only’ three times richer. 
This algorithm is problematic. First, the structure of the richer nation 
may not be economically optimal even for that country, but is itself the 
result of distorting policies. Some of Japan’s industrial development 
between 1868 and 1941 refl ected a felt urgency to develop a serious mili-
tary potential which did allow the Japanese to deploy battleships in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Japan’s metallurgical capabilities, refl ected 
partly in post-1950 industrial development, built upon the skills devel-
oped in the 1930s that contributed to Japan’s initial success in World War 
II. Similarly, the USSR in the 1920s and ’30s emphasized heavy industry 
in an attempt to build up military capacity but also as a perceived path to 
industrial success. India in the early 1950s emulated the Soviet path which 
deeply infl uenced some Indians such as Mahalanobis, then chair of the 
Planning Commission. India violated the Lin-Monga dictum of pursuing 
labour-intensive industry, but that experience, replicated in many other 
nations pursuing import-substituting industrialisation, does suggest one of 
the perils of emulating more ‘advanced’ nations; the body politic may be 
tempted to throw aside strict economic rationality and pursue technologi-
cally advanced and capital-intensive sectors, steel in the 1950s and ’60s 
and high technology today. Once started down the road of emulation, 
technocrats may not be able to rein in their bosses. Korea’s economists 
have shown the considerable cost to the heavy and chemical industry pro-
gramme of the 1970s and ’80s and it is possible that the interim costs were 
suffi ciently large that the protection failed to satisfy the Mill-Bastable test 
(Yoo, 1990). 
Moreover, the industrial policy of these nations was embedded within 
a macroeconomic framework that was conducive to growth, including 
(World Bank, 1993): 
•  exceptionally high saving and investment rates which continued for 
four decades, leading to the high growth rates of the capital-labour 
ratios; 
•  a rapid increase in education measured in years, but also high achieve-
ment in science and mathematics measured in international tests and 
growing tertiary education enrolments in science and engineering; 
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•  an enormous expansion of infrastructure including transportation, ports 
and roads that was not sectorally targeted; 
•  an emphasis on transferring technology from the rest of the world, 
whether in the form of technology licensing, FDI, the use of foreign 
consultants, or in some cases reverse engineering; 
•  the use of export growth as the sine qua non for the continuation of aid 
to fi rms, government programmes benefi ting fi rms being contingent on 
exporting. This forced fi rms to increase their productivity and was the 
impetus for the demand for importing more advanced technologies. But 
export growth was also abetted by macro policies that limited domes-
tic absorption and maintained a relatively constant real exchange rate 
that allowed potential exporters to gauge potential profi tability with-
out worrying about exchange-rate volatility. These macro aspects had 
a uniform impact, not one that varied among sectors. The fact that the 
bureaucracy charged with implementing export promotion was largely 
insulated from political pressure from fi rms, while there was a simulta-
neous close monitoring of fi rms that provided considerable information 
about their problems. 
Such policies are not easily emulated in most of the countries that need 
to expand their industrial base. 
Other problems emerge as well. For example, Yamamura (1986) (in an 
exhaustive study of Japanese industrial policy in the early 1950s) identi-
fi ed the criteria used by MITI to identify potential competitors with the 
US. Products encouraged were those with high income elasticities (so that 
additional supply by Japan would not drive down the initial international 
price) and a large market so that scale economies could be realized. To 
implement this policy the Japanese government: (a) provided interest-
rate subsidies; (b) protected the domestic market by tariffs; (c) limited or 
precluded entry of new local competitors so that favoured fi rms would 
not lose their ability to realize scale economies; (d) forbade foreign direct 
investment in the promoted sector; and (e) precluded potential local com-
petitors from borrowing from local fi nancial institutions to avoid the loss 
of scale economies by favoured fi rms. Korea and Taiwan, the other model 
nations that might be cited as having pursued a successful industrial pol-
icy, implemented some but not all of these measures. Clearly this is a for-
midable set of policies to implement and the complete programme is more 
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complex than simply looking at a nation that is richer. This programme 
would be diffi cult to implement in any nation, and especially in those with 
a poor education base, limited government legitimacy and the widespread 
corruption characteristic of many of the least industrialized nations. 
When Japan embarked on its policies, it targeted stable products 
whose characteristics were changing slowly. There are few such sectors 
nowadays. Even inexpensive clothing and shoes undergo remarkably 
rapid changes in style which demand that a successful fi rm be part of an 
international supply chain that can keep the supplier up-to-date on fash-
ions and quality standards. Moreover, it is not clear how offi cials trying 
to foster an individual sector would even choose a product. Looking at 
international trade statistics, one does not fi nd ‘shoes’ but 50 or more 
categories, each employing a different technology and requiring different 
production and marketing skills. How many government employees in 
a ministry of industry could make such choices and carry out the cal-
culation of a social cost/benefi t analysis? Moreover, to choose among 
products would require extraordinary knowledge of both other sectors 
and the international prospects of the industry with respect to both likely 
prices and cost structures. Lin and Monga correctly identify lacunae that 
the government should address to promote structural transformation, in 
particular, ‘information, co-ordination and externality issues, which are 
intrinsic to industrial upgrading and diversifi cation’. Kamal Saggi and I 
(2006) have provided a partial list of the requisite knowledge to deal with 
these problems, based on our synthesis of the industrial-policy literature. 
These include knowledge of: 
•  which fi rms and industries generate knowledge spillovers 
•  which fi rms and industries benefi t from dynamic scale economies—what 
is the precise path of such learning and the magnitude of the cost disad-
vantage at each stage of the learning process 
•  which sectors have a long-term comparative advantage 
•  the size of scale economies of different fi rms and sectors in order to 
facilitate investment co-ordination 
•  an ability superior to that of individual fi rms to learn about their poten-
tial competitiveness 
•  the nature and extent of capital-market failures 
•  the magnitude and direction of inter-industry spillovers 
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•  the relative amount of learning by individual fi rms from others and from 
their own experience 
•  the extent to which early entrants generate benefi ts for future entrants 
•  the extent of heterogeneity of fi rms’ learning abilities 
•  whether fi rms trying to reduce production costs also begin a simultane-
ous effort to improve their product’s quality in order to obtain a better 
reputation 
•  the potential effects of FDI or international trade in solving some of the 
coordination problems, including a detailed knowledge of which of tens 
of thousands of intermediates are tradeable 
•  forecasting which fi rms can create new knowledge and discover better 
production methods 
•  the spillover effects of FDI as well as the likely intensity of their purchase 
of domestic intermediates. 
This is obviously a formidable list. It is unlikely that, even if a govern-
ment hired several major international consulting fi rms, they would  possess 
the ability to undertake this programme, despite having many PhDs and 
MBAs on their staffs. The implication for much more poorly educated and 
compensated government staff with considerably fewer resources is obvi-
ous. If this characterization is valid, alternatives to government direction 
have to be sought. None of this implies that Lin and Monga are incorrect 
in their insistence on a positive role of government in building hard infra-
structure such as roads and soft infrastructure such as a legal system and 
an environment conducive to business. But these critical requirements are 
likely to exhaust the capabilities (and fi nances) of almost all national gov-
ernments of the least industrialized nations. 
Note
†  Howard Pack is Professor of Business and Public Policy, The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania. 
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Development may be conceptualized as the result of synergies between 
enhanced human capital and new knowledge, involving complementary 
investments in physical and social capital. The fundamental policy chal-
lenge is for the state to work with non-state actors and markets to address 
innovation and co-ordination externalities while minimizing negative gov-
ernment externalities. Since the time of the Industrial Revolution, coun-
tries that have effectively responded to the innovation and coordination 
challenges have become successful. The key is for a country to retain the 
ownership of its development and progressively build up its capabilities 
to add value and respond to shocks, even as it actively learns from, and 
engages with, the outside world. The reinforcement of successful experi-
ments through the feedback mechanism of performance-based rewards can 
lead to dramatic changes over time (Lim, 2011). 
Developing countries typically export primary commodities or start 
their industrialisation in the assembly and production segment of the 
value chain in such labour-intensive industries as garments. Most coun-
tries fail to move to higher value-added segments along the value chain 
(such as product design) or to shift to higher value-added sectors (such 
as machinery and equipment) for two reasons. They either neglect to 
address externalities in technical education, R&D, and infrastructure 
development or rush to promote sophisticated industries without the 
requisite accumulation of skill and scale economies. International bench-
marking based on endowment structures and close consultation between 
the government and the private sector is key to solving information and 
incentive problems at this stage, when countries try to upgrade their com-
parative advantage. 
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Drawing on development history and economic theory, Justin Yifu Lin 
and Célestin Monga offer practical advice to developing countries faced 
with the challenge of identifying promising sectors and facilitating struc-
tural transformation. They note that successful developing countries have 
typically targeted mature industries in countries with an endowment struc-
ture similar to theirs and with a level of development not much more 
advanced than theirs’ (emphasis added). Specifi cally, they propose that 
the government in a developing country focus on ‘tradeable goods and 
services that have been produced for about 20 years in dynamically grow-
ing countries with similar endowment structures and a per capita income 
[measured in purchasing power parity] that is about 100% more than 
their own, while also paying close attention to successful experiments in 
other sectors. They also advise the government to encourage the experi-
mentation, self-discovery, and scale-up efforts of private enterprises by 
removing constraints, supporting pilots, and providing direct incentives 
to pioneer fi rms. 
Building on the ideas of comparative advantage, self-discovery, and the 
facilitating state, this set of policy recommendations will help policy-mak-
ers in developing countries ‘to reap the advantage of backwardness’ in the 
early stages of development. However, more is likely to be needed if they 
are to move beyond ‘the middle-income trap’, when catch-up  economies 
may have to take considerable strategic risks to jump into non-mature 
industries to compete with advanced economies. This is not an easy task. 
In fact, countries tend to move through the product space by developing 
goods close to those they currently produce, and can reach the core ‘only 
by traversing empirically infrequent distances’, which may explain why 
poor countries fail to converge with the income levels of rich countries 
(Hidalgo et al., 2007: 482). 
Korea’s case is illustrative in this regard. Korea exploited its latent 
comparative advantage to develop mature, labour-intensive downstream 
industries in the 1960s, much in line with the advice provided by Lin and 
Monga. However, it did not just wait for its income and skill levels to 
rise to move into higher value-added industries. Instead, it systematically 
studied what had to be done to fi ll the missing links in the domestic value 
chain and move up the quality ladder, and made conscious and concerted 
efforts to aim for international competitiveness from the outset. It sought 
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to indigenize intermediate inputs imported from foreign upstream indus-
tries, through the acquisition of technology, the development of human 
resources, and the construction of optimal-scale plants aimed at the global 
market. For instance, in the chemical-textile value chain, it systematically 
built the linkages backwards from the export of textiles to the production 
of synthetic fi bers, and the development of basic petrochemicals.
Korea had a strong and increasing revealed comparative advantage in 
light industries when it made the decision to promote heavy and chemical 
industries in 1973. After benchmarking advanced industrial nations with 
natural endowments similar to its own, such as Japan, Korea recognized 
that it had a potential comparative advantage in machinery and equipment 
industries and began to remove the obstacles to achieving this objective, 
such as lack of technicians and engineers with the requisite skills in sophis-
ticated industries. The government drafted a plan to increase the supply of 
technicians from 240,000 in 1969 to 1,700,000 in 1981, and established 
mechanical technical high schools offering full scholarships to poor but 
talented young students. National universities were called upon to focus on 
one specialized engineering fi eld related to a nearby industrial complex. 
In promoting upstream industries in the 1970s, Korea had to make a 
strategic choice. It could play safe and develop heavy and chemical indus-
tries for the small domestic market and risk the ineffi ciency resulting from 
sub-optimal scales and entrenched protectionism. Alternatively, it could 
promote these industries for the global market and risk capacity under-
utilization and fi nancial distress. It chose the latter option because, despite 
considerable risks, this promised a dynamically effi cient growth trajectory 
if the country managed to develop the requisite skills before the fi nancial 
burden associated with scale economies and complementary investments 
became overwhelming. To minimize time and exploit scale economies in 
establishing capital-intensive industries, the government decided to rely on 
a select group of state-owned enterprises and family-based business groups 
(chaebol) with successful track records. It considered that scale economies 
called for regulated monopoly or oligopoly in these industries until demand 
became large enough to support effective competition (Lim, 2011). 
Although Korea’s case is but one example, it shows that industrial 
upgrading requires much more than international benchmarking based on 
comparative advantage and self-discovery and scale-up efforts. Innovation 
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and co-ordination externalities in structural transformation demand stra-
tegic risk-taking by the public and private sectors. 
Note
†  Wonhyuk Lim is Director of Policy Research, Center for International Devel-
opment, Korea Development Institute.
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Rejoinder by Justin Yifu Lin and Célestin Monga 
We are grateful to Professors Amsden, Tendulkar and Pack, and Drs Amo-
ako and Lim for their insightful comments on our article. We fi rst discuss 
some of the general themes emerging from their analyses. We then respond 
to some specifi c comments by each of them. 
1 General Comments
1.1 On Scope and Justifi cation. It is useful to start by stressing that every 
country in the world, intentionally or not, pursues industrial policy. This 
is true not only of the usual suspects such as China, Singapore, France 
and Brazil, but also of the United Kingdom, Germany, Chile and the 
United States. This is surprising only if one forgets that industrial pol-
icy broadly refers to any government decision, regulation or law that 
encourages ongoing activity or investment in a particular industry. After 
all, economic development and sustained growth are the result of con-
tinual industrial and technological upgrading, a process that requires 
public-private  collaboration. The theoretical case for industrial policy is 
quite strong and has been acknowledged in the literature at least since 
Adam Smith in the lesser known Book 5 of The Wealth of Nations (in 
which he discusses factor endowments and infrastructure endowments), 
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and Alfred Marshall, who outlined the analytical framework for under-
standing externalities and co-ordination. 
Nowadays, a new wave of skepticism rests on the idea that industrial 
(sectoral) policy and competition policy are contradictory or at best sub-
stitutes. This argument is implicit in some of the comments by Professors 
Tendulkar and Pack and Dr Amoako. We believe that industrial policy 
based on the Growth Identifi cation and Facilitation Framework (GIFF) 
actually enhances competition. By facilitating co-ordination and address-
ing externality issues, industrial policy helps many domestic and foreign 
fi rms to enter sectors that are consistent with the country’s latent com-
parative advantage and turn them into overt comparative advantages, 
and thereby intensifi es competition within the industries and enhances 
the economy’s competitiveness internationally (Lin and Chang, 2009). 
Moreover, as shown by Aghion et al. (2010), competition weeds out bad 
projects, and thus reduces the danger of picking the wrong winner. Also, 
fi rms may naturally try to differentiate horizontally in order to increase 
their competitiveness in the market. In such situations, the more intense 
product market competition is within sectors, the more innovative and 
competitiveness-enhancing it will be. 
1.2 On Discipline and Implementation. The political-economy diffi -
culties of implementing any type of public policy are well known. The 
 comments received highlight some of them: the fact that the body politic 
may be tempted to ignore economic rationality and pursue more sophis-
ticated sectors in its zeal to emulate advanced countries; and the pos-
sibility of extending even successful policies well beyond their effective 
timespan, thus creating opportunities for rent-seeking activities. These 
general  governance issues are increasingly well studied in the economic 
and political-science literature (Tollison and Congleton, 1995; Robinson 
and Torvik, 2005). 
These concerns are legitimate but only for the traditional type of 
industrial policy which encourages fi rms to enter industries that defy 
comparative advantage. Firms in these industries are not viable in an 
open, competitive market. Their entry and continuous operation often 
depend on large subsidies and protection, which create opportunities for 
rent-seeking and corruption, and make it diffi cult for the government to 
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abandon interventions and exit from distortions (Lin and Tan, 1999). The 
GIFF promotes something quite different: the development of industries 
that are consistent with the economy’s latent comparative advantage. 
Firms are viable once the constraints to their entry and operation are 
removed. The incentives provided by the government to the fi rst movers 
are to be temporary and small, solely for the purpose of compensating 
for their information externality. In that context, the issues of pervasive 
rent-seeking and the persistence of government intervention beyond its 
initial timetable can be mitigated. 
2 Specifi c Comments
Professor Tendulkar comments on the distinction between the roles of the 
state in facilitating growth and in identifying new industries for growth. 
He accepts the state’s important role in growth facilitation, but is more 
uncertain about its role in growth identifi cation. Referring specifi cally to 
the South Asian context, he also asks how the over-enthusiastic govern-
ment can be prevented from taking on much more than it can effectively 
handle.
We believe that without identifi cation it is hard to determine the type 
of facilitation that would be desirable. The appropriate hard and soft 
infrastructures needed to foster industrial upgrading are often industry-
specifi c. For the state to play its role in determining and providing the 
necessary infrastructure (facilitation), government offi cials must form a 
judgment and make decisions about which particular industries will need 
it (identifi cation). The two roles are therefore complementary and some-
times diffi cult to disentangle. Moreover, because resources and capacity 
are limited, governments must prioritise their interventions—and explic-
itly or implicitly engage in some form of growth identifi cation. 
The issue of over-enthusiastic governments is not specifi c to South Asia. 
Many countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia (even China before 
1979) exhibited the zealous state syndrome, with governments doing too 
much in their attempts to promote development. That risk, which is real, 
does not invalidate the need to deal with externalities and co-ordination. It 
simply points to the necessity to set clear, transparent and rigorous criteria 
that mitigate the propensity of governments to over-intervene or to support 
uncompetitive industries. We offer the GIFF precisely to advise political 
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leaders and the general public on the right way of carrying out industrial 
policy, and identify clearly what would be the wrong way, so that the prob-
ability for governments being over-enthusiastic is reduced. 
Professor Amsden argues that industrial policies in countries ranging 
from the Middle East’s energy belt to Asia’s manufacturing corridor and 
the so-called BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have been 
more successful in practice than is portrayed in our article. Admittedly, 
many OPEC countries avoided the resource curse and managed to reach 
commendable levels of per capita income. However, most of them failed 
to use the resource rents to facilitate structural transformation in their 
countries, as carried out by the other resource-rich countries, such as the 
 Scandinavian countries, the United States, Canada or Australia. 
We submit that the performance of resource-rich countries could be fur-
ther enhanced if they used the GIFF to support structural transformation. 
This would require them to invest an appropriate share of revenues from 
their natural resources in human, infrastructural and social capital, and 
create incentives for domestic or foreign fi rms to facilitate the develop-
ment and upgrading of industries in the non-resource sector. Their strategy 
should not be limited to maintaining good governance, keeping natural-
resource revenues in sovereign funds and investing in foreign equity mar-
kets to insure against commodity price fl uctuations, as is often the case. 
Professor Amsden also questions the applicability of the GIFF to a peas-
ant export economy where the pace of population growth is rapid and 
landlessness, unemployment and underemployment are high, but where 
labour costs are not low enough and manufacturing experience is not deep 
enough to compete against labour-surplus economies like India. Regarding 
population growth, the same could have been said about Asian econo-
mies before their economic take-off in the 1960s. Children represent old-
age insurance for many families in poor countries, and the increase in per 
capita income generally reduces fertility rates because that insurance is less 
needed and the opportunity cost of raising children rises with the increase 
in wages. East Asian economies did not have Mainland China’s restrictive 
family planning system but they experienced similar reductions in popu-
lation growth rates. African governments should have devoted the same 
focus on promoting economic growth as they did on various interven-
tions to reduce child mortality. As for the labour costs, those in the formal 
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sector may not be low, especially in some African countries, as observed 
by Amsden. But the informal-sector labour costs are unlikely to be high. 
Moreover, one way out of that dilemma is for those countries to follow the 
practice of Mauritius in the 1970s (Subramanian and Roy, 2003), namely, 
allowing wage fl exibility in the special economic zones so as to promote 
the development of new competitive, labour-intensive industries. 
Professor Amsden stresses the importance of experience in manag-
ing business organizations, which is important indeed. By facilitating the 
development of latent comparative advantage industries, the GIFF would 
allow more entrepreneurs to enter competitive manufacturing sectors, gain 
experience, and prepare their fi rms to upgrade to higher-level industries. 
Many successful business giants in Japan (Toyota, Sony, Honda), Korea 
(Samsung, LG, Daewoo), Taiwan-China (Formosa Plastics), or Hong Kong 
(Tyco-on Li Kasing) started as small businesses with a few employees and 
a few thousand dollars of investment. They overcame the odds because 
their promoters were gifted leaders, but they also acquired experience in 
business management because they operated in an environment that was 
conducive to sustained growth. 
She also notes that our model can be enhanced using industrial policy 
to invest overseas and attract skills. We agree. In a country that is record-
ing dynamic growth, the government can employ outward investments to 
facilitate: (i) the relocation of fi rms that operate in its sunset sectors to other 
lower-income countries with a similar endowment structure so as to use 
those countries as export bases and benefi t from their cheaper labour and/
or to get access to their domestic markets; (ii) the acquisition by domes-
tic fi rms of foreign fi rms in related sectors in higher-income countries, in 
order to get access to their technology, management experiences and mar-
ket channels; and (iii) the acquisition of resources by domestic fi rms (in 
resource-scarce countries) from countries where they are abundant. 
Dr Amoako argues that successful industrialisation has not always 
been based on competitive markets, and that African countries have not 
always succeeded despite following their comparative advantage. The 
GIFF provides a dual-track strategy for government intervention. Fol-
lowing comparative advantage, which is only the fi rst track of the GIFF, 
is a necessary condition for a successful industrial policy. However, that 
is not suffi cient. For industrial policy to contribute to a country’s growth 
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and structural transformation, the government also needs to play the 
facilitation role by providing incentives to the fi rst movers and to help 
them by removing binding constraints to their growth and by coordinat-
ing investments in the soft and hard infrastructures that are needed. The 
likely reason why some African countries have not succeeded despite fol-
lowing their comparative advantage is because their governments failed 
to play their facilitation role. 
By arguing that the article pays too much attention to supporting 
products that follow a comparative advantage and too little attention to 
the acquisition of technological capabilities and learning, he also seems 
to assume that the GIFF approach promotes static comparative advan-
tage. Actually it does the opposite. Our framework promotes upgrading 
and diversifi cation to new industries and is therefore dynamic in nature. 
There is a major difference between the GIFF and the theory of dynamic 
comparative advantage which Dr Amoako has in mind. The latter typi-
cally attempts to help fi rms to enter industries that are a country’s future 
comparative advantage. Because of endowment constraints, fi rms in those 
industries would not yet be viable in a competitive market even if the 
government helped them with the co-ordination and externality compen-
sation. By contrast, the GIFF aims at helping fi rms enter industries with 
latent comparative advantage. Under that scenario, fi rms would be viable 
and require no subsidies or protection once the government provides co-
ordination and externality compensation. It should be noted that if Afri-
can countries cannot be successful in industries with latent comparative 
advantage, their probability of success in industries without comparative 
advantages will be quite small. 
With the GIFF approach, developing countries can tap into the potential 
advantage of backwardness, record higher rates of growth and upgrade 
their industrial structure, income level, and endowment structure faster 
than the high-income countries. Once their income levels and endowment 
structures are close to those of high-income countries, they will have gained 
comparative advantage in advanced industries, which will enable them to 
compete directly with and even overtake the high-income countries. There-
fore, contrary to Dr Amoako’s prediction that ‘if each country diversifi ed 
and upgraded its industries only by trying to break into markets that coun-
tries ahead of it on the “industrial ladder” were becoming less competitive 
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in due to rising labour costs, then one would expect the industrial rankings 
of countries to be rather static over time’, it is actually a faster way for a 
latecomer to catch up with the more advanced countries. 
Professor Pack believes that targeting industries in richer comparable 
countries and then following the country’s comparative advantage accord-
ingly is a problematic algorithm. His reasoning is two-fold: fi rst, the eco-
nomic structure of the richer country could be the result of distorting 
policies; and second, a formidable set of policies is required for successful 
policies which go beyond the mere identifi cation of potential products. In 
support of his skepticism, he offers the examples of Japan and the USSR 
(which India tried unsuccessfully to emulate). This is a valid warning. Even 
in successful cases, industrial policy is never a smooth process. It always 
involves trial and error from governments that put in place good mecha-
nisms and channels to learn from mistakes, adjust economic strategies, and 
minimize the potential costs of bad decisions. 
However, our framework recommends not only that target countries be 
richer but also that they have recorded dynamic growth for a long period 
and where higher incomes and productivity gains in successful industries 
eventually raise wages and make them less competitive. If they have suc-
ceeded in growing dynamically for several decades, it is unlikely that they 
have followed strategies that defy their comparative advantage. 
After the Meiji restoration, Japan took the German kingdom of Prussia 
as a model. According to estimates by Angus Maddison (2010), Germany’s 
per capita income in 1890 was US$2,428 and Japan’s $1,012.1 Japan’s 
was 42% that of Germany, hence Japan’s strategy was consistent with 
the approach proposed in the GIFF. While Professor Pack’s summary of 
MITI’s policies in the 1950s and 1960s is quite instructive, the story behind 
the numbers is fully consistent with the GIFF analysis as well: Japan’s per 
capita income in 1950, 1960 and 1965 was $1,921, $3,986, and $5,934 
respectively, whereas those of the US were $9,561, $10,961, and $13,419. 
The ratios were as follows: 20%, 36% and 44%. The numbers for 1960 
and 1965 are consistent with the principle of the GIFF. The 1950 fi gure was 
lower than the normal threshold that the GIFF suggests. This is probably 
due to the fact that Japan was still recovering from the war and its human 
capital and soft and hard infrastructure were greater than those indicated 
by its per capita income; a strong indication is the fact that Japan’s per 
Comments and Rejoinder on Growth Identifi cation and Facilitation | 211
capita income in the 1930s had already reached about 40% that of the US 
(for example, $2,120 vs. $5,467 in 1935). 
In contrast to Japan’s story, the USSR in the 1950s was the wrong 
model for India for two reasons. First, the two countries did not have 
a similar endowment structure; the USSR was a resource-rich country 
while India was a resource-poor country. Secondly, the USSR was too far 
advanced compared with India. According to Maddison, the USSR’s per 
capita income in 1955 was $3,313, while India’s was $676 (only 20% 
that of its reference country). The GIFF recommends that latecomers be 
realistic (and even modest) in their choice of reference countries and target 
industries.
Professor Pack also observes that world trade has undergone remark-
ably rapid changes in style and that there are fewer stable products and 
industries to be targeted today compared with several decades ago. We 
believe that, despite changes in style and product customization, the divi-
sion of labour among countries at different levels of development is still 
the same. For example, television evolved from black and white to colour 
and to fl at panel today. The main producing countries have changed from 
the US before the 1950s to Japan in the 1960s-80s, to Korea in the 1980s-
2000s, and China today. A latecomer entering the market today could go 
into labour-intensive assembly of the fl at-panel TV production fi rst, just as 
forerunners did a few decades ago when they decided to compete success-
fully in the black and white and colour TV markets. 
Globalization provides huge potential for industrialisation through 
specialization. Several decades ago, many low-income countries faced the 
constraints of their limited market size, high transportation costs and trade 
barriers, and could not take advantage of the opportunities offered by 
large-scale manufacturing. With globalization, virtually any country can 
identify production activities for which it has overt or latent comparative 
advantage, scale them up and create its own niche in the world market. 
Precisely because of globalization, the economic development strategy in 
every country should follow comparative advantage closely. Multinational 
fi rms are more likely to exploit any small difference in production costs in 
the determination of their locations of production or procurement systems. 
Globalization also makes the government’s role in the facilitation process 
even more important because only with good hard and soft infrastructures, 
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which reduce transaction costs, can the cost advantage based on endow-
ment structure and specialization be realized. 
Professor Pack provides an impressive list of knowledge requirements 
about targeted industries that government offi cials would need to know 
in order to design a successful industrial policy. He questions the capacity 
of governments in developing countries to meet those requirements. First, 
all countries at low-income levels tend to lack high capacity by defi nition. 
Chang (2008) reminds us that, not so long ago, it was not unusual to refer 
to ‘Lazy Japanese and Thieving Germans’. With the process of economic 
development taking place, capacity will be enhanced in any society. More 
important, some of the requirements he identifi es are likely to be relevant 
only for more advanced industries in high-income countries. For industries 
with low technical content, the list should be streamlined considerably. 
Moreover, instead of analyzing the technical nature of various industries 
to fi nd out the knowledge underpinning them, the private sector and gov-
ernment offi cials can rely on the advantage of backwardness and observe 
what the dynamically growing countries with similar endowment struc-
tures are already doing. These successful countries must have already over-
come those knowledge challenges either by trial and error or by analysis. 
Dr Lim agrees that policy advice based on ideas of comparative advan-
tage, self-discovery and the facilitating state will help policy- makers in 
the early stage of development, but argues that more needs to be done 
to move beyond the middle-income trap. Korea, he writes, defi ed its 
comparative advantage by moving into heavy and chemical industries 
by building specifi c skills, fi lling specifi c gaps in the value chain, and 
relying on a select set of business groups and strategic choice. We agree 
with his observation that dynamically growing middle-income countries 
will have some industries that have already reached the global technol-
ogy frontier and will eventually face the challenge of taking risks in 
technology and product innovation. For such industries, the government 
should continue to play its facilitating role, and use policy instruments 
similar to those in high-income countries, such as subsidising the R&D 
activities of individual fi rms by funding basic research in universities or 
public institutions, granting patents for new inventions, offering prefer-
ential taxes and defense and other government procurements, etc. But 
for other industries that remain well within the global technological 
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frontier even at that level of development, the GIFF could be used to 
address externalities and co-ordination issues. 
The Korean government’s encouragement of the development of more 
capital/technology-intensive industries in the 1970s, as discussed by Lim, 
is in fact consistent with the need for industrial upgrading due to the 
change in comparative advantages. The textile, garment, plywood, wigs 
and other labour-intensive industries were Korea’s comparative advan-
tages and very competitive internationally in the 1960s. The success 
of these labour-intensive industries allowed the country to accumulate 
human and fi nancial capital. As a result Korea’s endowment structure 
was upgraded. That process led to a gradual loss of comparative advan-
tage in the original industries and allowed the economy to move into 
new, more capital- and technology-intensive industries. Lim’s account of 
Korea’s industrial upgrading process in the 1970s, which targeted mature 
industries in Japan instead of the most advanced industries in the United 
States, is in fact a good illustration of how the GIFF approach explains 
the country’s economic success. 
Note
1.  All the estimates of per capita income here are measured in 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars, taken from Maddison (2010).
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Introduction
Nigeria faces a growing employment crisis. Notwithstanding sustained, 
high and broad-based growth in the non-oil economy, unemployment has 
not fallen materially since 1999. More importantly, youth unemployment 
has markedly risen over the same period. While the number of jobs seems 
to have grown in line with the labor force, most of these jobs have been 
created in informal family agriculture. Wage employment, however, has 
declined. Nigeria needs a strategy aimed at increasing the employment 
intensity and sustainability of its growth performance. 
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How to promote economic growth has been a topic for economic dis-
course and research for a long time. Modern economic growth is a pro-
cess of continuous technological innovation, industrial upgrading and 
 diversifi cation, and of improvements in the various types of infrastructure 
and institutional arrangements that constitute the context for business 
development and wealth creation. While past theories have long empha-
sized that market mechanisms are essential to getting relative prices right 
and thereby facilitating an effi cient allocation of factors, the growth experi-
ence in many countries shows that governments often play a crucial role in 
facilitating industrial transformation. 
New Structural Economics1 conceptualizes these aspects of growth by 
integrating some of the insights from the old structural economics, namely 
the need to take into account, on the one hand, structural features of devel-
oping economies in analyzing the process of economic development and, 
on the other hand, the role of the state in facilitating structural change in 
developing countries. The key innovation of the approach is that it consid-
ers structural differences between developed and developing countries to 
be endogenous to their endowment structure. With the economy’s struc-
ture of factor endowment—defi ned as the relative composition of natural 
resources, labor, human capital and physical capital—being given at each 
stage of development and different from one stage to another, the optimal 
industrial structure will be different at different stages of development. To 
move from one stage to another, the market requires industrial upgrading 
and corresponding improvements in hard and soft infrastructure. 
The Growth Identifi cation and Facilitation Framework (GIFF) opera-
tionalizes key insights of New Structural Economics by developing a meth-
odology for identifying sectors where the country may have a latent com-
parative advantage and removing binding constraints to facilitate private 
fi rms’ entry into those industries. The purpose of this paper is to apply the 
GIFF to Nigeria. The reason for choosing Nigeria is that, in addition to 
facing a growing employment crisis, Nigeria is also Africa’s most populous 
country and a regional growth pole.2 
Following an overview of Nigeria’s recent economic performance and 
its impact on employment, the paper describes the basic rationale underly-
ing the GIFF and its methodology. The third section discusses, based on a 
range of criteria proposed by the GIFF, which sectors or products would 
be compatible with Nigeria’s latent comparative advantage and should 
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therefore be promoted using industrial policy. The fourth section reviews 
the binding constraints to growth in each of these sectors and discusses 
specifi c interventions the government could undertake—in collaboration 
with the private sector—in order to alleviate these constraints. In view of 
the fact that shortcomings in governance have in the past often under-
mined the effectiveness of policy interventions in Nigeria, this section also 
discusses how the measures could be implemented to ensure accountability 
and transparency. 
I. Recent Economic Developments in Nigeria
Since 2001, Nigeria has had the longest period of sustained expansion of 
the non-oil economy since independence. Growth has occurred across all 
sectors of the economy and has been accelerating. While non-oil growth 
averaged about 3–4 percent in 1995-2000, it more than doubled to over 
7 percent and rose to 8–9 percent in recent years. Even in spite of the cur-
rent global fi nancial crisis, growth of the non-oil economy remained above 
8 percent in 2009 and 2010. While the oil economy contracted in recent 
years owing to unrest in the Niger Delta, since 2009, the contribution of 
the Niger Delta has improved as a result of positive effects of the amnesty 
on oil production (table IV.1). 
Moreover, over the last fi ve years, the growth of Nigeria’s non-oil econ-
omy has been superior to that of most oil-exporting and non-oil exporting 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (table IV.2).
An analysis of the sources of growth shows that, while total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) seems to have improved signifi cantly since 2000, relative to 
the US it has been declining and has only recently improved (fi gures IV.1 
and IV.2).
Table IV.1: Macroeconomic Aggregates, 2003–2009 
(percent)
Aggregate 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Real GDP 10.2 10.5 6.5 6.0 6.4 6.00 7.0
Oil GDP 23.8 3.3 0.5 –4.4  –4.5 –6.2 0.5
Non-Oil GDP 5.8 13.2 8.6 9.4 9.5 9.0 8.3
Infl ation Rate 
(CPI annual average) 14.0 15.0 17.9 8.0 5.4 11.6 12.5
Source: World Development Indicators and various IMF reports.
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Table IV.2: Real Non-Oil GDP Growth, 2003–2009 
(percent per year)
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Nigeria 5.8 13.2 8.6 9.4 9.5 9.0 8.3
Oil producers
Angola 10.3 9 14.1 27.5 20.1 14.7 8.1
Cameroon 4.9 4.9 3.2 2.9 4.1 3.2 3.0
Gabon 0.8 2.3 4.3 4.9 6.2 3.0 2.3
Chad 6.0 –0.5 11 4.7 3.1 3.2 –0.5
Congo, Rep. 5.4 5.0 5.4 5.9 6.6 5.4 3.9
Equatorial Guinea 3.7 15.4 25.8 29.8 47.2 18.1 27.6
Non-oil producers
Ghana 5.2 5.6 5.9 6.4 6.3 7.3 3.5
Kenya 2.9 5.1 5.7 6.1 6.9 2.1 3.8
Tanzania 5.7 6.7 7.4 6.7 7.1 7.4 6.0
South Africa 3.1 4.8 5.1 5.0 4.8 3.7 –1.8
Source: WDI/Various IMF reports.
Figure IV.1: Evolution of Total Factor Productivity
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The growth of the non-oil economy was largely driven by the agriculture 
sector, which contributed on average more than 50 percent (table IV.3). 
The contribution of agriculture was followed by that of the wholesale 
and retail sector (about 20 percent), the manufacturing and fi nancial sectors 
(4–5 percent), and the telecommunications sector (about 3–4 percent). 
Since 2001, changes in the services sector have led to a structural 
change in Nigeria’s economy, manifested in substantial growth of the 
telecommunications, transportation, hotel and restaurants, construction 
and real estate, and fi nancial sectors. 
The fastest-growing sector has been telecommunications (at an aver-
age rate of over 30 percent), followed by the wholesale and retail sectors 
(about 15 percent) and construction (about 13 percent). Solid minerals 
grew by over 10 percent on average and manufacturing by about 8–9 per-
cent. Agriculture grew by 6–7 percent on average, the strongest sustained 
growth performance in more than a decade. 
Notwithstanding Nigeria’s strong economic performance over the 
past 10 years, its export and production structure has shown little 
Figure IV.2: Total Factor Productivity Relative to the United States
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 diversifi cation. Nigeria’s exports are concentrated in oil and gas (98 per-
cent), while the structure of the non-oil economy is dominated by the 
agriculture, wholesale, and retail sectors that serve the domestic market. 
How Have Employment and Incomes Responded 
to This Strong Growth Performance?
Table IV.4 shows how the labor force has evolved since 1999.
A key feature of Nigeria’s working-age population is the high share 
(approximately one-fourth) of the population that is not in the labor 
force. As in other African countries, formal unemployment (measured as 
job seekers who cannot fi nd a job) is extremely low. The vast majority of 
people outside the labor force are either discouraged job seekers or have 
not embarked upon a job search, as they do not consider the prospects to 
be promising. The share of people outside the labor force is a more suitable 
indicator of unemployment than the offi cial unemployment rate, which 
consists of individuals who are looking for, but are unable to fi nd, employ-
ment. Nonetheless, actual unemployment will be less than 25 percent given 
that there are individuals not in the labor force who are genuinely not 
interested in work. However, given the pervasive poverty in Nigeria, that 
fi gure is not likely to be high. 
Table IV.4 shows that despite the high growth performance, the share 
of the population that is not in the labor force has remained broadly 
unchanged. That means that the number of jobs has risen broadly in 
line with the labor force and that unemployment has remained basically 
unchanged. 
Table IV.3: Contribution to Non-Oil GDP 
(percent)
Sector 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Agriculture 55.3 54.5 53.5 52.3 51.1 49.9
Solid Mineral 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Manufacturing 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Telecommunication 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.4
Finance & Insurance 5.5 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.4
Wholesale and Retail Trade 17.4 18.2 19.2 20.2 21.1 21.7
Building and Construction 2.0 2.01 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3
Others 13.1 13.0 12.7 12.5 12.2 12.1
Source: WDI/IMF.
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Table IV.5 shows the evolution of employment broken down by fam-
ily agriculture, non-agriculture self-employed (that is, mostly urban) and 
wage employment. 
From 1999 to 2006, the most important structural changes that have 
occurred in Nigeria’s labor force have been a shift into agriculture employ-
ment and out of wage employment: the proportion of the sample popula-
tion aged 15 to 65 (excluding those in full-time education) with wage jobs 
declined over this period (from 15 percent in 1999 to 10 percent in 2006). 
The same is also true for those classifi ed as non-agriculture self-employed 
(their share of the population fell from 24.1 to 22.9 percent). The cat-
egory that saw a major increase in this share of the population was family 
 agriculture, which rose from 30.8 to 37.8 percent.3 
Table IV.6 provides further insights into the development of wage 
employment since 1999: Wage employment in parastatals, ministries and 
public companies has declined, while employment in the private sector 
and others (including NGOs, international organizations and associa-
tions) has risen. 
The decline of wage employment refl ects three developments: (i) the 
retrenchment of civil servants and the privatization of many parastatals 
led to a sharp decline in public service employment, which has long dom-
inated employment in the formal sector and continues to represent the 
largest share of wage employment; (ii) many private industries with large 
wage employment, notably the textile industry, have been in decline for 
a number of years and have shed a considerable part of their work force; 
and (iii) sectors of the economy that have grown quickly, such as whole-
sale/retail, construction and agriculture, have been, to a signifi cant extent, 
in the informal sector, while those in the formal sector, for example, the 
Table IV.4: Labor Force Status
(percent, weighted) 
Labor force status 1999 2004 2006
Not in the labor force 25.3 23.0 25.2
In the labor force 74.7 77.0 74.8
Unemployment status 
Employed 97.8 97.0 97.4
Unemployed 2.2 3.0 2.6
Source: Francis Teal / Luke Haywood NLSS 2003-2004 and General Household Survey 
(GHS) 1999–2006. Sample includes population aged 15–65 not in schooling.
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fi nancial services and hospitality industries, either are not very employ-
ment intensive or added labor from a very low base, failing to make a 
signifi cant difference in the growth of wage employment. 
Two features stand out: 
•  Among the young, the share of family agriculture almost doubled from 
1999 to 2006. 
•  By 2006, the share of young people outside the labor force in the urban 
areas had appreciably increased. A more detailed review of the share of 
the people outside the labor force suggests that most of them consist of 
women engaged in household work and men who have never had any 
employment experience. 
This picture generally supports the conclusion that youth unemploy-
ment has been on the rise since 1999, an alarming trend in view of the 
strong growth performance in recent years. 
The pattern of growth in Nigeria and its relation to the evolution of 
Nigeria’s labor market can be described as follows: 
•  Nigeria’s strong growth in recent years has been dominated by the agri-
culture sector. In the labor market this has been refl ected in a shift of 
Table IV.6: Types of Wage Employment 
(percent, weighted)
Type of employment 1999 2004 2006
Other 22.8 25.2 29.6
Parastatals and ministries 48.6 42.2 45.6
Private companies 17.0 20.5 18.0
Public companies 11.6 12.0 6.9
Source: Francis Teal / Luke Haywood NLSS 2003–2004 and GHS 1999–2006.
Table IV.5: Types of Employment as a Percentage of the Sample Population
(percent, weighted)
Type of employment 1999 2004 2006
Family agriculture 30.8 36.6 37.8
Non-agriculture self-employed 24.1 25.8 22.9
Non-agriculture unpaid family work 0 0.1 0.1
Wage employment 15.0 10.4 10.0
Apprenticeship 2.1 1.1 1.9
Unemployed 1.7 2.4 1.9
Not in the labor force 26.4 23.7 25.5
Source: Francis Teal / Luke Haywood NLSS 2003-2004 and GHS 1999–2006.
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employment into family agriculture. The considerable growth of employ-
ment in the agriculture sector is consistent with the absence of improve-
ments in agricultural productivity. 
•  Creation of contractual wage jobs in the rapidly growing sectors of the 
economy was unable to compensate for the loss of wage jobs in the 
public sector, parastatals and ministries, leading to a decline in wage 
employment. 
With the share of population outside the labor force unchanged for 
the population as a whole and rising for the lowest age bracket, Nigeria’s 
growth performance has clearly not responded to the aspirations of its 
population. 
Nigeria’s strong growth performance refl ected primarily two factors: 
(i) sound macroeconomic policies that created a more favorable environ-
ment for private investment, and (ii) sectoral policies, such as the banking 
consolidation exercise that directly boosted growth in specifi c sectors of 
the economy. Both macroeconomic and structural policies contributed to 
confi dence in a new era in the Nigerian economy and thus promoted invest-
ment, substantially fueled by foreign direct investment and remittances. 
However, this investment was more focused on capital-intensive than 
employment-intensive industries. Investment occurred primarily in the 
oil and gas and the telecommunications industries, where returns were 
particularly high. Hence, few productivity improvements occurred in sec-
tors that are employment-intensive and consistent with the comparative 
advantage of the economy, such as the labor-intensive manufacturing sec-
tor. As a result, the infrastructure constraints became more binding in 
these sectors of the economy, limiting improvements in their productivity 
and competitiveness and hence their ability to generate employment. A 
forward-looking growth strategy needs to focus on improving productiv-
ity in the employment-intensive sectors of the economy. 
The next section identifi es the sectors that Nigeria should target based 
on the methodology proposed by the Growth Identifi cation and Facilita-
tion Framework. 
II. The Growth Identifi cation and Facilitation Framework
New Structural Economics notes that modern economic growth is a pro-
cess of continuous technological innovation, industrial upgrading and 
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diversifi cation, and improvements in the various types of infrastructure 
and institutional arrangements that constitute the context of business 
development and wealth creation. At any given point in time, the struc-
ture of a country’s endowment, that is, the relative abundance of factors 
that the country possesses, determines relative factor prices and thus the 
optimal industrial structure. A low-income country with abundant labor 
or natural resources and scarce capital will have comparative advantage 
and be competitive in labor-intensive or resource-intensive industries. 
Hence, the optimal industrial structure in a country which will make the 
country most competitive is endogenously determined by its endowment 
structure. For a developing country to reach the income level of advanced 
countries, it needs to upgrade its industrial structure to the same relative 
capital-intensity of the advanced countries. 
A country’s endowment structure is not static, but will depend on 
the rate of capital accumulation and technological progress. The change 
in relative prices associated with these changes will affect the type of 
industries in which the country has a latent comparative advantage 
and hence the optimal industrial structure, given that, in order to be 
competitive, the new industry needs to be consistent with a country’s 
latent comparative advantage.4 Of particular importance to the latent 
comparative advantage is the wage level. By imitating or licensing to 
obtain technology—a process that is less expensive than inventing the 
technology on their own—low-income countries will be able to pro-
duce the same commodities at a signifi cantly lower cost than developed 
countries provided the enabling conditions have been created. That 
way the country can exploit the latecomer advantages by developing 
matured industries in dynamically growing, more advanced countries 
with endowment structures similar to theirs. By following carefully 
selected lead countries, latecomers can emulate the leader-follower, 
fl ying-geese pattern that has served well all successful economies since 
the 18th century. 
The process of upgrading the industrial structure to a higher level 
consistent with the factor endowment cannot rely solely on the market 
mechanism. For example, starting a new industry may be diffi cult because 
of the lack of complementary inputs or adequate infrastructure for the 
new industry even if the targeted industry is consistent with the economy’s 
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comparative advantage. Private fi rms will not be able to internalize those 
investments in their decision to upgrade or diversify. Therefore, the gov-
ernment has an important role in providing or coordinating investments in 
necessary infrastructure and complementary inputs. 
In addition, innovation which underlies the industrial upgrading and 
diversifi cation process is a risky process, as it presents a fi rst-mover prob-
lem. Both failure and success of a fi rst mover create externalities. For 
example, fi rms that are fi rst movers pay the cost of failure and produce 
valuable information for other fi rms. At the same time, when fi rst mov-
ers succeed, their experience also provides valuable information to other 
market participants about the type of industries that can be profi table in 
the specifi c country. However, if new fi rms enter on a large scale this may 
largely eliminate the possible rents that the fi rst mover may enjoy. In a 
developed country, a successful fi rst mover can in general be rewarded with 
a patent and enjoy the rent created by a matured industry. However, in a 
developing country, a new patent may not be available, as the industry may 
already be located within the global industrial frontier. Therefore, the fi rst 
mover will not be able to obtain a patent for its entry into a new industry 
in its economy, and, as a result, some form of direct support by the govern-
ment to pioneer fi rms may be justifi able. 
The GIFF proposes a new approach to help identify industries where 
the economies may have a latent comparative advantage and remove bind-
ing constraints to facilitate private fi rms’ entry into those industries, or 
facilitate industries that are already active in the country to grow fast. In 
this context, the GIFF argues that picking winners is inevitable because 
the binding constraints may be sector specifi c and removing them may 
not be possible for the private sector alone. Therefore the main issue is to 
minimize the error margin of picking the wrong industry. The key risk in 
this regard is that countries target industries that are too advanced and far 
beyond the latent comparative advantage or target industries in which the 
country has already lost its comparative advantage. 
The GIFF proposes a six-step approach to growth identifi cation and 
facilitation. Three of these steps aim at the selection of sectors. After 
the sectors are selected, value-chain analyses can be used to identify the 
binding constraints for private fi rms’ entry and growth in those sectors 
(box IV.1). 
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Box IV.1: Applying the GIFF: Comparative Value Chain 
 Analysis 
A forthcoming report by the World Bank on Light Manufacturing in Africa (World 
Bank 2011) demonstrates how to implement an innovative form of value chain 
analysis to both determine the competitiveness of a sector as well as assist 
governments and the private sector in identifying the constraints which most 
impact the cost competitiveness of domestically produced products on the 
global market. 
In the usual value-chain analysis, the advantages, bottlenecks and policy issues 
would be analyzed within the country of study with some comparison between 
sectors within the economy. In the comparative approach, however, China and 
Vietnam are being chosen as benchmark countries in order to compare the cost 
competitiveness of African production of particular products, chosen to be as like-
for-like as possible. 
After applying the GIFF to arrive at several sub-sectors which could potentially 
be successfully produced in SSA (Ethiopia,  Tanzania and Zambia were the sample 
countries), in-depth value chain analyses were conducted for particular products 
in each of those sub-sectors in order to gain a representative view of the com-
petitiveness and constraints of the sub-sector. The analysis included a quantitative 
breakdown of the proportion and cost of inputs, effi ciency input use, logistic costs, 
labor productivity, production wastage and effi ciency etc. This data was gathered 
from a reasonable sample of fi rms in all fi ve countries producing similar products in 
each of the fi ve identifi ed sub-sectors. Each component which impacts the cost and 
competitiveness of the fi rms was compared between China, Vietnam and SSA. The 
results were conclusive in identifying the cost elements which vary signifi cantly 
between East Asia and SSA, thereby identifying the priority areas for intervention. 
The results also screened out those sectors where the country does not have com-
parative advantage by calculating the domestic resource costs. 
For Nigeria, value chain analyses have been conducted in recent years for sev-
eral key sectors which have been valuable in highlighting the constraints and oppor-
tunities in the sectors studied. However, the new approach proposed in this paper 
is to use the GIFF to identify sectors where Nigeria may have some  comparative 
(Box continued next page)
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•  The fi rst step consists of identifying tradable goods and services that 
have been growing dynamically for about 20 years in fast-growing 
countries with similar endowment structures that have a per capita 
GDP about 100 to 300 percent higher than their own. In many cases, 
given that wages tend to rise in the growth process, a fast-growing 
country that has produced goods and services for about 20 years may 
begin to lose its comparative advantage in this sector.5 In addition, 
 Nigeria could domestically produce simple manufacturing goods which 
are labor-intensive, have limited economies of scale, require only small 
investments, and are imported. This step also allows the identifi cation 
of industries that are new to the country, but may be good business 
opportunities for Nigeria.
•  Second, among the industries on the list, the government may give prior-
ity to those in which some domestic private fi rms have already entered 
spontaneously, and try to identify: (i) the obstacles that are preventing 
these fi rms from upgrading the quality of their products; or (ii) the bar-
riers that limit entry to those industries by other private fi rms. For such 
industries, the government could also adopt specifi c measures to encour-
age foreign direct investment in the higher-income country to invest in 
these industries. 
•  Third, in addition to the industries identifi ed on the list of opportunities 
for tradable goods and services in step 1, developing country  governments 
advantage, latent or revealed. A comparative value chain analysis could then be 
undertaken in those identifi ed sectors which will provide rigorous evidence and 
support for a prioritized program by government and private sector to overcome key 
constraints in targeted sectors. For example, the comparative value chain provides 
some more conclusive evidence on the wage difference in specifi c sectors as well 
as the difference in labor productivity in those sectors. That way, conclusions can 
be drawn on both the poverty-reducing employment effect of expansion in a sector, 
as well as the labor cost advantage (or disadvantage) which can be a crucial aspect 
in determining competitiveness of a sector.
Box IV.1: Continued
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should pay close attention to successful self-discoveries by private enter-
prises and provide support to scale up those industries. 
The application of this methodology to Nigeria is discussed below.
III. Selecting Sectors
Selecting a Country with a Per Capita Income 100–300 percent 
above Nigeria’s
Table IV.7 shows a list of countries that have a per-capita GDP of 100 
to 300 percent of that of Nigeria. Removing slowly growing countries, 
i.e., countries growing at less than 6 percent per year, leaves the following 
countries: Indonesia, China, Vietnam and India. 
Using the criterion of factor endowment, among these countries 
Indonesia would stand out as the country with the greatest similarity 
with Nigeria because it is a natural resource-rich country and a former 
member of OPEC, but also specializes in labor-intensive production.6 
Indonesia has effectively used both its natural resources as well its abun-
dant labor supply to develop industries that correspond to its latent 
comparative advantage. As discussed in a blog by Justin Lin (March 
2011), a resource-rich, labor-abundant country can use both resource-
rich and labor-abundant countries as comparators.7 
While not a resource-rich country, Vietnam’s high growth rate makes 
it an appropriate comparator, especially in view of its labor-intensive 
Table IV.7: GDP Per Capita PPP in 2009
(constant 2005 international $)
Country GDP per capita Percent of Nigeria
Nigeria 2,001 100
Vietnam 2,682 134
India 2,970 148
Philippines 3,216 161
Indonesia 3,813 191
Morocco 4,081 204
Paraguay 4,107 205
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5,151 257
China 6,200 310
Tunisia 7,512 375
Source: World Development Indicators.
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economy. Its strong growth performance and consequent rise in labor 
costs could also quickly erode Vietnam’s cost advantage in certain labor-
intensive industries. 
Another country that lends itself as a comparator is China. China has a 
per capita income that is about 300 percent higher than that of Nigeria and 
is not a natural-resource-rich country. However, given its fast growth, large 
population size and domestic market, as well as fast ascent on the tech-
nological value-added ladder, its production structure may be suited for 
imitation given that it may be in the process of losing its cost advantage in 
some of the industries that have in the past driven its growth performance. 
This is especially true if Nigeria can use the rent from natural resources to 
improve its infrastructure and education. 
A further comparator country is India. While India has not consistently 
followed its comparative advantage of abundant unskilled labor, the avail-
ability of skilled labor has been successfully used for several new sectors, 
such as call centers. Hence in some areas, India’s production structure has 
been in line with its latent comparative advantage. 
Which Commodities Do These Countries Export?
Table IV.8 identifi es industries in these comparator countries where pro-
duction is labor intensive or requires natural resources, and provides brief 
comments on Nigeria’s potential in these industries. 
Imports of Labor-Intensive Manufactured Goods Have Limited 
Economies of Scale, and Require Only Small Investments
A review of imports of labor-intensive manufactured goods with limited 
economies of scale shows the following commodities (at the 4-digit SITC 
level) (table IV.9). 
Industries Where the Private Sector Is Already Active 
and Where Successful Self-Discovery Has Taken Place 
A third criterion for selection is to choose sectors in which Nigeria’s private 
sector has become increasingly active and where successful self-discovery 
has already taken place, such as ICT, light manufacturing, food process-
ing, wholesale and retail, construction and car parts, meat and poultry, oil 
palm, and cocoa. None of these industries currently produces for export. 
Table IV.8: Identifying Sectors for Growth: Key Exports of China, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia
China Vietnam India Indonesia Nigeria potential 
Palm oil Large domestic production. High potential established in detailed 
value chain analysis. However, low export value of USD 300,000 
in 2009. 
Rubber manufactures Crude rubber Tire industry closed several years ago as it could not compete 
with imports. Natural rubber is Nigeria’s 10th largest export. 
Large rubber plant exists in Calabar, Cross River. 
Apparel & clothing 
accessories; textile yarn, 
fabrics etc.; dyeing 
& tanning 
Apparel & clothing 
accessories; textile 
yarn, fabrics etc. 
Apparel & clothing 
accessories; textile 
yarn, fabrics etc. 
Apparel & clothing 
accessories; textile 
yarn, fabrics etc. 
Textiles is a failing industry primarily because competitiveness 
with imports is undermined by high costs of power in Nigeria, as 
well as a small wage differential to comparator countries which 
produce at large volumes. 
Footwear; travel goods, 
handbags; leather 
manufactures 
Footwear Leather – already private sector momentum, goat/kidskin leather 
is the 4th largest export. Industry already in place in Kano that 
needs better enabling conditions. 
Telecommunications & 
sound recording equipment; 
photographic 
Telecommunications & 
sound recording 
equipment 
Telecommunications & 
sound recording 
equipment 
Since December 2010, two operators have begun TV assembly 
in Lagos on CKD basis. Large potential for scaling up exists, 
provided land is being made available. 
Offi ce machines & 
automatic data 
projectors 
Electronic integrated 
circuits, telecoms. 
Printed circuits, 
electronically integrated 
circuits, insulated wire 
and optical fi ber 
IT –Knock-down of computers is successfully taking place. 
Manufactured 
fertilizers
Indigenous fertilizer plants exist and are growing fast; Nigeria has 
refi neries and fertilizer plants, but requires enabling conditions, 
such as the removal of the petroleum subsidy. Also, production 
of petrochemicals needs to match with specifi c type of refi ning 
capacity. 
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Fish, crustaceans 
prepared 
Fish, crustaceans 
prepared 
Fish, crustaceans 
prepared 
Food & beverages: booming sector oriented to the domestic 
market; Cocoa beans are 3rd largest export; frozen crustaceans 
5th largest export. 
Vegetables & fruit Cereals & cereal 
preparations; coffee, 
tea, cocoa, spices 
manufactured 
Cereals & cereal 
preparations; 
vegetables and fruit 
Fixed vegetable oils and 
fats; coffee, tea, cocoa, 
spices manufactured 
Both already active in Nigeria; to scale up, enabling conditions, 
especially power and a cold chain, are required. 
Road vehicles Road vehicles; other 
transport equipment 
Onitsha cluster in Anambra state focuses on car parts; 
motorcycles and tractors are assembled in a knock-down 
assembly already. 
Furniture and parts 
thereof; cork and wood 
manufactures 
Furniture and parts 
thereof 
Furniture industry active in Nigeria and rapidly growing. 
Paper, paperboard etc. Paper, paperboard etc. Already active and growing. Logistical support could help 
accelerate growth. 
Medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products 
medicinal and 
pharmaceutical 
products 
Industry established; but fragmented. Mergers could help 
reduce cost. 
Machinery - electrical, 
metalworking or 
power-generating 
Machinery - electrical, 
industrial 
Machinery - electrical, 
general industrial, 
power-generating 
electrical machinery Metal industry in place; but too small and scattered to be cost 
effective. Scaling up could be facilitated through creation of 
clusters. 
Organic chemicals; chemical 
materials & products; artifi cial 
resins, plastic materials; 
inorganic chemicals 
Organic chemicals Organic chemicals industry could benefi t from abundant supply 
of raw materials; however, petroleum subsidy is major distortion 
blocking larger foreign direct investment. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using declining export shares based on Comtrade data.
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However, all of them have signifi cant employment and growth potential 
and could be upgraded for exports. 
Figure IV.3 highlights how the growth and employment potential of a 
sector may differ on a regional or geographical basis. For example, rice 
production has a lower employment and growth potential in Kano than in 
Kaduna. And the wholesale and retail sector has greater growth potential 
in Lagos, given the very large domestic market, than in Kano, where the 
market is smaller. Such detailed regional analysis is very important, given 
the great disparity in Nigeria. 
In addition to these sectors, there are a number in which successful self-
discovery has already taken place. For example, production of suitcases 
has recently successfully started and is expanding rapidly. At this stage, 
60 percent of the required parts are being produced domestically, which 
has allowed for the unit cost to fall signifi cantly; also about 50 percent 
of the domestic demand is being met through domestically produced suit-
cases. A further area of successful self-discovery is TV assembly, which 
began as recently as December 2010. Both areas of production could be 
further expanded rapidly, including for exports, if the government pro-
vided assistance toward scaling up, e.g., through better access to fi nance. 
Table IV.9: Nigeria’s Top Imports, 2010 
Product (4-digit) 1,000 of US$ percent
Cereals and cereal preparations 863,917 10.7
Telecommunications & sound recording 330,136 4.1
Fish, crustaceans, mollusk, preparation 276,152 3.4
Other transport equipment* 255,846 3.2
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 241,312 3.0
Manufactures of metal 214,157 2.7
Artifi cial resins, plastic materials, cellulose 151,868 1.9
Essential oils & perfume material 104,932 1.3
Professional, scientifi c & controlling equipment 101,065 1.3
Dairy products and birds’ eggs 99,125 1.2
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 98,169 1.2
Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 96,489 1.2
Paper, paperboard, articles of paper 91,269 1.1
Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles 82,120 1.0
Beverages 58,480 0.7
Source: COMTRADE database, 4-digit SITC Revision 2.
* Since transport equipment may be protected by patents, Nigeria could start by producing generic 
products.
Figure IV.3: Prioritization of Value Chains for Further Investigation
Upside Potential
Low Feasibility
High Wholesale/Retail
Wholesale/Retail
Meat & Poultry
Food Processing Light Manufacturing
Construction
ICT
Oil PalmCocoa
Tourism
Key
Current Importance
to State Economy
State Colour Coding
Cross River
Kaduna
Kano
Lagos
Food Processing
Calabar Port
Solid Minerals
Meat & Poultry
Rice
Light Manufacturing
Rice
Dairy
Aquaculture
Leather
High
•  Growth
•  Employment
•  Ability to bridge competitiveness gap
•  Likelihood of policy reform
•  Capacity of private sector actors
•  Spillovers
Source: Treichel 2010.  
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What Are the Sectors in Which Nigeria Has a Potential 
Comparative Advantage Based on This Analysis? 
The sections above use three different criteria to identify sectors with high 
growth and employment potential that could be the subject of targeted 
interventions. First is the identifi cation of dynamically growing tradable 
industries in fast-growing countries with similar factor endowment and 
a per capita income 100 to 300 percent above that of Nigeria. Second is 
the review of Nigeria’s imports to identify sectors that require only small 
investments and have limited economies of scale and could therefore be 
manufactured domestically. Third is the identifi cation of domestic sectors 
where successful self-discovery has already taken place or that are already 
growing fast, but have a high employment impact and could grow faster. 
Upon application of the fi rst criterion, seven sectors emerge quite 
clearly for further analysis, as they represent industries in countries with 
a similar endowment structure: footwear, including sports shoes; tex-
tiles; TV recorders; aquaculture; motor vehicle parts; vegetable oil; and 
fertilizers. Additional sectors are motorcycles; meat, meat products, and 
oil seeds; fertilizers, petroleum products; leather; travel goods; offi ce 
machines; pharmaceutical products; and organic chemicals. 
Based on the second criterion, the following four sectors would be pri-
oritized: vehicles parts; color TV receivers; tires; and metal manufacture. 
The third criterion, which focuses on sectors that are already growing 
fast, yields a list of target sectors that is slightly different from that identi-
fi ed through the fi rst two criteria: light manufacturing, food processing, 
meat and poultry, palm oil and rice, telecommunications, leather, whole-
sale and retail, and construction. 
Nigeria is a country rich in natural resources, in particular oil and gas, 
but also solid minerals. Industries associated with these natural resources, 
in particular refi ned petroleum products, petrochemicals, cosmetics and 
plastics, are currently not particularly active in Nigeria. However, given 
that they are imported in large quantities, and raw materials are available 
in abundance, they should be subject to a detailed value chain analysis 
aimed at assessing whether they can be produced at a comparative advan-
tage in Nigeria. 
How should the targeted sectors be selected from this list? The key 
criteria will be the upside potential of the sector in terms of growth and 
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employment creation, as well as the feasibility of growth in terms of 
private sector capability and the public sector regulatory framework. 
These questions can ultimately be answered only through detailed value 
chain analysis, along the lines of the methodology described in Box 1. 
However, as a fi rst approximation, the list of potential target industries 
can be narrowed down further by applying a set of pre-screening crite-
ria developed in the context of the forthcoming report on light manu-
facturing in Africa. 
First, sectors with very high capital requirements and only small domes-
tic markets should be eliminated, given that Nigeria is not a capital abun-
dant country and initially success will be in catering to the large domestic 
market. Second, goods should ideally be produced by small and medium-
size enterprises in the comparator countries, given that large enterprises are 
currently not prevalent in Nigeria. However, to the extent that Nigeria’s 
business environment could be made conducive to attracting large-scale 
foreign direct investment, the goods could also be produced by large com-
panies in comparator countries. Third, a supply chain should exist for each 
product in the domestic market. Fourth, raw materials should be available 
in the domestic market or be easily imported. And fi fth, labor skills should 
be easily transferable. 
Table IV.10 shows whether the pre-selected sectors meet the criteria: 
Wholesale/retail and construction sectors have not been included, as they 
are not sectors that would be imitated from other countries, but may still 
benefi t from targeted interventions to make them more responsive to higher 
demand and more employment-intensive. 
Most of these sectors meet the pre-screening criteria, that is, they have 
some upside potential for growth and meet feasibility criteria. A notable 
exception is sportswear—unavailability of PVC in the domestic market cre-
ates a comparative disadvantage and has already resulted in the closure of 
domestic production. Its competitiveness may depend on the establishment 
of a domestic petrochemical industry. Also, in the comparator countries, 
fertilizer and petrochemical production as well as TV production may not 
take place in small or medium-size enterprises; however, targeted foreign 
direct investment may be able to attract investments to establish larger 
fi rms, including through joint ventures, provided enabling conditions have 
been put in place. 
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Table IV.10: Criteria for Screening Potential Subsectors
Product groups
Criteria 1: Production 
has low capital 
requirements and there 
is a signifi cant domestic 
market
Criteria 2: Production 
in comparator 
countries is by 
small and medium-size 
enterprises
Criteria 3: There is some 
factor endowment in 
Nigeria — supply chain 
exists in the domestic 
market (domestic or 
imported raw materials); 
labor skills should be 
easily transferable.
Footwear, including 
sports shoes, Travel 
bags
Yes Yes Leather supply chain 
exists; however, PVC 
required for sports 
shoes does not exist. 
Leather shoes and travel 
bags are already being 
manufactured and see 
strong growth.
TV electronics Yes In some cases Raw materials can be 
easily imported. Not 
a high-skills type of 
production.
Tires and motor vehicle 
parts
Yes Yes Rubber and associated 
supply chain exists. 
International companies 
were active in Nigeria.
Vegetable oil, 
aquaculture, palm 
oil and rice; food 
processing, meat and 
poultry
Yes Yes Yes
Motorcycles and tractors Yes Yes Yes
Fertilizers, 
petrochemicals, organic 
chemicals
Yes No Nigeria is abundant in 
oil and gas. Labor skills 
are transferable.
Light manufacturing Yes Yes Yes. Vibrant domestic 
industry with relevant 
skills already in place.
Leather Yes Yes Yes
Pharmaceuticals Yes Yes Yes
Paper board Yes Yes Yes
Source: World Bank 2011.
In a second step, Nigeria’s basic wage competitiveness in these sectors 
needs to be reviewed to determine whether that would allow Nigeria to 
reap the advantage of backwardness. 
Table IV.11 summarizes wage data for China, Vietnam, and Nigeria on 
a sectoral basis.
Table IV.11: Average Wage, Including Benefi ts, by Industry
(US$)
Sector 
Skilled labor Unskilled labor
Nigeria Ethiopia (ICA) Ethiopia Vietnam China Nigeria Ethiopia (ICA) Ethiopia Vietnam China
Food 135 82 89–141 181–363 398–442 87 45 26–52 78–207 192–236
Garments 85 82 37–185 119–181 331–370 54 48 26–48 78–130 237–296
Textiles 120 71 71 20
Machinery & equipment 163 125
Chemicals 212 127
Electronics 119 79
Non-metallic minerals 106 66
Wood, wood products 
& furn 
102 151 81–119 181–259 393–442 67 35 37–52 85–135 206–251
Metal & metal products 107 181 168–233 265–369 82 89 117–142 192–265
Other manufacturing 130 154 87 67
Source: Nigeria – Productivity and Investment Climate Survey, 2009; Ethiopia Investment Climate Survey, Manufacturing 2006 (reported values are mean over sample); Others – Light Manufacturing in 
Africa (2001), vol. II (values reported are the range reported by sample fi rms).
Note: Ethiopia has been included to provide another African country as a reference for Nigeria.
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These data confi rm Nigeria’s relative cost advantage in cheap labor in 
the industries identifi ed above. 
IV. How Can Growth in the Selected Value Chains Be Promoted? 
In addition to proposing the above methodology to identify target sectors, 
the GIFF also identifi es a number of steps to encourage growth in these 
targeted sectors. As discussed above, the government can try to identify the 
obstacles that are preventing these fi rms from upgrading the quality of their 
products or the barriers that limit entry to those industries through value 
chain analysis or the Growth Diagnostic studies suggested by Hausmann, 
Rodrik, and Velasco (2005). In addition, the government can adopt spe-
cifi c measures to encourage fi rms in the higher-income countries identifi ed 
in the fi rst step to invest in these industries. Moreover, in developing coun-
tries with poor infrastructure and an unfriendly business environment, the 
government can invest in industrial parks or export processing zones. Such 
industrial parks or EPZs typically provide conditions that are specifi cally 
targeted at certain sectors or industries, e.g., IT or light manufacturing, 
and are often built around already existing industry clusters. Lastly, the 
government can also provide limited incentives to domestic pioneer fi rms 
or foreign investors that work within the list of industries identifi ed in step 
1 in order to compensate for the non-rival public knowledge created by 
their investments. These steps may include corporate income tax holidays, 
directed tax credits, or priority access to foreign reserves to import key 
equipment. In the literature, the former type of intervention is referred to 
as soft and the latter as hard industrial policy. 
The following discusses key constraints in the selected value chains and 
what specifi cally could be done about it in the Nigerian context. Avail-
able value chain studies provide an analysis of the binding constraints to 
growth in a number of these value chains.8 The binding constraints can 
be broadly categorized in 5 categories: (i) physical infrastructure, in par-
ticular lack of power and roads; (ii) business environment (cumbersome 
procedures); (iii) lack of access to fi nance; (iv) lack of a technical and voca-
tional education system that corresponds to the needs of the market; and 
(v) restrictive trade policy. The annex table summarizes binding constraints 
and the measures that could be undertaken to address them in a number 
of selected value chains. 
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Specifi c measures to be undertaken for each category of constraints to 
growth could be as follows: 
Physical Infrastructure. Construction of industrial parks with dedicated 
power supply and transportation. Construction of independent power 
plants (IPPs) in geographical areas with high growth potential that already 
have a high concentration of promising value chains, possibly through the 
Bank of Industry in close collaboration with state governments. 
Business Environment. Selective capacity-building in key government 
agencies, such as the Standards Organization of Nigeria that enforce qual-
ity, and reform of business licensing as well as land transactions. 
TVET (Technical and Vocational Education and Training). Linking 
growth sectors to skills development through promotion of Innovation 
Enterprise Institutions (IEI)—an initiative promoted by the Nigeria Board 
of Technical Education. Developing a National Vocational Qualifi cation 
framework and calibrating the National Youth Service to assign youth 
corp participants to jobs matching their qualifi cations. Encouraging the 
development and adoption of training standards in traditional apprentice-
ships through trade associations. 
Access to Finance. Mobilizing mortgage-based fi nance by enhancing the 
availability of mortgages through reform of the land allocation system. 
Introducing directed credit schemes at concessional interest rates. 
Trade Policy Reform. Import bans and high tariffs adversely affect com-
petitiveness of a number of value chains. Replacing import bans that 
adversely affect certain sectors with the highest growth potential with 
tariffs could be very benefi cial to the development of industries. Some 
protection may still be necessary for sectors with high growth potential 
that still need to develop. 
Key Constraints for Each Sector
One of the most important challenges for government and the private 
sector is to identify the most important constraint, which, if alleviated, 
is likely to allow for the sector to grow faster. The annex table highlights 
various constraints for each value chain and how they could be addressed 
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in each individual case. The section below discusses some of the fi ndings 
from meetings with entrepreneurs in Lagos. Lack of electric power is a 
pervasive constraint in almost every industry and is therefore not specifi -
cally mentioned. It is imperative for the Nigerian government to promote 
construction of IPPs in industrial zones as the main tool for addressing the 
high cost of power. 
On a general note, entrepreneurs call for greater protection from imports 
through tariffs. In the past, Nigeria has consistently protected domes-
tic industry through high tariffs or import bans. However, the desired 
improvement in domestic output has not materialized, as key constraints 
to greater productivity have remained unaddressed, in particular the lack 
of power. Against this background, it would be preferable if continued pro-
tection was associated with a pre-commitment on the part of government 
to gradually phase out protection and address some of the key binding 
constraints in a comprehensive package of measures, e.g., the construction 
of independent power plants, the establishment of a fast-track window for 
imports of manufacturers and specifi c fi nancial interventions to facilitate 
access to fi nance of key value chains. Import bans should be replaced by 
tariffs, given the fact that most import bans cannot be enforced and only 
encourage smuggling. 
Food processing (including fruit juices, meat and poultry, noodles 
and spaghetti and tomato paste) has experienced strong growth in 
recent years and producers are confi dent about prospects for further 
growth. Tomato paste producers indicate that their growth poten-
tial would sharply improve if domestic production of tomatoes could 
be scaled up. In addition, specifi c government incentives such as for 
research and development, the full operationalization of the Export 
Expansion Grant (EEG) and assistance in distributing seeds could allow 
production to further expand. 
Construction has a very signifi cant potential for job creation. The pri-
mary constraint for faster growth is the unavailability of mortgage fi nanc-
ing. Specifi c interventions to improve the availability of such fi nancing 
through reform of the land transaction process and the development of 
mortgage-related fi nancial instruments would be critical to facilitate faster 
growth. In addition, the industry suffers from shortages of skilled techni-
cal labor. Targeted interventions to substantially upgrade the quality of 
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vocational training would help youth unemployment and reduce the cost 
of construction fi rms. 
Motorcycle, tractor and TV assembly are set for rapid expansion. Key 
constraints are the lack of adequate trade facilitation leading to delays in 
clearance of imports and the need for land to allow expansion of produc-
tion and reap benefi ts from economies of scale. 
Computer assembly is also growing rapidly. Partnership between the 
public and private sectors to help reduce the skills gap would be crucial 
to reduce cost. In addition, the government may facilitate the adoption of 
broadband internet access in universities and schools. 
Following years of decline owing to lack of competitiveness with 
imports, the tire industry ceased production in 2008. Key constraints to 
greater productivity include (i) the need for natural gas to power an IPP; 
(ii) the need to rehabilitate the Warri refi nery to facilitate availability of 
black carbon, a key input for tire production; and (iii) the need for a bail-
out fund to address the large amount of unserved debt. Gas had not been 
available owing to the turmoil in the Niger Delta, while the rehabilitation 
of the refi nery had not proceeded on a timely basis. An injection of fresh 
capital from the government could be crucial to bailing out the industry, 
especially if packaged with other measures, in particular the rehabilita-
tion of the Warri refi nery and concessional loans (based on a performance 
agreement with the private contractor). 
The metal industry has been suffering from power shortages and lower 
price competition from abroad. Nonetheless, some segments of the produc-
tion, like cast iron and manganese steel, have been prospering, while oth-
ers, such as aluminum, have been in decline. One of the key obstacles, in 
addition to the power supply, has been the customs administration which 
has been delaying the clearance of imported raw materials. However, the 
most important challenge in facilitating the growth of this industry is the 
lack of power. 
V. How Should Governance Issues Be Addressed 
in Implementing These Measures? 
One of the most important criticisms against industrial policy is the potential 
for elite capture of the interventions in a way that could seriously  undermine 
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the effectiveness of any policy intervention. Nigeria has a poor track record 
in governance, traditionally ranking near the bottom of the global Cor-
ruption Perception Index. In this context, it is important to establish some 
principles that would allow proper management of governance-related 
issues in the implementation of these targeted policy measures. Based on 
experience in other countries, the following seem to be components that 
could help improve the governance aspect of these measures: 
•  Transparency and accountability is best ensured through a public process 
of agreement and follow-up on the implementation of the agreed mea-
sures. For example, as a fi rst step a jobs summit could be held in which 
private and public sector representatives for key sectors meet, discuss and 
agree on critical interventions aimed at boosting growth in the individual 
sector, including selection criteria and appropriate implementation mech-
anisms. These Memoranda of Understanding could then be published 
and their implementation reviewed in public fora on a regular basis. 
•  The agreements should also explicitly specify the results that are to be 
expected. In addition, they should say that if the results are not achieved, 
the intervention should be retracted. 
•  A further measure helping to foster transparency and accountability is to 
limit the scale of the intervention. Smaller interventions stand a greater 
chance of transparency than large schemes. This is because the poten-
tial for elite capture is directly proportional to the magnitude of rents 
from government subsidies and other forms of protection and therefore 
smaller interventions stand a better chance. 
•  The selection of industries could be delegated to a consulting fi rm, rather 
than be handled by the government (as has been the case in Chile). 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper has aimed to identify sectors with high growth and employ-
ment potential and targeted interventions to remove binding constraints 
to growth in each of these sectors. The paper concludes that a number of 
sectors, some of which are already active in Nigeria and some new to Nige-
ria, may hold signifi cant potential for growth and employment creation 
and should be subject to detailed value chain analyses that would identify 
the type of interventions that would allow Nigeria to effectively compete 
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with its competitors. Targeted interventions to promote growth should 
primarily focus on (i) providing physical infrastructure, especially power, 
water and sewerage; (ii) improving the business environment; (iii) develop-
ing targeted vocational and educational skills programs; (iv) improving 
the business and regulatory environment; (v) reforming trade policy; and 
(vi) providing some tax incentives, access to fi nance, and access to foreign 
exchange for the targeted sectors. 
Of crucial importance in implementing these targeted interventions is 
the adoption, in parallel, of a range of measures to support good gover-
nance as highlighted above. Provided such policies are undertaken in par-
allel, Nigeria should be in a good position to maintain its strong growth 
performance, as well as to increase the employment intensity of growth. 
Table IV.A1: Growth-Inhibiting Cross-Cutting Constraints, Interventions and Expected Outcomes 
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Real estate & con-
struction: rising demand 
and emerging middle 
class provides signifi cant 
upside potential
Unreliable and high-cost infrastruc-
ture services (power, water, trans-
port); poor logistics & handling. 
under-developed freight transport 
services system
Public-private partnerships and sec-
toral reforms in the power sector and 
other key infrastructure areas (tariff 
and regulatory reform)
X XConstruction of independent power 
plants in geographical areas with high 
growth potential that already have a 
high concentration of promising value 
chains
Distortionary trade policy accompa-
nied by poor border controls, import 
bans on factor inputs; tariff and 
duties to protect domestic goods. 
Replace import bans on key inputs, 
such as rebar steel, with tariffs (15% 
tariff would maximize incentives for 
formalizing trade) 
X
Reform customs procedures, including 
through risk-based customs clearances 
Onerous administrative procedures, 
planning approvals & building per-
mits; burdensome business regula-
tory compliance, including EEG 
Initiate administrative reform program 
to simplify individual procedures in 
relevant agencies to speed up the 
compliance/approval process
X
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Redesign or reengineer procedures 
through careful process mapping and 
streamline legal basis as necessary 
Provide strong technical assistance in 
the preparation/design stage followed 
by hands-on implementation with 
stakeholders
Low-quality and unproductive labor 
inputs: shortage of skilled labor, 
lack of vocational training, unskilled 
labor exhibits low productivity 
Explore possibility of using the Innova-
tive Enterprise Institutions to deliver 
training programs 
X
Develop new and strengthen existing 
vocational institutions to increase 
access to unskilled, informal labor 
sector including programs designed for 
practical teaching programs (e.g. Voca-
tional Training Centre of Excellence in 
Lagos for the construction sector) 
Lack of regulator Enforcement on 
Product Standards, SON, Local 
Town Planning Authority 
Deliver capacity building program to 
strengthen inspection activities of 
relevant government authorities per-
taining to quality and safety standards 
of products in the construction industry
X
Inadequate development of the 
mortgage market 
Facilitate development of mortgage-
 related fi nancial services through 
reform of land transactions and devel-
opment of the fi nancial sector
X
(continued next page) 
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Poor environmental practices and 
enforcement; inadequate proce-
dures for disposal of construction 
materials 
Provide technical assistance to the 
State Ministry of Environment to 
develop the appropriate level of 
resources and expertise, as well as 
the institutional authority to enforce 
environmental regulations under its 
statutory responsibility
X
Food processing: rising 
incomes have spurred 
demand for alcoholic and 
non-alcoholic beverages 
and for processed foods 
Raw material costs sources locally 
are high because of import bans, 
leading to high and uncompetitive 
prices of products, produced with 
imported raw material 
Replace import bans on key inputs with 
tariffs and reform customs procedures, 
including through risk-based customs 
clearances 
X
Coordination failures, weak 
linkages between processors and 
producers
Industry associations to address 
information and knowledge transfers to 
SME processors 
X
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248 
Onerous administrative procedures, 
land registration
Initiate administrative reform program 
to simplify individual procedures in 
relevant agencies to speed up compli-
ance/approval process
X
Redesign or reengineer procedures 
through careful process mapping and 
streamline legal basis as necessary 
Provide strong technical assistance in 
the preparation/design stage followed 
by hands-on implementaton with 
stakeholders
Poor logistics & handling; poor 
rural roads to dispersed small scale 
farms; poor handling practices (no 
temperature control, improper bag-
ging, storage etc.); under-developed 
freight transport services system; 
business environment (power, 
water, roads) is lacking: IPP and 
other dedicated infrastructure for 
industrial areas with high volumes 
of food processing 
Deliver an integrated logistics program 
for the food sector from farm gate to 
the processing stage covering farm 
storage, drayage, wholesale markets, 
rural roads and line haul transport to 
the processor, complete with tempera-
ture control equipment as warranted
X X
(continued next page)
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Lack of skilled labor: support to the 
technical and vocational training 
system for food technology training; 
Low quality and unproductive labor 
inputs: shortage of skilled labor, 
lack of vocational training, unskilled 
labor exhibits low productivity. 
Explore possibility of using the Innova-
tive Enterprise Institutions to deliver 
training programs
X
Develop new and strengthen existing 
vocational institutes to increase access 
to unskilled, informal labor sector 
including programs designed for practi-
cal teaching programs (e.g. Vocational 
Training Centre of Excellence in Lagos 
for the construction sector); MAN and 
NASSI to provide outreach for private 
sector interventions
Sponsor technical advisory trips to 
locations that incorporate religious and 
traditional practices of the domestic 
target groups, e.g. Islamic run abattoirs 
and butchers in Dubai, Malaysia, South 
Africa
250 
Lack of regulator Enforcement on 
Product Standards - SON; State 
Dept of Agriculture; Veterinary 
Services; Livestock & Poultry ser-
vices; Agric Services, Pest control, 
produce inspection and fi sheries; 
NAFDAC 
Deliver capacity building program to 
strengthen inspection activities of 
relevant government authorities per-
taining to quality and safety standards 
of products in the agriculture, animal 
livestock and food industries. In par-
ticular, harmonize roles of food inspec-
tion agencies for seamless cooperation 
(State Ministry of Agriculture, State 
Ministry of Health, and NAFDAC)
X
Poor environmental practices and 
enforcement, improper environmen-
tal control of animal waste at public 
abattoirs 
Provide technical assistance to the 
State Ministry of Environment to 
develop the appropriate level of 
resources and expertise, as well as 
the institutional authority to enforce 
environmental regulations under its 
statutory responsibility
X
Meat & Poultry: 
urbanization, emerging 
middle class, and high 
income elasticity have 
created high demand for 
meat; fast food industry 
very important as source 
of demand 
Abattoirs are dysfunctional Privatization of abattoirs X
Import bans are undermining 
competitiveness 
Removal of import ban on meat X
Public sector institutions are weak, 
especially for veterinary services 
and other support services 
Targeted capacity-building for key 
government institutions 
X
Aquaculture: growing 
steadily from a low base 
refl ecting increased 
demand 
Information on technology options 
and prices 
Support with technical training and 
establishment designs
X
(continued next page)
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Access to fi nance Increase access to term lending for 
micro and small businesses
X
Input supply and business develop-
ment services 
Commercial stakeholders’ capacity to 
be developed through infrastructure, 
technology, information systems
X X
Unreliable and high cost infrastruc-
ture services (power, water, trans-
port); poor logistics & handling: poor 
rural roads to dispersed small scale 
farms
Construction of Independent Power 
Plants in geographical areas with high 
growth potential that already have a 
high concentration of promising value 
chains
X X
Leather: high-quality 
products with potential 
for international 
marketability that needs 
upgrading
Distortionary trade policy accom-
panied by poor border controls: 
import bans on factor inputs; tariff 
and dustiest to protect domestic 
goods; porous borders undermine 
trade policy 
Replace import bans with tariffs (15% 
tariff would maximize incentives for 
formalizing trade) 
X
Reform customs procedures, including 
through risk-based customs clearances
252 
Onerous administrative proce-
dures: burdensome business 
regulatory compliance, including 
EEG 
Initiate administrative reform program 
to simplify individual procedures in 
relevant agencies to speed up compli-
ance/approval process
X
Redesign or re-engineer procedures 
through careful process mapping and 
streamline legal basis as necessary
Provide strong technical assistance in 
the preparation/design stage followed 
by hands-on implementation with 
stakeholders
Low-quality and unproductive labor 
inputs: shortage of skilled labor, 
lack of vocational training, unskilled 
labor exhibits low productivity
Explore possibility of using the Innova-
tive Enterprise Institutions to deliver 
training programs 
X
Develop new and strengthen existing 
vocational institutions to increase 
access to unskilled, informal labor 
sector including programs designed for 
practical teaching programs (e.g. Voca-
tional Training Centre of Excellence in 
Lagos for the construction sector)
Sponsor technical advisory trips to 
locations that incorporate religious and 
traditional practices of the domestic 
target groups, e.g. Islamic run abattoirs 
and butchers in Dubai, Malaysia, South 
Africa
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Poor environmental practices and 
enforcement: improper chemical 
disposal practices by leather tan-
neries (3 out of 6 have no chemical 
treatment facilities) 
Provide technical assistance to the 
State Ministry of Environment to 
develop the appropriate level of 
resources and expertise, as well as 
the institutional authority to enforce 
environmental regulations under its 
statutory responsibility
X
Lack of regulator Enforcement 
on Product Standards: Veterinary 
Services; Livestock & Poultry 
services 
Deliver capacity building program to 
strengthen inspection activities of rel-
evant government authorities pertain-
ing to quality and safety standards of 
products in the agriculture and animal 
livestock industries
X
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ICT: crucial role in 
increasing productiv-
ity for other sectors by 
reducing communications 
and transactions costs; 
strong links with fi nancial 
sector, large market 
attracts FDI; recent 
increase in competition 
has led to productivity 
increases & product 
innovation; opportunities 
for regional investment; 
language skills allow for 
opening of call centers. 
Policy & regulatory reforms: NCC 
issues new licenses for new 
operators to enter exceeding the 
capacity of the market. Spectrum 
management plan to be issued. 
Enforcement capacity and ability 
to assess proper levels of service 
charges lacking; confusion over role 
of telecoms agencies 
Targeted capacity-building for commu-
nications regulator; new streamlined 
regulations
X
Market failures to access debt and 
equity fi nancing 
Specifi c fi nancing windows for the 
telecommunications sector 
X
Skills shortages Targeted training X
Light manufacturing 
(metal, wood process-
ing, furniture): rising 
demand in construction 
increases demand for 
structural timber and 
steel products 
High cost of raw materials (uncom-
petitive steel producers) 
Replace import bans with tariffs X
Skills shortages Targeted investment in vocational 
training, especially through IEI’s
X
Policy neglect at local government 
level results in low level of public 
sector investment 
Power needs of clusters should be 
met more effectively through IPP’s, 
dedicated water and roads supply
X
Unequal access to information 
especially for micro and small 
businesses 
Industry associations should increase 
the fl ow of market intelligence to the 
industry; improve technology transfer 
mechanisms by sharing information on 
successful innovation
X
Lack of access to fi nance Increased access to term lending X 
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Tires Access to fi nance Consider establishment of a bail-out 
fund and of a credit line at conces-
sional rates; construction of an IPP 
Power and water infrastructure Rehabilitate refi nery in Warri
Lack of access to black carbon 
because refi nery in Warri is 
dysfunctional
Car parts, motor cycle 
assembly 
Skills upgrade Reduce training costs 
Power and water infrastructure Build IPP in industrial zone 
Customs procedures Reform fast-track manufacturing line
Pharmaceutical goods Too small and fragmented to oper-
ate competitively 
Encourage mergers and acquisitions 
Color TV receivers Customs procedures Activate fast-track lane for 
manufacturers
Access to land Facilitate acquiring of land
Source: World Bank/DFID (2008).
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Notes 
†  The authors wish to thank Doerte Doemeland, Hinh Dinh, John Litwack, 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Brian Pinto, David Rosenblatt and Sunil Sinha for com-
ments and suggestions. Excellent research assistance was provided by Frances 
Cossar and Dimitris Mavridis.
  Volker Treichel has been a Lead Economist in the World Bank’s Offi ce of the 
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist from December 2010. Prior to that, 
he served as Lead Economist in Nigeria. Before 2007, he worked at the IMF, 
including as mission chief for Togo and resident representative in Albania.
1. See chapter I of this volume.
2. See also Global Development Horizons (2011).
3.  It is important to note that this fi nding does not necessarily imply that people 
in wage employment moved into family agriculture. It could also mean that 
those who previously reported no activity (that is, outside the labor force) but 
were at least temporarily involved in agriculture, became engaged in agriculture 
to an extent that they now reported employment in family agriculture. That 
means they moved from under-employment to employment. Rodrik (2010) 
fi nds evidence that labor moved from the wholesale/retail sectors (which have 
a reasonably high productivity) to agriculture.
4. See chapter II of this volume.
5.  Countries with a similar endowment structure should have a similar com-
parative advantage. The country with a lower wage level than the compara-
tor country is hence able to produce a commodity at a lower cost than its 
competitor. Within the same industry, the complexity of the associated tech-
nology may differ widely; as a result, in some specifi c products a country 
may have comparative advantage and others not. For example, when Korea 
entered the memory chip industry in the 1980s, Japan’s memory chip indus-
tries were still expanding. What made Korea’s entry successful was that it 
started with simple, technologically matured chips which Japan had pro-
duced 10 years ago. Also, an industry can be divided into different segments 
with different capital-intensity. For example, the IT industry can be divided, 
according to capital intensity, R&D, chips, spare parts, and assembly. The 
lower-income countries can enter the industry starting from labor-intensive 
assembly.
6.  The similarities between Nigeria and Indonesia had earlier been recognized 
in a World Bank publication which reviewed the economic performance of 
the two countries over the period 1960-85 (see Bevan, Collier, and Gunning 
1999). 
7. See Lin (2011).
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8.  A jobs summit that took place in Abuja in August 2010 identifi ed binding con-
straints to growth for each of the key value chains. How to alleviate these con-
straints has been agreed upon in a Memorandum of Understanding between 
the public and the private sector. These measures have subsequently been rati-
fi ed by the government and are currently being implemented.
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Introduction
Financial structure differs greatly across countries. In bank-based fi nancial 
systems such as in Germany, Japan, and India, banks offer the main fi nan-
cial services in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, monitoring corpo-
rate managers, and providing risk management services. In market-based 
systems such as in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Malaysia, 
both stock markets and banks play important roles in all fi nancial 
services. There are vast variations in fi nancial structure. Using compre-
hensive cross-country data on fi nancial structure, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2001) classify a large number of countries into four categories—
bank- or market-based systems in fi nancially developed or underdevel-
oped countries. Bank-based fi nancially-underdeveloped countries include 
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Bangladesh, Nepal, Egypt, Costa Rica, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, 
Colombia, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Greece, Argentina, Venezuela, India, 
and Ireland. Market-based fi nancially-underdeveloped countries include 
Denmark, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, and Turkey. Bank-
based fi nancially-developed economies include Tunisia, Portugal, Austria, 
Belgium, Italy, Finland, Norway, Japan, France, Jordan, Germany, Israel, 
and Spain. Finally, market-based fi nancially-developed countries include 
the Netherlands, Thailand, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Korea, 
Sweden, Great Britain, Singapore, the United States, Switzerland, Hong 
Kong, and Malaysia. 
What explains fi nancial structure? Does the combination of institu-
tions and markets that constitute the fi nancial system have any impact on 
economic development? These questions have fascinated economists for 
decades. One of the earliest attempts to address these questions was Gold-
smith (1969), who 40 years ago tried to document the change in fi nancial 
structure over time and to assess the impacts of fi nancial development on 
economic development. He states that “one of the most important prob-
lems in the fi eld of fi nance, if not the single most important one, almost 
everyone would agree, is the effect that fi nancial structure and development 
have on economic growth.” With data from 35 countries for the pre-1964 
period, he fi nds positive correlation between fi nancial development and 
economic growth. But data constraints prevented him from going far on 
fi nancial structure: he could rely only on careful comparisons of Germany 
and United Kingdom. Obviously, it is hard to extend the conclusions from 
case studies to the rest of the world. 
Since Goldsmith wrote, there has been great progress in the research 
on fi nancial structure. Having collected comprehensive cross-country data 
on fi nancial structure themselves (along with their coauthors), Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (2001) fi nd from this new data set that fi nancial systems 
become more complex as countries become richer with both banks and 
markets getting larger, more active, and more effi cient. But in general, the 
structure becomes more market-based in higher-income countries. They 
also fi nd strong and consistent evidence that what matters for economic 
development is the level of fi nancial development, and that the relative mix 
of banks and stock market does not matter much (Beck et al. 2001). 
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This conclusion that fi nancial structure is irrelevant for development 
faces signifi cant challenge. Several authors argue theoretically that 
fi nancial structure should matter a great deal. After all, economic devel-
opment increases the demand for the services provided by securities 
markets relative to services provided by banks (Allen and Gale 2000; 
Boyd and Smith 1998). Moreover, banks and stock markets exhibit 
distinct effectiveness in delivering corporate governance and investor 
protection (Stulz 2001). In particular, banks are better at reducing the 
market frictions related to fi nancing standardized, shorter-run, lower-
risk, and well-collateralized projects, while security markets are better at 
fi nancing more innovative, longer-run, and higher-risk projects that rely 
more on intangible inputs such as human capital (Allen and Gale 2000). 
Furthermore, the fact that stock markets become signifi cantly more 
active and important as economies develop also conjures up the notion 
that stock markets may become more useful as income levels rise.
In this paper, we summarize some recent progress, both theoretical and 
empirical, that suggest that fi nancial structure does indeed matter for eco-
nomic development, that banks and stock markets play different roles at 
countries at different development stages, and that there might be optimal 
fi nancial structure associated with each development stage. We also offer 
evidence that the actual fi nancial structure in a country may deviate from 
its optimum due to politics. 
In the rest of this paper, we fi rst summarize conventional wisdom and 
fi ndings about fi nancial structure. We then proceed to discuss some new 
ideas on this topic, along with empirical support for these new ideas.
Traditional View of Financial Structure 
and Economic Development
While the literature on the relative merits of banks versus markets is large, 
it can be summarized by four views (Beck et al. 2001; Levine 2002; Stulz 
2001). The fi rst is the fi nancial-structure-irrelevancy view. In a perfect 
capital market with risk-neutral agents, the interest rate determines which 
investment opportunities are worth taking up, and all investment oppor-
tunities yielding positive net return (after capital costs) will be taken (Stulz 
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2001). If there is imperfect capital mobility, that is, if capital fl ows across 
borders are hindered by worries about country-specifi c risks, then what 
matters for job creation, fi rm growth, and effi cient allocation of resources 
is whether the fi nancial system can provide effi cient fi nancial services and 
suffi cient access to fi nance; the mix of banks and markets does not matter. 
According to this view, only fi nancial depth, not fi nancial structure, mat-
ters for economic performance. 
A particular version of the fi nancial-structure-irrelevance view is the law 
and fi nance view, which argues that the primary determinant of the sound-
ness of the fi nancial system is the legal system (La Porta et al. 2000). In 
particular, this view holds that what is relevant for growth is not fi nancial 
structure, but rather whether it is bank-based or market-based. The overall 
fi nancial development is determined by the legal system and the origins of 
law. The legal system may affect external fi nance because good legal pro-
tection increases investors’ confi dence that they would reap at least some 
return on their investments (managed by fi rms) and as a result, they are 
more likely to provide investment funds to fi rm managers (La Porta et al. 
2000; Stulz 2001). 
Underlying the fi nancial-structure-irrelevancy view are strong assump-
tions that may not hold in reality. When the fi nancial system fails to direct 
savings to its more effi cient uses, fi nancial structure becomes important 
(Stulz 2001). Two key market imperfections destroy perfect fi nancial mar-
kets (Stulz 2001): managers have an information advantage over investors 
about the fi rm’s activities (“hidden information”), and managers’ actions 
cannot be observed by investors (“hidden action”). Hidden information 
and action allow managers to pursue its own objectives. And managers 
cannot credibly commit to return investment returns to investors, who in 
turn may fail to fi nance projects that may have positive returns to them 
in a perfect-information world. With these two issues in mind, fi nancial 
structure leads to real consequences when it changes information and 
transaction costs, affects the cost of capital, and alters the incentives and 
monitoring of management. 
The bank-based view emphasizes the positive role of banks in mobi-
lizing resources, identifying good projects, monitoring managers, and 
 managing risks, and highlights the shortcomings of the stock market 
(Beck et al. 2001). One of the pioneers in research on fi nancial structure, 
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Gerschenkron (1962), suggests that banks are more important than mar-
kets in the early stage of economic development when the institutional 
environment cannot support market activities effectively. The reason is 
that even in countries with weak legal and accounting systems and frail 
institutions, powerful banks can force fi rms to reveal information and pay 
their debts, thereby helping industrial growth. Moreover, banks may be 
better than markets at providing external fi nance to new fi rms requiring 
staged fi nancing: banks can more credibly commit to making additional 
funding available as the project proceeds, while markets fi nd it more dif-
fi cult to make credible, long-term commitments. In contrast, a good stock 
market quickly and fully reveals information in public markets, which 
decreases the incentives for investors to acquire information. Good mar-
ket development may thus impede incentives for identifying innovative 
projects and thereby hinder effi cient resource allocation. Moreover, liquid 
markets also lead to a myopic investment sentiment—all investors need to 
do is to watch stock prices without having to actively monitor fi rm man-
agers, which hinders corporate control. 
In contrast, the market-based view regards stock markets as crucial in 
promoting economic success (Beck et al. 2001). Markets allow investors 
to diversify and manage risks more effectively, thereby encouraging more 
supply of external fi nance. Market-based systems also facilitate compe-
tition, which induces stronger incentives for R&D and growth. Thus, 
market-based systems may be especially effective in promoting innovative 
and R&D-based industries (Allen and Gale 2000). Liquid stock markets 
also allow investors to build and seek large stakes, therefore enabling 
hostile takeovers to discipline shirking or incompetent managers (Stulz 
2001). This market-based view also emphasizes the negative roles played 
by banks. By spending expensive resources on information about fi rms, 
banks can extract large rents from fi rms, which reduces the incentives for 
fi rms to undertake high-risk, high-return projects since fi rms lose a large 
share of the rents to the banks. Moreover, because of the nature of the 
debt contracts—banks do not benefi t from high returns but are harmed by 
low returns—banks prefer to fi nance safe and low-return projects, retard-
ing innovation and growth. Moreover, powerful banks may collude with 
fi rm managers to prevent entry by other investors, a practice that reduces 
competition and effective corporate control and therefore growth.
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Conventional Empirical Results
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) use the new cross-country database 
on fi nancial structure to document how fi nancial structure evolves with 
economic development. They characterize fi nancial structure by ratios of 
banking sector development (measured by size, activity and effi ciency) rela-
tive to stock market development (similarly measured), with a higher ratio 
meaning a more bank-based structure. They then classify countries into 
bank-based or market-based countries. Austria, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have com-
paratively large, active banking systems. In contrast, Argentina, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Turkey, and Zimbabwe have 
particularly small, inactive banking systems. In terms of stock market 
development, some countries emerge as particularly well-developed by all 
measures (Australia, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United States), while 
other countries, such as Chile and South Africa, are large and  illiquid. A 
few countries, such as Germany and Korea, have active but small stock 
markets.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine fi nd that banks, nonbanks, stock markets, 
and bond markets are larger, more active, and more effi cient in richer 
countries, confi rming the fi ndings of Goldsmith (1969) with a smaller 
sample of countries in earlier periods. Thus fi nancial systems on aver-
age are more developed in richer countries. In addition, stock markets 
in higher-income countries tend to be more active and effi cient relative 
to banks. Furthermore, fi nancial structure is more market-oriented in 
countries with common law tradition (as distinct from a civil law tradi-
tion), strong protection of minority shareholder rights, good accounting 
systems, low levels of corruption, and no explicit deposit insurance. This 
is consistent with theories that argue that higher information costs and 
worse legal protection of property rights tend to favor banks over markets 
(Allen and Gale 2000; Stulz 2001). 
Beck et al. (2001) provide comprehensive evidence that fi nancial struc-
ture does not matter but that fi nancial depth does. They combine the new 
cross-country database of fi nancial structure with both fi rm-level and 
cross-country industry level data. Relying on evidence about fi nancial 
structure and economic performance at three levels (pure cross-country 
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comparisons, cross-industry, cross-country methods, and fi rm-level data 
across many countries), they obtain consistent results. They fi nd no evi-
dence that fi nancial structure helps explain country economic perfor-
mance: “Countries do not grow faster, fi nancially dependent industries 
do not expand at higher rates, new fi rms are not created more easily, 
fi rms’ access to external fi nance is not easier, and fi rms do not grow faster 
in either market-based or bank-based systems.” In contrast, they write, 
“distinguishing countries by overall fi nancial development does help 
explain cross-country differences in economic performance. Measures of 
bank development and market development are strongly linked to eco-
nomic growth. More specifi cally, the data indicate that economies grow 
faster, industries depending heavily on external fi nance expand at faster 
rates, new fi rms form more easily, fi rms’ access to external fi nancing 
is easier, and fi rms grow more rapidly in economies with a higher level 
of overall fi nancial-sector development.” They also fi nd that the part of 
fi nancial development explained by the legal system consistently explains 
fi rm, industry, and national economic success, consistent with the law and 
fi nance view of fi nancial structure.
New Waves of Theoretical Arguments
Does fi nancial structure really not matter for development? Recent develop-
ments cast doubt that this is the case. First, economists have come to real-
ize that there is often no one-size-fi ts-all recipe for development  (Kremer 
1993). The reform areas with the largest payoffs differ from country to 
country, and there are often development “bottlenecks,” which can be lik-
ened to the famous failure of the space shuttle Challenger: with thousands 
of components, it “exploded because it was launched at a temperature that 
caused one of those components, the O-rings, to malfunction” (Kremer 
1993). Consistent with this notion of country-specifi c and development-
stage-specifi c bottlenecks, some research has found policy complementarity 
in various contexts. In particular, Xu (2011) summarizes evidence suggest-
ing that the effects of the business environment on development tend to be 
heterogeneous depending on the stage of development, and that in particu-
lar, bad infrastructure and labor infl exibility—as in the case of India—tend 
to be key bottlenecks because of their negative indirect effects.
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Second, the theory on fi nancial structure has evolved. Relying on the 
comparative experience of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, Allen and Gale (2000) examine whether fi nancial structure 
matters. They conclude that since banks and markets offer distinct fi nan-
cial services, economies at different stages of development require distinct 
mixtures of these fi nancial services to work effi ciently. They conjecture that 
a country will require different mixtures of fi nancial services (that is, banks 
and stock markets) as it grows richer (Boyd and Smith 1998), and that 
when a country’s actual fi nancial structure differs from the optimal mix-
ture of banks and markets, its economy will not obtain the appropriate 
mix of fi nancial services, hurting economic growth. 
Lin, Sun, and Jiang (2011) also argue that fi nancial structure has to 
matter for development but from a different angle. The key reason, they 
contend, is that an effi cient fi nancial structure must refl ect the demand of 
the real economy. Fundamentally, factor endowments (labor, capital, and 
natural resources) determine industrial structure, which in turn needs the 
support of a certain development-stage-specifi c fi nancial structure. In par-
ticular, at each stage of development a country has a specifi c combination 
of factor endowments. That combination determines factor prices, which 
in turns determines the optimal industry structure, the nature of its associ-
ated risk, and distribution of fi rm size (Lin 2009). Since enterprises that 
operate in different industries differ in size, risk, and fi nancing needs, the 
demands of the real economy for fi nancial services at some development 
stages can be systematically different from those of the same economy at 
other stages. When the characteristics of fi nancial structure match those of 
an economy’s industrial structure, the fi nancial system can perform its fun-
damental functions most effi ciently and thus contribute to sustainable and 
inclusive development. Therefore, there is an optimal fi nancial structure 
for an economy at each stage of development. 
With respect to developing economies, the key characteristic of their 
endowment structures is the relative abundance of unskilled labor (and 
scarcity of capital). Labor-intensive industries and labor-intensive sections 
of capital-intensive industries have the comparative advantage and should 
thus dominate in these economies. Since the experiences from developed 
economies can be mimicked, the industries, products, and technologies that 
are appropriate in developing economies are relatively mature. With respect 
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to fi rm size, fi rms in labor-intensive industries are usually smaller, especially 
in terms of capital, relative to fi rms in capital-intensive industries. The effi -
ciency of the fi nancial system in developing countries therefore depends on 
its ability to serve the fi nancing needs of labor-intensive, small, and mature 
businesses. Since those fi rms also tend to be more opaque due to their lack 
of standard fi nancial information, screening fi rms and monitoring fi rm 
managers become the major concerns for providers of external funds to 
these fi rms. In such an economic environment, banks, especially small 
local banks, have more strengths than stock markets, due to their superior 
abilities to harness local information, assess “soft” information regarding 
creditworthiness, and engage in long-term relationships with borrowers. In 
addition, banks are particularly attractive to fi rms in low-income countries 
because banks represent lower costs of capital to fi rms in such countries: (i) 
when borrowing from no more than a few banks, these fi rms do not need 
to have public information such as fi nancial statements and external audit-
ing ready for the lenders, thus saving precious capital; (ii) interest rate pay-
ments for loans tend to be lower than returns to shares in the stock market 
due to lower risks associated with bank loans, a fact that again saves pre-
cious capital from the perspective of fi rms in developing countries. Thus, if 
there are no distortions, the fi nancial systems in these economies are likely 
to be characterized by the dominance of banks.
It is likely that small regional banks play an especially signifi cant role 
in effi ciently serving small fi rms in developing countries. Recent evidence 
suggests that there is a match between bank size and the size of fi rms that 
these banks serve. Large banks tend to shy away from small businesses but 
rather focus on large businesses, while small banks tend to target small 
businesses. Large banks can save transaction costs if making loans mainly 
to large businesses—since making a loan, no matter how large or small, 
involves the same procedures and forms. Making a few large loans to large 
businesses, rather than many smaller loans to small fi rms, therefore lowers 
the unit costs of loans for large banks. Serving small fi rms is thus left to 
small banks in developing countries.
In contrast, the key characteristics of the endowment structure in devel-
oped countries are the relative abundance of skilled labor and capital. The 
comparative advantage of these countries is then capital-intensive indus-
tries. Firms in such industries tend to be large, demanding more external 
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fi nancing. Since these countries are already at or near the technological 
frontier, fi rms there would spend much more on R&D and innovation, and 
bear higher technological and product innovation risks.1 With larger fi rm 
sizes, fi rms can afford the (more or less) fi xed costs of providing standard 
fi nancial information to the market, and specialized fi nancial agencies can 
make suffi cient money and become viable in providing specialized fi nancial 
and auditing information. Thus with standard fi nancial information avail-
able, stock markets, bond markets, and big banks become the main fi nance 
providers to these capital-intensive fi rms.
Moreover, there are arguments that stock markets are better suited to 
richer countries. For fi rms with new technologies or innovative projects, 
investors do not have much information and often have diverse opinions 
about the prospects of these new technologies. Decentralized stock markets 
allow people to agree to disagree about the future prospects of these fi rms, 
and these fi rms, as a result, are more likely to be funded (Allen and Gale 
2000). Furthermore, stock markets can take advantage of the standard 
fi nancial information—information available only in richer countries—to 
reduce the information asymmetry between the managers of a fi rm and the 
external investors, which allows investors to make more informed deci-
sions about what fi rms to invest in and in which fi rms they are more likely 
to have safer returns. Venture capital is often involved in the early stage of 
high-risk innovative and capital-intensive fi rms, but stock markets remain 
crucial by providing exit options for venture capital and by fi nancing fur-
ther development of these high-tech businesses. Banks can also offer staged 
investment once venture capital has identifi ed good projects as demon-
strated by good initial returns. Thus, for rich countries, the optimal fi nan-
cial structure is likely characterized by a large and active stock market, 
augmented with many large banks.2
As a result, for a country at a certain stage of its economic develop-
ment, some specifi c fi nancial structure will be more effi cient in mobilizing 
and allocating capital. In other words, there is a certain optimal fi nancial 
structure at a specifi c stage of development, in which the composition and 
relative importance of available fi nancial arrangements can most effi ciently 
allocate fi nancial resources to viable fi rms in the competitive sectors of the 
optimal industrial structure, which is in turn determined by its endow-
ment structure. The optimal fi nancial structure for developing countries 
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tends to feature a stronger role for banks (especially small banks) than for 
stock markets, while the opposite is true for developed countries. More-
over, the optimal fi nancial structure is dynamic. As the endowment struc-
ture changes with physical and human capital accumulation, the optimal 
industrial and fi nancial structure changes accordingly. There is, therefore, 
no unique fi nancial structure that fi ts all countries. For future reference, we 
call this view of optimal fi nancial structure specifi c to each development 
stage the new structural view.
Some New Empirical Results
Several fairly recent papers offer evidence supporting the premise that 
fi nancial structure matters in various ways for economic development. The 
fi rst and the key piece of evidence is based on a cross-country study by 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyan and Levine (2011). Noting that the past literature 
has not been successful in identifying the importance of fi nancial structure, 
they explore whether deviations from an optimal fi nancial structure are 
associated with the speed of development. They use data from 72 coun-
tries from 1980 to 2008 to reassess the role of fi nancial structure in eco-
nomic development. More specifi cally, they assess whether the sensitivity 
of economic development to increases in bank securities market develop-
ment change during the process of economic development, and whether 
each level of economic development is associated with an optimal fi nancial 
structure. Financial structure here is measured as the ratio of private credit 
(as a share of GDP) to security market capitalization (as a share of GDP) 
and some of its variants. 
The authors use quantile regressions to assess how the sensitivities of 
economic activity to bank and securities market development evolve as 
countries grow. The quantile regressions provide information on how the 
associations between economic development and both bank and securities 
market development change as countries grow richer. In contrast, the con-
ventional cross-country studies tend to focus on the association between 
economic development and fi nancial structure for the “average” country. 
The reliance on quantile regression, which implicitly insists that the effects 
of fi nancial structure have distinct effects for countries at different income 
levels, proves to be the key for fi nding that fi nancial structure matters. 
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A measure of optimal fi nancial structure at each level of development 
is constructed by regressing a measure of fi nancial structure as a share of 
GDP per capita for the sample of OECD countries, while also controlling 
for key institutional, geographic, and structural traits of those countries. 
The maintained hypothesis is that conditional on these traits, the OECD 
countries provide information on how the optimal fi nancial structure var-
ies with economic development. Next, the authors use the coeffi cients from 
the regression to compute the estimated optimal fi nancial structure for each 
country in each year. They then compute a “fi nancial structure gap,” which 
is equal to the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the difference 
between the actual and the estimated optimal fi nancial structure.
They fi nd that as economies develop, both banks and markets become 
larger relative to the size of the overall economy. More importantly, as 
countries become richer, the sensitivity of economic development to changes 
in bank development decreases, while the sensitivity of economic develop-
ment to changes in securities market development increases. Thus the rela-
tive demand for the services provided by the stock market increases as an 
economy develops, and these services differ from those the banks provide, 
as suggested by Allen and Gale (2000).
Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyan, and Levine (2011) fi nd some support for the 
notion that there is appropriate fi nancial structure for countries at distinct 
stages of development. In particular, deviations in an economy’s actual 
fi nancial structure from its estimated optimal one (that is, the size of the 
fi nancial development gap) are associated with reduced economic output. 
Even when controlling for the level of bank development, securities market 
development, a standard set of controls, and country fi xed effects, there is 
a robust and negative relationship between the fi nancial structure gap and 
economic activity. They also look at whether it matters if the non-optimal 
fi nancial structure is due to too much bank orientation or too much mar-
ket orientation, and fi nd that neither matters. Magnitudes of the effects of 
deviations from the optimal fi nancial structure are non-trivial: an increase 
of one standard deviation in the fi nancial structure gap is associated with 
a drop in log real GDP per capita of 0.06, or a 6 percent reduction in eco-
nomic activity. Further controlling for country and period fi xed effects and 
some standard controls, the magnitude drops by 50 percent but remains 
signifi cant. The magnitude, at face value, is interesting: it is certainly non-
trivial, but the magnitude is not overwhelmingly important. 
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It is useful to point out that this paper does not deal with the potential 
endogeneity of the fi nancial structure. If fi nancial structure does respond 
to income level, as the theory would suggest, then there may be bias for the 
estimated effects of fi nancial structure. Moreover, it is not clear that using 
OECD countries to infer optimal fi nancial structure is completely convinc-
ing. After all, OECD countries are all rich, and it is unclear that this group 
of countries can form the base to infer the optimal fi nancial structure in 
much poorer countries. Still, the paper offers plausible empirical support 
for the new structural view of fi nancial structure and is a nice fi rst step 
toward disentangling the mystery of the impact of fi nancial structure. 
The second clue of the effects of fi nancial structure comes from a large 
fi rm-level dataset. Cull and Xu (2011) use fi rm-level data across 89 coun-
tries, looking at how labor growth rates of fi rms vary with their country’s 
fi nancial structure. An important advantage of combining fi rm-level data 
and cross-country indicators of fi nancial structure is the ability to examine 
how various types of fi rms may be affected differently by fi nancial struc-
ture. This allows us to distinguish between the effi ciency-based (that is, the 
new structural view) and the political-economy based approach of explain-
ing the evolution of fi nancial structure. 
Cull and Xu (2011) regress fi rm-level labor growth rates to country-
level measures of bank and stock market development (after controlling 
for basic fi rm and country characteristics). They are concerned about the 
potential endogeneity of fi nancial structure in the labor growth equation 
for two reasons. First, there might be omitted variables that are corre-
lated with both fi nancial structure and labor growth rates. Such variables 
might, for instance, include non-fi nance business environment variables 
(Xu 2011). Second, causality might go both ways, from fi nance to fi rm 
growth, or vice versa. They thus resort to instrumental variables to deal 
with such issues. In particular, they consider potential instrumental vari-
ables including natural resource dependence, the level of trust in a society, 
cereal plantation patterns, settler mortality, and so on, and choose a sub-
set of these potential instrumental variables that are related to fi nancial 
structure yet pass the over-identifying restrictions test. Beside the instru-
mental variable approach, they also use the Rajan-Zingales difference-
in-difference approach to examine whether fi rms in industries that rely 
more heavily on external fi nance benefi t more in terms of fi rm growth 
from fi nancial development at the country level, holding constant both 
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country and industry fi xed effects, therefore controlling for all country- 
and industry-specifi c factors. This approach signifi cantly reduces the 
extent of omitted variable bias.
Relating fi rm growth to fi rm and country characteristics and fi nancial 
structure, and taking into account the potential endogeneity of fi nancial 
structure, Cull and Xu (2011) fi nd that labor growth is swifter in low-
income countries that have a higher ratio of private credit to GDP, and the 
growth-spurring effects of banking development are especially pronounced 
in industries that heavily rely on external fi nance. In high-income countries, 
labor growth rates are increasing in the level of stock market capitaliza-
tion. Both patterns are consistent with predictions from the new structural 
view and some earlier theoretical conjectures (Allen and Gale 2000; Boyd 
and Smith 1998; Lin, Sun, and Jiang 2011). 
The third clue about the effects of fi nancial structure emerges from 
examining the impact of fi nancial structure on poverty. Financial structure 
might affect poverty because entrepreneurs have trouble obtaining fi nance 
due to information asymmetry between them and investors—the entrepre-
neurs know more about the prospects of the projects than banks and ato-
mistic investors in the stock market. A number of researchers argue that 
banks are better able to reduce this information asymmetry problem than 
stock markets. One reason is that banks form long-term relationship with 
borrowers and can benefi t from the value of the information obtained from 
this long-term relationship. In contrast, well-established stock markets 
quickly and publicly reveal information, thereby reducing the incentives 
for individual investors to acquire information. Banks therefore may have 
better capacity to reduce the information asymmetry issue and make exter-
nal fi nancing possible. Moreover, since stock markets rely more strongly 
on the legal and accounting framework to safeguard necessary returns to 
investors, the effects of stock markets may depend on institutions to a 
greater extent, whereas banks can more effectively force fi rms and house-
holds to honor their contracts than stock markets (Gerschenkron 1962, 
Boyd and Smith 1998), and are therefore especially important in poorer 
countries with weak contract enforcement.
Based on the above logic, Kpodar and Singh (2011), using data from 
47 developing countries from 1984 to 2008, show that fi nancial deepening 
through banks is associated with reduced poverty levels, while market-based 
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measures of fi nancial development are associated with higher incidence of 
poverty in this sample. In addition, the interaction between institutional 
quality and the sized-based measures of the importance of stock markets 
relative to banks is negative and signifi cant in their regressions, indicating 
that as institutions improve, the positive link between market-based fi nan-
cial development and poverty incidence phases out, and even reverses after 
some threshold of institutional quality is reached. Conversely, the results 
suggest that in weak institutional environments bank-based fi nancial sys-
tems tend to reduce poverty more than market-based ones. The authors 
have dealt with the endogeneity of fi nancial structure for poverty by using 
the system GMM estimator, which controls for country fi xed effects, 
and allows fi nancial structure and other variables to be endogenous and 
predetermined. 
The Deviation from the Optimal Financial Structure
Besides derived demand based on industrial structure that originates in 
the endowment structure, there are other determinants of fi nancial struc-
ture that cause the actual fi nancial structure to deviate from the optimal 
one. Earlier research has shown that fi nancial structure is signifi cantly and 
robustly related to law and legal origins (La Porta et al. 2000; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine 2001); here we focus on several other factors such as the 
role of belief and ideas and the role of politics, which have emerged as 
potentially important in recent studies. 
The fi rst factor stems from the belief of government leaders.3 In most 
developing countries, the government plays a very important role in 
defi ning the structure of the economy. And the belief of the top gov-
ernment leaders will naturally shape the country’s fi nancial structure. A 
case in point is the fi nancial repression that is widely observed in many 
developing countries. Countries featuring fi nancial repression tend to 
adopt policies restricting entry into the banking sector, controlling inter-
est rates, and intervening in the allocation of bank loans. As a result, a 
few big banks tend to dominate the banking landscape, and capital tends 
to fl ow to large fi rms. Small businesses, which have comparative advan-
tages in these economies, have little access to credit and have to make do 
with internal capital or resort to informal channels for external fi nance. 
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Why do countries adopt such obviously ineffi cient policies? Inappropri-
ate development strategies adopted by the government are likely the main 
driving force leading to these repressive policies and distorted fi nancial 
system.4 If the government’s priority is to promote industries that are 
inconsistent with the comparative advantages endogenously determined 
by the economy’s endowment structure, it has to use distortional policies 
to channel scarce resources into the priority sectors. As a result, govern-
ment interventions and consequent repression of the fi nancial system are 
inevitable. Due to inertia of institutional change, such distorted policies 
can have prolonged infl uence on the evolution of the fi nancial system. 
A good example of this practice is China. In the 1950s, the factor endow-
ments in the Chinese economy were characterized by extreme scarcity of 
capital and enormous abundance of labor. The government, however, 
decided to adopt an ambitious comparative-advantage-defying develop-
ment strategy in which establishment and development of heavy industries 
took the fi rst priority. To push the development of heavy industries, which 
are very capital-intensive, the government had to deliberately distort prices 
of various products and production factors including labor, capital, and 
foreign exchange; replace market mechanisms with a government plan-
ning system to control the allocation of production factors; nationalize 
private businesses; and collectivize agricultural production with the Peo-
ple’s Communes. In this centrally planned economic regime, banks were 
closed or merged into the People’s Bank of China, which became the only 
fi nancial institution in the whole economy until the end of 1970s. After 
the reform and opening in the late 1970s, the government adopted a dual-
track approach to the transition: on one hand, some transitory protections 
and subsidies were provided to fi rms in the old priority sectors, and, on 
the other hand, entry to sectors that were consistent with the economy’s 
comparative advantages and were repressed in the old strategy were liber-
alized. As part of the economic reform, four big state-owned banks were 
established in the early 1980s. A dozen joint-stock commercial banks were 
also set up in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But interest rates are still 
under the control of the state, and domestic entry into the banking sec-
tor is rigidly restricted by the government. The market share of the four 
big state-owned banks has slowly declined, but they still hold a dominant 
position in the banking system today. Because of this serious mismatch of 
Financial Structure and Economic Development | 277
fi nancial structure with optimal industrial structure, labor-intensive small 
businesses have very limited access to formal fi nancial credit, a situation 
that reduces job creation and contributes to widening inequality of income 
distribution in China. 
A second factor behind the deviation of actual fi nancial structure from 
its optimal one stems from the belief of many policy advisors in the benefi ts 
of fi nancial liberalization and the possibility of leapfrogging in fi nancial 
development. As a policy prescription to correct fi nancial repression, fi nan-
cial liberalization has been generously prescribed by theorists and exer-
cised by many developing countries. While those repressive policies should 
be removed, some new, less noticeable policy distortions may be intro-
duced in the process of fi nancial liberalization. It is not rare that developing 
countries are advised to establish and develop a fi nancial system similar 
to those in the advanced economies. The U.K. and U.S. fi nancial systems, 
where fi nancial markets are highly active, are often taken as the model that 
developing countries should follow. This model is often justifi ed by the 
supposed superiority of fi nancial markets. As a result, some small, low-
income economies are eager to develop stock markets, consolidate small 
banks into large banks. and repress the development of local banks.
However, as the new structural view has argued—and with support-
ing evidence emerging—the optimal fi nancial structure for poor countries 
is likely to be systemically different from that for advanced economies. 
Thus imitating the fi nancial model of advanced economies will not lead 
to improved effi ciency of the fi nancial system nor generate better eco-
nomic performance in poor countries. Such imitation may even result in 
destructive consequences such as fi nancial crises. Such policy advice is also 
inconsistent with the growth experience of those successful economies 
in their industrialization periods. For instance, in the British Industrial 
Revolution, industrial enterprises were typically very small and mainly 
internally fi nanced at both the start-up and expansion stages. In the case 
of external fi nance, personal contacts played a crucial role. The role of 
the banking system in fi nancing long-term investment in industrial sec-
tors was insignifi cant. The British banks were typically small and locally 
based with a limited number of offi ces until at least the mid-19th century. 
Bank merger movement in England did not develop until the 1860s, with 
the peak of merger activity occurring in the late 1880s and early 1890s. 
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When it comes to the role of capital market, history shows that capital 
markets started to play an important role in fi nancing industrial sectors 
only at the end of 19th century. In the United States before 1890, indus-
trial fi rms were numerous, small, and closely owned. Industrial securi-
ties, except in the coal and textile industries, were almost unknown. A 
capital market for industrial preferred stocks did not develop until the 
1887–1904 merger wave. And public markets for common stocks devel-
oped even later. Therefore, while fi nancial markets are a prominent ele-
ment of the current U.K. and U.S. fi nancial systems, this was not the case 
at the early stage of economic development in these countries. According 
to Cull et al. (2006), during the 19th and early 20th centuries, it was a 
variety of local fi nancial institutions that emerged to meet the needs of 
small- and medium-sized fi rms in the economies of the North Atlantic 
Core. These fi nancial intermediaries were able to tap into local informa-
tion networks and so extend credit to fi rms that were too young or small 
to get funds from large, fi nancial center banks. 
The third factor causing deviation of reality from optimal fi nancial 
structure is politics, as argued by Calomiris and Haber (2011) in the case 
of bank crisis—in which case the fi nancial structure is clearly not optimal. 
Many under-banked economies repeatedly supplied credit imprudently: 
once a crisis was over, banks appeared to continue misallocating scarce 
credit to fi rms and households that were prone to default. Why? Calomiris 
and Haber rely on reasoning rooted in political economy that can explain 
the prevalence of fragile banking systems that allocate credit narrowly. The 
key reason is that government actors face inherent confl icts of interest when 
it comes to the operation of the banking system, and those confl icts can 
lead to banking instability and undersupply of credit. Specifi cally, govern-
ments regulate and supervise banks to limit risk taking but they also rely 
on banks as a source of risky public fi nance (by borrowing from and tax-
ing them). In addition, while governments enforce contracts that discipline 
bank borrowers, they also depend on bank debtors for votes or political 
support. Finally, governments distribute losses among creditors when a 
bank fails, but they also must depend on the largest creditor group—bank 
depositors—for their political fate. These confl icts of interest imply that 
regulatory policies toward banks often refl ect the interest of the political 
coalitions that support the government.
Financial Structure and Economic Development | 279
This political economic framework turns out to be very useful for under-
standing banking structure in a series of historical case studies (Scotland, 
England, United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil). Indeed, formation of 
viable political coalitions under different types of government dictated the 
evolution of the banking structure in each of these countries. Adapting the 
conceptual framework to the historical case studies leads to a number of 
conclusions. Foremost, the nature of the coalitions that generate barriers 
to entry in banking varies across types of political regimes. In an autocracy, 
it is easier to create a stable coalition in favor of tight entry restrictions, in 
part because potential borrowers from banks do not have a voice in the 
political process. Autocracies therefore tend to create banking systems that 
allocate credit narrowly to the government and to enterprises owned by an 
elite class of government-selected bankers. The narrow allocation of credit 
under authoritarian regimes has not resulted in greater banking sector sta-
bility, however: in times of economic strife, bank insiders and the govern-
ment expropriate fi rms and households that are either loosely or not at all 
affi liated with the coalition (that is, minority shareholders and depositors). 
In times of extreme diffi culty, the autocrat can (and has) expropriated bank 
insiders.
Mass suffrage, by giving voices to mass economic actors, makes it 
harder to sustain a banking system that allocates credit narrowly to an 
elite group. It does not, however, necessarily guarantee banking stability. 
Bank borrowers can vote for representatives that expand the supply of 
credit, improve the terms on which credit is offered, and then forgive those 
debts when they prove diffi cult to repay. This was largely the story of the 
U.S. subprime crisis. Under any type of political system, banking systems 
are fragile. Therefore, only a small share of countries has been able to 
enjoy stable banking along with broad credit supply, because this outcome 
requires political institutions that allow for mass suffrage, but also limit the 
authority and discretion of the parties in control of the government. 
To shed light on whether real fi nancial structure tends to deviate from 
the optimal fi nancial structure, Cull and Xu (2011) examine the types of 
fi rms that benefi t more from private credit market development. In particu-
lar, they allow the private credit variable (that is, private credit as a share of 
GDP) to interact with fi rm characteristics such as fi rm size and capital inten-
sity in the labor growth equation, estimated at the fi rm level. The authors 
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fi nd no evidence that small-scale fi rms in low-income countries benefi t most 
from private credit market development. Rather, the labor growth rates of 
large and capital-intensive fi rms increase more with the level of private 
credit market development. Thus large and more-capital-intensive fi rms 
seem to benefi t more from banking development in low-income countries. 
This suggests that the actual fi nancial structure likely deviates from the 
optimal fi nancial structure. In particular, the likely scenario is that banks 
in developing countries tend to lend mostly to large and capital-intensive 
fi rms, allowing a small segment of elite fi rms to grow faster. Such a sce-
nario could be due to an over-concentrated banking structure dominated 
by large banks, which in turn lend largely only to large fi rms (Lin, Sun and 
Jiang 2011), or political coalition between political and banking insiders 
restrict entry into the banking sector, resulting in a bank sector dominated 
by large banks, which lends largely to affi liated inside fi rms that tend to be 
large and capital-intensive (Calomiris and Haber 2011).
Conclusions
What explains the vast variations across countries in fi nancial structure? 
Does fi nancial structure have any impact on economic development? There 
has been some evolution on these questions. The traditional theoretical 
views tend to argue that fi nancial structure does not matter. The traditional 
empirical consensus tends to imply that it is fi nancial depth, not fi nancial 
structure, that determines aggregate economic performance.
Several researchers have recently argued that fi nancial services are 
endogenous to industrial structure which in turn depends on a country’s 
relative endowment structure, and optimal fi nancial structure should be 
specifi c to the particular development stage. And some recent fi ndings seem 
to support this view. In particular, while both banks and stock markets 
become larger and more active as a country grows richer, stock markets 
become  relatively more important. Moreover, as economies become richer, 
the sensitivity of economic development to changes in bank development 
decreases, while the sensitivity of economic development to changes in stock 
market development increase, thus the relative demand for the service pro-
vided by stock market increases. In addition, deviation of a country from 
its optimal fi nancial structure is found to be negatively and  signifi cantly 
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related to a lower income level. Firm-level evidence also shows that bank 
development has particularly strong effects in relatively poor countries, 
especially in those industries heavily relying on external fi nance, while 
stock market development has particularly strong effects in relatively rich 
countries. Banks (relative to stock markets) are also found to be relatively 
better in reducing poverty in developing countries, especially in institution-
ally weak countries. On the other hand, there is no evidence that small 
fi rms in developing countries benefi t more from bank development, due to 
the deviation of actual fi nancial structure from the optimal one.
The fi ndings have important implications. First, the optimal fi nancial 
structure changes, becoming more market-oriented, as economies develop. 
Second, new evidence suggests that indeed different fi nancial structures 
may be better at promoting economic activity at different stages of a coun-
try’s economic development. These fi ndings advertise fi nancial structure 
as an independent fi nancial policy consideration. And if the optimal mix-
ture changes as an economy develops, then this suggests the desirability 
of appropriately adjusting fi nancial policies and institutions as countries 
develop. Third, politics, legal origins, and beliefs of government leaders 
may cause the actual fi nancial structure in a country to deviate from its 
optimal, resulting in some effi ciency and welfare losses to the economy. 
Improving the understanding of what the optimal is and the effi ciency and 
welfare losses due to the deviation from the optimal, therefore, may miti-
gate the impact of political and other belief-related factors in the determi-
nation of a country’s actual fi nancial structure.
Notes
†  This paper benefi ted from discussions with Robert Cull and Asli Demirgüç-
Kunt, and the discussions at the World Bank Conference on Financial Struc-
ture held in Washington, D.C., on June 17, 2011.
  Lixin Colin Xu is a Lead Economist in the Development Research Group 
of the World Bank. 
1.  Technological innovation risks are those related to successfully developing new 
products, while product innovation risks concern those related to successfully 
getting the new product accepted by the market.
2.  There would also be numerous small banks offering services to small labor-
intensive fi rms in the non-tradable sectors.
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3.  The next four paragraphs draw heavily from Lin, Sun, and Jiang (2011). See 
also references therein. 
4.  See Lin (2009) for detailed discussion of development strategy and its impact 
on the development of fi nancial institutions.
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PART 1*†
Introduction
Since the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century, the world’s 
countries have evolved into two groups. The fi rst group includes rich, 
industrialized, developed countries (DCs). The second group includes 
poor, agrarian, less-developed countries (LDCs). The wealth of devel-
oped countries results from their industrial and technological advantages. 
Since the nineteenth century, political leaders and intellectuals alike have 
debated how to modernize LDCs (Gerschenkron 1962; Lal 1985). After 
World War II, many LDC governments adopted various policy measures 
to industrialize their economies. However, only a small number of econo-
mies in East Asia have actually succeeded in raising their level of per 
capita income to the level in DCs.1 
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I argue here that the failure of most LDCs to converge with DCs in 
terms of economic performance can be explained largely by their govern-
ments’ inappropriate development strategies. After World War II, most 
LDC governments pursued development plans that placed priority on the 
development of certain capital-intensive industries. However, an economy’s 
optimal industrial structure is endogenously determined by that economy’s 
endowment structure. Often the fi rms in a government’s priority indus-
tries are not viable in an open, competitive market because these industries 
do not match the comparative advantage of their particular economy. As 
such, the government introduces a series of distortions in its international 
trade, fi nancial sector, labor market, and so on, to support nonviable fi rms. 
It is possible with such distortions to establish capital-intensive industries 
in developing countries, but the economy becomes very ineffi cient because 
of misallocation of resources, rampant rent seeking, macroeconomic insta-
bility, and so forth. Consequently, convergence—that is, convergence of 
LDC economic indicators to levels akin to those in DCs—fails to occur. 
I argue that the government of an LDC should focus development efforts 
on upgrading the country’s endowment structure instead of on upgrad-
ing its industry/technology structure. Once the endowment structure 
is upgraded, profi t motives and competitive pressures will lead fi rms to 
upgrade their technologies and industries. The upgrading of the endow-
ment structure means faster accumulation of capital—both physical and 
human—than the growth of labor and natural resources in the economy. 
Capital accumulation depends on the economic surplus (or, alternatively, 
the profi ts) and the savings propensity in an economy. If an LDC develops 
its industries in accordance with its comparative advantages, its economy 
will have the largest possible economic surplus and the highest savings 
propensities and will therefore achieve the highest possible upgrade in 
its endowment structure. Following this strategy, an LDC could achieve 
faster upgrades in endowment, technology, and industrial structures than 
the DCs and realize convergence. A fi rm’s choice of industry/technology 
depends on the relative prices of capital, labor, and natural resources in 
the economy. Therefore, only if the price structure of the economy can 
refl ect the relative abundances of capital, labor, and natural resources will 
fi rms choose their industries and technologies according to comparative 
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 advantage. The price structure will refl ect the relative abundance of each 
factor only if the prices are determined in competitive markets. Therefore, 
the government’s primary function for economic development is to main-
tain well-functioning markets. 
I fi rst present a brief overview of recent theoretical developments and 
debates on economic growth and convergence. I then discuss the deter-
minants of a fi rm’s viability and an economy’s comparative advantages 
and their relations to the economy’s factor endowments. After analyzing 
a government’s alternative development strategies, I present the statistical 
measurement of a development strategy and the econometric estimation of 
the impact of the development strategy on economic growth. The policy 
implications of the analyses are set forth in a concluding section. 
Growth Theories: An Overview 
When the fi eld of development economics started to take shape in the 
postwar period, development economists encouraged LDC governments 
to adopt interventional policies to accelerate capital accumulation and to 
pursue “inward-looking” strategies oriented toward heavy industry or 
import substitution aimed directly at closing the industry-technology gap 
with DCs (Chenery 1961; Warr 1994). These economists were strongly 
infl uenced by the Soviet Union’s initial success in nation-building, by the 
pessimism surrounding the export of primary products born during the 
Great Depression, by the lack of confi dence in markets, and by neoclassical 
growth theory (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Prebisch 1959). Since the 1950s, 
most LDCs in both socialist and capitalist camps have adopted some varia-
tion of these strategies (Krueger 1992). 
According to seminal work by Robert Solow (1956) and others, neo-
classical growth theory, with its assumption of the same given technology 
to DCs and LDCs, has suggested that LDCs would grow faster than DCs 
and that the gap in per capita income between DCs and LDCs would 
narrow because of the diminishing returns to capital in DCs. However, 
empirical evidence shows that, while convergence occurred within the 
different states in the United States and among the DCs (Barro and 
 Sala-i-Martin 1992; Baumol 1986), most LDCs failed to narrow the gaps 
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between their per capita incomes and those of the DCs (Pearson 1969; 
Romer 1994). 
Unsatisfi ed with neoclassical growth theory’s inability to explain the 
continuous growth of DCs and the failure of most LDCs to converge with 
DCs, Paul Romer (1986) and Robert Lucas (1988) pioneered a new growth 
theory. Their theory treats technological innovation as endogenously deter-
mined by the accumulation of human capital, research and development 
(R&D), learning by doing, and so on. This new growth theory is insightful 
for explaining the continuous growth of DCs, which use the most advanced 
technologies. However, the new growth theory cannot satisfactorily explain 
the extraordinary growth and convergence during the last three decades of 
the twentieth century of the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in Asia, 
including South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and, recently, 
China (Pack 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1994). During the catch-up 
process, these NIEs’ investments in R&D, human capital, and learning by 
doing were much lower than those of DCs. 
The LDCs generally use technologies that are inside the technology 
frontier of the DCs (Caselli and Coleman 2000). Technological innovation 
in a DC that adopts technology on the new frontier can be obtained only 
through R&D or other knowledge-generating mechanisms. For an LDC, 
however, technological innovation can be the result of technology transfer 
or the imitation of existing technology held by DCs. The costs of techno-
logical innovation through R&D are obviously much higher than the costs 
of imitation or other ways of technological borrowing. Therefore, technol-
ogy diffusion from DCs to the LDCs will facilitate the growth of LDCs. It 
is futile, when attempting to understand convergence, to focus primarily 
on mechanisms that generate new technology. 
However, the technological gap between DCs and LDCs is fi lled with a 
whole spectrum of different technologies. An LDC is faced with the ques-
tion of which technology is appropriate to imitate or borrow. 
The idea of appropriate technology was fi rst introduced in neoclassical 
trade theory by Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz (1969), who formal-
ized “localized learning by doing.” E. F. Schumacher (1973) made a similar 
argument in development economics. The study of appropriate technol-
ogy has been revived recently by I. Diwan and D. Rodrik (1991), Susanto 
Basu and David Weil (1998), and Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti 
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(1999).2 However, the models based on the idea of appropriate technology 
are inconclusive on the issue of convergence. Basu and Weil (1998) con-
sider the relatively low capital stock in an LDC as a barrier to adopting the 
advanced technology of DCs. They conclude that an LDC will experience 
a period of rapid growth by raising its savings rate to take advantage of 
the advanced technology. However, their arguments cannot explain why 
governmental interventions to improve the savings rate in Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia—excluding the “Four Little Dragons”—failed to acceler-
ate the growth rate. In a cross-country study, Francisco Rodríguez and 
Dani Rodrik show that causality runs from growth to savings, not vice 
versa. It would be quite diffi cult for a rise in the savings rate to trigger 
rapid growth. By contrast, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) stress the disad-
vantages of importing technology. In their framework, technology in DCs 
is used by skilled workers. When the technology is transferred to an LDC, 
the technology is used by unskilled workers. This mismatch between labor 
skill and technology can lead to sizable differences in output per capita 
and total factor productivity (TFP). To Acemoglu and Zilibotti, improving 
the skill base and human capital of workers, the same argument made by 
Lucas (1993), is critical to income convergence. The assumption adopted 
by Acemoglu and Zilibotti is, however, too strong: they assume that LDCs 
always adopt DCs’ frontier technologies rather than some technologies 
inside the frontier. 
The appropriate technology argument does not answer the question 
of the appropriate role of LDC government in the process of economic 
growth. Although the linkage of knowledge diffusion with an appropri-
ate technology suggests an alternative development path that differs from 
the development practices followed by many LDCs, it is not clear if the 
government’s intervention matters to economic growth. Moreover, it is not 
clear if governments should adopt policies to improve the savings rate and 
human capital stock of the private sector or if they should subsidize the 
adoption of high technology industries directly. 
Viability, Comparative Advantage, and Endowment Structure
A country’s per capita income is a function of the prevailing technologies 
and industries found in the country. If two countries have an identical 
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technology-industry structure, the two countries should have a similar 
level of per capita GDP. To understand how the income of an LDC con-
verges to that of DCs, we need to understand how an LDC can narrow the 
technology/industry gap between it and DCs. I will fi rst defi ne the mean-
ing of a fi rm’s viability and the relationship between a fi rm’s viability and 
its industry/technology choice. 
I defi ne the term viability with respect to the expected rate of profi t of 
a normally managed fi rm in an open, free, and competitive market. If, 
without any external subsidies or protections, a normally managed fi rm is 
expected to earn a socially acceptable profi t in a free, open, and competi-
tive market, the fi rm is viable. Otherwise, the fi rm is nonviable. It is obvi-
ous that no one will invest in a fi rm if it is not expected to earn a socially 
acceptable normal profi t. Such a fi rm will exist only if the government 
gives it support. 
In a competitive market, the management of a fi rm will affect its prof-
itability. This statement is a known proposition. However, the expected 
profi tability of a fi rm also depends on its industry/technology choice. 
My discussion begins by presenting a simple economy that possesses two 
given factor endowments, capital and labor, and produces only one good. 
Each point on the isoquant shown in fi gure VI.1 represents a technology 
of production or a combination of capital and labor required to produce 
a given amount of a certain product. The technology represented by A is 
more labor-intensive than that of B; C, C1, D, and D1 are isocost lines. 
The slope of an isocost line represents the relative prices of capital and 
labor. In an economy where capital is relatively expensive and labor is rela-
tively inexpensive, as represented by isocost lines C and C1, the adoption 
of technology A to produce the given amount of output will cost the least. 
When the relative price of labor increases, as represented by the isocost 
lines by D and D1, production will cost least if technology B is adopted. 
In a free, open, and competitive market economy that produces only 
one product as illustrated in fi gure 1, a fi rm will be viable only if it adopts 
the least-cost technology in its production. In fi gure VI.1, if the relative 
prices of capital and labor can be presented by C, the adoption of technol-
ogy A costs the least. The adoption of any other technology, such as B, will 
cost more. Market competition will make fi rms that adopt technologies 
other than A nonviable. Therefore, in a competitive market with given 
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relative prices of labor and capital, the viability of a fi rm depends on its 
technology choice. 
In a competitive market, the relative prices of capital and labor are 
determined by the relative abundance or scarcity of capital and labor in 
the economy’s factor endowments. When labor is relatively abundant and 
capital is relatively scarce, the isocost line will be similar to that of line C in 
fi gure VI.1. When capital becomes relatively abundant and labor relatively 
scarce, the isocost line will change to something like line D. Therefore, the 
viability of a fi rm in a competitive market depends on whether its choice 
of technology is on the least-cost lines determined by the relative factor 
endowments of the economy. 
This discussion can be extended to an economy with one industry 
that has many different products and an economy that has many differ-
ent industries. As shown in fi gure VI.2, lines I1, I2, and I3 represent the 
isoquants of three different products that have the same output value in 
industry I. The average relative capital intensity of the three products is 
increasing from I1 to I3. As shown in fi gure VI.2, the viability of a fi rm is 
determined by whether or not its product and technology choices are on 
the least-cost line, which is determined by the relative factor endowments 
of the economy. 
Figure VI.1: Relative Price of Production Factors and Technique Choice
capital
labor
B
A
D CD1 C1
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An industry can be represented by an isovalue line, which is the enve-
lope of the isoquants of all different kinds of products in the industry. On 
the isovalue line of an industry, each point represents a specifi c product in 
the industry that is produced by a specifi c technology and has the same 
value as any other product in the same line. Figure VI.3 shows an econ-
omy that has three different industries, which are represented by the three 
industrial isovalue lines I, J, and K, respectively. These three lines have the 
same value. If labor is relatively abundant and the isocost line is indicated 
by C, the economy has a comparative advantage in industries I and J, and 
a fi rm will be viable if it enters industry I (or J) and adopts a correspond-
ing technology to produce product I1 (or J1). Suppose that the relative 
abundance of capital increases such that the isocost line changes to line D. 
The comparative advantage of the economy will change accordingly, and 
a fi rm will be viable if it upgrades its product-technology from J1 to J2 
in industry J or it migrates to industry K and produces K1. The fi rm that 
produces I1 in industry I will become nonviable. 
From the above discussion, one sees that the concept of a fi rm’s viabil-
ity and the concept of an economy’s comparative advantage are closely 
related. Viability refers to a fi rm’s expected profi tability, while comparative 
advantage refers to the competitiveness of an industry in an open economy. 
Figure VI.2: Product Choice in an Industry 
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Both are endogenously determined by the economy’s relative factor endow-
ments. In a closed economy, however, the concept of viability is still relevant 
while the concept of comparative advantage is not. This discussion leads to 
the conclusion that, if an LDC wants to close the industry-technology gap, 
it needs to start by focusing on narrowing the factor endowment gap. 
Alternative Development Strategies 
The government is the most important institution in any economy. Its eco-
nomic policies shape the macro incentive structure that fi rms in the econ-
omy face. With the aim of explaining the success or failure of convergence 
in an LDC, I analyze government economic policies toward industrial 
development. I group these policies into different development strategies 
and then broadly divide the development strategies into two mutually 
exclusive groups: the comparative-advantage-defying (CAD) strategy, 
which attempts to encourage fi rms to ignore the existing comparative 
advantages of the economy in their entry/choice of industry/technology, 
and the comparative-advantage-following (CAF) strategy, which attempts 
to facilitate the fi rms’ entry/choice of industry/technology according to 
the economy’s existing comparative advantages.3 No one country has ever 
Figure VI.3: Industry and Product Choices in an Economy
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followed either strategy consistently or without amendment. However, 
some countries have followed a strategy close enough to be a model of 
that strategy. A country that follows a particular strategy may also aban-
don it. A switch in strategy provides a good opportunity for careful com-
parison of the impact of different strategies. 
The Characteristics of Development Strategies 
The CAD Strategy. Most LDCs are characterized by relatively abundant 
labor and scarce capital. Therefore, in a free, open, and competitive mar-
ket, fi rms in LDCs enter relatively labor-intensive industries and adopt 
relatively labor-intensive technologies in their production.4 However, 
political leaders and intellectuals in LDCs often equate industrialization, 
especially heavy industrialization, with modernization and push their 
countries to develop capital-intensive heavy industries and adopt the most 
advanced technologies in their production as quickly as possible. They 
want the economy to develop some industry like K and produce product 
K1 when the isocost line determined by their endowment structure is C 
(see fi gure VI.3).5 With the given endowment structure, a fi rm producing 
product K1 will not be viable in a free, open, and competitive market. If 
a free, open, and competitive market is maintained, a fi rm following its 
government’s strategy will incur a loss equivalent to the distance between 
isocost lines C and C1. I call this loss a policy burden on the fi rm. Because 
the government is responsible for the fi rm’s entry-adoption of the industry/
technology, the government is accountable for the fi rm’s loss. Therefore, 
for implementing the CAD strategy, the government must give the fi rm a 
policy subsidy to compensate for losses incurred (Lin and Tan 1999; Lin, 
Cai, and Li 1998, 2001). 
How large the subsidy needs to be to compensate for the policy burden 
in the real world depends on how distant the promoted industry-technology 
is from the economy’s comparative advantages. If the distance is small, the 
government can rely on tax incentives or direct fi scal transfer to subsidize 
the fi rm. However, this distance is often very large when the government in 
an LDC pursues a CAD strategy and special institutional arrangements are 
required for achieving the strategy’s goal. 
When an LDC government pursues a CAD strategy, the most frequently 
used method of subsidy is to suppress interest rates by regulation in order 
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to reduce the project’s capital costs. In addition, the equipment for the 
CAD project, in general, cannot be produced domestically in an LDC and 
needs to be imported from DCs. Therefore, access to foreign exchange is 
also required for the CAD project. However, foreign exchange in an LDC 
is generally scarce and expensive because the LDC’s exports are limited and 
consist mainly of low-value agricultural products and resources. To lower 
the costs of equipment imports for the CAD project, governments also tend 
to overvalue domestic currency and undervalue foreign exchanges.6 
On the one hand, the distortions in the interest rate and the foreign 
exchange rates will stimulate fi rms in both the priority and nonpriority 
sectors to demand more capital and foreign exchange. On the other hand, 
distortions will suppress the incentives to save and export and, thus, 
reduce the availability of capital and foreign exchange in the economy. 
Therefore, there will be shortages in capital and foreign exchange, and 
the government will need to use administrative measures to ration capital 
and foreign reserves in order to guarantee that the CAD fi rms will have 
the resources to perform strategic tasks. The resource allocation function 
of markets is thus constrained, or even replaced by, direct government 
rationing.7 
Theoretically, the government that adopts a CAD strategy is respon-
sible only for giving a subsidy to compensate for the loss arising from the 
policy burden. Given information asymmetry, however, the government 
cannot distinguish losses induced by the policy burden from operational 
losses. The fi rms will use the policy burden as an excuse and use resources 
to lobby the government for ex ante policy favors, such as access to low-
interest loans, tax reductions, tariff protection, legal monopolies, and so 
on, to compensate for policy burdens. In addition to policy favors, if the 
fi rms still incur losses, they will also request that the government offer 
some ex post, ad hoc administrative assistance, such as more preferential 
loans. The economy will be full of rent-seeking or directly unproductive 
profi t-seeking activities.8 Because the fi rms can use the policy burdens as an 
excuse to bargain for more government support and because it is hard for 
the government to shun such responsibility, the fi rm’s budget constraints 
become soft.9 When a soft budget constraint exists, the manager of the fi rm 
will have no pressure to improve productivity and will have more on-the-
job consumption and other moral hazards. The subsidies could actually 
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end up much higher than those required to compensate for the original 
policy burdens. 
The CAF Strategy. The government in an LDC could adopt the alternative 
CAF strategy to encourage fi rms to enter the industries for which the coun-
try has comparative advantages and to adopt the technology in production 
that will make these fi rms viable. As discussed above, the industries for 
which the economy has comparative advantages and the technologies that 
are appropriate for production are all determined by the country’s relative 
factor endowments. However, the managers of fi rms, as micro agents, have 
no knowledge or concern of the actual endowments. Their only concerns 
are the prices of their outputs and the costs of their production. They will 
enter the industry and choose the technology of production appropriately 
only if the relative factor prices correctly refl ect the relative factor abun-
dances, which can be achieved only if the markets are competitive. There-
fore, when the government in an LDC adopts a CAF strategy, its primary 
policy is to remove all possible obstacles to the functioning of free, open, 
and competitive product and factor markets. 
The above discussions assume that the information about the product 
markets, industries, and production technologies is freely available to 
the fi rms in the economy. Therefore, when the factor endowment struc-
ture of the economy is upgraded, the fi rms can upgrade their product-
technologies or smoothly upgrade from a less capital-intensive industry 
to a relatively more capital-intensive industry. Such information may 
not be available, however, so it is necessary to invest resources to search 
for, collect, and analyze industry, product, and technology information. 
If a fi rm carries out the activities on its own, it will keep the information 
private, and other fi rms will be required to make the same investment 
to obtain the information. There will be repetition in the information 
investments. The information has a public goods aspect, however. After 
the information has been gathered and processed, the cost of informa-
tion dissemination is close to zero. Therefore, the government can col-
lect the information about the new industries, markets, and technology 
and make it available in the form of an industrial policy to all fi rms. 
The upgrading of technology and industry in an economy often requires 
the coordination of different fi rms and sectors in the economy. For example, 
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the human capital or skill requirements of new industries and technologies 
may be different from those used with older industries and technologies. 
A fi rm may not be able to internalize the supply of the new requirements 
and will need to rely on outside sources. Therefore, the success of a fi rm’s 
industry-technology upgrade also depends on the existence of an outside 
supply of new human capital. In addition to human capital, the fi rms 
that are upgrading may also require new fi nancial institutions, trading 
arrangements, marketing, distribution facilities, and so on. Therefore, the 
government may also use industrial policy to coordinate among fi rms in 
different industries and sectors for the upgrade of industry and technology 
in the economy. 
The upgrading of industry and technology is an innovation, and it is 
risky by nature. Even with the information and coordination provided 
by the government’s industry policy, a fi rm’s attempt to upgrade may fail 
because the upgrade is too ambitious, the new market is too small, the 
coordination is simply inadequate, and so forth. The failure will indicate 
to other fi rms that the targets of the industrial policy are not appropriate 
and, therefore, they can avoid that failure by not following the policy. That 
is, the fi rst fi rm pays the cost of failure and produces valuable informa-
tion for other fi rms. If the fi rst fi rm succeeds, the success will also provide 
externalities to other fi rms, prompting them to engage in similar upgrades. 
These subsequent upgrades will also dissipate the possible rents that the 
fi rst fi rm may enjoy, so there is an asymmetry between the costs of failure 
and the gains of success that the fi rst fi rm may have. To compensate for 
the externality and the asymmetry between the possible costs and gains, 
the government may provide some forms of subsidy, such as tax incen-
tives or loan guarantees, to the fi rms that initially follow the government’s 
industrial policy. 
It is worth noting that there is a fundamental difference between the 
industrial policy of the CAF strategy and that of the CAD strategy. The 
promoted industry/technology in the CAF strategy is consistent with 
the comparative advantage determined by changes in the economy’s 
factor endowments, whereas the priority industry/technology that the 
CAD strategy attempts to promote is not consistent with comparative 
advantage. Therefore, the fi rms in the CAF strategy should be viable, 
and a small, limited-time subsidy should be enough to compensate for 
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the information externality. By contrast, fi rms following a CAD strategy 
are not viable, and their survival depends on large, continuous policy 
favors and support from the government.10 
A comparison of the successes and failures of industrial policies on auto-
mobile production in Japan, South Korea, India, and China is a good illus-
tration of the differences between the CAF and CAD industrial policies. 
The automobile industry is a typical capital-intensive heavy industry, and 
its development is the dream of every LDC. Japan adopted an industrial 
policy to promote its automobile industry in the mid-1960s and achieved 
great success. Japan’s experience is often cited as a supporting argument by 
advocates of an industrial policy for heavy industries in developing coun-
tries. South Korea instituted an industrial policy for automobile produc-
tion in the mid-1970s and has also achieved a limited degree of success 
in automobile production. The automobile industries in China and India 
were started in the 1950s, and the industry in both countries has required 
continuous protection from the government since that time. How does one 
explain why a similar industrial policy can yield success in one instance and 
failure in another? This becomes clear once one compares the per capita 
income of these countries with the per capita income of the United States 
at the time when they initiated their policies (table VI.1). 
Per capita income is a good proxy for the relative abundances of capital 
and labor in an economy. Capital is abundant and wage rates are high 
in a high-income country. In a low-income country, the opposite holds 
true. Table VI.1 indicates that, when Japan initiated its automobile pro-
duction policy in the mid-1960s, its per capita income was more than 
40 percent that of the United States. The automobile industry was not the 
most advanced, capital-intensive industry at that time, nor was Japan a 
Table VI.1: Level of Per Capita Income
(in 1990 Geary-Khamis $)
Year United States Japan South Korea India China
1955 10,970 2,695 1,197 665 818
1965 14,017 5,771 1,578 785 945
1975 16,060 10,973 3,475 900 1,250
Source: Maddison 1995.
Note: The Geary-Khamis dollar is a multilateral purchasing power parity measurement of income. The use of the 
 Geary-Khamis technique to convert income in different countries ensures cross-country comparisons, base country 
 invariance, and additivity of the measurements. 
Development Strategy, Institutions, and Economic Performance | 301
capital-scarce economy. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) gave support only to Nissan and Toyota. However, more than 10 
fi rms—ignoring MITI’s prompting not to enter the industry—also started 
automobile production and were successful, even though they did not 
receive any support from MITI. The above evidence indicates that the 
Japanese automobile fi rms were viable and that the MITI’s promotion of 
the automobile industry in the 1960s was a CAF strategy. When Korea 
initiated its automobile industry development policy in the 1970s, its per 
capita income was only about 20 percent that of the United States and 
about 30 percent that of Japan. This may explain why the Korean govern-
ment needed to give its automobile fi rms much greater and longer support 
than the Japanese government did its fi rms. Despite the support, two of 
the three automobile fi rms in Korea recently fell into bankruptcy. When 
China and India initiated their automobile industry development policies 
in the 1950s, their per capita incomes were less than 10 percent that of 
the United States. The automobile fi rms in China and in India were not 
viable at all. It is still the case today that their survival depends on heavy 
government protection.11 
Human Capital and Economic Development 
The previous discussion focused on the accumulation of physical capital 
and its determining effect on an economy’s industry-technology upgrad-
ing. The role of human capital in the process of development has received 
much attention in the development literature in recent years. Recent empir-
ical work that attempts to explain cross-country income differences has 
included human capital as an explanatory variable in the production func-
tion and has found that human capital has a positive effect on economic 
growth (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort 
1996; Klenow and Rodriguez 1997; Barro 1997). 
What is the role of human capital accumulation in the development 
strategy of an LDC? If an LDC adopts a CAF strategy, the upgrading of its 
factor endowments will occur rapidly, and, consequently, the upgrading of 
its industry/technology will also be very rapid. Upgrading is an innovation 
by nature, even though the process is an imitation of an existing industry 
or technology from more advanced countries. The managers/workers will 
face and will need to handle uncertainty in skills, production, marketing, 
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and so on in the upgrading process. They will also need to make many 
adaptations in the borrowed technologies to fi t them to local conditions. 
Increasing the manager’s or worker’s human capital will increase his or 
her ability to handle these kinds of uncertainties and to carry out neces-
sary adaptations (Schultz 1975). When a developing country narrows its 
industry/technology gap with DCs, it will move from mature industries 
and technologies closer to newer, less mature, and more uncertain indus-
tries and technologies. The requirement for human capital increases with 
economic development because human capital becomes increasingly com-
plementary to physical capital in the new, frontier industries and technolo-
gies.12 Given the complementary relationship between physical capital and 
human capital, it is necessary to accumulate human capital along with the 
accumulation of physical capital in the convergence process. Human capi-
tal is not a substitute for physical capital, however. An overaccumulation 
of human capital will lead to waste. After World War II, many scientists 
and engineers migrated to the United States from India and Latin America 
and other developing countries, but they made little direct contribution to 
the economic growth of their mother countries. These scientists and engi-
neers are not to be blamed, however, because the low factor endowment 
structures in their mother countries made it impossible for many of them to 
fi nd suitable positions that would utilize their human capital at home. 
Comparison of CAF Strategy and CAD Strategy 
The attempt to catch up with DCs is justifi able for any LDC. The CAD 
strategy is appealing to political leaders and the general public in LDCs, 
including elite intellectuals, because most people directly observe the dif-
ferences between industry-technology structures in DCs and those of their 
own countries and notice the correlation between industry-technology and 
per capita income. However, a CAF strategy enables an LDC to catch up 
with DCs, while a CAD strategy in effect stifl es an LDC’s opportunity to 
catch up. Many other theories have also attempted to explain an LDC’s 
success or failure in achieving sustained economic development. The CAF/
CAD strategy framework provides a unifi ed explanation. 
Capital Accumulation. An economy’s optimal industry-technology struc-
ture is endogenously determined by its endowment structure. Therefore, if 
an LDC wants to attain the industry/technology structure of a DC, it fi rst 
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needs to narrow the gap between their respective factor endowment struc-
tures. The upgrading of the factor endowment structure means an increase 
in capital relative to labor. Capital accumulation depends on the size of 
surplus/profi ts accrued by fi rms and the rate of savings of economic agents 
in the economy. When, following the CAF strategy, a fi rm in an economy 
enters an industry in which that economy has a comparative advantage 
and adopts the least-cost technology in its production, the fi rm will be 
competitive, occupy the largest market share, and have the largest surplus/
profi ts. Meanwhile, the capital in the economy employed in the indus-
tries following comparative advantage will have the highest possible rate 
of return. Therefore, economic agents’ incentives to save will be highest. 
Moreover, the government will not distort the prices of factors and prod-
ucts, nor will the government use administrative powers to create legal 
monopolies. Therefore, there will be no scope for wasteful rent-seeking 
activities. The fi rm will have a hard budget constraint and will need to earn 
profi ts by improving management and competitiveness. The CAD strategy 
will result in just the opposite of what the CAF strategy promises regarding 
competitiveness, rates of return, rent-seeking activities, and the softness of 
budget constraints in fi rms in the priority industries. Therefore, upgrading 
the endowment structure will be faster under the CAF strategy than under 
the CAD strategy. 
Technology Transfer. Upgrading the endowment structure in an economy 
will provide the basis for upgrading the industry-technology structure 
(Basu and Weil 1998). The targeted industry-technology will be new to the 
fi rms in an LDC and will need to be transferred from DCs. The learning 
costs will be smaller under the CAF strategy than under the CAD strat-
egy because the distance between the new industry/technology and the old 
industry/technology is smaller under the former strategy than under the 
latter strategy (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). Moreover, the patent pro-
tections for many of the targeted technologies under the CAF strategy may 
have already expired. Even if a technology is still under patent protection, 
the license fee will be lower with the CAF strategy than with the CAD 
strategy because the targeted technology for the CAF strategy is older than 
the CAD strategy ceteris paribus. In some cases, the fi rm under the CAD 
strategy will not be able to obtain the technology from DCs and will need 
to “reinvent the wheel” and invest in costly and risky R&D of technology 
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by themselves. Therefore, the acquisition costs of the technology will be 
lower under the CAF strategy than under the CAD strategy. 
Openness in International Trade. A number of empirical studies show 
that more open countries exhibit stronger convergence tendencies than do 
closed countries (Harberger 1985; Dollar 1992; Warr 1994; Ben-David 
1993; Sachs and Warner 1995; Harrison 1996; Michaely 1977; Frankel 
and Romer 1999). International trade is expected to facilitate technol-
ogy diffusion among countries. Jong-Wha Lee (1995) fi nds that countries 
importing more capital goods tend to grow faster, which means that new 
technologies may be embodied in the capital goods. However, Rodríguez 
and Rodrik (1999) argue that “methodological problems with the empiri-
cal strategies employed in this literature leave the results open to diverse 
interpretations.” The role of trade policies is unclear. If the importation 
of equipment facilitates technology transfer, should the government adopt 
measures to promote it, or is it best to pursue trade liberalization in the 
sense of lower tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade? 
In this framework, a country adopting a CAF strategy will rely on 
importing products for which it does not have a comparative advantage 
and exporting products for which it has comparative advantage. For this 
country, openness is endogenously determined by the country’s factor 
endowment structure instead of by an exogenously determined policy for 
imports and exports. If the government in an LDC adopts the CAD strat-
egy and attempts to substitute the importation of capital-intensive manu-
factured goods by domestic production, not only will the country’s import 
trade be reduced but also its export trade will be suppressed. The latter 
consequence results from the transfer of resources away from the indus-
tries for which the economy has a comparative advantage. Also, exchange 
rates may be overvalued to facilitate the development of priority industries, 
effectively hampering export opportunities. Socialist economies, India, and 
many Latin American countries exemplify this case. The growth perfor-
mance of these countries is miserable compared with economies that have 
followed the CAF strategy more closely. The government in an LDC may 
adopt the CAD strategy and, at the same time, encourage its fi rms in the 
priority capital-intensive industries to export. In this case, exports will be 
unprofi table even though the fi rms may have a high ratio of exports to 
foreign markets and may achieve fast technology improvements.13 The 
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fi rms’ survival relies on the protection of domestic markets, preferential 
loans from banks, and other policy support. The country will have poor 
external accounts, accumulate foreign debt, and be easily affected by exter-
nal shocks. It may be better for an LDC to adopt a CAD strategy that 
encourages exports rather than a CAD strategy that encourages import 
substitution. However, the overall economic performance of an economy 
that adopts the export-promotion strategy will be poorer than that of an 
economy that adopts the CAF strategy.14 Therefore, it is not true that more 
exports in a country necessarily lead to higher GDP growth.15 
Financial Deepening. Since the pioneering works by E. S. Shaw (1969) and 
R. Mckinnon (1973), many researchers have argued that there exists cau-
sality between fi nancial deepening and economic growth in an economy. 
The indicator often used to measure fi nancial deepening is either the ratio 
of the money supply (M2) to GDP, or the total amount of credits from 
fi nancial intermediaries to private sector divided by GDP. The empirical 
fi ndings have supported the above hypothesis (Levine 1997; Rajan and 
Zingales 1998). 
However, the degree of fi nancial deepening in an LDC is, to a large 
extent, endogenous to a government’s development strategy. Under the 
CAD strategy, the carriers of a government’s development strategy are the 
large-sized fi rms. To support the fi nancial needs of nonviable large-sized 
fi rms, the government often nationalizes the fi rms and uses direct fi scal 
appropriation—skipping fi nancial intermediation—to support these fi rms. 
Such was the case in the former socialist planned economies and continues 
to be the case in India and many other LDCs. Even if the government relies 
on private fi rms to carry out the CAD strategy, the CAD needs of large-
sized fi rms will be signifi cant and can only be met by a heavily regulated oli-
gopolistic banking system; consequently, interest rates will be suppressed. 
In either case, the fi nancial system in the country will be underdeveloped. 
However, the most competitive and dynamic fi rms in LDCs are the labor-
intensive small- and medium-size fi rms, which are discriminated against 
and often denied access to fi nancial services by large banks. The fi nancial 
system is, thus, very ineffi cient. Moreover, the priority-sector fi rms that 
receive preferential access to bank loans are not viable and may not be able 
to repay loans. The banks often accumulate large amounts of bad debts 
from the large fi rms in the priority sectors, thus contributing to or even 
306 | New Structural Economics
triggering an economic crisis. A precondition for fi nancial deepening in an 
LDC is, therefore, a change in the government’s development orientation 
from a CAD strategy to a CAF strategy. 
Macroeconomic Stability. The bulk of empirical studies show that vol-
atility in the macroeconomy could hamper long-run growth (Barro and 
 Sala-i-Martin 1997). If the government in an LDC adopts the CAD 
strategy, fi rms in priority industries will not be viable and will rely on pref-
erential loans, trade barriers, and other policy support for their survival. 
Because existing comparative advantages are not utilized, the economy as a 
whole will not be competitive, no dynamic changes in the economy’s com-
parative advantage can be sustained, and the economic performance of the 
economy will be poor. The economy will have a weak fi nancial sector and 
poor external accounts. Fiscal defi cits, debt burdens, and fi nancial fragility 
will accumulate, and macroeconomic stability will become unsustainable. 
A country that follows the CAF strategy will have better external accounts, 
will have healthier fi nancial and fi scal systems, will be better equipped to 
resist external shocks, and will have a much better record of macroeco-
nomic stability.16 
Income Distribution. The relationship between income distribution and 
economic development is one of the oldest subjects in development eco-
nomics. Simon Kuznets (1955) proposed an inverted-U hypothesis, sug-
gesting that inequality tends to widen during the initial stages of economic 
development with a reversal of this tendency in the later stages. There is 
mixed evidence for this hypothesis. A number of cross-sectional studies 
support this hypothesis (Paukert 1973; Cline 1975, Chenery and Syrquin 
1975; Ahluwalia 1976). However, the study of 43 episodes in 19 countries 
by Gary Fields (1991) fi nds that there is no tendency for poorer countries 
to yield increased rather than decreased inequality or for richer countries 
to yield decreased rather than increased income inequality, while a case 
study by John Fei, Gustav Ranis, and Shirley W. Y. Kuo (1979) shows that 
the Taiwanese economy achieved growth with equity. I propose that the 
adoption of the CAF strategy in an LDC will alleviate income inequality, 
whereas the adoption of the CAD strategy will aggravate income inequal-
ity. The most important asset that the poor have in an LDC is their own 
labor. The CAF strategy will result in sustained economic growth through 
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the development of more-labor-intensive industries, creating more job 
opportunities for the poor, increasing wage rates, and allowing the poor 
to have a share in the benefi ts of growth. In contrast, the CAD strategy, 
by facilitating the development of more-capital-intensive industries, will 
reduce job opportunities for the poor and suppress wage rates of the work-
ing poor. Growth will not be sustainable, and when the economy breaks 
down, the poor will suffer the worst hardship, as evidenced by the recent 
East Asian fi nancial crisis (Stiglitz 1998). 
The Choices of Development Strategy
When development economics started to take shape in the mid-twentieth 
century, the dominant view among development economists was to advise 
LDC governments to ignore their own comparative advantages and to adopt 
an inward-looking variation of the CAD strategy, such as the heavy-indus-
try-oriented strategy or the import-substitution strategy. Proponents of the 
CAD strategy have often confused the causality of the dynamic change of 
comparative advantage. They have urged LDCs to disregard the constraint 
of relative capital scarcity in its factor endowments and to establish directly 
the same capital-intensive industries as those of DCs. They worked with 
the understanding that economic development can be accelerated if LDCs 
bypass development of labor- or resource-intensive industries. 
I argue that the alignment of industry/technology with an economy’s 
comparative advantage is key to facilitating the international diffusion of 
appropriate technology, to accelerating the rate of economic growth, and 
to realizing convergence. The dynamic change in an economy’s compara-
tive advantage depends on the dynamic change in the economy’s endow-
ment structure, which itself depends on the rapidity of capital accumula-
tion in the economy. Capital accumulation, in turn, depends on how well 
economic agents in the economy exploit existing comparative advantages 
in their choices of industry/technology. An LDC that responds to com-
parative advantages present in its own factor endowments as the guiding 
principle in its choice of industry/technology will minimize imitation costs, 
experience faster shifts in its endowment structure, and sustain a continu-
ous upgrade in its industrial structures. The development experience of the 
East Asian Four Little Dragons is a good illustration of the merits of the 
CAF strategy. 
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Like many other developing economies, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore were very poor after World War II. In the early 1950s, 
their levels of industrialization were low, their capital and foreign exchange 
reserves were extremely limited, and their per capita incomes were very 
low. Like any other developing economy, they also faced the problem of 
choosing an appropriate development path. Taiwan, South Korea, and Sin-
gapore initially adopted an import-substitution CAD strategy but gave up 
the attempt to develop heavy industries while still in their initial stages. 
Instead, based on their factor endowments, they energetically developed 
labor-intensive industries, promoted exports, and expanded their outward-
oriented economies to use their comparative advantages to the full extent. 
At the time, many European countries, the United States, and Japan 
were gradually replacing labor-intensive industries with technology- and 
capital-intensive ones because of an increasing abundance of capital and 
increases in wage rates. The Four Little Dragons had abundant, inexpen-
sive labor. Therefore, when developed countries’ comparative advantages 
changed to more capital- and technology-intensive industries, the four 
East Asian countries were able to capitalize on the dynamic opportunities. 
Through trade linkages and the openness of their economies, labor-inten-
sive industries in developed countries were relocated to these Asian econo-
mies. Because of the intensive use of their comparative advantages, the 
Four Little Dragons were very competitive and were thus able to achieve 
rapid capital accumulation. Along with the accumulation of capital and 
the change in comparative advantages, they gradually upgraded to more 
capital- and technology-intensive industries. As a result these four coun-
tries were able to sustain more than 30 years of rapid growth, fi rst becom-
ing newly industrialized economies and then reaching or nearly reaching 
the level of developed economies. Their extraordinary achievements in eco-
nomic development have attracted worldwide attention. 
Most developing economies adopted the CAD strategy in the 1950s 
and maintained that strategy for quite a long time. Why has Hong Kong 
never tried the CAD strategy, and why did Taiwan, South Korea, and Sin-
gapore switch to the CAF strategy shortly after trying the CAD strategy? 
Are these little dragons just lucky, or is their choice of the CAF strat-
egy attributable to the wisdom of their political leaders? Gustav Ranis 
and Mahmood Syed (1992) attribute the success to their poor natural 
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resources. In addition, I propose it is also attributable to their small popu-
lations. The CAD strategy is very ineffi cient and costly. The length of time 
this strategy can be maintained in an LDC depends on how many resources 
the government can mobilize to support it. The larger the per capita natu-
ral resources or the larger the population in an economy, ceteris paribus, 
the more resources government can mobilize to maintain the ineffi cient 
CAD strategy. For an economy with poor natural resources and a small 
population, the adoption of the CAD strategy will precipitate immediate 
economic crisis. By that time, the government will have no choice but to 
carry out reforms and change its strategy (Edwards 1995). In effect, infl u-
enced by the prevailing economic thoughts in the 1950s and motivated by 
the dream of nation building, many political leaders and intellectuals in 
Taiwan and Korea never gave up their desires to accelerate development 
of capital-intensive heavy industries. However, their per capita natural 
resources were extremely poor, and their populations were very small. 
The implementation of the CAD strategy in the early 1950s in Taiwan led 
to an immediate and enormous fi scal defi cit coupled with high infl ation, 
and the government was forced to give up the strategy (Tsiang 1984). 
When South Korea decided to push the heavy machinery and heavy chem-
ical industries in the 1970s, similar results occurred and the push was 
postponed (Stern et al. 1995). Singapore and Hong Kong were both too 
small in population and too poor in natural resources to implement the 
CAD strategy. 
The Transition Strategy
If the government adopts a CAD strategy, the development of labor-
intensive sectors—in which developing countries have comparative 
advantage—is repressed. The growth performance during the transition 
from a socialist economy to a market economy depends, therefore, on 
the country’s ability to create an enabling environment for the devel-
opment of labor-intensive sectors and at the same time fi nd a way to 
solve the viability issue for fi rms inherited from the previous develop-
ment strategy, paving the way for eliminating previous distortions and 
interventions. However, in many countries that adopted a CAD strategy, 
many nonviable enterprises exist that were unable to survive in an open 
and competitive market. If government distortions and interventions are 
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eliminated abruptly, these nonviable enterprises will become bankrupt. 
At the same time, the originally suppressed labor-intensive industries will 
thrive, and newly created employment opportunities in these industries can 
surpass the losses from the bankruptcy of nonviable fi rms. As a result, 
the economy can grow dynamically soon after implementing the shock 
therapy, with at most a small loss of output and employment initially. 
On the other hand, if the number of nonviable fi rms is too large, the 
output value and employment of those fi rms will make up too large a share 
in the national economy and shock therapy may be inapplicable. Its appli-
cation will result in economic chaos due to large-scale bankruptcies and 
dramatic increases in unemployment. To avoid such dramatic increases in 
unemployment or to sustain these “advanced” nonviable enterprises, some 
governments, for example in Eastern Europe, continued their protection 
and subsidies for these fi rms—either explicitly or implicitly—and in the 
end, the economy can fi nd itself in an awkward situation of shock without 
therapy (Kolodko 2000).17
The Chinese government opted for a dual-track approach, which is 
arguably better than shock therapy (McKinnon 1993). Instead of follow-
ing the “macro-institution-fi rst” approach proposed by the Washington 
Consensus, the Chinese government employed a ‘micro-fi rst’ approach 
to improve incentives for farmers and state-owned enterprise workers. 
It adopted the individual household-based farming system to replace the 
collective farming system,18 introduced profi t-retention and managerial 
autonomy to state-owned enterprises,19 making farmers and workers par-
tial residual claimants. This reform greatly improved the incentives and 
productivity in agriculture and industry (Groves et al. 1994; Jefferson, 
Rawski, and Zheng 1992; Jefferson and Rawski 1995; Lin 1992; Li 1997; 
Weitzman and Xu 1995). Then the government allowed collective town-
ship-and-village enterprises (TVEs),20 private enterprises, joint ventures, 
and state-owned enterprises to use the resources under their control to 
invest in labor-intensive industries that had been suppressed in the past. 
Meanwhile, the government required farmers and state-owned enterprises 
to fulfi ll their obligations to deliver certain quotas of products to the state 
at preset prices. The former reform improved the effi ciency of resource 
allocation, and the latter ensured the government’s ability to continue sub-
sidizing the nonviable fi rms. Therefore, economic stability and dynamic 
growth were achieved simultaneously. 
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Notes 
†  This is the inaugural D. Gale Johnson Lecture, presented at the University of 
Chicago on May 14, 2001. I am grateful for the helpful comments by Gary 
Becker, Kang Chen, James Heckman, Ralph Huenemann, Keijiro Otsuka, 
George Rosen, Jan Svejnar, Yingyi Qian, Kislev Yoav, Hao Zhou, and partici-
pants at the lecture. I am indebted to Mingxing Liu, Qi Zhang, and Peilin Liu, 
who provided invaluable help in reviewing the literature, assembling the data 
sets, and running the regressions. 
1.  Starting from very low levels, Japan’s per capita income, measured in cur-
rent U.S. dollars, exceeded that of the Unites States in 1988, and Singapore’s 
per capita income exceeded that of the United States in 1996. Taiwan, South 
Korea, and Hong Kong have all signifi cantly narrowed the income gap between 
themselves and the DCs. 
2.  Other economists also hold similar ideas about appropriate technology. 
Drawn from the lessons of the East Asian Miracle, some economists, such as 
K. Akamatsu (1962) and Ito Takatoshi (1998), suggested the “fl ying geese 
pattern” metaphor to describe the characteristics of industrial structure and 
technological diffusion during different development stages. But distinct pol-
icy proposals cannot be obtained from this metaphor. 
3.  Other ways of classifi cation exist. For example, Griffi n (1999) classifi es devel-
opment strategies into six alternatives: monetarism, open economy, industrial-
ization, green revolution, redistribution, and socialist strategy. 
4.  For simplicity, I neglect the endowment of natural resources in the discussion. 
The propositions derived from the discussion remain valid if natural resources 
are also considered. 
5.  Heavy industry was the most advanced sector in the past. Nowadays, the pri-
ority of the CAD strategy in an LDC is focused on information technology 
and other high-tech industries, which are the most capital-intensive industries 
now. 
6.  The distortions in the interest rate and the foreign exchange rate are univer-
sal for LDCs that pursue a CAD strategy. Socialist countries and other LDCs 
that adopted a development strategy oriented toward heavy industry often 
distorted the prices of raw materials and living necessities along with wages. 
7.  The government that adopts a CAD strategy can also ration capital to the fi rms 
that are not in the priority industries. This is, in fact, the practice in the socialist 
planned economy. Certainly, the fi rms in the nonpriority industries will receive 
less capital than if the government does not adopt this strategy. Alternatively, 
the government can allow the market to allocate capital after the fi rms in the 
priority industries have been guaranteed rations. The interest rate will conse-
quently be higher than it is when all capital is allocated by the market. On the 
contrary, the wage rate in the market will be lower because of the low labor 
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absorption of the fi rms in the priority industries. Therefore, the fi rms in the 
nonpriority industries will adopt a more labor-intensive technology in their 
production than if there is no government intervention. The above analyses 
are also applicable to the allocation of foreign exchange to fi rms in nonpriority 
industries. The distortions of interest rates and foreign exchange rates and the 
use of administrative allocations will lead to rent-seeking or directly unproduc-
tive profi t-seeking activities. 
8.  The loss from rent-seeking or directly unproductive profi t-seeking activities is 
estimated to be much larger than the loss from misallocation. 
9.  Kornai (1986) was the fi rst economist to analyze the phenomenon of the soft 
budget constraint. He attributed the existence of the soft budget constraint in 
a state-owned enterprise in a socialist country to the patriarchic nature of the 
socialist government. However, I argue that soft budget constraints arise from 
the government’s accountability for the nonviability of an enterprise caused by 
the government’s development strategy. My hypothesis can explain why the 
phenomenon of the soft budget constraint also exists in fi rms of nonsocialist 
countries, such as South Korea’s chaebols, and why the soft budget constraint 
phenomenon continues to exist in the Eastern European and former Soviet 
Union countries after their state-owned fi rms were privatized and the socialist 
system was abandoned. See also Lin and Tan (1999). 
10.  The dynamic comparative advantage is an often-used argument for the gov-
ernment’s industrial policy and support to the fi rms (Redding 1999). In our 
framework, however, it is clearly evident that the argument is valid only if the 
government’s support is limited to overcoming information and coordination 
costs and the pioneering fi rm’s externalities to other fi rms. The industry should 
be consistent with the comparative advantage of the economy, and fi rms in the 
new industry should be viable, otherwise they will collapse once the govern-
ment’s supports are removed. 
11.  Most big-push attempts by the LDCs in the 1950s and 1960s failed. However, 
there has been a renewed interest in the idea after the infl uential articles by 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989a, 1989b). Their papers show that a gov-
ernment’s coordination and support are required for setting up a key indus-
try and that the demand spillovers from the key industry to other industries 
will enhance economic growth. For the “big push” strategy to be successful, 
however, the industry being promoted must be consistent with the compara-
tive advantage, which is determined by the relative factor endowment of the 
economy, and the fi rms in the promoted industry must be viable after the push. 
Deviation from comparative advantage in the promoted industries and the 
consequent lack of viability of the chosen fi rms are the reasons why so many 
big-push attempts by the LDCs in the 1950s and 1960s failed. 
12.  In recent years, a variety of papers have argued that different technologies 
may display different degrees of skilled-labor or unskilled-labor bias. This idea 
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of skill complementarity has been employed to explain the increase in wage 
inequality in the 1980s and 1990s in the United States.
13.  I met a senior manager of Hyundai Automobile Company in the United States 
in the early 1990s. He told me that Hyundai was still losing money after 10 
years of successful exportation of cars to the U.S. market. 
14.  Taiwan and South Korea are good examples for comparison. Taiwan has fol-
lowed the CAF strategy consistently, whereas Korea has often attempted to 
switch from the CAF strategy to the CAD strategy. The GDP growth rate, 
income distribution, macro stability, and other development indicators in Tai-
wan are better than those of South Korea. 
15.  In the development literature, export promotion and import substitution are 
often used as a classifi cation of development strategy. There are some similari-
ties between this classifi cation and the CAF/CAD classifi cation. Any country’s 
level of export will be higher under a CAF strategy than that under a CAD 
strategy. However, the level of trade in any economy is endogenously deter-
mined by the economy’s endowment structure. It is inappropriate to use an 
endogenous variable as a policy target or instrument. 
16.  In the recent East Asian fi nancial crisis, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Malaysia were affected slightly whereas Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand were 
hard hit. One reason for the different performances among these two groups 
of economies is the difference in their development strategies. The fi rst group 
followed the CAF strategy closely, whereas the latter group leaned toward the 
CAD strategy; see Lin (2000). 
17.  The difference in the shares of nonviable fi rms in the economy might explain 
why the shock therapy recommended by Sachs succeeded in Bolivia but not 
in the economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Bolivia is 
a poor, small economy; therefore, the resources that the government could 
mobilize to subsidize the nonviable fi rms were small, and the share of nonvi-
able fi rms in the economy was also relatively small. Stiglitz (1998) questioned 
the universal applicability of the Washington Consensus. He pointed out that 
it advocated use of a small set of instruments—including macroeconomic 
stability, liberalized trade and privatization—to achieve a relatively narrow 
goal of economic growth. He encouraged governments to use a broader set of 
instruments—such as fi nancial regulations and competition policy—to achieve 
a broader set of goals, including sustainable development, equity of income 
distribution and so on. Stiglitz’s arguments are based on information asym-
metry and the need for government to overcome market failures. However, 
he did not discuss how to deal with the issue of nonviable fi rms in developing 
and transitional economies and the implications of nonviability for choices of 
transition path and policies.
18.  When reform started at the end of 1978, the government originally proposed 
to raise the agricultural procurement prices, to liberalize rural market fairs, 
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and to reduce the size of production teams of 20–30 households to voluntarily-
formed production groups of 3–5 households, but explicitly prohibited the 
replacement of the production team system with an individual household-based 
farming system. However, a production team in a poor village in Fengyang 
County, Anhui Province, secretly leased the collective-owned land to individ-
ual households in the team in the fall of 1978 and harvested a bumper increase 
in outputs in 1979. Seeing the effects of an individual-household-based farm-
ing system, the government changed its policy and endorsed this approach as a 
new direction of reform (Lin 1992). Initially, the collectively-owned land was 
leased to farm households for one to three years, extended to 15 years in 1985, 
and further extended to 30 years in 1994. The farm household was obliged to 
deliver certain amounts of agricultural produce at the government-set prices to 
fulfi ll its quota obligation until the late 1990s. 
19.  The state-owned enterprise reform proceeded from the profi t-retention system 
in 1979, the contract-responsibility system in 1986, and the modern corpora-
tion system from the 1990s to now. Each system was experimented in a small 
group of enterprises fi rst before that system was extended nationwide (Lin, 
Cai, and Li 1994).
20.  The TVE was another institutional innovation by the peasants in China dur-
ing the transition process. After the Household Responsibility System (HRS) 
reform, farmers obtained a substantial amount of residuals and saw profi table 
investment opportunities in consumer-products sector. However, due to the 
ideological reason at that time, the form of private enterprise was prohibited 
and the farmers used the collective TVE as an alternative to tap into the profi t-
able opportunity. The government initially put many restrictions on the opera-
tion of TVEs for fear of TVEs’ competition with state-owned enterprises for 
credits, resources, and markets. Only after the government was convinced by 
the evidences that the TVE was good for increasing farmers’ income and for 
solving the shortages in the urban markets, did the government give green light 
to the development of TVEs in rural China (Lin, Cai, and Li 1994).
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* Adapted from “Development Strategy, Development and Transition Performances: Empirical 
Analysis,” in Economic Development and Transition: Thought, Strategy, and Viability, by Justin 
Yifu Lin. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. Copyright © 2009 Cam-
bridge University Press. The conclusion was adapted from “Development Strategy, Viability, and 
Economic Convergence.” See disclaimer on the fi rst page of part 1 of this chapter.
PART 2*
Strategy Choice and Economic Performance: Empirical Testing
The previous sections discussed the effects of development strategy on 
institutional arrangements, economic growth, income distribution, and 
transition performance in a country. From those discussions, I derive sev-
eral testable hypotheses.
 Hypothesis 1. A country that adopts a CAD strategy will require various 
government interventions and distortions in its economy.
 Hypothesis 2. Over an extended period, a country that adopts a CAD 
strategy will have poor growth performance. 
 Hypothesis 3. Over an extended period, a country that adopts a CAD 
strategy will have a volatile economy.
 Hypothesis 4. Over an extended period, a country that adopts a CAD 
strategy will have less equitable income distribution. 
 Hypothesis 5. In the transition to a market economy, a country’s overall 
economic growth will be improved if it creates conditions to facilitate the 
development of formerly repressed labor-intensive industries.
Estimating the Choice of Development Strategy Using 
the Capital Intensity in the Manufacturing Sector
To expand the set of countries and testable hypotheses, Lin and Liu 
(2004) propose another technology choice index (TCI), which is defi ned 
as follows:
 
TCI
AVM LM
GDP Li t
i t i t
i t i t
,
, ,
, ,
=
 
(VI.1)
where AVMi,t is the added value of manufacturing industries of country 
i at time t; GDPi,t is the total added value of country i at time t; LMi,t is 
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the labor in the manufacturing industry and Li,t is the total labor force. 
If a government adopts a CAD strategy to promote its capital-intensive 
industries, TCI in this country is expected to be larger than otherwise. This 
is because if a country adopts a CAD strategy, in order to overcome the 
viability issue of the fi rms in the prioritized sectors of the manufacturing 
industries, the government might give the fi rms monopoly positions in the 
product markets—allowing them to charge higher output prices—and pro-
vide them with subsidized credits and inputs to lower their investment and 
operation costs. The above policy measures will result in a larger AVMi,t 
than otherwise. Meanwhile, investment in the prioritized manufacturing 
industry will be more capital intensive and absorb less labor—ceteris pari-
bus. The numerator in equation VI.1 will therefore be larger for a country 
that adopts a CAD strategy. As such, given the income level and other con-
ditions, the magnitude of the TCI can be used as a proxy for the extent that 
a CAD strategy is pursued in a country.1 The data for calculating the TCI 
are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2002) 
and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation’s Interna-
tional Yearbook of Industrial Statistics (2002). The means and variations 
of the TCI for each of the 122 countries in the period 1962–99 are reported 
in annex table VI.1.
Development Strategy and Institutions
To assess the effects of development strategy on the government’s distor-
tions and interventions in the economy—as postulated in Hypothesis 1—I 
use several proxies for the institutions: 1) the “black-market premium” 
is used as an index of price distortion; 2) the index of economic freedom 
(IEF) and the expropriation risk are used as indexes of government’s inter-
vention in property rights institution; 3) the number of procedures required 
for a start-up fi rm to obtain legal status and the “executive de facto inde-
pendence” are used as indexes of enterprise autonomy; and 4) the trade 
dependence ratio is used as an index for openness. The means and varia-
tions of each proxy for each country are reported in the annex table.
Development Strategy and Price Distortions. The black-market premium 
of 105 countries is taken from the Global Development Network Growth 
Database provided by the Development Research Institute of New York 
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University. The relationship between the TCI and the black-market pre-
mium across four decades (1960–69, 1970–79, 1980–89, 1990–99) is 
shown in fi gure VI.4.
Figure VI.4 shows that the TCI and the black-market premium had 
positive relationships throughout the four decades, which implies—as pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 1—that a higher degree of CAD strategy is associated 
with a larger black-market premium. 
Development Strategy and Government Intervention in Resource 
 Allocation. To measure government’s intervention in property rights 
institution, I use the index of economic freedom and the expropriation 
risk. The observations of IEF from 91 countries are taken from Economic 
Freedom of the World (Gwartney and Lawson 2007), which are available 
from 1970 onwards. This index ranges from zero to 10. A higher value 
means a higher degree of economic freedom. The correlations between 
the TCI and the IEF averaged across a decade for each country are shown 
in fi gure VI.5.
There is a strong negative relationship between the TCI and the IEF in 
each of the panels, which is consistent with the prediction that the more 
aggressively a government pursues a CAD strategy, the more government 
intervention is required, and the less economic freedom there is. 
The expropriation risk of 102 countries is adopted from the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide. The expropriation risk is the risk of outright 
confi scation and forced nationalization of property. This variable ranges 
from zero to 10. A higher value means that a private enterprise has a 
lower probability of being expropriated. Figure VI.6 plots the relationship 
between the TCI and the expropriation risk. Both variables are calculated 
as the average values from 1982 until 1997. 
As shown, there is a negative relationship between the TCI and expro-
priation risk, which is consistent with the expectation that the more 
aggressive the government’s CAD strategy, the more likely it is that the 
government will confi scate or nationalize an enterprise. 
Development Strategy and Enterprise Autonomy. To analyze the rela-
tionship between the government’s development strategy and enterprise 
autonomy, the study uses two indexes—including the number of pro-
cedures and the executive de facto independence used in Djankov and 
Figure VI.4: The TCI and Black-Market Premium
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Figure VI.5: The TCI and the IEF
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Murrell (2002)—to represent the extent of enterprise autonomy. There 
are 69 countries in the samples.
The “number of procedures” is the number of administrative proce-
dures that a start-up fi rm has to comply with in order to obtain legal 
status—that is, to start operating as a legal entity. “‘Executive de facto 
independence” is an index of “operation (de facto) independence of the 
chief executive,” descending from 1 to 7 (1 = pure individual; 2 = inter-
mediate category; 3 = slight to moderate limitations; 4 = intermediate cat-
egory; 5 = substantial limitations; 6 = intermediate category; 7 = executive 
parity or subordination). Both indexes are the average values for the years 
from 1965 until 1998. 
The positive relationship between the TCI and the number of proce-
dures and the negative relationship between the TCI and the executive 
de facto independence shown in fi gure VI.7 indicate that a high degree of 
CAD strategy is associated with low enterprise autonomy, which confi rms 
the prediction of Hypothesis 1.
Development Strategy and Openness. The trade-dependence ratio of 
115 countries—taken from Dollar and Kraay (2003)—is used to refl ect 
the openness of a country. The correlations between the TCI and open-
ness averaged across the past four decades in each country are shown in 
fi gure VI.8.2 
We fi nd that the TCI and openness have a negative relationship, which 
is consistent with the hypothesis that if a developing-country government 
adopts a CAD strategy, its economy will become more inward-oriented 
Figure VI.6: The TCI and Expropriation Risk
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than otherwise. This is because the CAD strategy attempts to substitute 
the import of capital-intensive manufactured goods with domestic produc-
tion, causing a reduction in imports. Exports will also be suppressed due 
to the inevitable transfer of resources away from the industries that have 
comparative advantage to the prioritized sectors determined by the CAD 
strategy. The more a country follows a CAD strategy, therefore, the less 
openness there will be in the country. 
Development Strategy and Economic Growth
Hypothesis 2 predicts that over an extended period, a country adopting a 
CAD strategy will have a poor growth performance. The following econo-
metric model is used to test the hypothesis:
 GROWTHi,t = C + αTCIi,t + βX + ϑ (VI.2)
Figure VI.7: The TCI and Enterprise Autonomy
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Figure VI.8: The TCI and Openness
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where GROWTHi,t is the economic growth rate in a certain period in coun-
try i, X is a vector that includes the initial per capita GDP to control the 
effect of the stage of development, the initial population size to control the 
effect of market size, the indicator of rule of law to refl ect the institutional 
quality—which was constructed by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002)—the 
trade-dependent ratio to refl ect openness, the distance from the Equator 
and whether the country is land-locked. The last two explanatory variables 
are included to capture the effects of geography. The instrumental vari-
able for controlling the endogeneity of institutional quality is the share of 
population that speaks English and the share that speaks a major European 
language (Hall and Jones 1999), which are used to capture the long-run 
impacts of colonial origin on current institutional quality. Similarly, the fi t-
ted values of trade predicted by a gravity model are used as the instrument 
for openness. This approach was proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999) 
and revised by Dollar and Kraay (2003). In the regressions that use panel 
data, the instrument for openness is the single-period lagged value of itself. 
Table VI.2 summarizes the defi nition of each variable and the data source. 
We will use two approaches to test this hypothesis. In the fi rst approach, 
the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of per capita 
GDP for the period 1962–99, and in the second, the dependent variable is 
the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP for each decade of the 
1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
Table VI.3 reports the estimates from the fi rst approach. Regression 
Model 1.1 and Model 1.2 use the OLS approach to obtain the estimates. 
The explanatory variables in Model 1.1 include only the proxy for the 
development strategy, LnTCI1, and the initial GDP per capita, LnGDP60, 
whereas Model 1.2 includes other explanatory variables that capture insti-
tutional quality, openness, geographic location and market size. Model 1.3 
has the same explanatory variables but the model uses the 2SLS approach 
in order to control the endogeneity of institutional quality and openness. 
The results show that the TCI has the expected negative effect and is 
highly signifi cant in all three regressions. This fi nding supports Hypothesis 
2 that the more aggressive is the CAD strategy pursued by a country, the 
worse the growth performance is in that country in the period 1962–99. 
The estimated coeffi cients of LnTCI1 have values ranging from –0.66 to 
–1.25. From the estimates, we can infer that a 10 percent increase from 
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Table VI.2: Variable Defi nitions and Data Source
Variable Defi nition Mean Std dev. Sources
LnGDP60 Log of real GDP per capita 
in 1960
7.33 0.80 World Bank World Development 
Indicators
LnGDP80 Log of real GDP per capita 
in 1980
7.91 1.05 World Bank World Development 
Indicators
LnGDP Log of real GDP per capita 
in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990
7.73 1.02 World Bank World Development 
Indicators
LnTCI1 Log of the average technology 
choice index from 1963 to 1999
0.96 0.90 World Bank World Development 
Indicators and UNIDO (2002)
LnTCI2 Log of the average TCI per decade 
in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s
0.85   0.84 World Bank World Development 
Indicators and UNIDO (2002)
LnTCI70 Log of the average TCI from 
1970 to 1979. If not available, 
we use the log of the average 
TCI from 1980 to 1985
0.91 0.92 World Bank World Development 
Indicators and UNIDO (2002)
ΔTCI Log of the average TCI from 
1999 to 1990 minus LnTCI70
0.07 0.38 World Bank World Development 
Indicators and UNIDO (2002)
RL01 Rule of law in 2000–01 0.003 0.95 Kaufmann and Kraay (2002)
LnOPEN1 Log of the average (exports + 
imports)/GDP from 1960 to 1999
–1.11 0.81 Dollar and Kraay (2003)
LnOPEN2 Log of the decadal average 
(exports + imports)/GDP in 
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s
–1.30 0.84 Dollar and Kraay (2003)
LnPOP1 Log of the total mid-year 
population from 1960 to 1999
15.2 2.11 World Bank World Development 
Indicators
LnPOP2 Log of the total initial-year 
population in 1960s, 1970s, 
1980s, 1990s
14.93 2.12 World Bank World Development 
Indicators
LANDLOCK Dummy variable taking value 
of 1 if country is land-locked; 
0 otherwise
0.18 0.39 Dollar and Kraay (2003)
LnDIST Log (DISTEQ+1), where DISTEQ 
is the distance from Equator, 
measured as absolute value of 
latitude of capital city
2.96 0.88 Dollar and Kraay (2003)
ENGFRAC Fraction of population speaking 
English 
0.07 0.24 Hall and Jones (1999), taken 
from Dollar and Kraay (2003)
EURFRAC Fraction of population speaking 
a major European language
0.22 0.38 Hall and Jones (1999), taken 
from Dollar and Kraay (2003)
LnFRINST Instrument variable for LnOPEN –2.83 0.64 Dollar and Kraay (2003)
INST Predicted value of RL01 in the 
cross-section estimation 
(ENGFRAC and EURFRAC as 
the instruments)
0.003 0.34 Author’s estimation 
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the mean in the TCI can result in approximately 0.1 of a percentage point 
reduction in the country’s average annual growth rate of per capita GDP 
for the whole period 1962–99.
The regression results also show that the initial per capita income and 
the population size have the expected signs and signifi cant effects on the 
growth rate. Rule of law, openness and distance from the Equator also 
have the expected signs. Rule of law, however, is not signifi cant in the 2SLS 
regression and distance from the Equator is not signifi cant in the OLS 
regression. Whether the country is land-locked is insignifi cant in all three 
regressions.
Table VI.4 reports the results from the second approach, in which the 
dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in 
Table VI.3: Development Strategy and Economic Growth—Model 1
Model 1.1
(OLS)
Model 1.2
(OLS)
Model 1.3
(2SLS)
Constant 7.32***
(1.60)
4.66**
(1.87)
3.26
(2.15)
LnTCI2 –1.25***
(0.20)
–0.66***
(0.18)
–0.92***
(0.19)
LnGDP60 –0.54***
(0.20)
–0.99***
(0.18)
–0.59***
(0.21)
RL02 0.58***
(0.21)
INST 0.22
(0.41)
LnOPEN2 0.70***
(0.22)
TRADE2 0.93**
(0.43)
LnDIST 0.20
(0.16)
0.47***
(0.16)
LnPOP2 0.33***
(0.09)
0.22**
(0.09)
LANDLOCK 0.07
(0.32)
0.46
(0.38)
Adjusted-R2 0.36 0.56 0.44
Observations 85 83 83
* indicates signifi cance at the 10 per cent level
** indicates signifi cance at the 5 per cent level
*** indicates signifi cance at the 1 per cent level
Note: The dependent variable is the yearly average of per-capita GDP growth rate in 
1962–99. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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each decade from 1960–99. The regressions to fi t the estimates are OLS for 
Models 2.1 and 2.2, one-way fi xed effect for Model 2.3, 2SLS for Model 
2.4 and 2SLS and one-way fi xed effect for Model 2.5. In the fi xed-effect 
models, time dummies are added to control the time effects, whereas the 
2SLS models are used for controlling the endogeneity of institutional qual-
ity and openness. 
As in the results in the fi rst approach, the estimates for the TCI have 
the expected negative sign and are highly signifi cant in all regressions. The 
fi nding is once again consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2 that 
development strategy is a prime determinant of the long-run economic 
growth performance of a country.3 
Table VI.4: Development Strategy and Economic Growth—Model 2
Model 2.1
(OLS)
Model 2.2
(OLS)
Model 2.3 
(fi xed effect)
Model 2.4 
(2SLS)
Model 2.5 
(2SLS, fi xed effect)
Constant 7.15***
(1.61)
8.36***
(2.16)
3.83*
(2.11)
–0.74
(2.56)
–2.70
(2.37)
LnTCI2 –1.10***
(0.21)
–0.69***
(0.20)
–0.40**
(0.19)
–0.69***
(0.24)
–0.47**
(0.22)
LnGDP –0.54***
(0.18)
–1.39***
(0.23)
–0.86***
(0.23)
–0.17
(0.27)
0.17
(0.25)
RL01 1.45***
(0.23)
1.12***
(0.22)
INST –0.38
(0.42)
–0.67*
(0.38)
LnOPEN2 0.24
(0.23)
0.35
(0.22)
TRADE2 0.01
(0.29)
–0.06
(0.27)
LnDIST –0.04
(0.18)
–0.10
(0.17)
0.27
(0.20)
0.17
(0.18)
LnPOP2 0.32***
(0.10)
0.41***
(0.09)
0.22*
(0.12)
0.27**
(0.12)
LANDLOCK –0.31
(0.39)
0.08
(0.36)
–0.23
(0.46)
0.02
(0.43)
Adjusted-R2 0.08 0.23 0.36 0.08 0.24
Observations 315 278 278 213 213
* indicates signifi cance at the 10 per cent level
** indicates signifi cance at the 5 per cent level 
*** indicates signifi cance at the 1 per cent level 
Notes: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of GDP per capita in the decades 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s. 
Models 2.3 and 2.5 include the time dummy. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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The results for other explanatory variables are similar to those in 
table VI.3.
Development Strategy and Economic Volatility
Hypothesis 3 is about the effect of a CAD strategy on the volatility of the 
economic growth rate. If a country follows a CAD strategy, there could 
be a period of investment-led growth, but it will not be sustainable and is 
likely to cause economic crisis. Therefore, a country that follows a CAD 
strategy is likely to be more volatile than otherwise. In the empirical testing 
of this hypothesis, the volatility of a country’s per capita GDP growth rate 
in the period 1962–99 is measured as follows:
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(VI.3)
where git is the growth rate of GDP per capita of i
th country in year t. 
In testing Hypothesis 3, the dependent variable is the log of the above 
measurement of volatility, Vi, and the explanatory variables are the same 
as those used in testing Hypothesis 2. The approaches to fi tting the regres-
sion equation are also similar to those used previously. Table VI.5 reports 
the results from fi tting the regression models. As expected, the estimates 
of the TCI are positive and highly signifi cant in all three regressions. The 
results support Hypothesis 3 and indicate that the deeper a country follows 
a CAD strategy, the more volatile is the country’s economic growth rate. 
From the estimates, it can be inferred that a 10 percent increase in the TCI 
could cause volatility to increase about 4–6 per cent.
The estimates for other explanatory variables show that the quality of 
institutions, the degree of openness, whether the country is land-locked 
and the population size all have negative effects on economic volatility. 
The coeffi cients on population size, which is a proxy for the size of the 
economy, are signifi cant in the OLS and 2SLS models. The estimated coef-
fi cients of initial per capita income in 1960 and the distance from the Equa-
tor are insignifi cant in all three regressions. The estimated coeffi cients of all 
other variables are either signifi cant in the OLS model or the 2SLS model. 
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Development Strategy and Income Distribution
In testing the effect of development strategy on income distribution, the 
following regression equation is used:
 GINIi,t = C + αTCI2i,t + βX + ε (VI.4)
where GINIi,t is the index of inequality in country i at time t, TCI is a 
proxy for the development strategy and X is a vector of other explanatory 
variables.
GINI coeffi cients are taken from a revised version of the data set in 
Deininger and Squire (1996). The data set includes the estimation of GINI 
Table VI.5: Development Strategy and Economic Volatility
Model 3.1
(OLS)
Model 3.2
(OLS)
Model 3.3
(2SLS)
Constant 0.49
(1.06)
3.03**
(1.44)
3.63**
(1.56)
LnTCI1 0.64***
(0.13)
0.41***
(0.14)
0.56***
(0.14)
LnGPP60 –0.04
(0.13)
0.17
(0.14)
–0.07
(0.15)
RL01 –0.33**
(0.16)
INST –0.20
(0.29)
LnOPEN1 –0.46***
(0.17)
TRADE1 –0.53
(0.33)
LnDIST –0.003
(0.11)
–0.15
(0.11)
LANDLOCK –0.31
(0.24)
–0.53*
(0.28)
LnPOP1 –0.26***
(0.06)
–0.18**
(0.07)
Adjusted-R2 0.29 0.47 0.37
Observations 103 93 93
* indicates signifi cance at the 10 per cent level
** indicates signifi cance at the 5 per cent level 
*** indicates signifi cance at the 1 per cent level 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the growth rate’s volatility for GDP 
per capita from 1962–99. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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coeffi cients for many countries in the various literature. Some are esti-
mated according to the data on income; others are based on expenditure. 
The coverage differs between the different countries’ GINI data. Deininger 
and Squire (1996) assessed the quality of GINI coeffi cient estimations; only 
those ranked as “acceptable” were used in the regression. The original esti-
mates of GINI coeffi cients based on income data are left unchanged, but 
those based on consumption expenditure are adjusted by adding 6.6, which 
is the average difference between the two estimation methods. Matching 
this GINI data with the TCI, I end up with a panel of 261 samples from 
33 countries. Figure VI.9 shows the relationship between the TCI and the 
GINI coeffi cient.
In order to test alternative hypotheses for the determination of inequality, 
I have included the explanatory variables—per capita income, GDPPCi,t, 
and its reciprocal, GDPPC–1i,t—which test the Kuznets inversed-U hypoth-
esis. If Kuznets’ hypothesis holds, the coeffi cients for these two variables 
should be signifi cantly negative.
Based on the data set of Deininger and Squire (1996), Li et al. (1998) 
conducted a robust empirical test, and the result showed that the GINI 
coeffi cient for an individual country was relatively constant across differ-
ent periods. Based on this conclusion, the GINI coeffi cient in the initial 
year in the data set is introduced into the regression, denoted by IGINI. 
In this way, the historical factors that could affect income distribution 
and those non-observable factors across countries can be excluded. In the 
Figure VI.9: Development Strategy and Income Distribution
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data set, the year of IGINI differs from country to country. In spite of 
this  difference, the higher the IGINI, the higher are the subsequent GINI 
 coeffi cients—regardless of the initial year. As a result, the coeffi cient of 
IGINI is expected to be positive. 
Corruption could also affect income distribution. Two explanatory 
variables are included in the regression: the index for corruption, CORRi,t, 
and the quality of offi cials, BQi,t. The data for these two variables are taken 
from Sachs and Warner (2000) and they differ from country to country but 
remain constant throughout the period studied. The larger the value is, the 
less is the corruption and the higher is the quality of offi cials. The coef-
fi cients of these two variables are expected to be negative.
Foreign trade could also affect income distribution. It affects the 
relative prices of factors of production (Samuelson, 1978) and market 
opportunities for different sectors in the economy. Consequently, trade—
through its effect on employment opportunities (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
1997)—can affect income distribution. The regression therefore includes 
an index of economic openness, denoted by OPENi,t, which is the share 
of total import and export value in nominal GDP, as an explanatory vari-
able. The data are taken from Easterly and Yu (2000). Openness could, 
however, have different impacts on skilled and unskilled labor, on trad-
able and non-tradable sectors and in the short run and in the long run. Its 
sign is therefore uncertain. 
Table VI.6 reports the results from fi ve regression models. Model 4.1 
includes all explanatory variables: TCI, IGINI, GDPPC, GDPPC–1, 
CORR, BQ and OPEN. As CORR, BQ and OPEN are endogenous, 
other models exclude these variables to control the endogeneity problem. 
Because IGINI, CORR and BQ are time invariant, the one-way effects 
model is applied in fi tting the regression of Models 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4. 
According to Hausmann tests, the one-way random-effect model is used 
in the regressions of Models 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4, and the two-way fi xed-effect 
model is used in the regression of Models 4.3 and 4.5. 
The estimated coeffi cients of TCI are positive and signifi cant at the 
1 percent level in all fi ve regression models. These results strongly sup-
port the hypothesis that the more a country pursues a CAD strategy, the 
more severe will be the income disparity in that country. This result holds 
whether the initial income distribution is equal or unequal.
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The estimated coeffi cients of IGINI are also positive and signifi cant at 
the 1 percent level in Models 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4. This result is consistent with 
the fi nding in Li et al. (1998): that is, the initial income distribution will 
have a carry-over effect in the subsequent period’s income distribution.
The estimated coeffi cients of GDPPC and GDPPC_1 in Models 4.1, 
4.3 and 4.4 are all insignifi cant and have an unexpected positive sign—
except for GDPPC in Model 4.1. Kuznets’ inversed-U hypothesis of 
income distribution is therefore rejected.
The results in Model 4.1 show that the coeffi cient for CORRi,t has an 
unexpected positive sign. One possible reason for this is that the effect of 
Table VI.6: The Effect of Development Strategy on Inequality
Model 4.1r Model 4.2r Model 4.3f Model 4.4r Model 4.5f
CONSTANT 6.46 8.18*** 31.5*** 8.09*** 32.6***
(4.72) (2.40) (1.75) (3.16) (0.97)
TCI 1.32*** 1.35*** 1.84*** 1.35*** 1.72***
(0.33) (0.31) (0.48) (0.32) (0.46)
IGINI 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.71***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
GDPPC –0.89 0.43 0.74
(11.3) (12.6) (10.8)
GDPPC_1 0.40 1.91 3.21
(1.84) (2.11) (16.6)
CORR 1.03*
(0.58)
BQ –0.84
(0.58)
OPEN 0.12
(1.68)
R2 0.9040 0.8941 0.5495 0.8936 0.5780
Hausmann statistics 3.32 1.19 23.91 1.99 7.98
Hausmann P-value 0.19 0.28 0.00 0.37 0.00
Sample 261 observations from 33 countries
f: fi xed-effect model 
r: random-effect model
* indicates signifi cance at the 10 per cent level
** indicates signifi cance at the 5 per cent level
*** indicates signifi cance at the 1 per cent level
Notes: Null hypothesis of Hausmann test: there is a random effect in countries and time. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
Development Strategy, Institutions, and Economic Performance | 337
corruption on distribution is not refl ected accurately in the surveys. The 
coeffi cient for bureaucracy quality, BQi,t, has an expected, but insignifi -
cant, negative sign. The coeffi cient for openness, OPEN, is positive, but 
not signifi cant. 
From the results above, it is clear that development strategy and initial 
income distribution are the two most important determinants of income 
distribution in a country. As argued above, for a country in which the 
government follows a CAF strategy, income distribution will become more 
equal even if its initial income distribution is unequal. In effect, this is the 
“growth with equity” phenomenon observed in Taiwan and other newly 
industrialized economies in East Asia (Fei, Ranis, and Kuo 1979).
Transition and Economic Performance
As mentioned above, the development of labor-intensive sectors—in 
which developing countries have comparative advantage—is repressed 
and many institutions are distorted if the government adopts a CAD 
strategy, resulting in poor resource allocation and ineffi ciency. The 
growth performance during transition to a market economy depends, 
therefore, on the country’s ability to create an enabling environment 
for the development of labor-intensive sectors and at the same time fi nd 
a way to solve the viability issue for fi rms inherited from the previous 
development strategy so as to pave the way for eliminating previous dis-
tortions and interventions. A CAD strategy is associated with a high TCI. 
If, after the reform/transition, a country is able to successfully develop 
labor-intensive sectors, resource allocation and growth performance will 
improve, and the TCI will decline. A successful transition from a CAD 
strategy is therefore expected to result in a negative change in the TCI. 
The larger the negative change is, the higher is the expected growth rate. 
For the purpose of testing Hypothesis 5, therefore, a variable, ΔTCI, is 
created to measure the difference between the log of average TCI in the 
period 1990–99 and the log of average TCI in the period 1970–79—as 
the transition in socialist countries and the reforms in other developing 
countries started in the 1980s. 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of the average 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita in the period 1980–99. In addition 
to ΔTCI, the explanatory variables include the log of average TCI in the 
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1970s,  initial per capita GDP in 1980 and other explanatory variables—
representing institutional quality, openness and population size—which 
are similar to those used in testing Hypothesis 1. 
Two approaches are used to test the hypothesis. The fi rst includes obser-
vations from all countries in the data set, while the second includes only 
the developing countries defi ned by Easterly and Sewadeh (2002). Both 
approaches try three regressions—two by OLS and one by 2SLS—to con-
trol the endogeneity problem of institutional quality and openness. Table 
VI.7 reports the results from the regressions. 
Table VI.7: Development Strategy and the Performance of Economic Reform/Transition
Model 5.1
(OLS)
Model 5.2
(OLS)
Model 5.3
(2SLS)
Model 5.4
(OLS)
Model 5.5
(OLS)
Model 5.6
(2SLS)
Constant 2.53
(3.17)
3.79
(3.63)
–2.94
(3.97)
4.28
(4.24)
–4.50
(5.01)
–9.03
(6.43)
ΔTCI –1.25**
(0.55)
–0.91**
(0.45)
–1.12**
(0.51)
–1.16*
(0.66)
–1.02*
(0.52)
–1.30**
(0.60)
LnTCI70 –0.84**
(0.41)
–0.38
(0.34)
–0.52
(0.38)
–0.61
(0.48)
–0.26
(0.38)
–0.31
(0.45)
LnGDP80 –0.04
(0.35)
–1.32***
(0.37)
–0.31
(0.38)
–0.34
(0.50)
–0.78*
(0.45)
–0.12
(0.57)
RL01 1.31***
(0.37)
1.78***
(0.47)
INST 0.44
(0.60)
0.96
(1.18)
LnOPEN1 0.71*
(0.36)
0.54
(0.49)
TRADE1 1.50**
(0.70)
2.23*
(1.26)
LnDIST 0.16
(0.28)
0.57*
(0.29)
–0.06
(0.33)
0.34
(0.36)
LnPOP1 0.52***
(0.17)
0.44***
(0.16)
0.79***
(0.19)
0.78**
(0.29)
LANDLOCK –0.87
(0.57)
–0.06
(0.68)
–0.55
(0.73)
0.54
(1.15)
Adjusted-R2 0.13 0.43 0.27 0.03 0.45 0.24
Observations 76 72 72 50 49 49
* indicates signifi cance at the 10 per cent level
** indicates signifi cance at the 5 per cent level
*** indicates signifi cance at the 1 per cent level
Notes: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of GDP per capita from 1980–99. The data samples in the regression 
of Models 6.4–6.6 include only the developing countries defi ned by Easterly and Sewadeh (2002). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.
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As expected, the sign of ΔTCI is negative and the estimates are signifi -
cantly different from zero in all six regressions. The results support the 
hypothesis that a larger reduction in the TCI from the level in the 1970s to 
the level in the 1990s has a larger positive effect on the average per capita 
GDP growth rate in the period 1980–99. For a country that adopts a CAD 
strategy, therefore, growth performance will be improved if the govern-
ment manages well the transition from a CAD to a CAF strategy. From the 
estimates, we can infer that a 10 percent reduction in the TCI level in the 
1990s to the level of the 1970s could cause a 0.1–0.13 percentage point 
increase in the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in the period 
1980–99.
The other explanatory variables all have the expected signs; however, 
except for the population size—which is positive and highly signifi cant in 
all six regressions—the other variables are either insignifi cant or signifi cant 
in some regressions but not in others. 
In a nutshell, as predicted by Hypothesis 5, the entry of small and 
medium-size fi rms into the repressed sectors under a CAD strategy is 
essential for the economy to achieve dynamic growth during the transi-
tion process.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter argues that most LDCs follow an inappropriate development 
strategy and that, as a result, convergence is impeded, economic volatil-
ity enhanced, and income distribution more unequal. During economic 
reform and transition, a country’s economic performance depends on its 
government’s ability to create an environment that facilitates the growth 
of labor-intensive industries, which have been suppressed in the past due 
to the government’s pursuit of a CAD strategy. The temptation to close 
the industry/technology gap as soon as possible is strong for LDCs. At 
a low level of factor endowment structure, however, LDCs’ economies 
do not have the comparative advantages necessary for  capital-intensive 
industries/technologies, and their fi rms will not be viable in an open, 
free, and competitive market if they enter/adopt these industries/tech-
nologies. To give priority to the development of non–comparative advan-
tage industries/technologies, the governments in LDCs often adopt a 
340 | New Structural Economics
CAD strategy and give nonviable fi rms policy support through a series 
of distortions in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and other prices. 
They also use administrative measures to directly allocate resources with 
distorted prices to the fi rms in the priority industries. With the above 
policy measures, an LDC may be able to establish fi rms that adopt high 
technologies in advanced industries for which the economy does not 
have the comparative advantages. However, the development of fi nancial 
markets will be repressed, foreign trade will be retarded, rent-seeking 
activities will be widespread, the macroeconomy will be unstable, income 
 distribution will be unequal, the economy will be very uncompetitive, 
and the country will fail to converge with DCs in terms of income. 
I argue here that the optimal industry/technology structure of an econ-
omy is endogenously determined by the economy’s factor endowment 
structure and that the CAF strategy is the better one for an LDC’s develop-
ment. The CAF strategy will induce the fi rms in an LDC to enter industries 
for which the country has comparative advantages and facilitate the fi rms 
adoption of appropriate technology by borrowing at low costs from the 
more advanced countries. The economy will be competitive. The country 
will enjoy rapid upgrades in its factor endowment structure and, conse-
quently, its industry/technology structure. As such, the CAF strategy will 
help an LDC achieve and foster a high rate of growth. Convergence will 
come true. The empirical fi ndings from the cross-country analyses are con-
sistent with the above hypothesis. 
To implement the CAF strategy, a government needs to maintain an 
open, free, and competitive market. The government can also adopt an 
industrial policy to facilitate the fi rms’ upgrading of industry/technology. 
However, the functions of an industrial policy should be limited to infor-
mation sharing, investment coordination, and compensation for externali-
ties produced by fi rst movers. 
The government of an LDC plays an especially important role, for bet-
ter or for worse, in the country’s economic development. As W. Arthur 
Lewis (1965) has noted, “No country has made economic progress with-
out positive stimulus from intelligent governments . . . On the other hand, 
there are so many examples of the mischief done to economic life by 
governments.” Here I would like to propose that, for the government 
in an LDC to be an intelligent one, its most important task is to get its 
development strategy right. 
Table VI.A1: TCI Based on Value Added in the Manufacturing Sector
122 countries
Economy
TCI 
(1963–99)
Growth rate 
of GDP per 
capita (%) 
(1962–99)
Black-market 
premium 
(1960–99)
Number of 
procedures 
(1999)
IEF
(1970–2005)
Expropriation 
risk (1982–97)
Executive 
de facto 
independence 
(1945–98)
Openness
(1960–2003)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean Mean S.D. Mean Mean Mean S.D.
Albania 1.771 0.095 1.713 9.190 7.503 6.492 5.483 0.742 7.264 48.321 15.940 
Algeria 2.157 0.979 1.377 8.127 147.937 137.826 4.363 0.481 6.763 56.805 15.229 
Argentina 2.564 0.588 0.915 5.742 40.934 77.874 14.000 5.365 1.172 6.313 3.140 16.423 6.248 
Australia 1.073 0.162 2.150 2.036 0.000 0.000 2.000 7.585 0.461 9.379 7.000 32.905 5.337 
Austria 1.083 0.071 2.790 1.831 0.000 0.000 9.000 7.149 0.545 9.743 7.000 69.527 15.824 
Bahamas 1.929 0.845 1.504 6.985 12.539 12.764 7.793 129.182 10.750 
Bangladesh 4.302 0.902 1.192 4.091 96.876 66.359 4.990 0.969 5.413 22.414 5.646 
Barbados 1.283 0.521 2.449 4.566 7.442 4.861 5.615 0.142 118.786 14.759 
Belgium 1.017 0.122 2.626 1.959 0.000 0.000 8.000 7.316 0.179 9.686 7.000 120.602 25.441 
Belize 1.067 0.072 3.256 4.168 26.857 21.769 6.235 0.497 116.954 9.390 
Benin 13.694 2.026 0.861 3.185 3.424 4.533 5.212 0.406 40.868 12.273 
Bhutan 4.514 4.247 3.278 3.045 3.521 68.883 10.109 
Bolivia 7.341 2.905 0.377 3.590 32.334 84.457 20.000 5.915 1.095 5.600 3.520 49.479 4.896 
Botswana 1.791 0.801 6.421 5.132 13.180 11.245 6.578 0.681 8.007 103.668 24.533 
Brazil 5.373 1.195 2.371 4.076 29.063 36.841 15.000 5.207 0.868 7.881 3.692 17.317 4.359 
Bulgaria 1.372 0.089 1.541 5.288 7.423 10.158 10.000 5.536 0.889 9.036 3.679 90.813 16.009 
Cameroon 7.018 1.626 0.977 5.993 3.431 4.531 5.597 0.144 6.463 48.559 9.062 
Canada 1.531 0.199 2.110 2.097 0.000 0.000 2.000 7.858 0.282 9.721 7.000 55.645 14.057 
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Central African Republic 9.830 2.221 –0.837 3.924 3.271 4.456 53.552 13.560 
Chile 4.307 1.223 2.595 4.798 38.157 104.680 10.000 6.554 1.345 7.800 3.667 46.041 14.844 
China 4.165 1.327 6.003 7.381 71.004 111.533 12.000 5.397 0.525 8.114 2.321 26.614 16.924 
Colombia 4.466 0.701 1.780 2.117 7.993 7.510 18.000 5.282 0.256 7.350 5.074 30.873 5.286 
Congo, Rep. 6.847 2.614 1.190 5.896 2.866 4.064 5.146 104.950 19.420 
Costa Rica 2.190 0.683 1.833 3.350 40.799 67.249 6.730 0.755 7.038 70.816 13.687 
Côte d’Ivoire
Croatia 1.581 0.637 0.884 8.096 37.525 25.826 12.000 5.855 0.680 3.192 102.438 19.668 
Cyprus 1.308 0.310 5.357 4.515 4.671 4.550 6.327 0.680 8.486 104.364 8.351 
Denmark 1.178 0.079 2.100 2.230 0.000 0.000 3.000 7.268 0.502 9.721 7.000 64.511 7.827 
Dominican Republic 2.532 0.368 2.800 5.232 31.641 36.064 21.000 6.356 3.340 59.607 20.106 
Ecuador 3.878 1.238 1.263 3.381 20.225 24.613 16.000 5.300 0.592 6.763 4.148 50.157 9.744 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.012 0.238 3.013 2.913 39.256 45.442 11.000 6.800 3.519 48.161 13.088 
El Salvador 4.229 1.569 0.825 3.925 42.640 48.101 6.468 1.264 5.206 56.661 9.927 
Ethiopia 17.921 2.621 0.326 7.127 72.262 73.517 6.047 32.004 10.522 
Fiji 1.564 0.214 1.711 4.700 1.605 1.939 5.963 0.231 101.288 15.192 
Finland 1.237 0.116 2.885 3.009 0.000 0.000 5.000 7.371 0.462 9.721 7.000 54.250 10.204 
France 1.106 0.096 2.519 1.664 0.000 0.000 15.000 6.645 0.432 9.707 5.283 38.959 9.083 
Gabon 2.119 0.759 2.538 10.245 1.740 4.035 4.944 0.470 7.556 93.218 15.593 
Gambia 5.442 3.157 0.595 3.398 6.511 11.907 8.385 101.192 17.250 
Ghana 5.962 2.075 0.071 4.253 248.144 729.713 10.000 5.159 1.390 6.219 1.943 47.462 25.698 
Greece 1.337 0.087 3.200 3.878 5.412 5.028 15.000 6.394 0.532 7.481 5.792 40.066 10.166 
Table VI.A1: (Continued)
122 countries
Economy
TCI 
(1963–99)
Growth rate 
of GDP per 
capita (%) 
(1962–99)
Black-market 
premium 
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(1970–2005)
Expropriation 
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Executive 
de facto 
independence 
(1945–98)
Openness
(1960–2003)
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Guatemala 3.303 0.279 1.230 2.500 12.346 15.467 6.321 0.542 5.156 39.266 7.322 
Guyana 0.733 0.935 5.216 209.506 270.332 6.242 0.556 5.956 151.372 49.475 
Honduras 3.183 0.790 0.820 2.946 12.008 26.842 6.180 0.359 5.413 68.718 16.915 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.713 0.071 5.192 4.445 –0.416 1.383 8.488 209.386 52.589 
Hungary 1.151 0.183 3.338 4.210 165.435 155.711 8.000 6.489 1.059 9.079 3.735 86.700 25.216 
Iceland 0.802 0.134 2.823 3.809 1.233 1.423 6.906 1.102 9.700 72.982 6.502 
India 3.635 0.421 2.573 3.077 26.530 24.692 10.000 5.744 0.729 8.069 6.959 15.517 6.343 
Indonesia 3.073 0.408 3.581 3.974 273.451 806.400 11.000 5.863 0.535 7.475 2.981 44.716 16.991 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.231 7.115 464.833 857.111 4.694 38.814 16.870 
Iraq 1.646 0.577 –2.515 18.460 851.008 2093.052 2.400 
Ireland 1.853 0.507 4.179 2.806 0.600 3.795 3.000 7.491 0.642 9.721 7.000 105.765 31.741 
Israel 1.287 0.232 2.744 3.677 14.077 17.706 5.000 5.686 1.283 8.513 7.000 79.064 23.283 
Italy 1.292 0.134 2.794 2.143 0.000 0.000 16.000 6.422 0.656 9.457 7.000 40.020 8.718 
Jamaica 3.248 0.621 0.756 4.339 19.076 17.070 6.000 6.200 1.023 7.044 7.000 87.759 15.792 
Japan 1.680 0.083 4.056 3.678 1.750 3.350 11.000 7.071 0.316 9.721 7.000 20.925 3.495 
Jordan 1.936 0.492 1.980 7.193 3.399 2.899 14.000 6.335 0.698 6.556 2.208 119.307 14.334 
Kenya 0.335 0.030 1.241 4.785 15.722 14.031 11.000 5.973 0.786 6.406 3.250 60.309 7.232 
Korea, Rep. 2.816 0.493 5.797 3.615 15.251 24.015 13.000 8.569 3.140 53.775 18.238 
Kuwait 1.090 0.477 –3.916 8.708 0.001 0.399 6.609 0.817 7.056 96.580 11.295 
Latvia 1.638 0.010 2.893 7.074 7.233 6.266 7.000 6.622 0.818 3.333 104.600 20.540 
Lesotho 8.719 2.037 3.935 6.891 9.133 8.125 112.698 33.884 
Libya 0.836 0.176 3.425 16.053 82.000 127.559 5.088 77.574 18.966 
Luxembourg 0.914 0.101 3.163 3.267 0.375 0.466 7.703 0.105 10.000 198.318 32.906 
Macao 0.384 0.060 2.666 4.375 156.762 28.830 
Madagascar 5.373 0.498 –1.041 4.032 15.000 21.331 17.000 5.316 0.599 4.686 3.684 40.325 9.212 
Malawi 8.631 2.923 1.309 5.380 36.658 31.917 12.000 5.038 0.397 6.863 1.571 60.909 8.653 
Malaysia 1.854 0.191 3.926 3.483 1.172 1.634 7.000 6.819 0.382 8.150 5.381 122.600 49.604 
Malta 1.143 0.091 5.196 4.244 2.724 5.448 6.236 0.663 7.875 162.837 27.787 
Mauritius 1.121 0.447 4.355 1.678 4.892 7.090 6.669 0.893 116.900 13.110 
Mexico 2.969 0.242 1.982 3.395 4.772 8.816 15.000 6.159 0.591 7.469 3.241 31.384 16.422 
Moldova 4.073 0.611 –1.986 10.241 0.000 122.079 25.610 
Mongolia 3.697 0.860 –0.258 6.501 0.635 3.085 5.000 7.950 3.333 120.161 32.221 
Morocco 3.201 0.383 1.926 4.544 7.673 6.987 13.000 5.600 0.526 6.713 1.930 51.277 10.001 
Namibia 3.711 –0.226 2.509 1.230 2.130 6.239 0.351 5.400 114.971 16.921 
Nepal 4.174 0.342 1.359 2.893 33.574 34.464 5.448 0.271 33.297 15.010 
Netherlands 1.158 0.204 2.253 1.946 0.000 0.000 8.000 7.620 0.305 9.979 7.000 100.484 12.498 
Netherlands Antilles 0.767 0.110 –1.846 1.312 –0.333 2.417 
New Zealand 1.061 0.188 1.420 2.906 0.600 3.795 3.000 7.656 0.900 9.736 7.000 57.134 6.072 
Nigeria 9.338 6.549 0.801 7.314 86.273 109.203 9.000 4.659 0.915 5.300 2.784 49.170 24.309 
Norway 0.914 0.072 3.090 1.723 0.000 0.000 4.000 6.890 0.534 9.850 7.000 73.425 3.821 
Oman 1.036 0.151 6.296 16.124 0.460 1.061 7.125 0.440 7.321 93.117 12.928 
Pakistan 6.114 1.221 2.564 2.397 38.871 42.583 8.000 5.190 0.632 6.150 4.083 32.965 4.991 
Panama 2.738 0.550 2.186 4.133 0.000 0.000 7.000 6.811 0.590 6.063 3.611 154.750 27.245 
Papua New Guinea 7.250 1.541 1.177 4.902 15.938 15.557 7.743 82.113 17.158 
Paraguay 2.852 0.450 1.598 3.634 25.390 37.524 6.041 0.405 6.900 48.239 20.040 
Peru 5.128 1.162 0.783 4.825 36.554 64.825 8.000 5.648 1.496 6.206 3.769 34.543 5.348 
Philippines 4.571 1.143 1.304 3.004 9.418 13.474 14.000 6.176 0.725 5.788 4.038 56.720 24.885 
Poland 1.704 0.327 3.320 3.604 351.565 270.847 11.000 5.755 1.103 7.814 3.538 51.814 5.736 
Portugal 1.265 0.257 3.684 3.804 4.263 7.944 12.000 6.635 1.028 9.006 3.538 57.577 11.450 
Puerto Rico 3.814 0.718 3.760 2.936 133.300 24.180 
Qatar 1.595 0.387 0.203 0.259 7.857 80.400 6.756 
Romania 1.086 0.046 0.400 5.217 169.469 158.714 16.000 5.149 0.711 7.557 3.180 60.521 11.528 
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Russian Federation 0.999 0.108 –1.259 7.645 520.000 576.479 20.000 8.500 2.796 56.640 19.001 
Saudi Arabia 1.675 1.101 
Senegal 8.914 2.469 0.003 4.200 3.431 4.531 16.000 5.506 0.494 5.925 3.000 62.380 14.527 
Sierra Leone –0.780 5.760 129.831 308.869 4.994 0.708 5.708 48.373 11.093 
Singapore 1.406 0.203 5.576 4.289 0.800 0.988 7.000 8.364 0.365 9.394 3.421 
Slovak Republic 1.176 0.004 
Slovenia 1.071 0.112 2.123 4.236 10.000 6.880 9.000 5.811 0.453 3.808 118.000 12.035 
South Africa 1.853 0.162 0.924 3.562 4.239 11.191 9.000 6.364 0.537 7.350 7.000 50.766 5.868 
Spain 1.267 0.199 3.332 2.698 2.344 2.235 11.000 6.750 0.508 9.550 3.471 35.180 12.544 
Sri Lanka 2.728 0.341 2.831 1.983 50.615 50.224 8.000 5.720 0.407 6.538 6.176 70.775 10.682 
Sudan 6.761 1.119 5.531 87.922 155.904 4.019 28.406 5.289 
Suriname 2.409 0.532 0.217 6.114 14.683 8.356 5.169 94.879 29.815 
Swaziland 3.817 0.733 2.008 4.193 11.283 7.128 146.657 30.193 
Sweden 1.206 0.124 2.198 1.993 0.000 0.000 6.000 6.856 0.681 9.500 7.000 58.955 13.210 
Switzerland 0.992 0.086 1.393 2.265 0.000 0.000 7.000 8.179 0.168 9.986 7.000 64.777 8.952 
Syrian Arab Rep. 2.058 0.755 2.559 8.022 128.798 211.522 5.413 51.880 13.155 
Tanzania 3.233 0.370 1.297 2.384 86.952 92.424 13.000 5.213 1.183 6.888 3.000 48.043 9.123 
Thailand 7.201 2.613 4.641 3.640 0.418 2.889 9.000 6.514 0.386 7.644 3.039 60.693 28.782 
Togo 9.660 2.364 1.270 6.390 3.431 4.531 4.979 0.326 6.500 83.123 18.104 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.475 0.446 2.043 4.713 30.029 20.051 7.294 89.984 18.725 
Tunisia 2.891 1.243 3.117 3.613 27.354 41.695 9.000 5.613 0.557 6.506 1.625 69.147 22.894 
Turkey 4.586 0.968 1.937 4.124 18.921 20.025 13.000 5.181 0.812 7.288 5.943 30.608 16.899 
Uganda 6.236 0.376 2.259 3.224 198.418 301.088 11.000 5.332 1.640 4.800 2.735 35.186 9.543 
United Arab Emirates 0.365 0.013 –3.028 8.110 –1.255 3.172 6.944 110.931 17.137 
United Kingdom 1.358 0.154 2.149 1.795 0.000 0.000 5.000 7.626 0.766 9.764 7.000 49.873 6.861 
United States 1.588 0.108 2.193 1.979 0.000 0.000 4.000 8.135 0.273 9.979 7.000 17.046 5.272 
Uruguay 2.036 0.430 0.887 4.408 11.699 26.516 10.000 6.304 0.426 6.938 4.712 35.923 7.589 
Venezuela, R. B. 2.826 0.843 26.885 62.964 14.000 5.254 0.900 7.106 5.093 
Zambia 5.909 1.694 –0.776 4.695 85.435 119.817 6.000 5.653 1.336 6.669 2.257 77.325 13.388 
Zimbabwe 5.118 1.358 0.450 5.847 52.239 56.792 5.000 3.912 0.855 6.025 4.643 53.964 16.555 
Note: Standard deviations for number of procedures, expropriation risk, and executive de facto independence are not available.
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Notes
1.  Lin (2003) constructs another index—based on the ratio of capital inten-
sity in the manufacturing industry and the capital intensity in the whole 
economy—as a proxy for measuring the degree with which a CAD strategy 
is pursued. That proxy is correlated highly with the current proxy and the 
results of empirical analyses based on that proxy are similar to the results 
reported in this section. The data for capital used in a country’s manufactur-
ing industry are, however, available for only a small number of countries. 
To enlarge the number of countries in the studies, I therefore use the proxy 
based on the added value of manufacturing industries.
2.  The samples are 86 for the 1960s, 97 for the 1970s, 107 for the 1980s and 114 
for the 1990s.
3.  These fi ndings are similar to the result presented in Lin (2003) using the TCI 
based on the ratio of capital intensity in the manufacturing industry and the 
capital intensity in the whole economy. Lin (2003) uses a two stage estimation 
to estimate the effect of the choice of the development strategy on growth. In 
the fi rst stage, TCI is regressed on several variables that capture an economy’s 
factor endowment. The residuals from this regression are used as a proxy for 
an economy’s deviations from a CAF strategy. They are expected to be zero if 
the government adopted a CAF strategy and nonzero if the strategy is CAD. 
The second stage consists of a cross-country growth equation where the depen-
dent variable is the annual growth rate of per capita real GDP. The results show 
that the proxy for the development strategy has the expected negative sign 
and is statistically signifi cant in all regressions. The magnitudes of the impact 
of the development strategy on the per capita GDP growth rate in the period 
1970–80 are twice those of the period 1980–92. The results suggest that if a 
developing country, for example, India, as shown in the appendix, adopted a 
CAD strategy causing TCI to be 8.47 and the residual to be 3.60, the annual 
per capita real GDP growth rate would be reduced 0.47 percent per year over 
the period 1970–92.
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“The golden age of fi nance has now ended,” as Barry Eichengreen com-
mented recently in reference to the Great Recession.1 In my view, however, 
the golden age of industrialization in the developing world has just begun. 
The global fi nancial crisis is still looming large over Europe. Newspa-
pers are carrying daily reports on the anemic recovery, stubbornly high 
unemployment rates, downgraded sovereign credit ratings, and recurrent 
debt crises occurring in the wake of the recession in advanced countries on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Political leaders the world over are just waking 
up to the fact that over reliance on making fi nancial deals to maintain a 
high standard of living, without building and rebuilding a strong industrial 
base, is just a mirage. 
For a sustainable global recovery and robust growth in the coming years, 
the world needs to look beyond the Euro Area and sovereign debt wor-
ries to the promise inherent in structural transformation, which, as defi ned 
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in this volume, is the process by which countries climb the industrial ladder 
and change the sector employment and production compositions of their 
economies. Except for a few oil-exporting countries, no countries have ever 
gotten rich without achieving industrialization fi rst. During my travels in 
the past three and a half years as the Chief Economist of the World Bank 
Group, I have been struck by the potential for less developed countries 
to take a page from the playbook of more successful industrializing East 
Asian countries, such as China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singa-
pore, and Vietnam, and to dramatically improve their development perfor-
mance.
My belief in the coming of a golden age of industrialization in the devel-
oping world is based on the potential to rapidly expand industrial sectors 
in developing countries, including those in Sub-Saharan African countries, 
and on the dynamic relocation of industries in a multipolar growth world. 
The fi rst force can be envisioned through an improved understanding of 
the mechanics of economic transformation in modern times ushered in 
by the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. In advanced countries 
technological innovation and industrial upgrading require costly and risky 
investments in research and development, because their vanguard tech-
nologies and industries are located on the global frontier. By contrast, a 
latecomer country can borrow technology from the advanced countries 
at low risk and cost. Hence, if a developing country knows how to tap 
the advantage of backwardness, its industrial upgrading and economic 
growth can proceed at an annual rate several times that of high-income 
countries for decades as the country closes its industrial and income gap 
with advanced countries. The second force is the rapid wage increase in 
the dynamically growing emerging market economies and the unavoidable 
relocation of their labor-intensive manufacturing industries to other lower-
income countries. Take China, for example: its monthly wage for unskilled 
worker is about $350. China is likely to maintain high growth in the com-
ing decades (Lin 2011a). Its monthly wage for unskilled worker will reach 
at least $1,000 in 10 years. Such wage dynamics means China will need 
to upgrade to higher value added, more capital-intensive sectors, opening 
up a huge opportunity for other countries with income levels lower than 
China’s to enter the labor-intensive manufacturing industries.
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In the UNU-WIDER annual lecture I delivered in Maputo, Mozambique, 
in May 2011, I explained how developing countries can capture these 
opportunities to achieve rapid industrialization and economic growth. The 
winning formula is for them to develop tradable industries that are expand-
ing rapidly in countries that have been growing dynamically for decades 
and that have higher income and similar endowment structures to theirs. 
The pattern of fl ying geese is a useful metaphor to explain my vision. Since 
the 18th century, the successfully catching-up countries in Western Europe, 
North America, and East Asia all followed carefully selected lead countries 
that had per capita income about twice as high as theirs, and emulated the 
leader-follower fl ying-geese pattern in their industrial upgrading and diver-
sifi cation before becoming advanced countries themselves (Lin 2011c). 
The emergence of large market economies such as Brazil, Russia, India 
and China (BRIC) as new growth poles in the multipolar world and their 
likely continuous dynamic growth in the postcrisis world offers an unprec-
edented opportunity to all developing economies with income levels cur-
rently below theirs—including those in Sub-Saharan Africa—to develop 
manufacturing and jump-start industrialization. China, for example, hav-
ing been a “follower goose” in East Asia, is on the verge of graduating 
from low-skilled manufacturing jobs. Because of its size, however, China 
may become a “leading dragon” for other developing countries instead of 
a “lead goose” in the traditional fl ying geese pattern of the international 
diffusion of industrial development. China will free up 85 million labor-
intensive manufacturing jobs, compared with Japan’s 9.7 million in the 
1960’s and Korea’s 2.3 million in the 1980s (Lin 2011c). 
The benefi ts of reallocating labor-intensive manufacturing jobs from 
China and other dynamically growing emerging market economies, such 
as India and Brazil, to low-income countries, most of which are located in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, could be enormous. In 2009 alone, China exported 
$107 billion worth of apparel to the world, compared with Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s total apparel exports of $2 billion (2 percent of Chinese apparel 
exports). If only 1 percent of China’s production of apparel is shifted to 
lower-wage African countries, African production and exports of apparel 
would increase by 47 percent. Similarly, employment gains could be sig-
nifi cant. Africa’s population (north and south of the Sahara) is 1 billion, 
352 | New Structural Economics
slightly less than India’s 1.15 billion. In 2009 manufacturing value added 
was 16 percent of GDP in India, 13 percent in Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, and 16 percent in North African countries such as Egypt, Morocco, 
and Tunisia. India’s employment in manufacturing was 8.7 million in 
2009. Hence, based on a back-of-the-envelope calculation, it is reason-
able to assume that total manufacturing employment in Africa is at about 
10 million (Lin 2011c). This suggests that relocation of even a small share 
of China’s 85 million labor-intensive manufacturing jobs to Africa would 
provide unprecedented opportunities for Africa.
But why are Chinese fi rms and lower-income country governments that 
would benefi t substantially from a reallocation of fi rms from China and 
other emerging market economies not yet organizing themselves to seize 
these opportunities? From my frequent interactions in the past three years 
with policy makers in low-income countries in Africa and Asia, as well as 
with business people and government offi cials in emerging market econ-
omies, I know that policy makers and business communities would be 
interested in pursuing this opportunity. Some individual fi rms from emerg-
ing markets have linked up with entrepreneurs in low-income  countries 
to develop various labor-intensive manufacturing industries. Still, many 
industrialists in emerging markets are hesitant to relocate abroad, espe-
cially to Africa. They cite the following concerns: (i) social and politi-
cal instability; (ii) differences in labor laws and qualifi cation; (iii) poor 
logistics; and (iv) the lack of adequate infrastructure and business con-
ditions. These soft and hard infrastructure concerns add to the risks of 
their investments, increase the transaction costs of their operations, and 
outweigh the potential benefi ts of low labor costs in Africa and other 
 low-income countries. 
How to deal with these infrastructure problems? The fi rst two issues can 
be mitigated through the commitment and broad-based support of recipi-
ent governments; the latter two could be addressed effectively through the 
development of sector-specifi c cluster-based industrial zones. Why is the 
latter sector-specifi c approach—sometimes called “picking winners”— 
desirable? 
First, the required infrastructure improvements are often industry spe-
cifi c. The cut fl ower and textile industries, for example, require different 
infrastructure for their exports. Because the government’s fi scal resources 
and implementation capacity in a developing country are limited, the 
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 government has to prioritize the infrastructure improvement according to 
the targeted industries.
Second, to compete in the globalized world, a new industry not only 
must align with the country’s comparative advantage so that its factor costs 
of production can be at the lowest possible level, but the industry also needs 
to have the lowest possible transaction-related costs. Suppose a country’s 
infrastructure and business environment are good and industrial upgrad-
ing and diversifi cation happen spontaneously. Without the government’s 
coordination, fi rms may enter into too many different industries that are 
all consistent with the country’s comparative advantage. As a result, most 
industries may not form large enough clusters in the country and may not 
be competitive in the domestic and international market. Only in the wake 
of many failures might a few clusters eventually emerge. Such “trial and 
error” is likely to be a long and costly process, reducing the individual 
domestic and foreign fi rms’ expected returns and incentives to enter new 
industries or relocate to other countries. This in turn can slow down or 
even stall a country’s economic development.
But there exists a long list of failed attempts to pick winners. These 
failures, as discussed in the previous chapters, were often the result of 
the inability of government to come up with good criteria for identifying 
industries that are appropriate for a given country’s endowment structure 
and level of development. In fact, governments’ propensity to target indus-
tries that are too ambitious and not aligned with a country’s comparative 
advantage largely explains why their attempts to “pick winners” resulted 
in “picking losers” (Lin, 2011d). 
The recipe to economic success therefore is the one that helps policy 
makers in developing countries identify the industries in which their 
economies may have a latent comparative advantage and remove binding 
 constraints to facilitate private domestic and foreign fi rms’ entry to and 
operation in those industries. Chapter III of this book provides the govern-
ments in developing countries with a pragmatic and easy-to-follow growth 
identifi cation and facilitation framework to do so. 
Many low-income countries have an abundance of natural resources. 
They may also benefi t from the industrialization opportunity provided 
by the industrial upgrading in dynamically growing emerging market 
economies by following the “fl ying geese” pattern. Resource-intensive 
industries, such as extraction, provide very limited job opportunities. 
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In a visit to Papua New Guinea in 2009, I found that its famous OK Tedi 
copper mine generated 40 percent of the country’s public revenues and 
80 percent of its exports but provided only 2,000 jobs in 2009. Most 
of Papua New  Guinea’s 6.6 million people still live on subsistence agri-
culture. Their wage rate is low, and wages constitute the major cost of 
production for labor-intensive industries. Low wage, natural-resource-
rich countries could therefore develop labor-intensive industries, creat-
ing much needed jobs. Indonesia is a good example showing that this 
is possible. Labor-intensive manufacturing industries not only offer the 
potential to absorb surplus labor from the rural subsistence sector, but 
the development of such industries can also pave the way through con-
tinuous upgrading to higher value added industries. Finland’s Nokia, for 
an example, started as a logging company and diversifi ed its operation 
to the labor-intensive business of producing rubber boots; it then became 
the original equipment manufacturer of household electronics for Phil-
lips before venturing into mobile phones. 
Still, resource-rich countries often suffer from the Dutch Disease, 
as export receipts from natural resources push up the value of the cur-
rency, thus adversely affecting the competitiveness of their other exports. 
Sometimes also the wealth from natural resources is captured by powerful 
groups, turning resource richness into a curse. At the same time natural-
resource rents can provide a great opportunity for development if man-
aged in a transparent way and prudently invested in human and physical 
capital, such as infrastructure, and used to diversify to nonresource sectors 
as suggested in the growth identifi cation and facilitation framework. These 
investments, if well chosen, can increase labor productivity, reduce pro-
duction and transaction costs and ultimately cure the Dutch Disease, and 
turn the abundance in natural resources from a curse to a blessing. This is 
because such countries have opportunities to accumulate capital, upgrade 
endowments, improve infrastructure, transform industrial structure, and 
subsequently raise incomes faster than labor-abundant, resource-poor 
countries (Lin, 2011b). 
The discussion so far has been on the opportunity of and ways to 
achieve rapid industrialization in low-income countries. The new struc-
tural economics also offers new insights to middle-income countries about 
how to upgrade their industries and achieve dynamic growth. A unique 
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feature of middle-income countries is that some of their industries will still 
locate within the global frontier and some of their industries will locate 
on the frontier because of the graduation of higher-income countries from 
those industries. For the former industries, the government can follow 
the growth identifi cation and facilitation framework to assist the private 
fi rms to tap into the potential of the latecomer’s advantage, and for the 
latter industries, the government should adopt the same measures as those 
in the advanced countries for supporting innovation in technology and 
industries. Commonly used measures include support for basic research, 
providing patent protection, mandated use of new technology/products, 
and direct government procurement of new products. If a middle-income 
country can implement these measures to facilitate private fi rms’ industrial 
upgrading and diversifi cation, the country can not only avoid the middle-
income trap but also achieve dynamic growth and catch up to advanced 
countries in a generation. 
The discussion so far has not discussed the technological innovation and 
productivity improvement in agriculture. In low-income countries, where 
most people work in agriculture, improving agriculture will be important 
not only for reducing poverty but also for generating economic surplus to 
support industrialization. Governments need to facilitate the innovation 
and extension of agricultural technology and improvement of infrastruc-
ture for agricultural production and commercialization.
Finally, as stated in the introduction, I am convinced that, every develop-
ing country, including those in sub-Saharan Africa, has the potential to grow 
at 8 percent or more continuously for several decades, to signifi cantly reduce 
poverty, and to become a middle-income or even a high-income country in 
the span of one or two generations, if its government has the right policy 
framework to facilitate the private sector’s development along the line of 
its comparative advantages and tap into the latecomer’s advantages. I hope 
this book will help developing countries to realize their growth potential. A 
world without poverty will then become a reality instead of just a dream.
Note
1. http://www.project-syndicate.org/series/the_next_financial_order/long_
description.
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as investor, regulator, coordinator of activity and expectations, and guide. All of this 
is set in a global economy that is itself in the midst of massive structural change. 
This book will become an essential reference for scholars and for policy makers 
not only in developing countries, but also, increasingly, in developed countries.”
— Michael Spence
 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics
 William R. Berkley Professor in Economics and Business, New York University 
Leonard N. Stern School of Business
“The World Bank has long been committed to the goal of achieving a world 
without poverty. In this brilliant volume, its Chief Economist, Justin Yifu Lin, lays 
out an economic agenda for how to make this dream a reality. He argues that the 
successes of China can be achieved elsewhere around the world, and explains 
clearly and forcefully the structural transformations that will be required and 
the role that government can and must play in that transformation. The book 
will be a landmark in rethinking development. It provides an alternative to the 
now discredited Washington Consensus policies that guided the Bretton Woods 
Institutions for years. Justin Lin’s ideas have already stirred discussion and debate. 
This book will ensure that they will continue to be central in the reexamination of 
developmental policy.”
— Joseph Stiglitz
 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics
 University Professor, Columbia University
